Definition of SECURITY

1

: the quality or state of being secure: as

a : freedom from danger : safety

b : freedom from fear or anxiety

c : freedom from the prospect of being laid off <job security>

2

a : something given, deposited, or pledged to make certain the fulfillment of an obligation

b : surety

3

: an instrument of investment in the form of a document (as a stock certificate or bond) providing evidence of its ownership

4

a : something that secures : protection

b (1) : measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage, crime, attack, or escape (2) : an organization or department whose task is security

1. An investment instrument, other than an insurance policy or fixed annuity, issued by a corporation, government, or other organization which offers evidence of debt or equity. The official definition, from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is: "Any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royaltyor lease, any collateral trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited."

2. Property which is pledged as collateral for a loan.

Definition of 'Security'

A financial instrument that represents: an ownership position in a publicly-traded corporation (stock), a creditor relationship with governmental body or a corporation (bond), or rights to ownership as represented by an option. A security is a fungible, negotiable financial instrument that represents some type of financial value. The company or entity that issues the security is known as the issuer.  For example, the issuer of a bond issue may be a municipal government raising funds for a particular project. Investors of securities may be retail investors - those who buy and sell securities on their own behalf and not for an organization - and wholesale investors - financial institutions acting on behalf of clients or acting on their own account. Institutional investors include investment banks, pension funds, managed funds and insurance companies.

Investopedia explains 'Security'

Securities are typically divided into debt securities and equities. A debt security is a type of security that represents money that is borrowed that must be repaid, with terms that define the amount borrowed, interest rate and maturity/renewal date. Debt securities include government and corporate bonds, certificates of deposit (CDs), preferred stock and collateralized securities (such as CDOs and CMOs).  Equities represent ownership interest held by shareholders in a corporation, such as a stock. Unlike holders of debt securities who generally receive only interest and the repayment of the principal, holders of equity securities are able to profit from capital gains.  In the United States, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other self-regulatory organizations (such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) regulate the public offer and sale of securities.

Definition of security

noun (plural securities)

• 1 [mass noun] the state of being free from danger or threat:the system is designed to provide maximum security against toxic spillsjob security

• the safety of a state or organization against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage:a matter of national security

• procedures followed or measures taken to ensure the security of a state or organization:amid tight security the presidents met in the Colombian resort

• the state of feeling safe, stable, and free from fear or anxiety:this man could give her the emotional security she needed

• 2a thing deposited or pledged as a guarantee of the fulfilment of an undertaking or the repayment of a loan, to be forfeited in case of default.

• 3 (often securities) a certificate attesting credit, the ownership of stocks or bonds, or the right to ownership connected with tradable derivatives.

n. pl. se·cu·ri·ties

1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety.

2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.

3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:

a. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious.

b. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack.

c. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant.

d. Measures adopted to prevent escape: Security in the prison is very tight.

4. Something deposited or given as assurance of the fulfillment of an obligation; a pledge.

5. One who undertakes to fulfill the obligation of another; a surety.

6. A document indicating ownership or creditorship; a stock certificate or bond.

International security

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Global security" redirects here. For the website of that name, see GlobalSecurity.org. For the academic journal, see International Security.

Terrorism like that on September 11 is one of the concerns of international security.^{[clarification needed]}

International security consists of the measures taken by nations and international organizations, such as the United Nations, to ensure mutual survival and safety. These measures include military action and diplomatic agreements such as treaties and conventions. International and national security are invariably linked. International security is national security or state security in the global arena.

With the end of World War II, a new subject of study focusing on international security emerged. It began as an independent field of study, but was absorbed as a sub-field of international relations.^[1] Since it took hold in the 1950s, the study of international security has been at the heart of international relations studies.^[2] It covers labels like “security studies”, “strategic studies”, “peace studies”, and others.

There is no universal definition of the concept of security, but concepts in international security studies have been defined, such as sovereignty, war, anarchy, security dilemma, etc. The meaning of "security" is often treated as a common sense term that can be understood by "unacknowledged consensus".^[3] As there is no universal concept, the content of international security has expanded over the years. Today it covers a variety of interconnected issues in the world that have an impact on survival. It ranges from the traditional or conventional modes of military power, the causes and consequences of war between states, economic strength, to ethnic, religious and ideological conflicts, trade and economic conflicts, energy supplies,science and technology, food, as well as threats to human security and the stability of states from environmental degradation, infectious diseases, climate change and the activities of non-state actors.^[4]

While the wide perspective of international security regards everything as a security matter, the traditional approach focuses mainly or exclusively on military concerns.^[1]

[edit]Concepts of security in the international arena

See also: National security#Definitions

There is no universal definition of the concept of security. Edward Kolodziej has compared it to a Tower of Babel.^[5] Roland Paris (2004) views it as “in the eye of the beholder”.^[6] But there is a consensus that it is important and multidimensional. It has been widely applied to “justify suspending civil liberties, making war, and massively reallocating resources during the last fifty years”.^[7]

Walter Lippmann (1944) views security as the capability of a country to protect its core values, both in terms that a state need not sacrifice core values in avoiding war and can maintain them by winning war.^[8] David Baldwin (1997) argues that pursuing security sometimes requires sacrificing other values, including marginal values and prime values.^[7] Richard Ullman (1983) has suggested that a decrease in vulnerability is security.^[9]

Arnold Wolfers (1952) argues that “security” is generally a normative term. It is applied by nations “in order to be either expedient - a rational means toward an accepted end - or moral, the best or least evil course of action”.^[10] In the same way that people are different in sensing and identifying danger and threats, Wolfers argues that different nations also have different expectations of security. Not only is there a difference between forbearance of threats, but different nations also face different levels of threats because of their unique geographical, economic, ecological, and political environment.

