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Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 20: 433–447, 2007

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN 1351-8046 print

DOI: 10.1080/13518040701533022

OPERATION “WEST”: THE ROLE OF THE NORTHERN FLEET AND ITS AIR FORCES IN THE LIBERATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC IN 19441

Mikhail Suprun

Translated by Vera Hill

The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, the naval component of which received the codename Operation “West,” saw the Soviet Northern Fleet play a major role in the liberation of the Russian Artic in late 1944. The capabilities of the Northern Fleet had been substantially enhanced by LendLease aid since the summer of 1941 and British and American vessels provided in lieu of the Soviet share of Italian naval assets. Nonetheless, it seems that a fear of losing major naval units led to timidity in their use and only partial fulfillment of the objectives of the operation.

During World War II, 1944 was a year of decisive victories for the Allies. By the autumn, the German Army had retreated hundreds of kilometers on the Eastern Front. On the map, the solid front line almost coincided with the dotted line of the pre-war Soviet border. However, in the North it remained the same as the invaders had marked it in 1941.

On 31 March 1944, Stalin signed a special directive on the liberation of the Russian Arctic.2 From this point on, the leadership of the Karelian

1The translation of this article from Russian was made possible thanks to support from the Center for Military and Strategic Studies of the University of Calgary. Maps covering the region discussed in this article are provided with the introduction to this special issue of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies on ‘Russian and Soviet Naval Power in the Arctic 1914–1945’.

2For a wider account of the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation from a Soviet perspective, see Major James F. Gebhardt, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944 (Leavenworth Papers, Number 17) (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1990). For a broader overview of the war in the Arctic from a German perspective see the reprinted Earl F. Ziemke,

The German Northern Theatre of Operations 1940–1945 (German Report Series) (Uckfield, E. Sussex: The Naval and Military Press Ltd, no date) (ed.).

Address correspondence to Mikhail Suprun, Faculty of History, Pomor State University, 163002 Arkhangel’sk, Naberezhnaia Severnoi Dvini 4/2–57, Russian Federation. E-mail: vma@pomorsu.ru

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Front and Northern Fleet proceeded to prepare the requisite operation: maps were checked, documentation at headquarters level was prepared, and strategy and tactics were worked out. But this was not all. In the summer, with the beginning of the advance of the Soviet Army in Karelia, units located in the Arctic significantly increased their activity. The number of attacks by Soviet aircraft on the ports of Varanger Fjord alone increased more than fourfold.3 The Northern Fleet organized a number of high-intensity operations in order to interrupt enemy’s communications and to reveal weaknesses in their opponent’s defense. Rarely did an enemy convoy pass Varanger Fjord without losses. On 23 August air forces of the Northern Fleet performed the biggest air strikes of the war on the ports of Vardö and Vadsö.4 Starting on 3 September with the beginning of the preliminary stage of the operation for the liberation of the Russian Arctic, the number of strikes on the enemy increased sharply. This resulted in fourteen enemy ships operating in northern Norway being lost during September.5

3In 1944, air forces of the Northern Fleet carried out 994 sorties in attacks on the ports of Linakhamari, Kirkenes, Vardö and Vadsö. There were 172 sorties in 1941, and 207 in each of the years 1942 and 1943. Central Archive of the Navy (TsVMA) f.12.o.1.d.78.ll.15–20.

