Part 5 environment related incidents

A vessel started receiving HFO bunker from a barge while moored alongside a terminal. The first tank was filled to the ordered level by the chief engineer and the bunkering continued into a second tank.

The chief engineer and second engineer left for dinner, leaving the fourth engineer in charge alone, without any means of communicating with the barge. While monitoring the loading of fuel into the second tank the fourth engineer panicked because he thought there was a risk of the tank overflowing, which was not the case. He tried to contact the barge unsuccessfully. He then decided to slightly open the valve to the first tank and throttle the valve to the second tank to 50 %. The volume in the first tank was 87 % and the second tank was 71%. Then he tried to contact the barge again to suspend bunker operations but once again was unsuccessful. As there was no action taken on the barge or on the vessel itself, the first tank finally overflowed through the air vent and contaminated the deck and water in the port. Fortunately the pollution was contained in the vessel’s vicinity by a mooring rope, which was laid on the surface. To stop the overflow, the wing tank valve was opened and the valve to the first tank was closed. Shortly after the bunker operation was suspended the barge left the vessel.

Despite the presence of the scupper plugs, and also as a consequence of the heavy rain, some HFO had overflowed the edge of the portside deck plating, contaminating the shell plating and surrounding waters. A professional completed the cleaning operation of the vessel’s hull and the port.

At the time of the overflow, the fourth engineer was attending the bunkering operation alone although the decision of the chief engineer to only bunker 891mt of HSFO in tank 1 and 2 to a total 93% to 94% of their capacity must have warranted extra precautions to be taken.

The fourth engineer had no VHF available and could not communicate with the barge’s crew although the pre-bunkering check list confirmed that ‘’ship shore/barge communication channels established’’.

The fourth engineer was in charge of both sounding of the FO tanks (on deck) and handling the tanks’ valves (in the engine room) when the latter is the second engineer’s responsibility as per the bunkering plan.

It was discovered that the engineers had serious difficulties communicating with each other because the second engineer did not speak English. From interviewing the chief engineer, it appeared he was convinced that the overflow occurred from tank 2, although all evidence pointed to the fact that the overflow occurred from tank 1. Therefore there was a lack of communication between the engineers.

There were serious ISM breaches by the vessel where the most serious were:

• Not sending the correct notification to the authorities about the incident according to IMO resolution 851(20).

• Disregarding bunkering and safety procedures as per SMS.

• The crew not being familiar with vessel and bunker procedures.

• Lack of communication between engine crew, i.e. the second engineer couldn’t speak English.

WHAT?

Oil Spill during bunkering

1WHY? The fourth engineer was overseeing the bunker operation by himself and thought there was a risk of the tank overflowing. He panicked and decided to open the valve to the first tank, which was almost full.

2 WHY? The chief engineer and second engineer had left for dinner and the fourth engineer had no means of communicating with the barge, bridge or other engineers. As he could not contact the barrge, or anyone on the vessel itself, the first tank finally overflowed.

3 WHY? The company’s bunkering procedures were ignored by the chief engineer. No risk assessment was carried out; no record of any toolbox meeting exists, which is a requirement.The bunkering checklist was filled out but ignored.

4 WHY? Serious lack of communication, familiarisation and inefficient shipboard management by the chief engineer.

5 WHY? The company has not been able to establish an acceptable onboard safety culture and SMS Procedures are not thorough enough.

Consequences:

a) a vessel was detained because of serious failure of the ISM Code; b) substantial costs for cleaning the vessel’s hull and surrounding water; c) loss of time and employment of vessel due to the incident; d) an additional audit was carried out by the classification society to verify that non-conformities had been rectified.