Barry Buzan (2000) views the study of international security as more than a study of threats, but also a study of which threats that can be tolerated and which require immediate action.^[11] He sees the concept of security as not either power or peace, but something in between.^[12]

The concept of an international security actor has extended in all directions since the 1990s, from nations to groups, individuals, international systems, NGOs, and local governments.^[13]

[edit]The Multi-Sum Security Principle

Traditional approaches to international security usually focus on state actors and their military capacities to protect national security. However, over the last decades the definition of security has been extended to cope with the 21st century globalized international community, its rapid technological developments and global threats that emerged out of this process. One such comprehensive definition has been proposed by Nayef Al-Rodhan. What he calls the "Multi-sum security principle" is based on the assumption that "in a globalized world, security can no longer be thought of as a zero-sum game involving states alone. Global security, instead, has five dimensions that include human, environmental, national, transnational, and transcultural security, and therefore, global security and the security of any state or culture cannot be achieved without good governance at all levels that guarantees security through justice for all individuals, states, and cultures."^[14]

Each of these five dimensions refers to a different set of substrates. The first dimension refers to human security, a concept that makes the principle referent object of security the individual, not the state. The second dimension is environmental security and includes issues like climate change, global warming, and access to resources. The third substrate refers to national security, defined as being linked to the state’s monopoly over use of force in a given territory and as a substrate of security that emphasizes the military and policing components of security. The fourth component deals with transnational threats such as organized crime, terrorism, and human trafficking. Finally, the integrity of diverse cultures and civilisational forms tackles the issue of transcultural security. According to this multi-faceted security framework all five dimensions of security need to be addressed in order to provide just and sustainable global security. It therefore advocates cooperative interaction between states and peaceful existence between cultural groups and civilizations.^[15]

[edit]Traditional security

[edit]Introduction

The traditional security paradigm refers to a realist construct of security in which the referent object of security is the state. The prevalence of this theorem reached a peak during the Cold War. For almost half a century, major world powers entrusted the security of their nation to a balance of power among states. In this sense international stability relied on the premise that if state security is maintained, then the security of citizens will necessarily follow.^[16] Traditional security relied on the anarchistic balance of power, a military build-up between the United States and the Soviet Union (the two superpowers), and on the absolute sovereignty of the nation state.^[17] States were deemed to be rational entities, national interests and policy driven by the desire for absolute power.^[17] Security was seen as protection from invasion; executed during proxy conflicts using technical and military capabilities.

As Cold War tensions receded, it became clear that the security of citizens was threatened by hardships arising from internal state activities as well as external aggressors. Civil wars were increasingly common and compounded existing poverty, disease, hunger, violence and human rights abuses. Traditional security policies had effectively masked these underlying basic human needs in the face of state security. Through neglect of its constituents, nation states had failed in their primary objective.^[18]

More recently, the traditional state-centric notion of security has been challenged by more holistic approaches to security.^[19] Among the approaches which seeks to acknowledge and address these basic threats to human safety are paradigms that include cooperative, comprehensive and collective measures, aimed to ensure security for the individual and, as a result, for the state.

To enhance international security against potential threats caused by terrorism and organized crime, there have been an increase in international cooperation, resulting in transnational policing. The international police Interpol shares information across international borders and this cooperation has been greatly enhanced by the arrival of the Internet and the ability to instantly transfer documents, films and photographs worldwide.

[edit]Theoretical approaches

Main article: International relations theory

[edit]Realism

[edit]Classical realism

Main article: Classical realism in international relations theory

In the field of international relations, realism has long been a dominant theory, from ancient military theories and writings of Chinese and Greek thinkers, Sun Tzu and Thucydides being two of the more notable, to Hobbes, Machiavelli and Rousseau. It is the foundation of contemporary international security studies. The twentieth century classical realism is mainly derived from Edward Hallett Carr's book The Twenty Years' Crisis.^[20] The realist views anarchy and the absence of a power to regulate the interactions between states as the distinctive characteristics of international politics. Because of anarchy, or a constant state of antagonism, the international system differs from the domestic system.^[21] Realism has a variety of sub-schools whose lines of thought are based on three core assumptions: groupism, egoism, and power-centrism.^[22]According to classical realists, bad things happen because the people who make foreign policy are sometimes bad.^[23]

[edit]Neorealism

Main article: Neorealism (international relations)

Beginning in the 1960s, with increasing criticism of realism, Kenneth Waltz tried to revive the traditional realist theory by translating some core realist ideas into a deductive, top-down theoretical framework that eventually came to be called neorealism.^[22] Theory of International Politics^[24]brought together and clarified many earlier realist ideas about how the features of the overall system of states affects the way states interact:

"Neorealism answers questions: Why the modern states-system has persisted in the face of attempts by certain states at dominance; why war among great powers recurred over centuries; and why states often find cooperation hard. In addition, the book forwarded one more specific theory: that great-power war would tend to be more frequent in multipolarity (an international system shaped by the power of three or more major states) than bipolarity (an international system shaped by two major states, or superpowers)."^[25]

The main theories of neorealism are balance of power theory, balance of threat theory, security odilemma theory, offense-defense theory, hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory.

[edit]Liberalism

Main article: Liberalism in international relations theory

Liberalism has a shorter history than realism but has been a prominent theory since World War I. It is a concept with a variety of meanings. Liberal thinking dates back to philosophers such as Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant, who argued that republican constitutions produce peace. Kant's concept of Perpetual Peace is arguably seen as the starting point of contemporary liberal thought.^[26]

[edit]Economic liberalism

Economic liberalism assumes that economic openness and interdependence between countries makes them more peaceful than countries who are isolated. Eric Gartzke has written that economic freedom is 50 times more effective than democracy in creating peace.^[27] Globalization has been important to economic liberalism.

[edit]Liberal institutionalism

Main article: Liberal institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism views international institutions as the main factor to avoid conflicts between nations. Liberal institutionalists argue that; although the anarchic system presupposed by realists cannot be made to disappear by institutions; the international environment that is constructed can influence the behavior of states within the system.^[28] Varieties of international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are seen as contributors to world peace.

[edit]Comparison between realism and liberalism

Realist and liberal security systems[29]
Theoretical base		Realist (alliance)	Liberal (community of law)
Structure of the international system		Material; static; anarchic; self-help system	Social; dynamic; governance without government
Conceptions of security	Basic principles	Accumulation of power	Integration
	Strategies	Military deterrence; control of allies	Democratization; conflict resolution; rule of Law
Institutional features	Functional scope	Military realm only	Multiple issue areas
	Criterion for membership	Strategic relevance	Democratic system of rule
	Internal power structure	Reflects distribution of power; most likely hegemonic	Symmetrical; high degree of interdependence
	Decision-making	Will of dominant power prevails	Democratically legitimized
Relation of system to its environment		Dissociated; perception of threat	Serves as an attractive model; open for association

[edit]Constructivism

Main article: Constructivism (international relations)

Since its founding in the 1980s, constructivism has become an influential approach in international security studies. “It is less a theory of international relations or security, however, than a broader social theory which then informs how we might approach the study of security.”^[30]Constructivists argue that security is a social construction. They emphasize the importance of social, cultural and historical factors, which leads to different actors construing similar events differently.