4To date, there has not been any consensus in the literature on the reasons for the massive air raids on Vardö and Vadsö of August 23 1944, in which about 200 soviet aircraft were involved. In Norway no explanation has been found as to the reason for these raids, which primarily resulted in civilian casualties. On this matter I would like to present my point of view. It is thought that the devastation of the ports of Vardö and Vadsö was first of all preconditioned by operational-tactical considerations relating to the passage of convoy JW.59 to Kola Inlet. However, even more important was the large group of ships led by the battleship “Arkhangel’sk” that were following the same course further north. The latter, like the “Tirpitz” of the German Fleet, was becoming the ‘sacred cow’ of the Northern Fleet. People’s Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, as well as his deputy G.I. Levchenko, present on board the battleship at the time, repeatedly demanded of Admiral V.I Platonov (acting for A.G. Golovko, who had been taken ill) that extreme measures be taken for the escort of the arriving ships (see V.I Platonov, Zapiski admirala (Moskva: 1991) pp. 268–270). Since the principal strength of the Northern Fleet without this squadron was in torpedo boats and aircraft, V.I. Platonov sought to use them as much as possible in order to constrain enemy forces in the Russian Arctic. On August 17–19 a powerful strike was made on an enemy convoy in the region of Varanger Fjord, and on August 23 on the principal German bases of Vardö and Vadsö. It is likely that the choice of date for the bombardment of these towns had also been influenced by political factors. It is known that negotiations concerning Finland’s withdrawal from the war were being held at the time. A powerful bombardment of northern Norwegian towns could have been a significant factor in applying pressure on a Finland hesitating in making the choice for withdrawal from the war. It is also noteworthy that the date for the bombardment of Vardö and Vadsö coincided with the initial bombing of Stalingrad and the beginning of concentrated bombing of Arkhangel’sk on the same date two years earlier. How much of this coincidence was actually considered in the planning of the bombardments of Norwegian ports is conjecture.

5J. Rohwer and G. Hummelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945. The Naval History of World War Two (London: Greenhill Books, 1992) pp. 303, 305.

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By this time the Northern Fleet had been re-enforced with powerful ships and at the beginning of the operation numbered more than 300 large and medium fighting units, including a battleship and cruiser.6 From the air they were covered by 563 aircraft, half of which had been directly assigned to the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation.7 The penetration of the enemy’s defenses seaward and landing of troops on the shore was supposed to be accomplished by units of the Northern Defense District (SOR) consisting of two marine brigades, an artillery regiment and three machine-gun battalions, numbering in total about 15 thousand men.8 Superiority over the enemy was overwhelming.9 The naval component of the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation was given the codename “West.”

The principal tasks of the Fleet and its air forces in the operation “West” had been formulated in an order of the Fleet command of September 8, 1944. These tasks were: at sea — to sabotage the “evacuation of enemy troops via sea routes through the ports of Varanger Fjord,” and on the shore — after breaking through enemy defense to reach the TitovkaPetsamo road and prevent the retreat of German forces. Further on, it was required of the marine units to render all possible assistance to the coastal flank of the Karelian Front.10 The planning of separate, smaller operations was also undertaken in accordance with the principal objectives the landing of troops, convoy operations and the possibility of enemy attacks on sea routes.

On 7 October units of the 14th Army of the Karelian Front started the execution of their role in the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, and launched an offensive in the region. After two days of battle, Soviet units forced a crossing of the river Titovka and by the end of 9 October threatened to

6Department of Central Archive of the Navy (further referred to as OTsVMA) f.11.d.17814.l.5–7. The battleship “Arkhangel’sk,” previously the British “Royal Sovereign,” and cruiser “Murmansk,” previously the US “Milwaukee,” were handed over to the Soviet Union in lieu of the Soviet share of the surrender Italian heavy naval units in May and April 1944 respectively, along with Town Class destroyers from Britain, supplied by the US in 1940 as part of the ‘destroyers for bases’ agreement (by 1944 with much updated equipment) (ed.).

7TsVMA f.767.o.2.d.88.l.247ob.

8G.S. Ivanov, ‘Pobeda v Zapoliar’e’, in Morskoi sbornik (1964) Number 10, p.16.

