- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •Introduction: the nancial system
- •Introduction: the nancial system
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1.2Financial institutions as ‘intermediaries’
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1.3The creation of assets and liabilities
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1.4Portfolio equilibrium
- •1.2 Financial markets
- •1.2Financial markets
- •1.2.1Types of product
- •1.2.2The supply of nancial instruments
- •1.2.3The demand for nancial instruments
- •1.2.4Stocks and ows in nancial markets
- •1.3 Lenders and borrowers
- •1.3Lenders and borrowers
- •1.3.1Saving and lending
- •1.3 Lenders and borrowers
- •1.3.2Borrowing
- •1.3.3Lending, borrowing and wealth
- •1.4 Summary
- •1.4Summary
- •2.1Lending, borrowing and national income
- •2.1 Lending, borrowing and national income
- •2.1 Lending, borrowing and national income
- •2.1 Lending, borrowing and national income
- •2.2 Financial activity and the level of aggregate demand
- •2.2Financial activity and the level of aggregate demand
- •2.2 Financial activity and the level of aggregate demand
- •2.2.2Liquid assets and spending
- •2.2.3Financial wealth and spending
- •2.3 The composition of aggregate demand
- •2.3The composition of aggregate demand
- •2.4 The nancial system and resource allocation
- •2.4The nancial system and resource allocation
- •2.4 The nancial system and resource allocation
- •2.5 Summary
- •2.5Summary
- •3.1The Bank of England
- •3.1 The Bank of England
- •3.1.1The conduct of monetary policy
- •3.1 The Bank of England
- •3.1.2Banker to the commercial banking system
- •3.1 The Bank of England
- •3.1.3Banker to the government
- •3.1.4Supervisor of the banking system
- •3.1 The Bank of England
- •3.1.5Management of the national debt
- •3.1.6Manager of the foreign exchange reserves
- •3.1.7Currency issue
- •3.2 Banks
- •3.2Banks
- •3.2 Banks
- •3.2 Banks
- •3.3Banks and the creation of money
- •3.3 Banks and the creation of money
- •3.3.1Why banks create money
- •3.3 Banks and the creation of money
- •3.3.2How banks create money
- •3.3 Banks and the creation of money
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4.1The demand for bank lending
- •3.4.2The demand for money
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4.3The monetary base
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.5Building societies
- •3.5 Building societies
- •3.6 Liability management
- •3.6Liability management
- •3.6 Liability management
- •4.1 Insurance companies
- •4.1Insurance companies
- •4.1 Insurance companies
- •4.1 Insurance companies
- •4.1 Insurance companies
- •4.2Pension funds
- •4.2 Pension funds
- •4.2 Pension funds
- •4.3Unit trusts
- •4.3 Unit trusts
- •4.3 Unit trusts
- •4.5NdtIs and the ow of funds
- •4.6Summary
- •Issuing house
- •5.1The discount market
- •5.1 The discount market
- •5.1 The discount market
- •5.1 The discount market
- •5.1 The discount market
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2.1The interbank market
- •5.2.2The market for certicates of deposit
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2.3The commercial paper market
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2.4The local authority market
- •5.2.5Repurchase agreements
- •5.2.6The euromarkets
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2.7The signicance of the parallel markets
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.3Monetary policy and the money markets
- •5.3 Monetary policy and the money markets
- •5.3 Monetary policy and the money markets
- •5.3 Monetary policy and the money markets
- •5.4Summary
- •6.1The importance of capital markets
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2.1Bonds
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •Index-linked bonds
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2.2Equities
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2.3The trading of bonds and equities
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.3Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.4Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.4 Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.4 Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.4 Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.4 Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.5The behaviour of security prices
- •6.5 The behaviour of security prices
- •6.5 The behaviour of security prices
- •6.5 The behaviour of security prices
- •6.5 The behaviour of security prices
- •6.6 Reading the nancial press
- •6.6Reading the nancial press
- •Interest rate concerns biggest one-day decline
- •6.6 Reading the nancial press
- •6.6 Reading the nancial press
- •6.7Summary
- •Interest rates
- •7.1The rate of interest
- •7.1 The rate of interest
- •7.2The loanable funds theory of real interest rates
- •7.2 The loanable funds theory of real interest rates
- •7.2 The loanable funds theory of real interest rates
- •7.2.1Loanable funds and nominal interest rates
- •7.2 The loanable funds theory of real interest rates
- •7.2.2Problems with the loanable funds theory
- •7.3 Loanable funds in an uncertain economy
- •7.3Loanable funds in an uncertain economy
- •7.4 The liquidity preference theory of interest rates
- •7.4The liquidity preference theory of interest rates
- •7.6 The monetary authorities and the rate of interest
- •7.5Loanable funds and liquidity preference
- •7.6The monetary authorities and the rate of interest
- •7.6 The monetary authorities and the rate of interest
- •7.6 The monetary authorities and the rate of interest