[edit]Prominent thinkers

Barry Buzan – Copenhagen School Alexander Wendt – Constructivism Edward Hallett Carr – Classical realism Hans J. Morgenthau – Classical realism Immanuel Kant – Kantian liberalism John Mearsheimer – Neorealism Kathryn Sikkink – Constructivism Kenneth Waltz – Neorealism Machiavelli – Classical realism Peter J. Katzenstein – Constructivism Robert Axelrod – Liberal institutionalism Robert Gilpin – Neorealism Robert Jervis – Neorealism Robert Keohane – Liberal institutionalism Thomas Hobbes – Classical realism Thucydides – Classical realism

[edit]Human security

Main article: Human security

Human security derives from the traditional concept of security from military threats to the safety of people and communities.^[31] It is an extension of mere existence (survival) to well-being and dignity of human beings.^[31] Human security is an emerging school of thought about the practice of international security. There is no single definition of human security, it varies from “ a narrow term of prevention of violence to a broad comprehensive view that proposes development, human rights and traditional security together.” Critics of the concept of human security claim that it covers almost everything and that it is too broad to be the focus of research. There have also been criticisms of its challenge to the role of states and their sovereignty.^[31]

Human security offers a critique of and advocates an alternative to the traditional state-based conception of security. Essentially, it argues that the proper referent for security is the individual and that state practices should reflect this rather than primarily focusing on securing borders through unilateral military action. The justification for the human security approach is said to be that the traditional conception of security is no longer appropriate or effective in the highly interconnected and interdependent modern world in which global threats such as poverty, environmental degradation, and terrorism supersede the traditional security threats of interstate attack and warfare. Further, state-interest-based arguments for human security propose that the international system is too interconnected for the state to maintain an isolationist international policy. Therefore, it argues that a state can best maintain its security and the security of its citizens by ensuring the security of others. It is need to be noted that without the traditional security no human security can be assured.

Traditional vs Human Security[17]
Type of security	Referent	Responsibility	Threats
Traditional	The state	Integrity of the state	Interstate war, nuclear proliferation, revolution, civil conflict
Human	The individual	Integrity of the individual	Disease, poverty, natural disaster, violence, landmines, human rights abuses

[edit]UNDP human security proposal

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report (HDR)^[32] proposes that increasing human security entails:

• Investing in human development, not in arms;

• Engaging policy makers to address the emerging peace dividend;

• Giving the United Nations a clear mandate to promote and sustain development;

• Enlarging the concept of development cooperation so that it includes all flows, not just aid;

• Agreeing that 20 percent of national budgets and 20 percent of foreign aid be used for human development; and

• Establishing an Economic Security Council.

The report elaborates on seven components to human security. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy list them as follows:

Components of human security as per the HDR 1994 report[33]
Type of security	Definition	Threats
Economic security	An assured basic income	Poverty, unemployment, indebtedness, lack of income
Food security	Physical and economic access to basic food	Hunger, famines and the lack of physical and economic access to basic food
Health security	Protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles	Inadequate health care, new and recurrent diseases including epidemics and pandemics, poor nutrition and unsafe environment, unsafe lifestyles
Environmental security	Healthy physical environment	Environmental degradation, natural disasters, pollution and resource depletion
Personal security	Security from physical violence	From the state (torture), other states (war), groups of people (ethnic tension), individuals or gangs (crime), industrial, workplace or traffic accidents
Community security	Safe membership in a group	From the group (oppressive practices), between groups (ethnic violence), from dominant groups (e.g. indigenous people vulnerability)
Political security	Living in a society that honors basic human rights	Political or state repression, including torture, disappearance, human rights violations, detention and imprisonment

Security

X-ray machines and metal detectors are used to control what is allowed to pass through an airport security perimeter.

Security spikes protect a gated community in the East End of London.

Security checkpoint at the entrance to theDelta Air Lines corporate headquarters inAtlanta

Security is the degree of protection to safeguard a nation, union of nations, persons or person against danger, damage, loss, and crime. Security as a form of protection are structures and processes that provide or improve security as a condition.The Institute for Security and Open Methodologies (ISECOM) in the OSSTMM 3 defines security as "a form of protection where a separation is created between the assets and the threat". This includes but is not limited to the elimination of either the asset or the threat. Security as a national condition was defined in a United Nations study (1986):^{[citation needed]} so that countries can develop and progress safely.

Security has to be compared to related concepts: safety, continuity, reliability. The key difference between security and reliability is that security must take into account the actions of people attempting to cause destruction.

Different scenarios also give rise to the context in which security is maintained:

• With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security.

• Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness.

[edit]Perceived security compared to real security

Perception of security may be poorly mapped to measureable objective security. For example, the fear of earthquakes has been reported to be more common than the fear of slipping on the bathroom floor although the latter kills many more people than the former.^[1] Similarly, the perceived effectiveness of security measures is sometimes different from the actual security provided by those measures. The presence of security protections may even be taken for security itself. For example, twocomputer security programs could be interfering with each other and even cancelling each other's effect, while the owner believes s/he is getting double the protection.

Security theater is a critical term for deployment of measures primarily aimed at raising subjective security in a population without a genuine or commensurate concern for the effects of that measure on—and possibly decreasing—objective security. For example, some consider the screening of airline passengers based on static databases to have been Security Theater and Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System to have created a decrease in objective security.

Perception of security can also increase objective security when it affects or deters malicious behavior, as with visual signs of security protections, such as video surveillance, alarm systems in a home, or an anti-theft system in a car such as avehicle tracking system or warning sign.

Since some intruders will decide not to attempt to break into such areas or vehicles, there can actually be less damage to windows in addition to protection of valuable objects inside. Without such advertisement, a car-thief might, for example, approach a car, break the window, and then flee in response to an alarm being triggered. Either way, perhaps the car itself and the objects inside aren't stolen, but with perceived security even the windows of the car have a lower chance of being damaged, increasing the financial security of its owner(s).

