- •We’re then going to look at moves in both Western and Eastern Europe towards détente in the period
- •I will finally offer some conclusions.
- •Post-Cuba these pressures became stronger
- •There have been critical voices debating how real the thaw was or not
- •Still in general it was good that the Test Ban Treaty had been concluded – moves away from the idea of general ‘hot’ war between the two sides
- •De Gaulle’s policies linked to other Western European criticism of the cold war status quo
- •One final Western European policy which moved towards détente was the policy of the West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt often called Ostpolitik (or Eastern policy)
- •Europe very important in the move towards détente then
- •A major breakthrough in ussr-Soviet relations came with the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968
- •Whilst there were moves towards détente during this period there were also other important international events which limited these moves
- •If the Soviets moved away from good behaviour they were to be punished – this policy would be used to great effect with the Soviets but also with the Chinese, we will have a look at that a bit later.
- •From July 1963 the Soviets and the Chinese decided not to set a date for future relations – Sino-Soviet split
- •Mao’s cultural revolution from 1965-9 further increased the difference between the two powers –
- •In July 1971 it was announced that Richard Nixon would be visiting China – from a position of enmity to normalisation of diplomatic relations within a couple of years
- •Moscow summit – May 1972
There have been critical voices debating how real the thaw was or not
There are several examples regarding this doubt: Firstly, despite the erection of the Berlin wall, there continued to be tension between the East and West over Berlin. The West were still determined to remain in the city, this was evidenced by JFK’s famous speech at the end of June 1963 in West Berlin where he stated that ‘He was a Berliner’ ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’
In addition to the West’s resolve to continue the Cold war in Berlin, there was also debate in the West about a Multilateral Nuclear Force or (MLF) This threatened US-Soviet relations as it proposed to give NATO forces access to nuclear weapons. This was strongly opposed by the Soviets (and the French) as it would de facto grant West Germany nuclear weapons. By mid-1965 this proposal was thrown out but its very discussion showed that détente was not complete in this period.
There was less chance of a global catastrophe but there was still mutual suspicion during this period.
Still in general it was good that the Test Ban Treaty had been concluded – moves away from the idea of general ‘hot’ war between the two sides
Pressures for détente were not only felt between the United States and the Soviet Union during this period. Indeed the period saw Europe, in the West and in the East, moves away from the orthodoxies of the early Cold War. Indeed Young suggests that there was more rapid move towards détente in Europe than there was between the United States and the Soviet Union. Détente actually had a longer pedigree in Europe than it did between the United States and the Soviet Union. Clement Atlee the post-war PM in the United Kingdom and Churchill had urged détente in the 1950s – Churchill had called for a joint East-West summit. In November 1954 the French president had urged East-West talks at the UN. Why were there such strong calls for détente?
The foreign policy of Great Britain and France had a very different diplomatic tradition to the United States and the Soviet Union. Both powers were less ideological and more willing to (accept the status quo)– Britain in particular wanted trade across borders – doesn’t care about ideology so much.
A second important reason was the mutual fear of war. Western Europe had allied itself to the United States as a result of the Cold War but over the course of the 1950s and early 1960s Western Europe began to worry more and more about the possibility of war. They knew that they were right in the firing line if war was to start. If moves for détente were strong from Western Europe, they were also joined by calls from the East by the end of the 1960s.
Let’s first look at pressure from the Western side of the continent and then we can move on to the situation in the East.
One of the key ways that détente was supported in Western Europe was the fragmentation of the bloc. The symbol of this fragmentation was the moves of the French under their President Charles De Gaulle
De Gaulle took a strongly anti-American stance and pushed the French away from the Americans. Why was this the case? Firstly he was annoyed by the American involvement in Vietnam and in Europe in general secondly he did not like moves to create a NATO multilateral force which would give West Germany control of nuclear weapons. What did he do to respond to this? Firstly from the early 1960s he strongly criticised the US for its involvement in Vietnam, and in 1964 he established diplomatic links with China. In the same year he signed and agreement on economic cultural and scientific exchanges with the USSR. In March 1966 De Gaulle went even further when he withdrew France from NATO’s command structure, citing French independence (France didn’t leave NATO entirely but it was a clear signal of the independent step De Gaulle was taking). In addition in June 1966 De Gaulle visited the USSR. He had thus made a strong case for a European policy that was more independent from the dominance of the United States. His was a strong voice for détente in Europe, whilst at the same time he realised that France needed the United States.