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23.
HYPOXIA DURING ANESTHESIA
MACHINE AND MONITORISSUES
NatachaZamor
CASE
pressure gauges, and pressure regulators. e PISS prevents
the attachment of an incorrect cylinder to the yoke (see A 65- year- old septic female is undergoing emergent bowel resection for ischemic colitis. In the middle of the case the oxygen low- pressure alarm sounds and the oxygen ow drops. e hospital engineers announce that central oxygen supply has been compromised because of hospital construc­tion eorts. What are the next steps to keep this patient safe and avoid hypoxia?
Hypoxia results from inadequate oxygen tension at the cellular level characterized by tachycardia, hypertension, peripheral vasoconstriction, dizziness, and mental con­fusion. Hypoxia has various etiologies including anemia, histotoxic, metabolic, and hypoxic (meaning inadequate delivery of oxygen to the patient). is chapter discusses how hypoxic hypoxia can occur through the anesthesia machine interface and the safety features within the mod­ern anesthesia machine to help prevent its occurrence.
e anesthesia ventilator comprises three systems:high­pressure, intermediate- pressure and low- pressure systems (see Figure 23.1). Within each of these three frameworks there
Figure 23.2). Each gas cylinder has a pin conguration to t its respective gas yoke. e positions of the holes on the cylinder valve correspond with the pins tted to the yoke. e pin positions for each medical gas are unique. ere are six possible targets for each of the two pins to be inserted. ese targets are measured in millimeters from the edge of the yoke. For oxygen tanks, the pins are inserted at the 2- and 5- mm position and for the nitrous oxide tanks, the pins are inserted at the 3- and 5- mm positions.
2– 4
If an attempt is made to t the wrong gas cylinder to the wrong yoke, a tight seal will not be made. Furthermore, the incorporation of a color code scheme used on caps, hoses, connectors, knobs, and pressure gauges also helps to improve safety and pre­vent cross- linking.
2,4
An inherent weakness of the PISS is if the wrong pin pulls out or breaks, it can lead to misconnec­tions.5 Several case reports have been published regarding misconnections from eroded or shortened pins.
6– 12
ere have also been manufacturer errors where the cylinder con­tent and yoke pins were mismatched.
13– 16
are safety features to help prevent the delivery of a hypoxic gas mixture to the patient. ey include the pin index safety system (PISS), diameter index safety system (DISS), failsafe valve, oxygen- nitrous oxide proportioning system, oxygen supply failure alarm, owmeter sequence, and, most distally, the oxygen analyzer. If any of these components are absent, then the anesthesia machine is obsolete by American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) standards.1 Even with all these safety checks, mechanical malfunctions and technical errors can and do occur. None of these features can replace the vigi­lance of the anesthesiologist administering the anesthetic.
THE INTERMEDIATE- PRESSURESYSTEM
e intermediate system receives gas from the pipeline or pressure regulators and extends to the ow control valves. It includes the pipeline connections, oxygen failsafe valve, oxygen ush, ventilator gas outlets, pressure gauge, and ow control valves. Safety features in this system to prevent hypoxic gas delivery include the DISS, the failsafe valve, and the low- pressurealarm.
THE HIGH- PRESSURESYSTEM
e high- pressure system is composed of E cylinders down to the pressure regulators. It includes the hanger yoke,
176
DIAMETER INDEX SAFETYSYSTEM
e anesthesia workstation has pipeline inlet connections of oxygen, nitrous oxide, and air. ese inlets are threaded using
High-Pressure system
Intermediate-
e
s
outlet)
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177
Figure23.1 The high- ,
intermediate- , and low- pressure systems of the anesthesia machine. SOURCE:Reprinted with
permission from Subrahmanyam M, Mohan S.Safety features in anesthesia.
Indian J Anaesth. 2013;57(5):472– 80.
DISS ttings.17 e Compressed Gas Association developed the DISS to establish a standard for noninterchangeable, movable connections for use with medical gases.18 e non­interchangeable indexing is achieved by a series of increas­ing and decreasing diameters of the connecting components that act in a key- like fashion so that the ttings within the gas service group will connect only with their own kind.
