Добавил:
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз: Предмет: Файл:

Political communications. Lecture course. Курс лекций

.pdf
Скачиваний:
0
Добавлен:
06.09.2026
Размер:
1 Мб
Скачать
• Disinformation;
• rumors, “leaks” or transmission of information from
“confidential sources”;
• indoctrination (Stoltenberg: NATO’s new concept will
aim to contain Russia and China);
• playing on prejudices and delusions;
• personal testimonies;
• “Glorification of reality”;
• logical “traps”, when presented with two options, we have a tendency to immediately assume that they are mutually exclusive; for instance, the dialogue on the issue of work/life balance starts with the exclusive alternative trap. We think of work and life as two separate spheres, rather than recogniz­ing that all of our time is our life. But living and working does not have to be a zero-sum game, and thinking of it that way can be detrimental to living a life (which includes working a career) that you enjoy;
• intimidation.
In the modern world, non-marketing technologies are ac­tively used in the supranational arena to achieve the goals of the most resource-provided actors in world politics. In the 21st century, it is information that has begun to play a key role in changing the balance of political forces on the world stage. The quality and effectiveness of the state’s foreign policy and the country’s place on the world stage began to depend on the skillful management of information processes.
International relations in this context can be represented as a communicative process of information exchange. According to the concept of communicative action by J. Habermas, there are two types of behavior: instrumental and communicative. With instrumental behavior, one side focuses on its own inter­est, ignores the goals of the other side, does not seek mutual understanding, which leads to a distortion of communication or, with conscious deception, manipulation. The second behav­ior, communicative, on the contrary, is focused on streamlining relations, ensuring the truth and truthfulness of information
51
during its circulation. With this behavior, information ex­change occurs on equal terms. Of course, in practice in politics, it is the first, instrumental type of communication with the dis­tortion of information for political purposes that is most often used. This leads to conflicts in the information environment, as well as to its most dangerous phase – information wars.
Information war
During the 20th century, humanity has experienced 264 wars. The death toll, including the civilian population, ac­cording to various sources, is about 71,5–115,8 million peo­ple. The top 5 countries participating in the wars include Chi­na (34), Great Britain (30), France (27), USA (24), Russia (20). In the course of the armed conflicts that have occurred, the theory and practice of information-psychological influence has been improved more and more. The term “information war” appeared in 1976, when it was used by the Western physicist T. Reiner in relation to wars, the main targets of which would be information systems. However, US experts instead of this term, which is interpreted exclusively as “information war”, have chosen a different, ambiguous term – “information war­fare”, and thus the information confrontation has ceased to be a war in the literal sense of the word. Translated from English, “warfare – 1) war; warfare; 2) fight, clash”.
Without going into details of theoretical problems and dis­cussions regarding the content of the concept of “information war” (IW), we will note in this textbook that, in general, un­derstanding this phenomenon is associated with three main ap­proaches.
The classical approach reduces the information war to separate information events, information means of corporate competition, interstate confrontation or armed struggle. The second approach is the result of the activities of representa­tives of the US military departments, whose specialists refer information confrontation to the sphere of military confron­tation. The first definitions of IW were given in the United
52
States in a number of documents (Directives of the US Depart­ment of Defense TS3600.I “Information War” dated Decem­ber 21, 1992; Directive of the Chairman of the Chief Executive of the US Defense Ministry No. 30 “Combating Control Sys­tems”, 1993) after “Operation desert” (1990–1991). Since then, this concept has been officially used by the Ministry of Defense as a kind of electronic warfare. In 1996, this concept of in­terpretation was expanded in the report of the American cor­poration Rand “Strategic Information Warfare. A New Face of War” (MR-661-OSD). In this report, the term Strategic In­formation Warfare was used for the first time, which gave this type of struggle a military-strategic meaning, and then a politi­cal one.
The third approach can be called modern. It is broader in its essence and is connected with the fact that the information war is a phenomenon of an outwardly peaceful period of inter­state confrontation. IW allows solving foreign policy problems in a non-violent way.
It is important to understand that regardless of the theoret­ical content of the IW concept, in practice its various variants are implemented: from many years of information confronta­tion (the information war of the USSR and the USA, the IW of Western actors and the modern Russian Federation) to the use of information warfare as part of combat military opera­tions as one of the mandatory elements of information support of military campaigns.
An information conflict is a clash of interests of political groups in order to resolve contradictions over influence, power, disposal of resources, access to the adoption of generally sig­nificant decisions, as well as the exercise of political leadership in the information and psychological space. Among the various types of conflicts, the most significant is the classification by spheres of manifestation. They are divided into canalized con­flicts with a limited degree of activity of participants and ri­valry, and escalating conflicts, involving an expanding sphere of manifestation; such conflicts are difficult to manage and
53
have the most devastating consequences. Due to the lack of in­ternational and national legal norms, and social mechanisms that could prevent the proliferation of conflicts in the informa­tion and psychological sphere, conflicts are increasingly becom­ing escalating. Therefore, information-psychological conflicts often take the form of information warfare.