However, the non-profit, security research group, ISECOM, has determined that such signs may actually increase the violence, daring, and desperation of an intruder.^[2] This claim shows that perceived security works mostly on the provider and is not security at all.^[3]

It is important, however, for signs advertising security not to give clues as to how to subvert that security, for example in the case where a home burglar might be more likely to break into a certain home if he or she is able to learn beforehand which company makes its security system.

[edit]Categorizing security

There is an immense literature on the analysis and categorization of security. Part of the reason for this is that, in most security systems, the "weakest link in the chain" is the most important. The situation is asymmetric since the 'defender' must cover all points of attack while the attacker need only identify a single weak point upon which to concentrate.

Politics

Collective security

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement, regional or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the peace. Collective security is more ambitious than systems of alliance security or collective defence in that it seeks to encompass the totality of states within a region or indeed globally, and to address a wide range of possible threats. While collective security is an idea with a long history, its implementation in practice has proved problematic. Several prerequisites have to be met for it to have a chance of working.

Contents   [hide]  1 History 1.1 Early mentions 1.2 Collective security in the League of Nations 1.3 Recent events 2 Theory 2.1 Basic assumptions 2.2 Prerequisites 3 Collective defense 4 See also 5 References 6 Bibliography 7 External links

[edit]History

[edit]Early mentions

Collective security, as suggested by many, is one of the most promising approaches for peace and a valuable device for power management on an international scale. Cardinal Richelieu proposed a scheme for collective security in 1629, which was partially reflected in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. In the eighteenth century many proposals were made for collective security arrangements, especially in Europe.

The concept of a peaceful community of nations was outlined in 1795 in Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.^[1] Kant outlined the idea of a league of nations that would control conflict and promote peace between states.^[2] However, he argues for the establishment of a peaceful world community not in a sense that there be a global government but in the hope that each state would declare itself as a free state that respects its citizens and welcomes foreign visitors as fellow rational beings. His key argument is that a union of free states would promote peaceful society worldwide: therefore, in his view, there can be a perpetual peace shaped by the international community rather than by a world government.^[3]

Bahá'u'lláh (1817–1892), the founder of the Bahá'í Faith, prescribed collective security as a means to establish world peace in his writings during the 19th century:

The time must come when the imperative necessity for the holding of a vast, an all-embracing assemblage of men will be universally realized. The rulers and kings of the earth must needs attend it, and, participating in its deliberations, must consider such ways and means as will lay the foundations of the world's Great Peace amongst men. Such a peace demandeth that the Great Powers should resolve, for the sake of the tranquility of the peoples of the earth, to be fully reconciled among themselves. Should any king take up arms against another, all should unitedly arise and prevent him. If this be done, the nations of the world will no longer require any armaments, except for the purpose of preserving the security of their realms and of maintaining internal order within their territories. This will ensure the peace and composure of every people, government and nation.^[4]

International co-operation to promote collective security originated in the Concert of Europe that developed after the Napoleonic Wars in the nineteenth century in an attempt to maintain the status quo between European states and so avoid war.^[5][6] This period also saw the development of international law with the first Geneva Conventions establishing laws about humanitarian relief during war and the international Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 governing rules of war and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.^[7][8]

The forerunner of the League of Nations, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), was formed by peace activists William Randal Cremer and Frédéric Passy in 1889. The organization was international in scope with a third of the members of parliament, in the 24 countries with parliaments, serving as members of the IPU by 1914. Its aims were to encourage governments to solve international disputes by peaceful means and arbitration and annual conferences were held to help governments refine the process of international arbitration. The IPU's structure consisted of a Council headed by a President which would later be reflected in the structure of the League.^[9]

At the start of the twentieth century two power blocs emerged through alliances between the European Great Powers. It was these alliances that came into effect at the start of the First World War in 1914, drawing all the major European powers into the war. This was the first major war in Europe between industrialized countries and the first time in Western Europe the results of industrialization (for example mass production) had been dedicated to war. The result of this industrial warfare was an unprecedented casualty level with eight and a half million members of armed services dead, an estimated 21 million wounded, and approximately 10 million civilian deaths.^[10][11]

By the time the fighting ended in November 1918, the war had had a profound impact, affecting the social, political and economic systems of Europe and inflicting psychological and physical damage on the continent.^[12] Anti-war sentiment rose across the world; the First World War was described as "the war to end all wars",^[13][14] and its possible causes were vigorously investigated. The causes identified included arms races, alliances, secret diplomacy, and the freedom of sovereign states to enter into war for their own benefit. The perceived remedies to these were seen as the creation of an international organization whose aim was to prevent future war through disarmament, open diplomacy, international co-operation, restrictions on the right to wage wars, and penalties that made war unattractive to nations.^[15]

[edit]Collective security in the League of Nations

After World War I, the first large scale attempt to provide collective security in modern times was the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919-20. The provisions of the League of Nations Covenant represented a weak system for decision-making and for collective action. An example of the failure of the League of Nations' collective security is the Manchurian Crisis, when Japan occupied part of China (which was a League member). After the invasion, members of the League passed a resolution calling for Japan to withdraw or face severe penalties. Given that every nation on the League of Nations council had veto power, Japan promptly vetoed the resolution, severely limiting the LN's ability to respond. After two years of deliberation, the League passed a resolution condemning the invasion without committing the League's members to any action against it. The Japanese replied by quitting the League.

A similar process occurred in 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia. Sanctions were passed, but Italy would have vetoed any stronger resolution. Additionally, Britain and France sought to court Italy's government as a potential deterrent to Hitler, given that Mussolini was not yet in what would become the Axis alliance of World War II. Thus, neither enforced any serious sanctions against the Italian government. Additionally, in this case and with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the absence of the USA from the League of Nations deprived the LN of another major power that could have used economic leverage against either of the aggressor states. Inaction by the League subjected it to criticisms that it was weak and concerned more with European issues (most leading members were European), and did not deter Hitler from his plans to dominate Europe. The Ethiopian monarch Emperor Haile Selassie I continued to support collective security though, having assessed that impotence lay not in the principle but in its covenantors commitment to honor its tenets.