- •7.7The structure of interest rates
- •7.7 The structure of interest rates
- •7.7.1The term structure of interest rates
- •7.7.2The pure expectations theory of interest rate structure
- •7.7 The structure of interest rates
- •7.7.3Term premiums
- •7.7 The structure of interest rates
- •7.7 The structure of interest rates
- •7.7.4Market segmentation
- •7.8 The signicance of term structure theories
- •7.7.5Preferred habitat
- •7.7.6A summary of views on maturity substitutability
- •7.8The signicance of term structure theories
- •7.8 The signicance of term structure theories
- •7.9Summary
- •8.1 The nature of forex markets
- •8.1The nature of forex markets
- •8.1 The nature of forex markets
- •Indirect quotation
- •8.1 The nature of forex markets
- •8.2 Interest rate parity
- •8.2Interest rate parity
- •8.2 Interest rate parity
- •8.3 Other foreign exchange market rules
- •8.3Other foreign exchange market rules
- •8.3.1Differences in interest rates among countries – the Fisher effect
- •8.3 Other foreign exchange market rules
- •8.3.3Equilibrium in the forex markets
- •8.4Alternative views of forex markets
- •8.4 Alternative views of forex markets
- •8.6Monetary union in Europe
- •8.6 Monetary union in Europe
- •8.6 Monetary union in Europe
- •8.6 Monetary union in Europe
- •8.6.2The uk and the euro
- •8.7Summary
- •9.1Forms of exposure to exchange rate risk
- •9.1 Forms of exposure to exchange rate risk
- •9.2Exchange rate risk management techniques
- •9.3.1Financial futures
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3.2Options
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3.3Exotic options
- •9.4 Comparing different types of derivatives
- •9.4.2Forward versus futures contracts
- •9.4.3Forward and futures contracts versus options
- •9.5 The use and abuse of derivatives
- •9.5The use and abuse of derivatives
- •9.5 The use and abuse of derivatives
- •9.6 Summary
- •9.6Summary
- •International capital markets
- •10.1 The world capital market
- •10.1The world capital market
- •10.2Eurocurrencies
- •10.2 Eurocurrencies
- •10.2 Eurocurrencies
- •10.2.2The nature of the market
- •10.2 Eurocurrencies
- •10.2.3Issues relating to eurocurrency markets
- •10.2 Eurocurrencies
- •10.3 Techniques and instruments in the eurobond and euronote markets
- •10.3 Techniques and instruments in the eurobond and euronote markets
- •10.3 Techniques and instruments in the eurobond and euronote markets
- •10.4 Summary
- •10.4Summary
- •11.1 The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.1The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.1 The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.1 The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.1 The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.2 Financing the psncr
- •11.2Financing the psncr
- •11.2.1The psncr and interest rates
- •11.2 Financing the psncr
- •11.2.2The sale of bonds to banks
- •11.2.3The sale of bonds overseas
- •11.2.4Psncr, interest rates and the money supply – a conclusion
- •11.2 Financing the psncr
- •11.3 Attitudes to public debt in the European Union
- •11.4The public debt and open market operations
- •11.6Summary
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1.1The nancing needs of rms and attempted remedies
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1.2Financial market exclusion
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1.3The nancial system and long-term saving
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1.4The nancial system and household indebtedness
- •12.2 Financial instability: bubbles and crises
- •12.2Financial instability: bubbles and crises
- •12.2 Financial instability: bubbles and crises
- •12.3 Fraudulent behaviour and scandals in nancial markets
- •12.3Fraudulent behaviour and scandals in nancial markets
- •12.3 Fraudulent behaviour and scandals in nancial markets
- •12.3 Fraudulent behaviour and scandals in nancial markets
- •12.4The damaging effects of international markets?
- •12.4 The damaging effects of international markets?
- •12.5Summary
- •13.1 The theory of regulation
- •13.1The theory of regulation
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2.1Regulatory changes in the 1980s
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2.3The 1998 reforms
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2.4The Financial Services Authority (fsa)
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.3 The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3 The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3.1Regulation of the banking industry in the eu
- •13.3 The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3.2Regulation of the securities markets in the eu
- •13.3 The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3.3Regulation of insurance services in the eu
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.5Summary
- •Interest rates (I%)
- •Interest rates (I%)
- •Interest rates (I%)
- •Interest rates (I%)
12.3 Fraudulent behaviour and scandals in nancial markets
and move money around among subsidiaries but the claimed funds sometimes did not
exist. The company led for bankruptcy. Calisto Tanzi was arrested.
In addition, questions were asked about the company’s accounting rm, the US-
based Grant Thornton, which had audited Parmalat’s books until 1999 and had continued
to audit the books of Bonlat, the subsidiary with the missing $4.9bn. Grant Thornton
claimed that it had been the victim of a fraud but the head of the Italian branch of the
company resigned and his partner was suspended after warrants had been issued for
their arrest.