Before turning into IW, the conflict in the information sphere goes through two other stages of information-psycho­logical relations.
In general, there are three stages (А.В. Манойло, А.И. Петренко).
1. Information-psychological struggle (or confrontation), which is characterized by the use of moderate methods of re­solving contradictions.
2. Aggression with intensive methods of conflict resolution.
3. War – a stage in which the parties use radical methods of waging a struggle. The key feature of IW is the use of infor­mation weapons.
In the international legal space, there are a huge num­ber of unresolved problems related to the theory and practice of IW:
• there is no universally accepted definition;
• there are no legislative norms that include the crimi­nal-legal characteristics of IW shares, the degree of their dan­ger to society, the responsibility of the parties;
• there are no international legal norms establishing inter­national responsibility for IW actions and aggression;
• there are no internal mechanisms of legal proceedings against aggressor states;
• there is no procedure for eliminating the consequences of operations.
This sad fact also suggests the further development and use
of this technology as a new format for modern wars.
Any information war consists of two components:
1) information impact;
2) information counteraction.
54
Martin Libiki identifies seven forms of information war-
fare:
1) Hacker;
2) Electronic;
3) Cyberwar;
4) Intelligence;
5) Psychological;
6) Economic;
7) Command and control.
According to the object of influence, information wars are
divided into two types:
1) information and technical, in which telecommunications systems, data transmission systems, information security sys­tems, radio electronic means, etc. become objects of influence and protection;
2) information-psychological, the objects of influence and protection are the psyche of the political elite and the popula­tion; decision-making system, public opinion formation sys­tem, etc.
In this paper, information-psychological warfare is studied.
In information and psychological wars, various methods of influence are used: fraud, bluff, scams, machinations, po­litical games, advertising campaigns, manipulative influence, provocations, disinformation, propaganda, etc.
At the same time, more and more attention is being paid by scientists and practitioners to propaganda, since this method has the greatest potential in shaping public opinion.
Information wars are a reality for many countries, in par­ticular, Russia, which over the past 15 years has been the ob­ject of negative information impact from Western actors. De­spite the legacy of the Soviet past, post-Soviet Russia at the end of the 20th century was of no interest to the community of Western states. Russia was weak and did not pose a danger as an informational opponent or an object against which it is possible to unleash informational wars.
55
With the election of V. Putin as President in 2000, the situ­ation begins to change, as the new Russian President actively promotes the idea of Russia’s own interests and the preserva­tion of Russian sovereignty. A particularly significant event was Putin’s Munich speech in 2007, in which the President of the Russian Federation sharply criticized the United States for its aggressive foreign policy, positioning the United States as the only center in a unipolar world system, and their unwill­ingness to follow the norms of international law.
From this moment, a new stage of information wars against the already modern Russian state begins, waged on behalf of the democracies led by the United States.
Russia faced in practice with information negative impact during the so-called five-day war in August 2008, on the night of August 8, when Georgia subjected the capital of South Os­setia to massive shelling, after which it attempted to establish control over South Ossetia. On the afternoon of August 8, the Russian president announced the start of a “peace enforcement operation” in the conflict zone. Significant Russian forces were brought into the region. Within a few days, Russian troops, to­gether with South Ossetian armed formations, ousted Georgian troops from South Ossetia, and also, in cooperation with Ab­khaz forces, from the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, temporarily occupying a number of regions of Georgia adjacent to the con-
1
flict zones
.
This conflict is unique in its two “arenas”: real – military, and informational. Thus, a real military operation was carried out by Russian peacekeepers in accordance with international agreements. Any violation of neutrality on the border by Geor-
1
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (September 2009). – Vol. I. Архивная копия от 5 марта 2016 г. на Wayback Machine – The Conflict in Georgia in August 2008. – P. 11. – “The shelling of Tskhinvali by the Georgian armed forces during the night of 7 to 8 August 2008 marked the beginning of the large-scale armed conflict in Georgia, yet it was only the culminating point of a long period of increasing tensions, provocations and incidents”.
56
gia or the unrecognized territories of South Ossetia and Abkha­zia automatically entailed the intervention of Russian military contingents, which happened in practice. However, the situation was presented in a distorted way in the information space – Rus­sia attacked Georgia using military force. In general, this provi­sion was actively promoted in the Georgian and European media.
In January 2021, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR issued a decision in which it stated the following: “The court rejected Georgia’s argument that the Russian army allegedly invaded South Ossetia the day before the start of the Georgian aggres­sion – August 7, 2008. Russia is not responsible for the inci­dents that occurred during the repulse by Russian military personnel of the attack of the Georgian army on the peacekeep­ing contingent and the local civilian population in the period from 8 to 12 August 2008” (Implementation of Resolution 1633 (2008) on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia). Despite this fact, in the mass consciousness of the citi­zens of many states, the image of Russia as an enemy, an ag­gressor, began to take shape, and sometimes “resurrect” again.
