- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •Introduction: the nancial system
- •Introduction: the nancial system
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1.2Financial institutions as ‘intermediaries’
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1.3The creation of assets and liabilities
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1 Financial institutions
- •1.1.4Portfolio equilibrium
- •1.2 Financial markets
- •1.2Financial markets
- •1.2.1Types of product
- •1.2.2The supply of nancial instruments
- •1.2.3The demand for nancial instruments
- •1.2.4Stocks and ows in nancial markets
- •1.3 Lenders and borrowers
- •1.3Lenders and borrowers
- •1.3.1Saving and lending
- •1.3 Lenders and borrowers
- •1.3.2Borrowing
- •1.3.3Lending, borrowing and wealth
- •1.4 Summary
- •1.4Summary
- •2.1Lending, borrowing and national income
- •2.1 Lending, borrowing and national income
- •2.1 Lending, borrowing and national income
- •2.1 Lending, borrowing and national income
- •2.2 Financial activity and the level of aggregate demand
- •2.2Financial activity and the level of aggregate demand
- •2.2 Financial activity and the level of aggregate demand
- •2.2.2Liquid assets and spending
- •2.2.3Financial wealth and spending
- •2.3 The composition of aggregate demand
- •2.3The composition of aggregate demand
- •2.4 The nancial system and resource allocation
- •2.4The nancial system and resource allocation
- •2.4 The nancial system and resource allocation
- •2.5 Summary
- •2.5Summary
- •3.1The Bank of England
- •3.1 The Bank of England
- •3.1.1The conduct of monetary policy
- •3.1 The Bank of England
- •3.1.2Banker to the commercial banking system
- •3.1 The Bank of England
- •3.1.3Banker to the government
- •3.1.4Supervisor of the banking system
- •3.1 The Bank of England
- •3.1.5Management of the national debt
- •3.1.6Manager of the foreign exchange reserves
- •3.1.7Currency issue
- •3.2 Banks
- •3.2Banks
- •3.2 Banks
- •3.2 Banks
- •3.3Banks and the creation of money
- •3.3 Banks and the creation of money
- •3.3.1Why banks create money
- •3.3 Banks and the creation of money
- •3.3.2How banks create money
- •3.3 Banks and the creation of money
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4.1The demand for bank lending
- •3.4.2The demand for money
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4.3The monetary base
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.4 Constraints on bank lending
- •3.5Building societies
- •3.5 Building societies
- •3.6 Liability management
- •3.6Liability management
- •3.6 Liability management
- •4.1 Insurance companies
- •4.1Insurance companies
- •4.1 Insurance companies
- •4.1 Insurance companies
- •4.1 Insurance companies
- •4.2Pension funds
- •4.2 Pension funds
- •4.2 Pension funds
- •4.3Unit trusts
- •4.3 Unit trusts
- •4.3 Unit trusts
- •4.5NdtIs and the ow of funds
- •4.6Summary
- •Issuing house
- •5.1The discount market
- •5.1 The discount market
- •5.1 The discount market
- •5.1 The discount market
- •5.1 The discount market
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2.1The interbank market
- •5.2.2The market for certicates of deposit
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2.3The commercial paper market
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2.4The local authority market
- •5.2.5Repurchase agreements
- •5.2.6The euromarkets
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.2.7The signicance of the parallel markets
- •5.2 The ‘parallel’ markets
- •5.3Monetary policy and the money markets
- •5.3 Monetary policy and the money markets
- •5.3 Monetary policy and the money markets
- •5.3 Monetary policy and the money markets
- •5.4Summary
- •6.1The importance of capital markets
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2.1Bonds
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •Index-linked bonds
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2.2Equities
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2.3The trading of bonds and equities
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.2 Characteristics of bonds and equities
- •6.3Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.3 Bonds: supply, demand and price
- •6.4Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.4 Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.4 Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.4 Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.4 Equities: supply, demand and price
- •6.5The behaviour of security prices
- •6.5 The behaviour of security prices
- •6.5 The behaviour of security prices
- •6.5 The behaviour of security prices
- •6.5 The behaviour of security prices
- •6.6 Reading the nancial press
- •6.6Reading the nancial press
- •Interest rate concerns biggest one-day decline
- •6.6 Reading the nancial press
- •6.6 Reading the nancial press
- •6.7Summary
- •Interest rates