central pipeline crossings. ere have been multiple incidences of patient asphyxiation because a non- life­sustaining gas is substituted for oxygen or an oxygen line is poisoned with a toxic gas line contaminant. recently as 2004, 2005, and 2006 there were six reported incidences of intraoperative death from hypoxic asphyxia­tion when central pipeline gases were crossed in Europe.20
Pressure system
O Pipeline
N
Cylinder
Pressure
gauge
Pressure
regulator
2
Supply
2– 4
Fail-Safe
O
N
O Cylinder
2
Supply
Check
valve
O
N
2
N
O
2
O
2
O
2
O2Cylinder
Supply
is safety feature however, does not protect against
19– 31
As
Low-Pressure system
Calibrated vaporizers
Check valv
Machine
outlet
(common ga
Pipeline
Pressure
gauge
valve
Oxygen
supply failure
alarm
Pipeline Supply
2
Flow Meters
Second-stage
Pressure
O
2
regulator
Flow-control
valve
Oxygen
flush
valve
In the United States, pipeline- related deaths were reviewed from 1972 to 1993. Forty- ve deaths resulted from 26 pipeline incidents. Of these, 13 were due to crossed pipe­lines and 5 involved a substitution of oxygen by another gas in the bulk supply.8 In 1996 Moss and Evans reported that trichloroethylene contamination was implicated in four deaths in Texas.21 More recently, in 2002, two additional hypoxic deaths were reported in New Haven, Connecticut. ese deaths resulted from a medical gas system failure in which an altered oxygen owmeter was inadvertently connected to a wall supply source for nitrous oxide.22 Additional problems arose when pipelines were shortened and connectors were attached improperly within the operating room, allowing nitrous oxide lines to be adapted to oxygen outlets.
3
PIN INDEX SYSTEM YOKE BLOCK CYLINDER VALVE
Figure23.2 The pin index system and its components. SOURCE:Reprinted with permission from Subrahmanyam M, Mohan S.Safety features in anesthesia. Indian J Anaesth.
2013;57(5):472– 80.
HYPOXIA DURING ANESTHESIA:MACHINE AND MONITORISSUES 177
PIN INDEX SYSTEM
NIPPLE
WASHER
INDEX PINS
GAS OUTLET
TAPERED SCREW
TABERED TO FIT
TO CYLINDER
BODY
PIN INDEX PORT
178
SPROCKET
LINK-25 CHAI
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OXYGEN SUPPLY FAILUREALARM
e oxygen supply failure alarm (or low pressure alarm) will sound when there is a signicant decrease in oxygen sup­ply pressures. is occurs when there is a sudden loss of cyl­inder or pipeline pressure or when the anesthesia machine is turned o. Many anesthesia machines have a pneumatic alarm device that sounds a warning when oxygen sup­ply pressure decreases to a predetermined threshold value such as 30 psig. e 2000 American Society for Testing
delivery to maintain an FiO2 > 25%. Only at extremely low oxygen pressure is the nitrous oxide ow completely stopped.
2– 4,33
e presence of a failsafe valve in the absence of a pro­portioning system can still deliver a hypoxic mixture to the patient. In such a scenario, the oxygen ow control valve is closed, but because there is normal oxygen pipeline pres­sure, 100% nitrous oxide or any inert gas can be delivered to the patient, resulting in hypoxia.
and Materials (ASTM) standard mandates that a medium priority alarm be activated within 5 seconds when oxygen
LOW- PRESSURESYSTEM
pressure deceases below a manufacture specic pressure threshold.
2,3,32
e low- pressure system involves the owmeter to the common gas outlet. It includes the owmeters, vaporiz-
FAILSAFEVALVE
ers, proportioning system, common gas outlet, and oxygen ush valves.
is device is designed to prevent the delivery of a hypoxic gas mixture when oxygen supply fails. is feature is incor­porated at the level of the pressure regulators. A failsafe valve is present in the gas line supplying each of the ow meters except oxygen. As oxygen supply pressure decreases, the valve shuts o or proportionately decreases the supply of all other gases.2 In this conguration, when oxygen pres­sure falls, the ow of other gases will concurrently fall to prevent the administration of a hypoxic gas mixture. is feature is called the Pressure Sensor Shut O Valve in the Ohmeda machine and the Oxygen Failure Protection Device in the Dräger machine. In the Ohmeda machine, once oxygen pressure drops below 30 psi the unopposed force of a spring closes the valve and nitrous oxide cannot be administered. In the Dräger interface, a decrease in oxy­gen pressure causes a proportional decrease in nitrous oxide
OXYGEN– NITROUS OXIDE PROPORTIONINGSYSTEM
e proportioning system is a feature that joins the nitrous oxide and oxygen ow rates together to prevent the deliv­ery of a hypoxic mixture. e oxygen– nitrous oxide pro­portion system is also known as the hypoxic guard and has diering nomenclature based on the machine manu­facturer. Ohmeda calls its proportion system the “Link 25 Proportion Limiting Control” while Dräger calls its proportion system the “Oxygen Ratio Monitor Control” (ORMC) and the “Sensitive Oxygen Ratio Control” (S- ORC) in its most recent models.