Thus, Russia came out victorious in the August conflict, but lost the first major information war against itself in the 21st century.
The second major reason for the next round of anti-Russian information wars was the entry of Crimea into the Russian Fed­eration in 2014. Next – the operation of Russian troops in Syria since 2015, a special military operation in Ukraine since Febru­ary 2022. It should be noted that these events have become the most large-scale “points” for the aggravation of information aggression, however, over the past 15 years, many Russian ini­tiatives, persons, actions have become “topics” of information wars against the Russian Federation.
“Ukrainian case”
The Ukrainian case is already a traditional reason for waging an anti-Russian information war.
57
Relations between modern Russia and Ukraine are of a pen­dulum nature. We note the existence of a direct connection be­tween the nature of bilateral relations, a specific person about the head of Ukraine, and the specifics of the information space in both countries. In 1992–2004, Russia’s attitude towards Ukraine was determined by the desire to strengthen interstate integration. Against the backdrop of the five-day war of 2008 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004–2005, rela­tions practically came to naught, however, with the election of the pro-Russian-oriented V. Yanukovych as the President of Ukraine (2010–1014), relations improved, soon due to the change of power and the arrival of the anti-Russian President P. Poroshenko, then V. Zelensky, connections were practically lost, and the war in the information space flares up with great intensity.
We offer only one of the elements of the information war against Russia, carried out by Western and Ukrainian actors during the regime change in 2014, regarded by Russia as an­other color revolution.
• The rally in support of European integration, organized on November 21, 2013 in the central square of Kiev, can be con­sidered the starting point of the political crisis and the begin­ning of a new stage in the escalation of the information war.
• The protest that arose in the center of Kiev soon spread to other cities of Ukraine. These actions were named “Euro­maidan” by analogy with the events of 2004.
• The protest movement was supported by Western politi­cians and the media.
• To promote the ideas of European integration, the illu­sion of readiness to admit Ukraine to the EU was created, while joining the Customs Union was presented as unprofitable.
• Russia itself was presented as “a new empire of evil, as well as a source of totalitarianism, corruption and infringe­ment of freedoms”. The entire expanded information cam­paign was aimed at forming a myth about the need to “protect Ukraine from Moscow’s imperial ambitions”.
58
In the mass consciousness, some attitudes were fixed:
• Ukrainians are ethnically closer to Europeans;
• European integration is the only way to a bright future for Ukraine;
• integration within the framework of the Customs Un­ion – an inevitable return to the USSR, where Russia will defi­nitely dictate its rules to Ukraine;
• “Muscovites” are occupiers who have oppressed the Ukrainian people for centuries.
The contribution of Western actors to the escalation of the
information conflict was also significant.
• American and Western European politicians and media have launched an extensive advertising, propaganda and disin­formation campaign.
• Famous Western politicians arrived in Ukraine to sup­port the protesters: J. McCain, V. Nuland, A. Kwasniewski. They began to call for pressure on the government at the Euro­maidan sites.
• A significant contribution to the cause of information support for the coup d’etat was made by non-governmental as­sociations created with US funds. For example, the National Endowment for Democracy, which is closely associated with the CIA, has funded 65 projects in Ukraine. At one time, Victoria Nuland, US Assistant Secretary of State, said that the states spent $ 5 billion to create conditions for regime change in Kiev.
• With the support of Western news agencies, whole net­works of public organizations, bloggers, and electronic media workers were created, which significantly influence the mass consciousness. More than 270 thematic TV programs and 1220 radio programs were launched!
• The United States, among other things, has contributed to the training of Ukrainian media workers. For example, the American Agency for International Development (USAID), through the European Center for Journalism, implemented the MediaNet project, through which about 3,700 Ukrainian jour­nalists were trained.
59
Below is a comparative analysis of Russian and Ukrainian
positions on some topics (Tab. 2.2).
Ukrainian crisis in the media and political discourses
of Russia and the West
Russia West
Advantages of deepening eco­nomic ties between Russia and Ukraine
Integration within the CU – non-return to the USSR
Instead of liberal rhetoric of hu­man rights, Russian discourse was dominated by “rhetoric of human rights in the tradition of countering fascism” and vio­lence. Euromaidan is a negative event in Russian discourse. The image of Euromaidan par­ticipants also developed: partici­pants – protesters – activists – self-defense – instigators of riots – neo-Nazi groups – right­wing extremist associations – militants
Yanukovych is a legitimate president
Gas and other forms of dependence on Russia, which are worth getting rid of in order to get out of the crisis.
“Ukraine has one foot in Europe and the other in an economic abyss. But the economic abyss seems less daunting than Putin’s embrace” (Forbes, 2013)
European integration is the only way to a bright future for Ukraine
The emergence of protests in Ukraine is a natural and legitimate reaction of the oppressed people to the arbitrariness of the authorities and the oligarchy. As for the neo-Nazis from the Right Sector, the West either kept silent about them, or closed its eyes “if only they would oppose Russia”
The Western media especially noted the corruption of the regime and its undemocratic character
Table 2.2
60