- •7.1The rate of interest
- •7.1 The rate of interest
- •7.2The loanable funds theory of real interest rates
- •7.2 The loanable funds theory of real interest rates
- •7.2 The loanable funds theory of real interest rates
- •7.2.1Loanable funds and nominal interest rates
- •7.2 The loanable funds theory of real interest rates
- •7.2.2Problems with the loanable funds theory
- •7.3 Loanable funds in an uncertain economy
- •7.3Loanable funds in an uncertain economy
- •7.4 The liquidity preference theory of interest rates
- •7.4The liquidity preference theory of interest rates
- •7.6 The monetary authorities and the rate of interest
- •7.5Loanable funds and liquidity preference
- •7.6The monetary authorities and the rate of interest
- •7.6 The monetary authorities and the rate of interest
- •7.6 The monetary authorities and the rate of interest
- •7.7The structure of interest rates
- •7.7 The structure of interest rates
- •7.7.1The term structure of interest rates
- •7.7.2The pure expectations theory of interest rate structure
- •7.7 The structure of interest rates
- •7.7.3Term premiums
- •7.7 The structure of interest rates
- •7.7 The structure of interest rates
- •7.7.4Market segmentation
- •7.8 The signicance of term structure theories
- •7.7.5Preferred habitat
- •7.7.6A summary of views on maturity substitutability
- •7.8The signicance of term structure theories
- •7.8 The signicance of term structure theories
- •7.9Summary
- •8.1 The nature of forex markets
- •8.1The nature of forex markets
- •8.1 The nature of forex markets
- •Indirect quotation
- •8.1 The nature of forex markets
- •8.2 Interest rate parity
- •8.2Interest rate parity
- •8.2 Interest rate parity
- •8.3 Other foreign exchange market rules
- •8.3Other foreign exchange market rules
- •8.3.1Differences in interest rates among countries – the Fisher effect
- •8.3 Other foreign exchange market rules
- •8.3.3Equilibrium in the forex markets
- •8.4Alternative views of forex markets
- •8.4 Alternative views of forex markets
- •8.6Monetary union in Europe
- •8.6 Monetary union in Europe
- •8.6 Monetary union in Europe
- •8.6 Monetary union in Europe
- •8.6.2The uk and the euro
- •8.7Summary
- •9.1Forms of exposure to exchange rate risk
- •9.1 Forms of exposure to exchange rate risk
- •9.2Exchange rate risk management techniques
- •9.3.1Financial futures
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3.2Options
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3 Derivatives markets
- •9.3.3Exotic options
- •9.4 Comparing different types of derivatives
- •9.4.2Forward versus futures contracts
- •9.4.3Forward and futures contracts versus options
- •9.5 The use and abuse of derivatives
- •9.5The use and abuse of derivatives
- •9.5 The use and abuse of derivatives
- •9.6 Summary
- •9.6Summary
- •International capital markets
- •10.1 The world capital market
- •10.1The world capital market
- •10.2Eurocurrencies
- •10.2 Eurocurrencies
- •10.2 Eurocurrencies
- •10.2.2The nature of the market
- •10.2 Eurocurrencies
- •10.2.3Issues relating to eurocurrency markets
- •10.2 Eurocurrencies
- •10.3 Techniques and instruments in the eurobond and euronote markets
- •10.3 Techniques and instruments in the eurobond and euronote markets
- •10.3 Techniques and instruments in the eurobond and euronote markets
- •10.4 Summary
- •10.4Summary
- •11.1 The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.1The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.1 The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.1 The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.1 The measurement of public decits and debt
- •11.2 Financing the psncr
- •11.2Financing the psncr
- •11.2.1The psncr and interest rates
- •11.2 Financing the psncr
- •11.2.2The sale of bonds to banks
- •11.2.3The sale of bonds overseas
- •11.2.4Psncr, interest rates and the money supply – a conclusion
- •11.2 Financing the psncr
- •11.3 Attitudes to public debt in the European Union
- •11.4The public debt and open market operations
- •11.6Summary
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1.1The nancing needs of rms and attempted remedies
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1.2Financial market exclusion
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1.3The nancial system and long-term saving
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1 Borrowing and lending problems in nancial intermediation
- •12.1.4The nancial system and household indebtedness
- •12.2 Financial instability: bubbles and crises
- •12.2Financial instability: bubbles and crises
- •12.2 Financial instability: bubbles and crises
- •12.3 Fraudulent behaviour and scandals in nancial markets
- •12.3Fraudulent behaviour and scandals in nancial markets
- •12.3 Fraudulent behaviour and scandals in nancial markets
- •12.3 Fraudulent behaviour and scandals in nancial markets
- •12.4The damaging effects of international markets?