As well as the charges in Italy, the SEC in the US charged Parmalat with fraudulently
offering $100m of unsecured notes to US investors and of inating its assets by at least
$5bn. In late May 2004, Italian prosecutors sought to have thirty-two Parmalat execut-
ives put on trial. Several former executives later pleaded guilty to misleading investors,
received jail sentences and testied in the trial of Calisto Tanzi. The trial was still continuing
in September 2006.
Parmalat was subsequently rebuilt as a company and again listed on the Italian stock
exchange. In 2006, the new management of the company sought to take legal action
against banks whom it believed assisted in the fraud.
Enron, a regional natural gas pipeline company, was formed in 1985 through a
merger between two other companies, Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth. The
chairman and chief executive of the new company, Kenneth Lay, was a long-time
friend of George W Bush, who was to become US President in 2000. The US energy
market was deregulated in the late 1980s and from 1989 Enron began trading natural
gas and electricity allowing users to buy gas or electricity from different producers.
It made its breakthrough via contracts to deliver energy products at future dates. It
also sold nancial instruments designed to protect customers against large swings in
energy prices. It thus effectively moved from being a straightforward energy company
to a derivatives and nancial company. It was frequently recommended by stock
market analysts because of its innovative approach to energy trading. In 1999 Enron
took advantage of the dot.com boom by launching Enron online, the rst global
commodity trading web site.
The company had also expanded during the 1990s by takeovers including, in
1998, the British water company, Wessex Water. It became the US’s seventh biggest
corporation and in 2000 its share price peaked at $90.56. However, Enron had
nanced its takeovers by going heavily into debt, concealing the extent of that debt
by dubious accounting practices including the establishment of complex special
partnerships. Thus, their share price was based on misleading information about the
state of the company.
By early 2001 things were beginning to go wrong. Within Enron’s auditor, Arthur
Andersen (itself the US’s eighth biggest company), worries were beginning to be
expressed about the accounting practices being followed. Nonetheless, it later emerged
that the auditor had sought to protect its client from investigation by destroying
a number of important documents. Jeffrey Skilling, who had taken over from
Kenneth Lay as chief executive in February 2001, resigned from the job in August
2001, the position reverting to Kenneth Lay. Skilling claimed ‘personal reasons’ for
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Chapter 12 • Financial market failure and nancial crises
the resignation but it soon became clear that severe difculties lay ahead. At around
this time, the major gures in the corporation began selling their shares in the com-
pany while the share price was still high. In October 2001 Enron reported a $618m
loss for the previous quarter and disclosed a $1.2bn reduction in shareholder equity,
partly in connection with partnerships run by chief nancial ofcer Andrew Fastow,
who was sacked by the company. Enron shares lost a fth of their value and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation into the account-
ing practices. In November 2001 Enron admitted to having greatly overstated its
prots over the previous four years. Its credit rating was slashed to junk bond status.
This seriously damaged the company because many of Enron’s debt agreements were
dependent on the retention of its investment grade credit rating – the loss of that
rating triggered debt repayments that it could not make.
At the beginning of December 2001 Enron led for bankruptcy. It was at that time
the biggest bankruptcy in US corporate history but was surpassed by the bankruptcy
of WorldCom in the summer of 2002. Four thousand Enron employees lost their
jobs. The pension plans of many Enron employees lost almost all their value because
they held many Enron shares.
In January 2002, the US Justice Department opened a criminal investigation into
Enron and, later the same year, charged Arthur Andersen with the obstruction of
justice. The accounting company collapsed with the loss of 85,000 jobs. Kenneth
Lay resigned as Chairman and Chief Executive and a former deputy chairman com-
mitted suicide. In October 2002, Andrew Fastow was indicted on seventy-eight charges
including conspiracy, fraud and money laundering. In 2003, Fastow’s wife and seven
other executives were charged. At the beginning of 2004, Fastow and his wife pleaded
guilty. Fastow accepted a ten-year prison sentence and became a prosecution witness.
His wife was jailed for one year. Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling were arrested and
their trial began in January 2005.
In May 2006 Lay was convicted on six counts of wire fraud, securities fraud and
conspiracy. Skilling was found guilty on nineteen counts of conspiracy, securities
fraud, insider trading and making false statements. Sentences were to be announced
in September 2006 but Lay who was facing a prison sentence of up to forty-ve years
died of a heart attack in early July 2006.
We have here added two of the major nancial scandals of recent years to the
several others dealt with in this book. There have been many others – WorldCom,
Allied Irish Banks, the Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI), Daiwa
Bank, Hollinger International...In scandals such as these, jobs are lost, share-
holders lose out, often employees lose savings, high legal costs have to be met and
condence in the equities market and other nancial markets are damaged. Two sets
of questions arise:
-
l
Are the frauds that often produce these scandals simply the result of a ‘small
number of bad apples’? Or do they suggest something seriously wrong with the
operation of nancial markets?
-
l
How do these frauds escape attention for so long? What can be done to reduce
their number and importance in the future?
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