In July 1971 it was announced that Richard Nixon would be visiting China – from a position of enmity to normalisation of diplomatic relations within a couple of years

Kissinger had to announce that rapprochement with China was in no ways directed against any other countries, especially the Soviet Union. So as not to scare the Soviet Union. The opening represented investment and trading opportunities and protection to the US should a war start.

China feared the Soviets more than the US so it made sense for Mao to move towards them.

Soviets worried about the opening – possibilities of a two front war against it –

Japanese annoyed by the US move, start to think about a more independent foreign policy – normalisation of diplomatic relations between China and Japan 1972

Beijing summit, February 1972 – US continue their support of the opening (also underlined by support of Pakistan in the war – China and Pakistan had close relations).

Nixon meets Mao Feb 1972 – massive propaganda coup but concrete results not that large – no major US-Chinese agreement signed, no real changes in US policy in East Asia (although not anti-Chinese).

But common interests despite great differences – both sought to contain the Soviets – avoid clashes with each other and contain Soviet Communism – a success.

Communique – important document stating Sino-American rapprochement – 1)discussions of policy in East Asia – US to end the war in Vietnam

2)Chinese statement regarding Taiwan

3)Both US and China believed in non-agression, non-intervention

4)Move towards normalisation of relations

5)Support for trade between the two countries

Moscow summit – May 1972

Showed big movements towards détente between the US and the Soviets between 1971 and 1973, discussions on scientific cooperation, arms limitation, attempts to avert future superpower crises.

Brezhnev believed the summit and détente were of great long-term importance, recognition of USSR as a superpower – confirmation of Ostpolitik treaties and blunt Chinese confidence from the Opening.

Spring 1972 attacks Communists and Americans in Vietnam – still went ahead.

May 1972 summit – 1)agreement on a joint US-Soviet space mission

2)Improvements to the hotline, 3) Joint commercial commission to talk of a trade deal between the two countries – established in Spetember 1972. Trade offices in each other’s capital.

Basic principles – 12 principles of superpower conduct – peaceful coexistence, mutual equality, restraint during crises, avoiding confrontation, no use of force.

So important successions of the Moscow summit – hopes for peace.

Before we look at the Salt deal, let’s look at the problems regarding arms limitations in the 1960’s. Relative parity of nuclear weapons had been achieved by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Both side had the weapons to launch a second strike, i.e to survive the first strike and hit back – this was therefore the age of mutually assured destruction – no nuclear deterrant worked (We won’t attack you, you don’t attack us – as you will be destroyed).

Relative equality had been achieved regarding the three types of weapons above – but there were threats to the balance.

First the ABM – worries over a spiral in the arms race – as if one side developed good ABM’s then the other side would have to build lots more missiles to counter this, would mean the building of loads more weapons. So moves to see limitations of these.

Secondly the MIRV – improved strike capacity without having to build more missiles, (ICBMS, SLBMS), Soviets well behind in MIRVS, Soviets started to build MIRVs from 1970 (neither side seriously sought to limit these – so SALT I dead in the water already).

Discussions between 1969-72 about what limitations the other side was willing to accept, had different demands, extremely complicated.

Complicated discussions regarding the limitations of weaponsThe final classic Soviet-US agreement during the period came in 1972 with the signing of the SALT 1 (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) agreements in May 1972. This can be seen to be the height of US-Soviet détente. As part of SALT the US and Soviets signed two deals – 1)Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (against missile attacks from the other side). As part of this the US and Soviets could have Two ABM ‘fields’ and 200 missiles each

The Second agreement on ‘Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles’ Limited the two sides to the following – InterContinentalBallisticMissiles (land based): 1054 US, 1618 Soviet

SubmarineLaunched Ballistic Missiles: 656 US, 740 Soviet Strategic Bombers: 455 US, 140 Soviet. The agreement was To last five years: SALT II to follow

Considered by both sides to be a considerable success – showed that the US accepted the USSR as an equal and confirmed both powers interests in peaceful coexistence

Nixon used this as the basis to get elected in 1973 -

So we have already seen why Moscow was seen as a success, a host of agreements in different areas and important deal regarding SALT.

There were a number of negative issues though:

Both sides still see each other as ideological enemies, no move away from NATO and the Warsaw Pact – still support liberation movements on both sides of the iron curtain

Basic principles only a code of conduct – not things that had to necessarily be stuck to

Biggest flaws in SALT I – ABM a success but they were difficult to build anyway

Offensive agreement shortcomings – Celings set at a high level, no control of MIRVs – warheads continue to increase – Soviets allowed large numbers of SLBMS – not sure why…

Soviets allowed to have more missiles and could MIRV them from 1975 onwards

Difficult to say whether positive or negative - but still an important deal.