One active and articulate exponent of collective security during the immediate pre-war years was the Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov. However, there are grounds for doubt about the depth of Soviet commitment to this principle, as well as that of Western powers. After the Munich Agreement in September 1938 and the passivity of outside powers in the face of German occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 it was shown that the Western Powers were not prepared to engage in collective security against aggression by the Axis Powers together with the Soviet Union, Soviet foreign policy was revised and Litvinov was replaced as foreign minister in early May 1939, in order to facilitate the negotiations that led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Germany, signed by Litvinov's successor, Vyacheslav Molotov, on August 23 of that year. The war in Europe broke out a week later, with the German invasion of Poland on September 1.

[edit]Recent events

The 1945 United Nations Charter, although containing stronger provisions for decision-making and collective military action than those of the League of Nations Covenant, does not represent a complete system of collective security, but rather a balance between collective action on the one hand and continued operation of the states system (including the continued special roles of great powers) on the other.

Cited examples of the limitations of collective security include the Falklands War. When Argentina invaded the islands, which are overseas territories of the United Kingdom, many UN members stayed out of the issue, as it did not directly concern them. There was also a controversy about the United States role in that conflict due their obligations as an Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the "Rio Pact") member. However, many politicians who view the system as having faults also believe it remains a useful tool for keeping international peace.

The role of the UN and collective security in general is also evolving given the rise of internal state conflicts since the end of WWII, there have been 111 military conflicts world wide, but only 9 of which have involved two or more states going to war with one another. The remainder have either been internal civil wars or civil wars where other nations intervened in some manner. This means that collective security may have to evolve towards providing a means to ensure stability and a fair international resolution to those internal conflicts. Whether this will involve more powerful peacekeeping forces or a larger role for the UN diplomatically will likely be judged from a case to case basis.

[edit]Theory

Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any states within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. This contrasts with self-help strategies of engaging in war for purely immediate national interest. While collective security is possible, several prerequisites have to be met for it to work.

Sovereign nations eager to maintain the status quo, willingly cooperate, accepting a degree of vulnerability and in some cases of minor nations, also accede to the interests of the chief contributing nations organising the collective security. Collective Security is achieved by setting up an international cooperative organisation, under the auspices of international law and this gives rise to a form of international collective governance, albeit limited in scope and effectiveness. The collective security organisation then becomes an arena for diplomacy, balance of power and exercise of soft power. The use of hard power by states, unless legitimised by the Collective Security organisation, is considered illegitimate, reprehensible and needing remediation of some kind. The collective security organisation not only gives cheaper security, but also may be the only practicable means of security for smaller nations against more powerful threatening neighbours without the need of joining the camp of the nations balancing their neighbours.

The concept of "collective security" forwarded by men such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson, are deemed to apply interests in security in a broad manner, to "avoid grouping powers into opposing camps, and refusing to draw dividing lines that would leave anyone out."^[16] The term "collective security" has also been cited as a principle of the United Nations, and the League of Nations before that. By employing a system of collective security, the UN hopes to dissuade any member state from acting in a manner likely to threaten peace, thereby avoiding any conflict.

[edit]Basic assumptions

Organski (1960) lists five basic assumptions underlying the theory of collective security :^[17]

• In an armed conflict, member nation-states will be able to agree on which nation is the aggressor.

• All member nation-states are equally committed to contain and constrain the aggression, irrespective of its source or origin.

• All member nation-states have identical freedom of action and ability to join in proceedings against the aggressor.

• The cumulative power of the cooperating members of the alliance for collective security will be adequate and sufficient to overpower the might of the aggressor.

• In the light of the threat posed by the collective might of the nations of a collective security coalition, the aggressor nation will modify its policies, or if unwilling to do so, will be defeated.

[edit]Prerequisites

Morgenthau (1948) states that three prerequisites must be met for collective security to successfully prevent war :

• The collective security system must be able to assemble military force in strength greatly in excess to that assembled by the aggressor(s) thereby deterring the aggressor(s) from attempting to change the world order defended by the collective security system.

• Those nations, whose combined strength would be used for deterrence as mentioned in the first prerequisite, should have identical beliefs about the security of the world order that the collective is defending.

• Nations must be willing to subordinate their conflicting interests to the common good defined in terms of the common defence of all member-states.

[edit]Collective defense

Current major military alliances

  NATO, CSDP

  SCO(Not a Military Block), CSTO

  SADC

  PSC

See also: List of military alliances

Collective defense (also collective defence) is an arrangement, usually formalized by a treaty and an organization, among participant states that commit support in defense of a member state if it is attacked by another state outside the organization. NATO is the best known collective defense organization. Its now famous Article V calls on (but does not fully commit) member states to assist another member under attack. This article was invoked after the September 11 attacks on the United States, after which other NATO members provided assistance to the US War on Terror in Afghanistan.

Collective defense has its roots in multiparty alliances, and entails benefits as well as risks. On the one hand, by combining and pooling resources, it can reduce any single state's cost of providing fully for its security. Smaller members of NATO, for example, have leeway to invest a greater proportion of their budget on non-military priorities, such as education or health, since they can count on other members to come to their defense, if needed.

On the other hand, collective defense also involves risky commitments. Member states can become embroiled in costly wars in which neither the direct victim nor the aggressor benefit. In the First World War, countries in the collective defense arrangement known as the Triple Entente (France, Britain, Russia) were pulled into war quickly when Russia started full mobilization against Austria-Hungary, whose ally Germany subsequently declared war on Russia.