- •12.4 The damaging effects of international markets?
- •12.5Summary
- •13.1 The theory of regulation
- •13.1The theory of regulation
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2.1Regulatory changes in the 1980s
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2.3The 1998 reforms
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.2.4The Financial Services Authority (fsa)
- •13.2 Financial regulation in the uk
- •13.3 The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3 The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3.1Regulation of the banking industry in the eu
- •13.3 The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3.2Regulation of the securities markets in the eu
- •13.3 The European Union and nancial regulation
- •13.3.3Regulation of insurance services in the eu
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.4 The problems of globalisation and the growing complexity of derivatives markets
- •13.5Summary
- •Interest rates (I%)
- •Interest rates (I%)
- •Interest rates (I%)
- •Interest rates (I%)
7.7.3Term premiums
However, people do not have perfect information about the future course of short-
term interest rates. All they can have are estimates of these rates, which are subject
to the risk of error. The further into the future we try to look, the greater is the
chance that we shall be wrong. Suppose a lender acquires a long-term bond that
pays an interest rate related to expected short-term interest rates but then nds
that short-term rates rise above the expected level. As current interest rates rise, the
prices of existing bonds fall, and bond holders suffer a capital loss. As we have seen
in Chapter 6, the longer the time to maturity of the bond, the greater will be the fall
in bond price. It follows that the risk of capital loss associated with any given error
in forecasting future interest rates, the capital risk,is greater for long-term than for
short-term bonds.
People respond to risk in different ways. If they have the same attitude to both
the risk of loss and the prospect of gain, the two balance out and they are said to be
risk-neutral. In this case, the yield curve reects what investors expect to happen
to short-term rates of interest. In equilibrium, the outcome is exactly the same as
with perfect certainty. However, now it is possible that investors’ expectations will
be wrong and thus that the market will not be in equilibrium. This case is set out
formally in Box 7.4.
-
Box 7.4
The expectations view of the term structure of interest rates under
uncertainty assuming risk neutrality
Assume that there are two types of bond available to investors. They are identical in all
ways but one – one bond is for one year only (short-term bond); the second bond is for
two years (long-term bond). A person who wishes to invest for two years has a choice of
two strategies.
Strategy A
Buy a one-year bond now and when it matures in one year’s time, use the funds to buy
a second one-year bond. The investor knows the current rate of interest on one year
bonds, i, but does not know what the rate of interest on one-year bonds will be in
s
one year’s time. However, he holds the same expectation about that rate (which we shall
call the expected future short-term rate, i) as everyone else in the market.
224
....
FINM_C07.qxd 1/18/07 11:33 AM Page 225
7.7 The structure of interest rates
Strategy B
Buy a two-year bond now. The investor knows the current rate of interest on a two-year
bond (i*).
Calculations
The investor can thus calculate the certain return to Strategy B and the expected return
to Strategy A.
2
The certain return to strategy B we can write as (1 i*). All interest rates, remember, are
written as decimals. Thus, if i* were 5 per cent, a £100 bond would return in two years’
time: £(100) (1 0.05)2£100 1.1025 £110.25.
The expectedreturn to Strategy A, we can write as: (1 i)(1 i).
s
Now we can calculate the value that iwould need to be for the two strategies to pro-
duce the same return at the end of two years: that is, the value imust take for the investor
to be indifferent between the two strategies. We call this value f. By denition,
2
(1 i)(1 f) (1 i*)2
s2
2
and, (1 f) (1 i*)/(1 i).
2s
Let ibe 4 per cent and i* be 5 per cent. Then, (1 f) 1.1025/1.04 1.06 and
s2
f0.06 or 6 per cent.
2
In other words, if investors are to be indifferent between the two strategies, the
expected short-term rate of interest in one year’s time must be 6 per cent. Then no one
would have a reason for changing the balance of their present holdings of one-year and
two-year bonds: the market would be in equilibrium.