9By October 1944, the German naval leadership had approximately 130 medium and large ships in the north of Norway, including the damaged battleship “Tirpitz,” and around 80 aircraft, of which less than a half could be directly engaged against the aircraft of the Northern Fleet due to the bigger proportion being constrained by the actions of units of the Karelian Front and its 7th Air Army. The “Van Der Hoop” Division, opposing units of the Northern Fleet, numbered about 5 thousand men. (OTsVMA f.11.d.14950.l.7; TsVMA f.12.o.1.d.77.l.247; B. Hafsen, U. Larsstuvold, B. Olsen, S. Stenersen, Flyalarm. Luftkrigen over Norge. 1939–1945 (Unknown) pp. 224–225; J.F. Gebhardt. ‘The Petsamo-Kirkenes operation (October 7–30, 1944): A Soviet Combined Arms Operation in Arctic Terrain’, in The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, Volume 2, Number 1 (January 1989) p.83.

10OTsVMA.f.11.d.14058.l.21; d.21492.ll.6–10.

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encircle core enemy forces in the sector.11 At this time units of the Northern Fleet had only just started to concentrate and deploy forces for the offensive.

THE LANDING OF TROOPS IN MAATTI BAY AND ASSAULT OF THE MUSTA MOUNTAIN RIDGE ON 10 OCTOBER

On the evening of 9 October the headquarters of the Fleet, headed by the commander, Admiral A.G. Golovko, were ferried across from Poliarnoe to the Ribachii Peninsula in the region of Ozerko. A whole flotilla of high-speed boats also arrived there. Towards the evening, the destroyers “Gremiashchii” and “Gromkii” entered Motov Bay and started systematic shelling of the German defense line. Diversionary troops landed at around 22:00 under the fire of torpedo boats in the region of the Capes Pikshuev and Mogil’nii. Two groups consisting of 22 men each emptied the magazines of their sub-machine guns in an uncoordinated manner and littered the area with a large number of smoke canisters, creating the illusion that at least a whole battalion had landed. For even greater effect, covering torpedo boats fired a couple of torpedoes at the shore. Even though the return fire was quite languid, it appears that the diversionary landing was successful. The landing of the main force on the opposite shore passed unnoticed.

The thunder of artillery in Motov Bay muffled the roar of engines of more than thirty boats that cast off the shore of Pummanki and took course towards Maati Bay. The boats were carrying around three thousand marines of the 63rd Marine Brigade. Towards midnight, the marines landed on the shore of the bay in three groups. They were supposed to reach the Titovka-Petsamo road and block the enemy’s retreat. Landing troops also consisted of another, special group of 195 reconnaissancediversionary troops under the command of Captain N.P. Barchenko. They were to make their way to Cape Krestov unnoticed and destroy enemy batteries that controlled movement into Petsamo (Pechenga) Bay. Having met no resistance, groups of marines advanced inland.12

The onus of breaking through German defense was on the 12th Marine Brigade under the command of Colonel V.V. Rossokhin. A few hours prior to the attack, the brigade, then consisting of three battalions and a penal company, reached its start line along the line of the Musta Mountain ridge. At 3:30 a powerful artillery preparation started that lasted for an hour and half, after which infantry units started the attack. At this time

11L. Rendulich, Upravlenie voiskami (Moskva: 1974) p.196; N.M. Rumiantsev Razgrom vraga v Zapoliar’e (1941–1944 gg.) (Moskva: 1963) p.180.

12OTsVMA.f.11.d.14059.ll.14–19.

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strong southerly winds brought snow flurries that descended on the battlefield. Poor visibility allowed the defenders’ trenches to be approached close enough for the throwing of grenades. Soon key points of the defense line were taken over by the marines. After the assault the burial command gathered the remains of 76 marines. 289 infantry were injured. According to the Soviet data, enemy losses in this battle consisted of 437 soldiers and officers, of whom 14 were taken prisoner.13

During the day, the marines, while moving southward, reached the road to Petsamo, where on the evening of 11 October they took up defensive positions. However it was too late. The rearguard of the 6th German Mountain Division had passed just a few hours beforehand.14 Moreover, German units managed to stay ahead of the pursuit by almost 24 hours — being unable to effectively navigate on tundra, the marines were careful not to move at night.

