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Political communications. Lecture course. Курс лекций

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Russia West
For the Russian side, “the return of Crimea to the Russian Federation is a great histori­cal event, the restoration of justice and the correction of the historical mistake made by Nikita Khrushchev in the last century...” The annexation of Crimea is positioned in the context of the people’s right to self-determi­nation
“Militias”. Attention was drawn to the need to find ways to resolve the conflict by Ukraine independently, the military presence of Russia in the region was denied, and cases of hu­manitarian assistance were recognized
The end of table 2.2
The Crimean referendum was called by the EU and the US unconstitutional, illegal and, as a result, illegitimate. “The Western powers did not recognize the vote as constitutional and regarded it as an attempt by Moscow to provide itself with a false cover of law for the annexation of Crimea” (The Independent, 2014). The referendum was called anti­democratic. “The Crimean referendum was a demonstration of fictitious democracy” (The Guardian, 2014)
“Separatists”, “terrorists”, and later – “Russian-terrorist forces” in relation to those who disagree in Donbass
On the one hand, the phobias and cliches of the Cold War era have returned to Western discourse regarding Russia. On the other hand, new ones have been added – “country­occupier”, “sponsor of terrorism”, etc. Russia began to position itself as an aggressor country, striving by any means to preserve its influence in the post-Soviet space. “After more than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia still suffers from phantom pain from limb amputation. It whines every time the former Soviet republic takes a step towards integration with the West”, Reuter, 2013 (restoration of Russian empire)
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This case clearly demonstrates the main non-marketing technologies of political communications that are used by the initiators of modern information wars.
Lecture Review Questions
1. What are the fundamental differences between market-
ing and non-marketing types of political communications?
2. What are the current propaganda technologies?
3. What is the specificity of agitation?
4. What are the problems of conceptualization of informa-
tion wars on a global level?
5. What non-marketing technologies of political communi­cations are most often used in the release of modern informa­tion wars against the Russian Federation?
Sources
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Gandesha, S. How do People Become a Mass? [Text] / S. Gandesha //Polity. – 2022. – Vol. 54. – №. 1. – P. 84–106.
Hobbs, R. Teaching about Propaganda: An Examination of the Historical Roots of Media Literacy [Text] / R. Hobbs, S. McGee // Journal of Media Literacy Education. – 2014. – № 6 (2).
Muradov, I. The Russian hybrid warfare: the cases of Ukraine and Georgia [Text] / I. Muradov // Defence Stud­ies. – 2022. – Vol. 22. – Iss. 2. – P. 1–24.
Murphy, D.M. Propaganda: can a word decide a war? / D.M. Murphy, J.F. White // The US Army War College Quar­terly: Parameters 37.3. – 2007. – № 23. – P. 348–387.
Pedro-Carañana, J. The Propaganda Model Today [Text] / J. Pedro-Carañana, D. Broudy, J. Klaehn. University of West­minster Press, 2018.
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Seib, Ph. Information at War: Journalism, Disinformation and Modern Warfare [Text] / Ph. Seib //International Journal of Communication. – 2022. – Vol. 16. – P. 4.
Robinson, P. The propaganda model: still relevant today? [Text] / P. Robinson //Noam Chomsky. – Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015. P. 77–96.
U.S. Military opportunities: information warfare concepts of operation [Electronic resource]. – URL; https://www.rand. org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1016/ MR1016.chap7.pdf (accessed 17.03.2021).
Wright, B. Manipulating the Masses: Woodrow Wilson and the Birth of American Propaganda by John Maxwell Ham­ilton [Text] / B. Wright //Southwestern Historical Quarter­ly. –2022. – Vol. 125. – №. 3. – P. 325–326.
Евгеньева, Т.В. Технологии социальных манипуляций и методы противодействия им [Текст] / Т.В. Евгеньева – СПб. : Питер, 2007.
Кошкин, Р.П. Информационная война вокруг событий на Украине: геополитический анализ [Текст] / Р.П. Кош­кин // Стратегические приоритеты. – 2015. – № 1. – С. 10–
29.
Манойло, А.В. Государственная информационная по­литика в условиях информационно-психологической вой­ны [Текст] / А.В. Манойло, А.И. Петренко, Д.Б. Фролов. – 3-е изд. – М. : Горячая линия – Телеком, 2012.
Панарин, И.Н. Информационная война, PR и мировая политика [Текст] / И.Н. Панарин. – М. : Горячая линия – Те­леком, 2006.
Политические коммуникации [Текст] : учеб. пособие для студентов вузов / Ю.Ю. Петрунин [и др.] ; под ред. А.И. Со­ловьева. – М. : Аспект Пресс, 2004.
Харитонова, Е.В. Нейролингвистическое программиро­вание как метод анализа и проектирования латентного со­держания текстов. Скрытое эмоциональное содержание тек­стов СМИ и методы его объективной диагностики [Текст] / Е.В. Харитонова. – М. : Смысл, 2004.
