- •We’re then going to look at moves in both Western and Eastern Europe towards détente in the period
- •I will finally offer some conclusions.
- •Post-Cuba these pressures became stronger
- •There have been critical voices debating how real the thaw was or not
- •Still in general it was good that the Test Ban Treaty had been concluded – moves away from the idea of general ‘hot’ war between the two sides
- •De Gaulle’s policies linked to other Western European criticism of the cold war status quo
- •One final Western European policy which moved towards détente was the policy of the West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt often called Ostpolitik (or Eastern policy)
- •Europe very important in the move towards détente then
- •A major breakthrough in ussr-Soviet relations came with the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968
- •Whilst there were moves towards détente during this period there were also other important international events which limited these moves
- •If the Soviets moved away from good behaviour they were to be punished – this policy would be used to great effect with the Soviets but also with the Chinese, we will have a look at that a bit later.
- •From July 1963 the Soviets and the Chinese decided not to set a date for future relations – Sino-Soviet split
- •Mao’s cultural revolution from 1965-9 further increased the difference between the two powers –
- •In July 1971 it was announced that Richard Nixon would be visiting China – from a position of enmity to normalisation of diplomatic relations within a couple of years
- •Moscow summit – May 1972
Whilst there were moves towards détente during this period there were also other important international events which limited these moves
The most important issue during the period, which took US public attention, US military focus and their economic resources away from détente – this was the Vietnam war
From the mid-1960s the US sent combat troops into Vietnam to prevent the spread of Communism in the country. The war was disastrous for the United States on a number of fronts, firstly economically as millions of dollars poured into the war, secondly due to its moral standing in the world and thirdly as the United States lost the support of a whole generation of youth back home.
In terms of the cold war it slowed moves towards détente – Soviets forced to support North Vietnam though it didn’t want prolonged war due to competition with China over who was the controlling force in world communism. The Ussr supplying arms to the North Vietnamese – stopped a trade bill being passed through congress in 1966 (Vietnam also held back agreements at Glassboro as discussions often turned towards the war in Vietnam)
Another important issue during the period which held back talks was the Six day war between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan (When Israel took over the occupied lands which are so controversial to this day). The two great powers backed different powers in the conflict. The Soviets backed the Arab powers and the USA backed Israel. During this conflict there was the first use of the hotline between USA/USSR.
Another issue which slowed down discussions was the Prague Spring of 1968 – here was a similar situation to Hungary in 1956. Cz had been under a harsh regime of Antoni Novotny, he had led a regime of stalinist economic planning, this had led to stagnation in the late 1950s. From the early 1960s gradual relaxation, of censorship and the economy reformed slowly. When Antoni Dubcek replaced Novotny in Jan 1968 things moved quickly. Dubcek was a reformer – sought to create Socialism with a human face, Seeks to make reforms to decentralise, market elements to economy, non-communist orgs to form, Freer discussion of reform, relaxation of censorship – anti-communist voices rise (Havel)
These moves to reform led to criticism from other parts of the bloc, D was moving to quickly, in May 1968 D was criticised by Brezhnev himself and Plans to invade Cz were discussed – meeting of five leaders in May - East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, USSR (Kadar stood up for D)
No intervention but growing calls for intervention from Czech conservatives and voices in the Soviet army. D believes there will be no intervention – naïve? Reforms too popular thinks D – also follows a loyal foreign policy
By Mid-July the Non- Communist voices had begun to call for more reform – a situation which turned Kadar against D. In another big 5 meeting in July – planned intervention – Kosygin warns D – throughout August about the possibility of intervention if he did not go more hardline
End of August – intervention – Operation Danube, Soviets arrest D take them to Moscow – Husak alternative
Operation Danube-500,000 troops (Poland, other Warsaw pact countries) to Cz – only 100 czechs die
Normalisation – reformers pushed out of the Communist party – censorship restored
The Czech spring invasion initially hurt détente talks between East and West, especially as a result of the Brezhnev doctrine which was announced by B in November 1968 "When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries."
So by 1968 Soviet-US relations had moved forward but there was still work to be done and considerable differences to iron out. Still at the same time détente was still pushed for, the US realised this was their main policy against the Cold War, The Soviets knew they had to continue as well.
What effect would the new president of the United States Richard Nixon, who took office in January 1969, have on this uncertain situation in the Cold War? Nixon took power with America in the midst of the Vietnam war which was going badly militarily and to which the American public had lost patience with, he took over with détente on the agenda between the Soviets and the US, with the successful Test Ban Treaty and NPT in 1968. On the opposite side was a leader in Brezhnev who also sought détente and peaceful coexistence. By this time the Soviets had achieved relative parity in the arms race and had the possibility to undertake a second strike (which meant that deterrence was possible). How could Nixon affect the situation? Nixon started as he meant to go on, by taking the policy of détente with both hands, despite his reputation for anti-Communism. Let’s have a look at his inaugural speech.
His mission then was to take on the idea of diplomacy, of developing détente and working with powers that were prepared to work with him.
Despite these big aims there was relatively uneven progress in the early nixon years (from 1969-71) but Nixon’s foreign policy (developed in conjunction with his National security adviser Henry Kissinger) was to achieve spectacular results in the long run.
First of all Nixon had to deal with the quagmire that was Vietnam – which had turned into an unwinnable war.
Nixon knew this was the case and thus supported the eventual withdrawal of American troops in the country. This was based on a term called the Nixon doctrine – this meant that states fighting communism would have to rely on their own resources over those of the States – he thus wanted the eventual
Replacement of US forces with South Vietnamese forces (a bit like what the US have been trying to do in Iraq and Vietnam).
At the same time Nixon was prepared to retaliate against the North Vietnamese in 1969 and even invaded Cambodia in early 1970 to buy time for another attack on the North. He also sent a fleet to the Bay of Bengal in 1971 as a result of the India-Pakistan war. Eventually Nixon withdrew troops from Vietnam by 1973.
Nixon’s policy of détente was not an all out enthusiastic embracing of peace but it was to be a gradual process dependent on the actions of the Soviet Union. It was therefore a policy of reciprocity. If the Soviets behaved well then the US would move in their direction. It wasn’t to be about power plays and shows of strength like Kruschev had attempted to do but was to be about concrete agreements. Nixon and Kissinger wanted to get business done.
We have already seen how the Soviet Union under Brezhnev was prepared to negotiate, Nixon and Kissinger sought to exploit this in order to get what they wanted.
This policy has been known as linkage – The premise behind linkage, as a policy, was to connect political and military issues, thereby establishing a relationship making progress in area "A" dependent on progress in area "B.“