At the time the battle was unfolding in the area of Musta Mountain ridge, the diversionary detachment under the command of I.P. Barchenko secretively approached Cape Krestov, which is located on the opposite shore to the port of Linakhamari, and at dawn on 12 October attacked one of the batteries on the western part of the cape. This attack was such a surprise that the commandos succeeded in capturing three 88-millimeter guns in working order. The detachment attempted to capture the neighboring 150-millimeter battery, but was however repulsed by the garrison with assistance from troops brought up from Linakhamari. Attacks renewed after the battery was bombed for four hours by aircraft launched from the airfield at Pummanki, showering them with phosphorus and rockets, and strafing their positions with cannon and machine-gun fire. Even after the bombardment, which should have destroyed any signs of life, the garrison continued to resist.

Only at the end of day on 13 October, with the arrival on the cape of a large soviet reinforcement and the landing at Linakhamari of the main force, were the Germans forced to surrender.15 The commandos had however fulfilled their task — they had inhibited the batteries covering Linakhamari and hence eased the task of marines at the port.

THE LANDING OF TROOPS AT LINAKHAMARI ON 12 OCTOBER

Around the beginning of the day the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral A.G. Golovko, was informed about the capture of Luostari by

13OTsVMA.f.General Headquarters of the Navy.d.13163.l.321.

14Rendulich (note 11) p.196; Rumiantsev (note 11) p.180.

15TsVMA .f.767.op.2.d.68.ll.21–23. For more details see I.P. Barchenko-Emel’ianov,

Frontovie budni Rybach’ego (Murmansk: 1984).

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14th Army and the movement of troops of the Karelian Front to the road west of Petsamo. To speed up the capture of this important harbor, the command made the decision to land troops at the port of Linakhamari, without waiting for the surrender of the garrison on Cape Krestov. Capture of this port would enable the blockade of Petsamo from the sea. Admiral A.G. Golovko was himself in charge of this operation. Major I.A. Timofeev was placed in charge of the troops on the ground, and the landing was the responsibility of Guards Captain 3rd class S.D. Ziuzin.

At around 21:00 three groups of boats with 660 marines on board left the base at Pummanki and two hours later approached Petsamo Bay. Regardless of all precautions taken, the troops were detected and shelled by shore batteries that controlled the entrance to the bay. Having reached full speed, the boats, under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union Captain-Lieutenant A.O. Shabalin, followed by a group of “Higgins” boats broke through the hail of fire towards the quays of the port.

The landing began under heavy fire. Two boats were holed, but were however able to leave the battlefield. Two other boats, having lost orientation in smoke, landed more than a hundred marines on the opposite, eastern shore of bay. Seeking shelter from artillery fire, submarine chaser MO-428 crashed onto rocks. The marines nonetheless captured the heights around Linakhamari in just over two hours. Early morning the next day the enemy attempted to counterattack, but without success — additional troops were required. Soon reconnaissance aircraft discovered an enemy column of 300 infantry, hastily moving on the road from Trifon to provide assistance to the garrison at Linakhamari. Captain P.A. Eudokimov’s planes attacked the column, destroying defenders last hope of reinforcement. After the air attack Major I.A. Timofeev and Senior Lieutenant B.F. Peterburgskii’s marines continued the attack, encircling the remainder of the German detachment. Towards the evening the bulk of this force ceased resistance.16

In the morning of the next day naval aircraft were engaged again, attacking the German batteries that maintained control over the entrance to the bay. In the afternoon, marines landed in this area, only to discover wrecked guns in positions billowing smoke with shell-holes in place of buildings. The garrisons had managed to evacuate prior to the landing by marines.