This article was last updated February 2010   A. Concept 1 Collective security has been referred to as ‘a system, regional or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the peace’ (Lowe and others 13). In recent years it has come to have a wider meaning. In the 2005 report In Larger Freedom (at paras 77–78), the United Nations Secretary-General (→ United Nations, Secretary-General) embraced a comprehensive concept of collective security as suggested by the → High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which was convened by him in 2004. In accordance with this concept, any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances undermines States as the basic unit of the international system and poses a threat to international security. So defined, there are six inter-connected clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned. The first include economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation. The remaining five clusters concern traditional threats to State security, namely interstate conflict, internal conflict, → weapons of mass destruction, → terrorism, and transnational organized crime (UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 25). 2 The expression ‘collective security’ is not a term of art in international law. It belongs more to the discipline of international relations, where a ‘collective security system’ may be distinguished from military alliances, which are usually aimed at defence against third States on the one hand, and ‘world government’ which implies a much greater degree of integration on the other. 3 While the expression ‘collective security’ does not occur in the → United Nations Charter (‘UN Charter’), it is often used to refer to the system for the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN Charter and the corresponding provisions of regional organizations. Some question whether the UN Charter provides for a true collective security system (Lowe and others 13–15), but United Nations organs regularly use the term, at least in an aspirational way (see for example, UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ [16 September 2005]; Statement by the President of the Security Council [19 November 2008]). 4 The system of collective security under the UN Charter is reflected principally in the provisions concerning the maintenance of international peace and security, especially those relating to the UN Security Council (→ United Nations, Security Council). These include Art. 2 (4) UN Charter, which contains a general prohibition on the threat or use of force (→ Use of Force, Prohibition of; → Use of Force, Prohibition of Threat), except in the case of → self-defence, recognized by Art. 51 UN Charter (see also → Self-Defence, Anticipatory; → Self-Defence, Pre-emptive; → Self-Defence, Collective), or the use of force by or authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII UN Charter. 5 If it determines, in accordance with Art. 39 UN Charter, the existence of a threat to the peace (→ Peace, Threat to), breach of the peace (→ Peace, Breach of), or act of → aggression, the UN Security Council may make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken by members of the UN to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such measures may be non-forcible, such as → economic sanctions under Art. 41 UN Charter, or may involve the use of force as provided in Art. 42 UN Charter. In this manner, the UN Charter attempts to realize the first purpose of the UN set forth in Art. 1 (1) UN Charter, namely ‘[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace…’   B. Historical Evolution 6 The → League of Nations had been preceded in the 19th century by the arrangements known as Concert of Europe (→ History of International Law, 1815 to World War I) and some theoretical schemes for perpetual peace from earlier periods (W Penn An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe: By the Establishment of an European Diet, Parliament, or Estates [Taylor London 1693, reprinted by Georg Olms Verlag Hildesheim 1983]; CI Castel de Saint-Pierre Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe [Schouten Utrecht 1713, reprinted by Fayard Paris 1986]; I Kant Zum Ewigen Frieden [Nicolovius Königsberg 1795, reprinted by Fischer Frankfurt 2008]). The establishment of the League in 1919 marked the first serious attempt to institutionalize collective security in modern times. The League's goals included → disarmament, the prevention of war through collective security (→ Conflict Prevention), the settling of disputes between countries through → negotiation, → diplomacy, → arbitration, and → judicial settlement of international disputes, and the improvement of global welfare. However, the League Covenant did not seek to outlaw the unilateral use of force and lacked a system for central decision-making and the enforcement of → sanctions. The members of the League undertook to respect and preserve as against external aggression the → territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the League, but the Council was only empowered to ‘advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfiled’ (Art. 10 League Covenant). In the central provision of the League Covenant on the use of force the members agreed to submit a matter that might lead to a rupture to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council, but thereafter merely agreed ‘in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report of the Council’ (Art. 12). These provisions were supplemented by the → Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), which sought to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy. In practice, the League proved to be ineffectual in the face of Italy's conquest of Abyssinia (1936) and the aggressive acts of Germany and the Soviet Union. The League found itself unable to agree on collective sanctions, let alone to take military action. One of the lessons drawn was that in order for any collective security system to be effective, the existence of a centralized decision-making procedure for determining acts of aggression and imposing enforcement measures was essential. 7 The notion of collective security developed against the background of inter-State military conflict and the desire to prevent the outbreak of such conflict (→ Armed Conflict, International). This was also the case for the collective security system under the UN Charter elaborated against the backdrop of World War II. As a result, the enforcement system contained in Chapter VII UN Charter was not designed to deal with intra-State conflicts (→ Armed Conflict, Non-International). Nonetheless, since the adoption of the UN Charter, and in particular since the end of the → Cold War (1947–91), the large number of internal armed conflicts around the globe has resulted in the deployment of the enforcement mechanisms foreseen under Chapter VII UN Charter. These included measures ranging from sanctions to military measures in relation to, inter alia, the former Yugoslavia (→ Croatia [eg UNSC Res 1037 (1996) (15 January 1996) SCOR 51st Year 25]; → Bosnia-Herzegovina [eg UNSC Res 824 (1993) (6 May 1993) SCOR 48th Year 11]; and → Kosovo [eg UNSC Res 1244 (1999) (10 June 1999) SCOR 54th Year 32]), Somalia (eg UNSC Res 794 [1992] [3 December 1992] SCOR 47th Year 63; → Somalia, Conflict), Haiti (eg UNSC Res 841 [1993] [16 June 1993] SCOR 48th Year 119; UNSC Res 940 [1994] [31 July 1994] SCOR 49th Year 51; → Haiti, Conflict), → Angola (eg UNSC Res 864 [1993] [15 September 1993] SCOR 48th Year 59), → Rwanda (eg UNSC Res 929 [1994] [22 June 1994] SCOR 49th Year 10), → Congo, Democratic Republic of the (eg UNSC Res 1078 [1996] [9 November 1996] SCOR 51st Year 115), → Liberia (UNSC Res 788 [1992] [19 November 1992] SCOR 47th Year 99), → Sierra Leone (eg UNSC Res 1132 [1997] [8 October 1997] SCOR 52nd Year 83); → Côte d'Ivoire (eg UNSC Res 1464 [2003] [4 February 2003] SCOR [1 August 2002–31 July 2003] 176), and → Sudan (eg UNSC Res 1769 [2007] [31 July 2007] SCOR [1 August 2006–31 July 2007] 234).   C. UN Charter Provisions on Collective Security 8 The main provisions of the UN Charter on collective security are Art. 2 (4) (prohibition of the threat or use of force); Art. 51 (inherent right of individual or collective self-defence); and Arts 39–42, concerning respectively the determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression (Art. 39); provisional measures (Art. 40); measures not involving the use of armed force (Art. 41); and measures involving the use of armed force (Art. 42). 