That is, our equilibrium condition for the market is that i(the expected future short-
term rate of interest) be equal to f(the rate of interest that causes the two strategies to
2
produce the same return at the end of two years).
It follows that if people expect the short-run rate in one year’s time to be greater than
f(i.e. if), they will shift from long to short bonds without limit. In the reverse case
22
(if) they will shift from short to long bonds without limit.
2
In the latter case, capital risk would increase, but there is both an upside risk (interest
rates fall and bond prices rise) and a downside risk (interest rates rise and bond prices
fall). Risk-neutral investors will see the upside and downside risk as offsetting each other.
In equilibrium, with if, the term structure indicates what the market expects to happen
2
to short rates, just as under conditions of certainty. Thus, if ii* and fi, then ii; people
s 2 ss
are expecting short-run rates to rise: the yield curve will be rising. Equally, if ii* but fi,
s2s
then iiand people are expecting short rates to fall: the yield curve will be falling.
s
If we next assume that people generally do not much like taking risks (they are
risk averse), we can argue that lenders will have to be paid a rather higher rate
of interest than the average of the expected but uncertain short-term rates to per-
suade them to buy longer-term bonds. This addition to the interest rate is sometimes
known as a risk premium, but is better referred to as a term premium to avoid con-
fusion with the risk premium paid to offset exchange rate risk or default risk. It
is also sometimes referred to as a liquidity premium but this, strictly speaking, is
incorrect since ‘liquidity’ refers to the speed and ease with which an asset can be
converted into money without risk. A long-term bond can be converted into cash as
225
....
FINM_C07.qxd 1/18/07 11:33 AM Page 226
Chapter 7 • Interest rates
quickly and as easily as a short-term bond through the secondary market. The term
premium is justied by the extra risk of capital loss associated with a long-term
bond, not with any greater difculty involved in converting the bond into cash.
Term premium:The addition to the rate of interest needed to persuade capital
risk-averse savers to lend for longer periods.
If we apply this to the example in Box 7.3, the rate of interest on ve-year bonds
will need to be greater than 10 per cent because, although lenders are as likely to
overestimate as to underestimate future short-term rates, since we have assumed them
to be risk-averse, they will be more worried by the possibility of underestimating
them. (In the jargon we can say that they are more worried by the downside risk
than they are attracted by the upside risk.) We can say that interest rates on long-term
securities will include a term premium. This provides an extra reason for an upward-
sloping yield curve; but yield curves may still slope down, despite the inclusion of
a term premium in the long-term rates. For instance, if people expect short-term
rates to fall in the future, they have an incentive to buy long-term bonds now to
‘lock in’ to current rates. However, this increased demand for long bonds will force
up their price and force down long interest rates. This effect may be strong enough
to outweigh the term premium included in long rates.
Why are borrowers willing to pay this premium? Borrowers raise funds in order
to invest – to acquire assets that will produce a prot at a rate higher than they
are paying to borrow. However, they do not wish (and may indeed not be able) to
repay the loan until they have earned their prots. If their investment projects are
long-term ones (as, for example, are most purchases of capital equipment), they will
prefer to borrow long (matching long-term liabilities to long-term assets). Thus, we
can summarise much of the foregoing by saying that lenders would (other things
being equal) rather lend short term whereas borrowers often wish to borrow long.
Borrowers may thus be prepared to pay a higher rate of interest on long-term funds
than the average of expected short-term rates of interest in order to obtain funds in
the form they prefer.
So far, we have been assuming that all lenders have the same attitudes. Specically,
we have been assuming that all risk-averse lenders are worried about capital risk.
However, some savers may have no plans to sell their bonds before the maturity
date. Since they know that at maturity they will be paid the face value of the bond,
such savers have no reason to be worried about capital risk. Rather, their concern
might be with the size of interest payments that they receive every six months. For
them, long-term bonds provide greater certainty than short-term ones. People buy-
ing fteen-year bonds and intending to hold them until maturity know how much
income they will receive for the whole of that period. People buying a series of
fteen one-year bonds do not know this since the income they receive each year will
depend on what happens to short-term interest rates in the future. They face the risk
that short-term interest rates might fall. In other words, they face an income risk.
We have seen in Chapter 4 that some institutions, for example pension funds and
life insurance companies, have a good idea of liabilities well into the future and wish
226
....
FINM_C07.qxd 1/18/07 11:33 AM Page 227