While the marines were examining the ruins of the batteries at the entrance to the bay, 12th Marine Brigade disembarked from Cape Krestov and was soon transported by boat to Linakhamari. Despite an exhausting forced night-time march over the tundra, 1st Battalion of the brigade

16OTsVMA.f.11.d.35713.ll.44–46. For more details see K.F. Fokeev, Desant v Lienakhamari (Moskva: 1968).

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continued the advance and towards the evening had ejected the Germans from the settlement of Trifon. Another unit, 63rd Brigade, during the day cleared the eastern shore of Petsamo Bay of small groups of the enemy and concentrated near the settlement of Parovara for transportation to Trifon.17 Nonetheless, the brigade’s participation in the battle for Trifon village was not needed. The German command hastened to withdraw troops from the area. From 13 October, as one of the brigades of the Karelian Front penetrated to the road to Tårnet, German forces in the Petsamo region had no other choice but to hastily withdraw to the west or surrender.

Early in the morning of 15 October Petsamo (Pechenga), the main target of the first stage of Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, fell. Units of the Northern Fleet played an important role in this. During the six days of the operation, marines threw the enemy back more than 80 kilometers, clearing the shore from the Motov to Pechenga Bays. The enemy suffered significant losses. In captured equipment alone the Fleet counted 120 guns and mortars, 134 machine-guns, and 590 examples of other firearms. During combat operations, units of the Northern Defense District lost 323 men killed and 822 injured.18 Side by side with the landing of marines, that rendered great assistance to the advancing troops of Karelian Front, submarines operated against German sea communications, along with torpedo boats and the Fleet’s aircraft. During the six days of the offensive they succeeded in sinking nine enemy transports and ships and to destroy no less than 8 aircraft. The Fleet’s losses were 16 aircraft.

With the fall of Pechenga operations of the Karelian Front were paused for three days as a result of the need to regroup forces and even more so by the need to resolve the question regarding the crossing of Norwegian border by Soviet troops. There were no such problems for the units of the Northern Fleet. They were able to regroup “on the go.”19 Therefore operation “West” was continued without pause. Aircraft and submarines

17OTsVMA.f.General Headquarters of the Navy.d.13163.ll.344,347. 18OTsVMA.f.11.d.14059.ll.48. German losses are also given here — 3,000 men killed,

which is highly unlikely. Currently it is impossible to establish the exact number. According to available sources, the total losses of the “Van Der Hoop” Division at this time did not exceed 1,000 men.

19With the occupation of Petsamo (Pechenga) a naval base was created on the basis of its port and units of the Northern Defence District, consisting of the 12th Marine Brigade under the command of Captain 1st Rank M.S. Klevenskii. According to the directives of the com- mander-in-chief and the chief of the headquarters of the Fleet of September 30, 1944, the following were among the goals of the base: defence of sea routes between Pechenga and Kola Bay, the organization of docking operations in this area, the provision of supplies to the troops of Karelian Front, and participation in landing operations on the shore of Varanger Fjord (TsVMA .f.767.op.2.d.68.ll.76,78.).

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of the Fleet were on station, MTBs patrolled the fjords, and naval vessels escorted supply convoys.

On 16 October aircraft reported that there was an enemy convoy originating from Bök Fjord. Attack aircraft took off. During the day, nine groups of attack planes and torpedo-bombers departed for the EkkeröyKramvik area in order to attack the convoy. As a result two ships were sunk. Losses to the Fleet’s aviation were not comparable: three Sturmoviks and eight “Bostons,” including the aircraft of the commander of the 9th Guards Air-Regiment B.P. Syromiatnikov. Regardless of the losses, the Fleet’s aircraft continued attacks on the convoys the day after. At dawn, 12 IL-2 aircraft bombarded ships near Cape Ekkeröy. The sinking of the escort V-6107 cost the Fleet five more aircrews.20 Torpedo boats also attempted to attack the convoy under the cover of night, but were driven off by powerful fire from the escorts. Five submarines patrolling near Norwegian shores did not discover any objectives for attack.