Ohmeda’s Link 25 System is a pneumatic and mechani­cal device (see Figure 23.3). e heart of the conguration
LINK-25 PROPORTIONING
SYSTEM
N2O
N
NITROUS OXIDE
SPROCKET
178 PART IV. PULMONARY CRISES
OXYGEN
O
2
Figure23.3 Mechanical linkage of oxygen and nitrous ow
meters, to prevent hypoxic mixture delivery. SOURCE:Reprinted
with permission from Subrahmanyam M, Mohan S.Safety features in
anesthesia. Indian J Anaesth. 2013;57(5):472– 80.
2
2
OO
2
CD
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179
is a mechanical integration of the nitrous oxide and oxy­gen ow control valves through a stainless steel chain. e nitrous oxide control valve has a 24- tooth sprocket and is connected to the 28- tooth sprocket of the oxygen control valve. Normally both knobs can be operated independently. At nitrous oxide to oxygen ratio 3:1 these valves become linked. Any further increase in nitrous oxide proportionally increases the oxygen ow to prevent a ratio greater than 3:1. e nal 3:1 ow ratio results because the nitrous oxide ow control valve is supplied by approximately 26 psig, whereas the oxygen ow control valve is supplied by 14 psig. e combination of the mechanical and pneumatic aspects of the system yields the nal oxygen concentration.
2,5,17,19,33– 34
ere have been case reports of malfunctions in the Link­25 proportioning system. connecting the sprockets allowed nitrous oxide to increase
19,35– 37
In one case, a broken chain
to hypoxic concentrations.36 In another case, malposition of the oxygen control knob on its stud caused failure of the knob to engage, despite delivery of 100% nitrous oxide.19 In addition, loosening the stop screw on the collar of the oxygen control knob has led to the delivery of a hypoxic mixture in at least three cases.
19,37
e North American Dräger proportioning systems, the ORMC and the S- ORC, are pneumatic oxygen– nitrous oxide interlock systems designed to maintain the fresh gas oxygen concentration at 25 ± 3. e ORMC and S- ORC limit nitrous oxide ow to prevent delivery of a hypoxic mixture. Supply oxygen and nitrous oxide are modulated through respective resistors to exert a backpres­sure on the oxygen and nitrous oxide diaphragms. is backpressure, in conjunction with the diering spring con­stants of the upper and lower springs, causes movement of a piston attached to the proportioning valve. An increase
in nitrous oxide ow beyond 72% to 78% moves the pis­ton, which raises the proportioning valve and limits further nitrous oxide ow. Similarly, if the oxygen ow is reduced to less than 22% from 28%, the nitrous oxide ow will be reduced proportionally to maintain the oxygen percentage required.
2,5,17,19,33– 34
e proportioning systems can permit a hypoxic mix­ture if the wrong gas is supplied though the oxygen pipe­line or cylinder. Both the Ohmeda Link 25 system and the Dräger ORMC/ S- ORC will be fooled if a gas other than oxygen is present in the oxygen pipeline. Furthermore, a hypoxic mixture can be delivered if there is a defective pneumatic or mechanical component, leaks downstream of ow control valves, or if a third inert gas is used.
2,4,5,17,19,33– 34
FLOWMETER SEQUENCE
Eger et al. in 1963 were the rst to point out that an upstream oxygen owmeter can deliver a hypoxic mix­ture.38 If several owmeters are mounted together and a leak develops in one ow tube, a higher proportion of the gas coming from the upstream owmeter will tend to be lost through the leak. If the oxygen owmeter is upstream, this will tend to deliver a hypoxic mixture to the patient (see Figure 23.4). Eger suggested that this danger could be reduced if the oxygen owmeter were mounted in a down­stream position.38 is has now become the convention in modern anesthesia machines. is owmeter sequence, however, is not foolproof. Regardless of the sequence of owmeters, a break in the oxygen owmeter can lead to a hypoxic mixture if nitrous oxide is being used.39 In this scenario, oxygen escapes through the leak and nitrous oxide continues to ow through the common gas outlet. is is
Figure23.4 Potential unsafe and safe arrangements of ow
meter tubes. SOURCE:Reprinted with per mission from Subrahmanyam
M, Mohan S.Safety features in anesthesia. Indian J Anaesth.
2013;57(5):472– 80.
HYPOXIA DURING ANESTHESIA:MACHINE AND MONITORISSUES 179
2
AIRN2OO
AIRN
OO
2
UNSAFE
SAFE
AIR
2
AIRN
N2OO
180
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particularly true at high ratios of nitrous oxide to oxygen
2,4,5,17,19,33– 34,39
ow.