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LECTURE 3. STATE INFORMATION
POLICY
Key Terms: state information policy, models of interac-
tion between the state and the media, counterparties of the state in the information space, the image of the state.
Features of information policy as a direction
of state activity
Despite the expansion of the range of political communica­tions’ actors due to the increase in the individual activity of cit­izens, the development of electronic governments, the intensi­fication of information exchanges at the supranational level as a result of globalization processes, the state still remains the most important actor in political communications today.
It can act in the information space in different ways. So, the forms of information behavior of the state can be the so-called singular actions associated with information coverage of some individual events, information campaigns (including election campaigns). The forms include the actions of the state in the post factum mode, when the state does not plan in advance the production and distribution of any messages, but only reacts to some events that have occurred. This mode of functioning is the least desirable and attractive for the state. However, the most large-scale form of information activity is information policy.
Information policy can be understood as a set of inter-relat- ed activities aimed at creating the conditions for citizens to get information that meets their basic needs and interests, the de­velopment of appropriate technical means to ensure the estab­lishment (processing, storage and delivery) of information re­sources of business, entertainment, scientific, educational and other measures. In modern conditions, this type of information activity of the state involves ensuring international contacts and relations between the state and society, embedding institu­tions and power structures in global information processes.
64
Like any political relationship, information policy combines public, shadow and semi-shadow politics. So, public informa­tion policy suggests the main efforts of the state constantly aims to create open and accessible means of transmitting infor­mation to the public. In turn, the shadow and semi-shadow poli­tics are associated with the need to maintain not only mass com­munication, but also to solve complex problems related to the settlement of relations within the ruling layers or confidential matters (issues related to provision of state secrets, national se­curity, diplomacy, etc.).
The information policy of the state is possible as a special purposeful activity for the production and dissemination of in­formation corresponding to the goals of the political regime, including ideological principles. The second element of the in­formation policy is the information support of what the state is doing in a particular area. This form of information policy is associated with the publicity and openness of the activities of state institutions and is implemented in order to inform dif­ferent audiences (citizens, certain social groups, international structures), explain the need for actions taken.
The elements and directions of state information policy in­clude:
• creation of conditions for the citizens to obtain informa-
tion, meeting their basic needs and interests;
• the development of information technology infrastructure;
• providing international contacts, integration into global
information environment;
• counter the information risks.
The media has always been and remains the only conductor of information state policy. In their famous work “Four Theo­ries of the Press”, American sociologists F. Siebert, T. Peter­son and W. Schramm raised the problem of the relationship between power and the media. The classification put forward by them is based on the criterion of freedom and the criterion of control.
65
According to authoritarian theory, rooted in 16th centu­ry England, the media should be under the control of power. At that time, any criticism from the public was considered harmful to the stability of the state, so the ruling elite used a variety of mechanisms that influence the media, such as cen­sorship, licensing, and in some cases punishment for objection­able coverage of political issues.
Press freedom theory, or libertarian theory, is the exact op­posite of authoritarian theory. It declares the freedom of the press from state control. Every individual has the right to free­dom of speech, to receive reliable information, and any gov­ernment intervention infringes on these fundamental rights of a citizen. A free media is an essential element of a free, dem­ocratic society. From this concept follows the positioning of the media as the “fourth power”, independent of the other three branches: legislative, executive and judicial.
The theory of social responsibility arose at the junction of the first two theories. In the second half of the 20th centu­ry, the media became unprecedentedly powerful. Radio, televi­sion and the Internet have spread. And although journalists re­mained free, they had certain obligations to society. Therefore, publishers and journalists made some concessions and limited their rights in order to implement state interests. Thus, the theory of social responsibility arose.
Communist theory gravitates toward an authoritarian ap­proach. In line with this approach, in the socialist countries, the media were tightly controlled by the state represented by the communist party. Mass media is the main propaganda tool. The main goal is to contribute to the prosperity and stability of the socialist society
1
.
Depending on the type and characteristics of political re- gimes, one can distinguish different types and purposes of in-
1
Siebert F, Schramm W. Four theories of the press: The Authoritari­an, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of what the Press Should be and Do / University of Illinois Press, 1956.
66
formation policy in them. So, under the conditions of the total- itarian model, the state implements full control of power over the information sector. All media are state-owned, relations between the state and the population are based on one-way com­munications from top to bottom without feedback. The main goal of political communications is the dissemination of state ideology and the consolidation of its postulates in the mass con­sciousness. Obviously, in the case of totalitarian regimes, the state used exclusively non-marketing forms of political com­munications, implementing informational secrecy, a ban on al­ternative information. We note that at present, modern North Korea can be accurately attributed to totalitarian regimes, however, elements of such an information policy are used by any, including democratic, regimes involved in information wars.
The main objective for various authoritarian regimes is to ensure “manageable” electorate through the control and manip­ulation of media institutions. Comparing authoritarianism and totalitarianism, we can talk about their similarity: both types are based on the underdevelopment of political relations, a nar­row circle of decision makers, the predictability of political de­velopment and the nominal nature of elections, and the turno­ver of power in general.