9 Before the Security Council can take any measures in order to enforce collective security, it first has to cross the threshold that triggers the possibility of collective enforcement action under Chapter VII UN Charter by determining the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression in accordance with Art. 39 UN Charter. 10 Non-forcible measures under Art. 41 have in the past included broad economic sanctions regimes that affected large sections of the economy of the affected State, such as the sanctions regimes against Iraq (UNSC Res 661 [1990] [6 August 1990] SCOR 45th Year 19; → Iraq-Kuwait War [1990–91]) and → Serbia (UNSC Res 757 [1992] [30 May 1992] SCOR 47th Year 13). Since the 1990s the Security Council has shown a preference for sanctions that are more narrowly targeted, aimed at a specific sector, or at a government, rebel group or other entity, or individuals. Examples include oil embargoes, arms embargoes (including nuclear-related materials), travel bans, assets freezing, or any combination of the aforementioned (eg Sierra Leone [UNSC Res 1132 (1997) (8 October 1997) SCOR 52nd Year 83]; → Taliban [UNSC Res 1267 (1999) (15 October 1999) SCOR 54th Year 148]; Sudan [UNSC Res 1556 (2004) (30 July 2004) SCOR [1 August 2003–31 July 2004] 150]; North Korea [UNSC Res 1718 (2006) (14 October 2006) SCOR [1 August 2006–31 July 2007] 279]; Iran [UNSC Res 1737 (2006) (23 December 2006) SCOR [1 August 2006–31 July 2007] 259]; Democratic Republic of the Congo [UNSC Res 1807 (2008) (31 March 2008) SCOR [1 August 2007–31 July 2008] 126]). 11 As far as measures involving the use of force are concerned, Art. 43 (1) UN Charter directed Member States to make → armed forces available to the Security Council at its request. Under Arts 46 and 47, the Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives, was to advise and assist the Security Council. But these provisions have remained largely a dead letter. While the Military Staff Committee has continued to meet, it has done nothing of substance since the late 1940s (though it was mentioned in UNSC Res 665 [1990] [25 August 1990] [SCOR 45th Year 21] in connection with the Iraq-Kuwait war). Numerous proposals have been made over the years, particularly in the 1990s, for UN standing forces of one sort or another (see generally Roberts). 12 However, as the Art. 43 agreements never materialized, the UN was forced to look for alternatives. It found a solution in the authorization of ‘able and willing’ States and/or regional organizations to carry out military measures on its behalf (Blokker 542). The authorization model was used for the first time during the → Korean War (1950–53) (UNSC Res 82 [1950] [25 June 1950]). The return of the Soviet Union to the Security Council prevented further use of this instrument during the Cold War era (Blokker 542–43). The only exception was UNSC Resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966 which was adopted to enforce the oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia (→ Rhodesia/Zimbabwe). However, since 1990 this model has been revived, beginning with UNSC Resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, which was adopted after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The concept of authorization is nowadays well established in the practice of the Security Council and was also recognized by the → European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Behrami and Behrami v France (at para. 133). 13 The most obvious basis for authorizing States to engage in military operations on its behalf can be found in Art. 42 UN Charter. It is now clear that the existence of an Article 43 agreement is not a prerequisite for the Security Council to resort to Art. 42 UN Charter, as this would severely limit the powers of the Security Council under this Article. Consequently, Chapter VII UN Charter has been interpreted to mean that the Security Council can authorize Member States to undertake military measures for the restoration or maintenance of international peace and security, where they are willing to do so. This argument gains strength if one reads Art. 42 in conjunction with Art. 48 (1) UN Charter. The latter concretizes States' obligation to carry out binding decisions of the Security Council, in that it provides the Security Council with the power to determine who will participate in enforcement action. If one reads Art. 48 (1) together with Art. 25, it provides the Security Council with the power to determine that the action required for the execution of Security Council decisions is undertaken by all or only some UN Members. This complements the material basis for authorizing Member States to undertake military measures on behalf of the Security Council, provided in Art. 42 (Frowein and Krisch 757). 14 Another possible basis for authorizing States to use force would be the right of self-defence recognized in Art. 51 UN Charter (Gill 92). In fact, it has been argued that the authorization of the use of force against Iraq in UNSC Resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 was an exercise of the right of self-defence recognized in Art. 51, rather than a collective security measure. However, the question does arise whether Art. 51 is intended to be used by the Security Council itself. It seems that this Article would instead provide a basis for action by States, either individually or collectively, if an → armed attack occurs, pending Security Council action. Once the Security Council itself authorizes States the use of force on its behalf, it does so on the basis of Arts 42 and 48 (1) (Frowein and Krisch 757; Weston 520). 15 When authorizing States to use force on its behalf, the Security Council normally does not specify the Charter Article(s) on which it relies. Instead it authorizes the use of ‘all necessary means’ or ‘all necessary measures’ after reference to the fact that it is ‘acting under Chapter VII’, but without indicating the exact Charter Article. Examples include UNSC Resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 (para. 2; Iraq); UNSC Resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994 (para. 3; Rwanda); UNSC Resolution 1080 (1996) of 15 November 1996 (SCOR 51st Year 117; para. 3; Democratic Republic of the Congo); UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999 (SCOR 54th Year 130; para. 4; East Timor); UNSC Resolution 1386 (2001) of 20 December 2001 (SCOR [1 January 2001–31 July 2002] 272; para. 3; → Afghanistan, Conflict); and UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004) of 8 June 2004 (SCOR [1 August 2003–31 July 2004] 60; para. 10; → Iraq, Invasion of [2003]). 16 In recent times pressure has developed for so-called → humanitarian intervention. This is not addressed in the Charter, yet States and groups of States have sometimes asserted such a right without Security Council authorization. The classic example is the → North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention over Kosovo in 1999. This was followed by efforts to develop the concept of → responsibility to protect, under which as a last resort the Security Council could, under certain conditions, authorize the use of force to protect populations from → genocide, → war crimes, → ethnic cleansing, and → crimes against humanity (2005 World Summit Outcome paras 138–39, reaffirmed by the Security Council in Resolution 1674 [2006] [28 April 2006] SCOR [1 August 2005–31 July 2006] 228).   D. Collective Security and Regional Organizations 17 Apart from authorizing individual States to enforce military measures on its behalf, the Security Council can also utilize regional organizations for this purpose. This follows from Art. 53 (1) UN Charter, which determines that the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. 18 Since the 1990s the central role of the Security Council in relation to collective enforcement has been challenged by the actions of some regional organizations, which have engaged in military action in the absence of an explicit Security Council authorization. This was (in part) motivated by the widespread and systematic human rights atrocities committed in the States in which these organizations intervened. 