Other safety features include ow con­trol knob conguration. e ow control knob for oxygen is the largest and most protruding and has tactile dieren­tiating features like a uted prole for additional and easy identication.
MANDATORY MINIMUM OXYGEN FLOWALARM
2,4,5,17,19,33– 34
Some anesthesia machines require a minimum (50 to 250 cc/ min) ow of oxygen before other gases will ow.
OXYGENSENSOR
17
e oxygen sensor is the only monitor that analyzes gas composition, making it the most important safeguard against hypoxic gas delivery. Modern anesthesia ventilators use infrared analysis, paramagnetic oxygen analysis, and electrochemical oxygen analysis to measure oxygen con-
2. You were administering an oxygen and nitrous oxide anesthetic. What do you expect to happen to your ratios of oxygen and nitrous oxide during a central pipeline failure? What safety feature in the modern anesthesia machine facilitatesthis?
3. You open your oxygen cylinder to provide oxygen to your patient. Can you keep your pipeline connected? Why or whynot?
4. Is there a role for manual ventilation now that you are working o the oxygen cylinder?
5. You are told that it is now safe to reconnect to the pipeline source. You do so and place your patient on 100% oxygen. Your patient who was previously saturating 100% now desaturates and appears cyanotic. What is your dierential? If there were a central pipeline crossing, what safety feature in your machine would detect it and what safety features mightnot?
centration delivered to the patients. None of the monitors upstream of the oxygen analyzer are able to decipher gas
REFERENCES
composition. Hence, if there were a pipeline crossover, as long as the pressure in the “oxygen” line was maintained, it would pass the oxygen supply failure alarm, the failsafe valve, and the O2- N2O proportioning system, but would be detected at the level of the oxygen analyzer. Use of an oxy­gen analyzer with a low concentration alarm limit during the administration of general anesthesia is required in the ASA monitoring standards.40 Both the international and US standards on respiratory gas monitors analyzers pub­lished in 2004 and 2005 require that a high- priority alarm be used for inspired oxygen concentration below 18% and that it not be possible to set the low oxygen alarm below
17,32,41
18%.
is monitor is also unfortunately not fool­proof. ere have been reports in the literature of oxygen analyzer malfunction.
42,43
ere are multiple systems built into the modern anes­thesia machine to help prevent the delivery of a hypoxic mixture to the patient. ere are documented malfunc­tions and failures within each of these safety features. Ultimately, nothing replaces the attentiveness of a vigilant anestheticteam.
CASE- BASED LEARNING DISCUSSION
1. In the context of a recognized pipeline failure, what
are the necessary steps you need to take to manage the patient and keep her safe? Order them by importance.
1. American Society of Anesthesiologists Guidelines for Determining Anesthesia Machine Obsolescence. Available at http:// www.asahq. org/ Search.aspx?q=gu idel ines+determining+anesthesia+machine +obsolescence.2004.
2. Miller RD, et al., eds., Miller’s Anesthesia. 7th ed. Philadelphia, PA:Churchill Livingstone/ Elsevier;2010.
3. Donaldson M, et al. Nitrous oxide- oxygen administration: when safety features no longer are safe. Journal of the American Dental Association. 2012;143(2):134– 43.
4. Subrahmanyam M, Mohan S. Safety features in anesthesia. Indian Journal of Anaesthesia. 2013;57(5):472– 80.
5. Dryo JF. Clinical Engineering Handbook. 1st ed. Burlington, MA: Academic Press;2004.
6. Hogg CE. Pin- indexing failures. Anesthesiology. 1973;38(1): 85– 87.
7. Goebel WM. Failure of nitrous oxide and oxygen pin- indexing. Anesthesia Progress. 1980;27(6):188– 91.
8. Petty W. AANA journal course: update for nurse anesthetists— medical gases, hospital pipelines, and medical gas cylinders: how safe are they? American Association of Nurse Anesthetists Journal. 1995;63(4):307– 24.
9. Mead P. Hazard with cylinder yoke. Anaesthesia and Intensive Care. 1981;9(1):79– 80.
10. omas AN, et al. Interchangeable oxygen and air connectors. Anaesthesia. 2001;56(12):1295– 6.