In democracies the law establishes a variety of media forms and forms of ownership, free competition, and the growing plu­ralism of the state and private media, constitutional and legal guarantees protect them from arbitrariness of the authorities. However, we must not forget that any society is elitist, and democratic political leaders and elites also use non-marketing types of political communications to realize their own or na­tional interests.
American experience in the implementation of state infor­mation policy. Regulation of the information sphere became
a priority of the American state information policy earlier than in other countries. Traditions of individualism determined the general approach of the American political system to the chal-
67
lenges of the information age. This is due to the fact that it was the United States that became the epicenter of the information revolution in the second half of the 20th century. After the economic boom of the 1990s, when the Clinton administration sought to extract the maximum economic benefit from the in­formation technology revolution, there was a sharp increase in state control.
The priority of the administration of George W. Bush Jr. there was counteraction to terrorism, which required strength­ening state control over information resources. Such measures caused strong protests from the civil society, under the influ­ence of which these decisions were revised under the adminis­tration of President B. Obama. In this regard, the Obama ad­ministration adopted “net neutrality” – the principle of “net neutrality”, which was based on the work in the field of law by the American law professor Tim Wu. The American jurist ar­gued that the Internet should develop in accordance with the principle of equality, which is expressed in that all information networks should strive to provide equal access for all users to any digital content
1
.
President D. Trump decided to cancel the principle of “net neutrality”, which provoked a wave of protests from the enter­prises of the information technology complex. In May 2018, the issue of overturning Trump’s decision was put to a vote in a Senate resolution. With a minimal margin, the principle of net neutrality was supported. Priorities for European infor- mation regulation policy have a certain unique specificity, but are in many ways similar to the American ones. First of all, the information policy of European countries is developing at several levels: at the national level and at the level of the struc­tures of the European Union. Most, if not all, EU member states proclaim democratic principles of state regulation of the Inter-
1
Wu T. Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination // Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law. – 2003. – Vol. 2. – P. 141–176.
68
net and the national zone of cyberspace. All European countries prioritize the protection individual rather than state interests in the digital space. All national cybersecurity strategies ad­dress both threats infrastructure, as well as the fight against propaganda and dissemination of malicious information from abroad. At the global level, Europe is facing double Inter­net fragmentation – both at the national level and at the level of European Union institutions.
Features of the Russian information policy
Modern Russian information policy is a rather contradicto­ry phenomenon. By modern in this textbook, we mean the poli­cy that begins in the post-Soviet stage, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the transformation of the USSR into the Russian Fed­eration.
The main stages of the evolution of the Russian state infor­mation policy can be represented by the following steps: early 1990s, mid 1990s, 2000 to present.
The beginning of the 1990s information policy was virtu­ally nonexistent. This period can be considered as the most complex and chaotic, the state system of television and radio broadcasting that existed in the Soviet period with the aim of spreading the Soviet ideology ceased to exist, the state was weakened in the economic, ideological, military spheres. It was even possible to talk about the existence of a single Russian state formally, the central government was split (in the ear­ly 1990s, the political system of Russia was extremely unsta­ble due to the confrontation between the pro-Yeltsin, liberal elite and the pro-Soviet nomenklatura, which led to the seizure of the White House in August 1991 and further establishment of the regime of the President of modern Russia B. Yeltsin, and then the adoption of the new Constitution of 1993). During the period of dual power and confrontation, the former nomenklat­ura still received information support from the State Televi­sion and Radio Broadcasting Company, but this did not help the regime survive.
69
The mid-1990s. The state information policy is associated exclusively with the relations of the state with mass media or informational support of technological disasters and military conflicts. This is the period of the greatest flourishing of the media, the active use of Western models and standards of tel­evision and radio broadcasting. During this period, the most active distribution of marketing political communications is due to the flourishing of the activities of political consultants, specialists in the field of political marketing and management. A large number of independent political consulting agencies appear and begin to function actively, providing services to po­litical actors during election campaigns. The information plu­ralism of this stage is also associated with the fact that in the second half of the 1990s, information media holdings owned by Russian oligarchs were tools for promoting oligarchic interests in the Russian information space.
Beginning of 2000s. Information policy is examined more comprehensively as the state’s activities to establish informa­tion relations with other political parties and corporations, the introduction of legal norms, as well as professional train­ing. With the coming to power of the new President V. Putin, the Russian state is heading towards centralization, the estab­lishment of the so-called vertical of power with the weakening of the regions and the strengthening of the federal center. The state is aware of the need to create and further develop pro­state channels as a means of integrating Russian society, and a mechanism to counter the influence of first oligarchic, op­position, and then hostile Western media (many of which are considered by the Russian political regime as tools of informa­tion wars with Russia). In general, at the present stage, one can observe tendencies towards centralization and ideologization of Russian information policy.
The current priorities of the Russian information policy are:
• promotion by Russian State of national information cor-
porations on the international market;
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