On 18 October the Karelian Front recommenced the advance to the west. At 13:50, the foremost units of the 253rd Rifle Regiment of the 45th Rifle Division under the command of General I.V. Panin were first to cross the Norwegian border, making haste for Tårnet.21 On the same day, the command of the Northern Fleet organized the third, major landing in the German rear from the start of the operation.

THE LANDING ON THE SUOLA AND AARES BAYS ON 18 OCTOBER

At 3:30 4th Battalion of the 12th Marine Brigade (485 men) under the command of mayor G.R. Blokhin were loaded onto boats and four hours later landed in two groups in the Suola and Aares Bays. Small German patrols were not able to put up any serious resistance to the marines. Towards the end of the day the first group scouted the territory from the Suola to Aares Bays. At the same time the second group reached the outskirts of the village of Afanas’ev, where they came under artillery fire. Further movement of the marines was renewed only after the fire of the German batteries had been suppressed by attack aircraft from the airfield at Pummanki.

In two days the battalion cleared the shore up to the Norwegian border and set up position on the shore of the bay opposite the Norwegian village of Kung Oscar. The battalion’s mortar men proceeded to fire at the village, which could not but cause consternation for the Germans. The latter attempted to counterattack during the evening of 21 October, but

20OTsVMA.f.20.d.38085.ll.12–13.

21Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence (TsAMO).f.363.op.6208.d.306.l.74.

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were however beaten off and suffered sizeable losses. Their significant losses and unfavorable reports from neighboring units did not leave them with any other choice but to leave Kung Oscar and adjacent settlements. The marines took advantage of the situation and occupied the settlement of Kung Oscar and two others on the evening of the following day.22

During these days, definite successes were achieved by submariners and sailors of the Northern Fleet. On 20 October, the submarine V-4 (commander - Captain 3rd Rank Ia.K. Iosseliane) attacked and sunk patrol boat UJ-1219 near the North Cape. On the same day the trawler R-311 was seriously damaged in uncertain circumstances. The next night five Soviet torpedo boats attacked a convoy en route to Pers Fjord. Boat N-215 under the command of 1st Lieutenant V.S. Kuznetsov had more luck than the others. A torpedo fired by this boat proved fatal for the minesweeper M-31.

Having returned from their night hunt, torpedo boats passed the watch to the aircraft. At 12:45 Moscow time 69 bombers and attack planes under the cover of 32 fighters attacked Kirkenes. During the bombardment depots were destroyed, two ships sunk and reserves of fresh water, necessary for steamship boilers, destroyed. The latter circumstance forced the German command to halt the evacuation of Kirkenes.23

During these days, the activities of naval aircraft continued almost uninterrupted, the short hours of daylight typical at these latitudes during the winter months yet to set in. At this time the number of sorties was into the hundreds. It appears that aviation bore the bulk of responsibility for sabotaging the enemy’s evacuation. All nine German ships sunk or seriously damaged between 22 and 27 October, were lost due the activities of aircraft of the Northern Fleet.

LANDING AT KOBBHOLM FJORD ON 23 OCTOBER

The next marine landing was undertaken when units of Karelian Front captured the town of Nikel’ and started the advance on Kirkenes. Marine units landed on the shore were supposed to clear the southern shore of Varanger Fjord from Kobbholm to Jar Fjord, thus providing assistance to 14th Army advancing on Kirkenes.

Late at night three groups of boats under the overall command of Captain 2nd Class B.A. Permskii left Linakhamari and five hours later approached Kobbholm Fjord, where they dispersed. According to their

22OTsVMA.f.General Headquarters of the Navy.d.13163.ll.364, 367.

23TsVMA .f.767.op.2.d.88.ll.262–262ob.; E.F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theatre of Operations, 1940–1945. Department of the Army. Pamphlet No 20–271 (Washington: 1959) p. 308 (also note 2).