11. Saha B, etal. Interchangeable oxygen and carbon dioxide cylinders. Anaesthesia. 2005;60(8):827– 8.
12. Chamley D, Trethowen L. Pin index failure. Anaesthesia and Intensive Care. 1993;21(1):128– 9.
13. S erlin S. Check your tanks. Anesthesia & Analgesia. 2004;98(3):870.
14. Menon MR, Lett Z. Incorrectly lled cylinders. Anesthesia. 1991;46(2):155– 6.
15. Taylor NJ, Davison M. Inaccurate color coding of medical gas cylinders. Anaesthesia. 2009;64(6):690.
16. Crombie N. Confusing and ambiguous labeling of an oxygen cylinder. Anesthesia. 2009;64(1):98.
180 PART IV. PULMONARY CRISES
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181
17. Dorsch JA. Understanding Anesthesia Equipment. Philadelphia, PA: Wolters Kluwer Health/ Lippincott Williams & Wilkins;
2008.
18. Compressed Gas Association. Standard for Medical Gas Supply Systems at Health Care Facilities. Chantilly, VA:CGA;2013.
19. Atlee JL. Complication in Anesthesia. 2nd ed. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders;2006.
20. Her H, etal. Fatal errors in nitrous oxide delivery. Anaesthesia. 2007;62(12):1202– 6.
21. Moss E. Hospital Deaths. Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation Newsletter. Summer 1996.http:// www.apsf.org/ newsletters/ html/ 1996/ summer/ apsfmoss.html
22. Worth RF. Hospital says two died in nitrous oxide mistake. NewYork Times. January 17, 2002. http:// www.nytimes.com/ 2002/ 01/ 17/ nyregion/ hospital- says- two- died- in- nitrous- oxide- mistake.html.
23. Sprague DH, Archer GW Jr. Intraoperative hypoxia from an erroneously lled liquid oxygen reservoir. Anesthesiology. 1975;42: 360– 2.
24. Lye A, Patrick R. Oxygen contamination of the nitrous oxide pipelines supply. Anaesthesia and Intensive Care. 1998;26(2): 207– 9.
25. Schumacher S, etal. Bulk liquid oxygen supply failure. Anesthesio­logy. 2004;100(1):186– 9.
26. Bernstein DB, Rosenberg AD. Intraoperative hypoxia from nitro­gen tanks with oxygen ttings. Anesthesia & Analgesia. 1997; 84(1):225– 7.
27. DiPaolo V. Hospital’s failure to analyze gases made crossing of gas lines deadly. Mod Healthcare. 1977;Sep:116– 17.
28. Crossed oxygen and nitrous oxide gas lines claim yet another victim. Biomed Safety Standards. 1978;8:141– 2.
29. Another case of crossed oxygen and nitrous oxide gas lines. Biomed Safety Standards. 1978;8:117– 8.
30. Mazze RI. erapeutic misadventures with oxygen delivery systems: the need for continuous in- line oxygen monitors. Anesthesia & Analgesia. 1972;51(5):790– 2.
31. Weller J etal. Anesthetists’ management of oxygen pipeline failure: room for improvement. Anesthesia. 2007;62(2):122– 6.
32. ASTM:Standard specication for particular requirements for anes­thesia workstations and their components. (ASTM F1850- 00). In Medical devices and services, vol. 13.01. Conshohocken, PA;2005.
33. Baheti DK, et al. Understanding Anesthetic Equipment & Procedures: APractical Approach. New Delhi, India: JP Medical Ltd;2014.
34. Rose G. Anesthesia Equipment Simplied. New York, NY: McGraw Hill Professional;2014.
35. Ishikawa S, etal. Hypoxic gas ow caused by malfunction of the pro­portioning system of anesthesia machines. Anesthesia & Analgesia. 2002;94(6):1672.
36. Gordon PC, et al. Failure of the proportioning system to pre­vent hypoxic mixture on a Modulus II Plus anesthesia machine. Anesthesiology. 1995;82(2):598– 9.
37. Cheng CJ, Garewal DS. A failure of the chain- link mechanism on the Ohmeda Excel 210 anesthetic machine. Anesthesia & Analgesia. 2001;92(4):913– 4.
38. Eger EI, etal. Anesthetic ow meter sequence:a cause for hypoxia. Anesthesiology. 1963;24(3):396– 7.
39. Chung DC, et al. Hypoxic gas mixtures delivered by anesthetic machines equipped with a downstream oxygen owmeter. Canadian Anaesthetists’ Society Journal. 1980;27(6):527– 30.
40. American Society of Anesthesiologists. Standards for basic anes­thesia monitoring. ASA 2011. https:// www.asahq.org/ ~/ .../ stan­dards.../ standards- for- basic- anesthetic- monitoring.pdf
41. International Standards Organization. Medical electrical equipment- participation requirements for the basic safety and essential perfor­mance of respiratory gas monitors. Geneva, Switzerland; 2004.