19 In accordance with one line of argument, Art. 53 UN Charter constitutes a ‘right of emergency’ for regional organizations (Walter 261). Just as States can rely on the right to self-defence recognized in Art. 51 UN Charter in a case of an armed attack unless or until the Security Council takes action, regional organizations would have the power to intervene where the Security Council remains inactive in situations of → gross and systematic human rights violations. This argument is underpinned by the rationale that the chances for abuse of the military mandate by a regional organization is unlikely, due to the institutional and collective control provided within the regional body, as well as by the higher degree of disinterest and objectivity within an organization composed of mutually independent States (Walter 262; Franck [2007] 25). 20 The line of argument favouring a ‘right of emergency’ for regional organizations contradicts the wording of the second sentence of Art. 53 (1) UN Charter, according to which no enforcement action shall be taken by regional organizations without authorization by the Security Council. The suggestion that the Security Council could prevent the regional organization from intervening by adopting a Chapter VII resolution turns the Charter system on its head, as it forces the Security Council to justify why it is not adopting military measures. In this way the Security Council is required to do the opposite of what is envisaged by the Charter system which is, in accordance with Art. 27 (3) UN Charter, based on an ‘opt-in procedure’ in the case of enforcement action, as opposed to an ‘opt-out’ procedure (De Wet 296). Second, any Chapter VII resolution intended to terminate the regional organization's military action could be frustrated by a veto of a permanent member which is silently condoning the illegal military operation. A case in point was the attempt of → Russia to terminate the air campaign in Kosovo. On 26 March 1999 Russia submitted a draft resolution that would have condemned the NATO military action as a breach of international law (Belarus, India, and Russian Federation: Draft Resolution [26 March 1999]). However, this draft resolution, which was supported only by → China and → Namibia, failed to receive more than three votes. 21 Moreover, although the structure of the regional organizations and their collective decision-making procedures may lessen the possibility of abuse, the possibility remains. For example, it is possible that in situations where some members constitute a dominant economic and military force within a regional organization, they would be able to engineer a military intervention in accordance with their strategic interests. Questions have, for example, in the past been raised about the dominant role of Nigeria in the → Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) during its interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. 22 Despite these objections the → African Union (AU) has formally claimed for itself the right to intervene in Member States in instances of gross human rights violations. In accordance with Art. 4 (h) Constitutive Act of the African Union, the organization may intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (Abass and Baderin 15). In accordance with Art. 7 (1) Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Assembly may take such a decision on the basis of a 2/3 majority. Apart from arguing that the AU would be claiming a ‘right of emergency’ for itself, it is also arguable that Art. 4 (h) constitutes a collective, ex ante form of → intervention by invitation. Since the Member States of the AU have given their express consent to military intervention under certain conditions, the use of force would fall outside the scope of the prohibition in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter and not be in violation of the UN Charter. However, this argument in turn raises the question whether such an invitation can be extended for an open-ended period of time, or whether it has to be limited to a particular conflict (Abass and Baderin 17 and 19). 23 Throughout the 1990s, regional organizations have occasionally sought to justify military interventions on the basis of so-called ex post facto authorizations by the Security Council (Franck [2007] 25). Even though this does not find any textual basis in the UN Charter, it cannot be excluded that the Security Council could develop a practice of retroactive authorization. However, in order for such an authorization to be convincing, it would have to be given in unambiguous terms. Otherwise regional organizations or States could attempt to justify unauthorized, unilateral interventions on the basis of obscure language in subsequent Security Council resolutions which were not intended for that purpose. Examples of attempts to justify military interventions by regional organizations on the basis of ex post facto Security Council authorization include the interventions in the 1990s by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone.   E. Conclusion 24 The UN Charter system of collective security has undergone significant evolution since 1945. Especially since the end of the Cold War, the authorization of willing and able States or regional organizations to use military force on behalf of the UN has become a well-established substitute for the Art. 43 agreements foreseen in the UN Charter. In the post-Cold War era it provides a pragmatic way to facilitate military operations in a fashion that also takes account of the military complexities surrounding a military intervention, such as the need for unified command and control. Some have questioned whether the international law on the use of force as set out in the UN Charter is still relevant today, in the face of modern threats. Yet in September 2005, the Heads of State and Government meeting in the UN General Assembly solemnly declared ‘that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace and security’ (World Summit Outcome para. 79; Wood 4). 25 At the same time, the central role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security is facing significant challenges, not in the least because of the persistent perception of the abuse of the → veto by the permanent members. As a result, there is a tendency amongst economically and militarily strong States and regional organizations to circumvent the perceived ineffectiveness of the Security Council through various mechanisms. These range from the expansive interpretation of open-ended military mandates and the scope of the right to self-defence, to attempts to develop new customary exceptions to Art. 2 (4) UN Charter, such as a residual right of intervention for regional organizations and the right of States to exercise a ‘responsibility to protect’ in instances of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Although most of these developments are highly controversial, their presence in the discourse may lead to a weakening of the central authority of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. 26 Finally, it is worth noting that there has been a renewed debate as to whether there could be a role for the General Assembly in instances where the Security Council fails to authorize the use of force in the face of widespread human rights atrocities. Such a role would seem to contravene Art. 11 (2) UN Charter, which reserves (all aspects of) enforcement action exclusively to the Security Council (→ Certain Expenses of the United Nations [Advisory Opinion] 164–65), and to be beyond the powers of the General Assembly which are only recommendatory. Unlike the Security Council, the General Assembly has no power of authorization. One could, however, attempt to justify such a role with the argument that the General Assembly would be exercising an emergency role for which it had already set a precedent of a sort with the adoption of the → Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950) at the time of the Korean War (Österdahl [1999] 133 et seq).

Security and Security Complex: Operational Concepts

Security continues to be a top concern, a major issue of debate in national, regional, and global agendas. Likewise, it continues to require major resources and the sacrifice of many lives. However, as societies and international relations change, the approach to security also evolves. For that reason, security continues to be the focus of discussion, and to be redesigned in all its components and major dimensions, from its reference to international security systems. Starting from these debates, and in the light of the current international situation, what we propose in this paper are operational concepts of security and of security complex.