2.2 Выбор правил голосования

Алескеров Ф., Ортешук П. Выборы. Голосование. Партии. – М.: Академия, 1995. – 206 с.

Тагепера Р., Шугарт М.С. Описание избирательных систем (гл. из кн. Tagepera R., Sugart M.S. Seats and Votes: The Effects of Determination of Electoral Systems. New Haven, 1989 // Полис 1997. №3. С. 114-136

Epstein Richard A. Promise and Pitfall of Simple Rules // Constitutional Political Economy, 1998. v. 9. P. 151-161

Heckelman Jac. C. The effect of the secret ballot on voter turnout rates // Public Choice Vol. 82, Issue 1/2, January 1995. P. 107-124.

Miller G. The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science// Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXV (September1997). P. 1173-1204.

Saari D. Decisions and Elections. Explaining the Unexpected. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Wicksell Knut. A New Principle of Just Taxation. In: Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. Ed by R.A. Musgrave and A. Peacock, L. Macmillan. 1958. P. 72-118.

Zywicki Todd. J. Epstein and Polanyi on Simple Rules, Complex Systems, and Decentralization // Constitutional Political Economy,1998. v. 9. P. 143-150

2.3. Правило большинства

Bickers Kenneth N., Stein Robert M. Building majority coalitions for sub-majority benefit distributions // Public Choice Vol. 91, Issue 3/4, June 1997 P. 229-249 (2.3.)

Douglas R.Arnold. Legislators, Bureaucrats, and Locational Decisions // Public Choice, 37,1981, P. 107-32.

Eavey C.L. and Miller G.J. Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining? // American Political Science Review, 78, Sept. 1984, P. 719-33.

Kramer Gerald. On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule // Econometrica, 41, March 1973, P. 285-97.

Miguel Gouveia. Majority rule and the public provision of a private good //Public Choice Vol. 93, Issue 3/4, 1997. P. 221-244.

McKelvey R. Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control // Journal of Economic Theory, 12,1976, P. 472-482.

Plott C. A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule // American Economic Review, 57 (1967), P.787-806.

Shepsle K.A. and Weingast B.R. Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice // Public Choice. Vol. 37. 1981 P.503-19.

Stratmann Thomas The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting // American Economic Review, 82, Dec. 1992, P. 1162-76.

Tullock Gordon. Why So Much Stability? // Public Choice. 1981. Vol 37. P. 189-202.

2.4. Правило большинства и правило единогласия

Rae D. Decision Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice // American Political Science Review. 1969. Vol 63. P. 40-57.

Rae D. The Limits of Consensual Decision // American Political Science Review. 1975. Vol. 69. P.1270- 1294.

2.5. Альтернативы правила большинства

Groves Т. and Ledyard J. Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem // Econometrica. 1977. Vol. 45, May P. 783-809.

Hylland A. and Zeckhauser R. Selecting Public Goods Bundles with Preferences Unknown and Tax System Given, mimeo. H. Moulin. Prudence versus Sophistication in Voting Strategy // Journal of Economic Theory. 1981. Vol. 24. P. 398-412.

Moulin H. Prudence versus Sophistication in Voting Strategy.- Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, vol. 24, p. 398-412.

Mueller D. Voting by Veto // Journal of Public Economics, 1978. Vol. 10. P. 57-75.

Tideman N. and Тullock G. A New and Superior Process for Making Social Decisions // Journal of Political Economy, 84, 1976, P. 1145-1159.