42. Vinay B, Gopalakrishna KN. An unusual cause with a simple solu­tion for failure of oxygen sensor in a Dräger Fabius GS ventilator. Saudi J Anaesth. 2014;8(4):565– 6.
43. Harris B, etal. An insidious failure of an oxygen analyzer. Anesthesia & Analgesia. 2006;102(5):1468– 72.
HYPOXIA DURING ANESTHESIA:MACHINE AND MONITORISSUES 181
182
Endotracheal tubes
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24.
AIRWAYFIRE
Ju- MeiNg
CLINICALCASE
intensive care with its accompanying morbidity.4 One or two deaths per year are caused by airway res.
1,5
A 67- year- old male, intubated from the intensive care unit (ICU), presents for tracheostomy. He has a history of hypertension and was involved in a motor vehicle accident 1 week prior, sustaining a liver laceration (treated conserv­atively), right pneumothorax and 7th to 10th rib fractures with lung contusion, and a fracture of his right femoral sha (managed with internal xation). His arterial blood gas showed PaO2 of 89 mmHg, PaCO2 42 mmHg on assist- control ventilation with fractional inspired oxygen concentration (FiO2) of 0.6, and PEEP 8 cmH2O. e anesthetic plan is to advance his endotracheal tube (ETT) until the tip is just above the carina (cu is below the tra­cheal incision) and to use a volatile anesthetic in 100%O2.
CONCEPT
ree elements have to be present for any re to start:(1)igni­tion source, (2)fuel, and (3) an oxidizer. is “re triad” (Figure 24.1) is interdependent, and removing any one com­ponent eliminates the potential of a re outbreak altogether. Oxygen- enriched environments lower the temperature at which fuels ignite and cause res to burn more intensely and spread more quickly. Nitrous oxide supports combustion and OR res involving mixtures of nitrous oxide and oxy­gen are as easily ignited and as severe as res involving 100% oxygen. In airway res, ignition sources include the electro-
BACKGROUND
surgical unit (ESU) and laser. e ETT is the most common fuel, though the patient’s tissue is another potential fuel. e
oxidizer is usually oxygen. In order to reduce risks of airway e true incidence of operating room (OR) res is di­cult to ascertain; the Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI) estimates that 550 to 650 surgical res occur in the
re during airway surgery, oxygen concentration should ide-
ally be less than 30% before using electrocautery, and nitrous
oxide should not be inuse. United States per year,1 and about 21% occur in the air­way despite reductions in inspired oxygen concentration to less than 30%. Operating room res can result in dev­astating morbidity and mortality, and are largely prevent­able. e American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA)
IGNITION
SOURCE
Lasers
Electrocautery Units
has issued an updated Practice Advisory for the Prevention and Management of Operating Room Fires,2 including the updated operating room res algorithm. e emphasis is on prevention (education, training, and proper surgical tech­nique), surgical team communication, and management of re when it occurs. An airway re refers to a re in the airway or breathing circuit, and usually occurs during tra­cheostomy, endoscopic airway surgery, or oropharyngeal
FUEL
OXIDIZER
Oxygen
surgery. Historically, the estimated incidence of airway res was between 0.4% and 0.57% in patients undergoing laser airway surgery.3 Airway injuries can necessitate prolonged
Figure24.1 The elements in the “re triad.”
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183
CLINICAL SCENARIOS— OROPHARYNGEAL/ LARYNGEAL SURGERY
Electrocautery use during tonsillectomy or laser laryngeal surgery can cause res when an oxygen- enriched environ­ment is allowed to build up in the oropharynx. During tra­cheostomy, subcutaneous/ adipose tissues in the neck and/ or the ETT have been reported to ignite when electrocautery
concentration to decrease to < 30% depending on the circuit length, the fresh gas ow rate, and the starting circuit oxygen concentration.7 e laser tip should be visible and clear of the end of the bronchoscope or ETT during lower airway sur­gery. During tracheostomy, it is important to ensure a hemo­static surgical eld prior to tracheal incision. is avoids the need for diathermy aer the airway isopen.
8
was utilized. Endoscopic laser surgery of the lower airways can lead to airway burns; smoke coming from the patient’s
ANESTHETIC CONSIDERATIONS
mouth may indicate combustion of airway tissue and/ or the ETT, as there is no possible route for venting. Aserious ther­mal or chemical injury from airway re is less likely when the ame or smoke is vented out through a tracheostomy open­ing or the oropharynx before reaching the distal airway.
6
Dierent anesthetic techniques have been used during laser surgery of the airway.9 e FiO2 should be kept at the minimum tolerated by the patient during critical periods, and ventilation may be held if necessary. Depending on the nature and location of the lesion, patient comorbidities,
PREVENTION STRATEGIES
and the availability of equipment and expertise, the mode of ventilation and/ or method of securing airway may be modied. e possibility of complete airway collapse or
Primary prevention should be accomplished through education and training of all OR personnel. Steps should include credentialing of surgeons for laser operation, safety checklists, and protocols for airway res. Periodic checks of both the availability and functional status of re safety equipment, as well as re drills, will help to ensure that high standards are maintained.
Secondary prevention includes preoperative discussion among the surgical team prior to high- risk procedures, pre­assigned tasks in the event of a re, and closed- loop com­munication before use of the laser or ESU. Communication should help to ensure that inspired oxygen concentration is below 30% and that the ow of oxygen is stopped when possible during periods of laser or ESU within the airway.
an inability to ventilate must be taken into consideration when deciding between spontaneous or positive- pressure ventilation. “Tubeless” techniques (jet ventilation, inter­mittent apneic ventilation) omit the ETT as fuel source, however laser- safe ETTs are commonly used when ventila­tion through an ETT is necessary. To reduce the risk of a re when a laser safe ETT is not available, the tube sha may be covered with metal foil or laser- protective coatings, and saline added to the tube cu (Figure 24.2).
9
During elective tracheostomy, the patient usually arrives to the OR with a cued ETT (generally made of PVC that can ignite in an O2- rich environment) in situ. Communication between the surgeon and anesthesiologist regarding the patient’s respiratory status (tolerance of apnea, loss of recruitment, FiO2 requirements) and coordination
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
of tube exchange (endotracheal tube- for- tracheostomy can­nula) are critical. Airway re is prevented by minimizing FiO2 (<0.3) and eliminating the use of electrocautery aer
Warning signs should be posted at OR entry points. Water/ saline and wet sponges should be immediately available to extinguish the re. All equipment should be tested prior to use; the laser should be placed in a standby mode when not in activeuse.
entering the trachea. When decreasing the FiO2, use high fresh gas ows and monitor the expired oxygen concentra­tion. is ensures that both the FiO2 and expired oxygen concentrations are reduced.7 For patients who do not toler­ate low FiO2 or prolonged apnea, the ETT may be advanced such that the cu is distal to the surgical entry point. is
SURGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
allows continued ventilation and use of higherFiO2.
Clear warning should be given by the operator as to when the laser is activated and avoidance of laser or electrocautery use for hemostasis when O2 concentrations are high. It may take minutes for both the inspired and expired circuit oxygen
AIRWAYFIRE 183
ACUTE MANAGEMENT
Should a re occur, immediate and concurrent steps should include the following as shown in Box 24.1.
10
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Figure24.2 Laser- resistent tubes. Mallinckrodt Laser oral tracheal
tube (Covidien, Boulder, CO) is a metal tube with a very high ignition temperature and double cuffs designed to be lled with saline so that a laser strike to the proximal cuff will extinguish the re, and distal cuff will prevent backow of oxygen. Laser­Shield II Endotracheal tube (Medtronic Xomed, Inc., Jacksonville, FL) has a reective aluminium wrap with smooth uoroplastic overwrap to reduce trauma, and methylene blue in the ination valve for immediate detection of cuff rupture.
e anesthesiologist should immediately disconnect the anesthesia circuit and/ or turn o the oxygen ow as the surgeon stops lasering/ electrocautery and oods the eld with saline. Saline ush down the ETT can help extin­guish intraluminal re. If the re is not extinguished by these maneuvers, the CO2 re extinguisher should be used.2 Depending on the amount of damage to the ETT and/ or airways, the ETT may be removed or changed. is is oen indicated if the tube has been melted in order to remove an ignition source and prevent further tissue damage. e cli­nician must weigh the risk- benet ratio of minimizing the inhalation of toxic combustion products and the spread of re into the tracheobronchial tree against losing the airway (especially if this was a previously dicult airway or one that has since become edematous). In certain circumstances, the benets of leaving the ETT in may outweigh the risks of leaving it in place aer the airway re is extinguished. e damaged ETT may still allow for acceptable ventila­tion of the lungs with oxygen, or serve as a conduit for a tube exchanger.6 If in doubt, the ETT should be removed to limit damage, and an alternate means of securing the airway established.
antibiotics, based on the degree of damage and patient comorbidities, this might warrant individual discussion. As shown in Box 24.1, further management depends on the severity of injury and need for postoperative
BOX 24.1 RECOMMENDED INTERVENTIONS WHEN AIRWAY
FIREOCCURS
Remove or minimize the oxygen delivered: disconnect the
patient from the source of oxygen if possible; if this is
not possible then lower to 21%FiO
Extinguish the fire with saline or a saline- soakedcloth
Assess injuries with beroptic bronchoscopy and direct
laryngoscopy and determine whether it is safe to remove
the damaged endotracheal tube and if the airway can
be safely secured. The benet of removing the damaged
endotracheal tube has to be weighed against the risks
of potential difculties of securing the airway; this has
to be judged on a case- by- casebasis
Remove all external burning objects from patient
2
SUBSEQUENT MANAGEMENT
After the fire is extinguished and the patient stabilized (mask, supraglottic airway, or ETT), the extent of air­way damage should be assessed. The clinician should perform bronchoscopy (flexible or rigid) of the tracheo­bronchial tree and lavage and/ or remove debris/ foreign bodies if necessary. Although there is little evidence for the routine administration of steroids and prophylactic
184 PART IV. PULMONARY CRISES
Resume ventilation and oxygen delivery as soon as
safely possible
Prevent reignition:
Continue cooling the area ofre
Resume ventilation with the lowest toleratedFiO
Formulate alternateplans:
If the procedure is a tracheostomy, then proceed with
tracheostomy expeditiously before removing the burned
endotracheal tube if it was onre
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185
vertically from the wound. What are the immediate
BOX 24.1 CONTINUED
steps totake?
If the initial surgical procedure was not a tracheostomy,
after assessing the airway, consider prophylactic
tracheostomy
Assess whether the patient needs to be kept intubated
after the procedure
Monitor the patient for signs of lunginjury
3. e re is extinguished. Should the ETT be removed? Should the surgeon then proceed with the procedure once the re is extinguished?
4. ere is minimal damage to the tissues around the tracheostomy and the procedure is completed without further incident. What follow- up measures are important?
ventilation. Ideally after an airway fire during trache­ostomy, patients should return to the ICU (after rees­tablishing the airway with a tracheostomy), and be monitored for evidence of lung injury.
ese events should be reported and analyzed in order to identify prevention steps that need to be rein­forced in order to decrease the likelihood of future airway res occurring. Hospital risk management should also be notied.
CASE- BASED LEARNING DISCUSSION
1. What do you think of the anesthesia plan? What are
some alternatives?
2. e case proceeds with the original plan. e
endotracheal tube is advanced under bronchoscopic guidance until the tip is just above the carina, and the patient is anesthetized with isourane 1% in 100% O2. e tracheal incision is made, and just as the surgeon is attempting to control bleeding in the adipose tissue with the diathermy (monopolar coagulation), a 15- cm jet of ame was seen arising
REFERENCES
1. ERCI Institute. New clinical guide to surgical re prevention. Health Devices. 2009;38:314– 32.
2. Apfelbaum JL, Caplan RA, Barker SJ, etal. Practice advisory for the prevention and management of operating room res:an updated report by the American Society of Anesthesiologists task force on operating room res. Anesthesiology. 2013;118:271– 90.
3. Burgess GE III, LeJeune FE Jr. Endotracheal tube ignition during laser surgery of the larynx. Archives of Otolaryngology. 1979;105: 561– 2.
4. Tykocinski M, omson P, Hooper R. Airway re during trache­otomy. ANZ Journal of Surgery. 2006;35:49– 57.
5. Wolf LG. Danger from OR res still a serious problem. Journal of Clinical Monitoring and Computing. 2000;16:237– 8.
6. Chee WK, Benumof JL. Airway re during tracheostomy:extuba­tion may be contraindicated. Anesthesiology. 1998;89:1576– 8.
7. Remz M, Luria I, Gravenstein M, etal. Prevention of airway res:do not overlook the expired oxygen concentration. Anesthesia & Analgesia. 2013;117:1172– 6.
8. Rogers ML, Nickalls RWD, Brackenbury ET, Salama FD, Beattie MG, Perks AGB. Airway re during tracheostomy:prevention strat­egies for surgeons and anaesthetists. Annals of e Royal College of Surgeons of England. 2001;83:376– 80.
9. Sheinbein DS, Loeb RG. Laser surgery and re hazards in ear, nose, and throat surgeries. Anesthesiology Clin. 2010;28:485– 96.
10. Frendl G. Laser surgery of the airway and laser safety. In:Hartigan PM, ed. Practical Handbook of oracic Anesthesia. NewYork, NY:Springer; 2012:427– 44.
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