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ARTICLES

The EvolutionofExecutive-LegislativeRelations

inRussiasince 1993

ThomasF. Remington

BorisEl'tsin'sabruptdeparturefromthe presidencyon NewYear'sEve 1999 began a new phase in Russia'spostcommunistpoliticaldevelopment.Withthepresidencyno longeroccupied bytheauthoroftheconstitution,thequestionariseswhetherhis successorwillconsiderhimself morebound bytheconstitutionalarrangementsin place since 1993,or less.RatherthantospeculateonVladimirPutin'spoliticalpersonality,this paper willinsteadexaminetherecordofpresident-parliamentrelations since 1993 forindicationsconcerningwhetherRussia'sinstitutionshave beguntosettleintothoseofa consolidatedconstitutionaldemocracy.'

There are good reasonsfordoubt. Since the 1993 Constitutionwas adopted,relationsbetweenRussia'spresidentand parliamenthaveoften been tensetothepointofthreateningtheconstitutionalfabricitselfThe.- atricaldisplaysofinterbranchconflict,El'tsin'simperioususe ofpresidentialpowers,andcontentionintheDuma dominatebothpopularandschol- arlyimpressionsofRussianfederal-levelpolitics.2Anyparticularpower

The researchon whichthispaperisbased has been supportedbytheConferenceon SystemicChange and InternationalSecurityin Russiaand theNew StatesofEurasia sponsoredbythePaul H. NitzeSchool forAdvancedInternationalStudiesofJohnsHopkins University,atwhichan earlierversionwaspresented.I also wishtoacknowledgethesupportof the NationalScience Foundation (SBR-9631221) and the National Council for Eurasianand East European Research.Neitherbearsanyresponsibilityfortheideas or

conclusionspresentedhere.Much oftheresearchhas been conductedin collaboration withStevenS. Smithand Moshe Haspel,whomI wishto thankfortheircontributionsto the ideas and evidencecitedhere. I am also gratefulforthe helpfulcommentsof the

anonymousreadersofthemanuscript.

1. In referringto "consolidationofdemocracy,"IfollowLarryDiamond'sdefinition. Diamond discussesthe consolidationof democracyin termsof threechallenges:the "deepening"ofdemocracy,meaningthatdemocraticformsbecome moreresponsiveand accountable;theincreaseintheregularityofpoliticalinstitutionsand procedures;and the improvementin thegovernment'sabilityto delivergood performanceLarry.Diamond, DevelopingDemocracy:TowardConsolidation(Baltimore,1999), 73-116.

2. Forexample,JoelOstrowhasarguedthattheparty-dominatedgoverningstructure of the Duma has failedat conflictmanagement.In Ostrow'sview,Duma procedureis

"completechaos,""a mess,""incapableofeffectingmajorpolicychange.... The Duma as a resultisa legislatureof450 splitpersonalities,and outcomesarehighlyunstableand unpredictable."See Joel M. Ostrow,"ProceduralBreakdownand Deadlock in the Russian StateDuma: The Problemsofan Unlinked,Dual-ChannelInstitutionalDesign,"Europe-

AsiaStudies50,no. 5 (July1998): 796,806,807,809.

The presidentialoffice,meanwhile,hasbeen characterizedas "super-presidential"in itspowersand authoritarianin theexerciseofthosepowers.StephenHolmesarguedthat "thesystemestablishedbyYeltsin'sconstitution,in fact,can mostsuccinctlybe described

SlavicReview59,no. 3 (Fall2000)

strugglebetweenpresidentand parliamentcarriessome riskofescalating to an all-outconstitutionalcrisis,as in August1991 or SeptemberOctober 1993. Presidentand parliamenthave foughtat severalpoints overcontrolofthegovernment,and theDuma's attempttoimpeachthe presidentin May 1999 came quite close to receivingthe required 300 votes.3A French-stylemodel ofpeaceful"cohabitation"betweena presidentofone politicalorientationand a governmnentreflectingan oppositionmajorityhasyettoemergeinRussia.

Reviewingtheliteratureon the"perilsofpresidentialism"as itapplies to Russia,StephenWhiteidentifiesthreeseriousweaknessesin thepresentconstitutionalmodel:theregime'sdependence on thepersonofthe president,whomaybe ormaybecome unfitforthejob; tensionbetween presidentand parliamentstemmingfromtheirrivalelectoralbases,which mayresultindeadlockand theuse ofdecreestobypassthelegislativeprocess;and theambiguouspositionofthegovernment,cross-pressuredby therivaldemandsofparliamentand president.4Russia'sconstitution,in

as superpresidentialism"and that"theflipside ofsuperpresidentialism,therefore,is figleafparliamentarianismSee." StephenHolmes,"Superpresidentialismand ItsProblems," EastEuropeanConstitutionalReview2,no. 4,and 3,no. 1 (Fall 1993-Winter1994): 123-24. GeraldM. EasterdescribesRussia'sregimeas one inwhich"a strongauthoritarianpresidentcoexistswitha weakdemocraticparliament."GeraldM. Easter,"PreferenceforPresidentialism:PostcommunistRegimeChangein Russiaand theNIS," WorldPolitics49,no. 2 (January1997): 209.

Paul Kubicek,assessingtheperiod ofconfrontationbetweenEl'tsinand his parlia-

mentaryoppositionin 1993,observesthat"rulebydecree replaced theruleoflaw"and findsevidencethatin thepost-1993periodthesamepatternrecurred:"Recently,Yeltsin has again takentorulebydecreeon theissuesofministerialappointments."He seesRussia'spoliticalsystemas an instanceof"delegativedemocracy,"wherethepresidentuseshis electoralmandatetolegitimateauthoritarianrule.Paul Kubicek,"DelegativeDemocracy in Russiaand Ukraine,"CommunistandPost-CommunistStudies27,no. 4 (December 1994):

429 and 430.

StephenHanson andJeffreyKopsteinwrite:"The RussianConstitutionof 1993 also resembledthatofWeimarGermanyin thepotentiallyauthoritarianpowersitgrantedto theexecutive.However,intheRussiancasestrongpresidentialismwasnotsomuch'creeping' as overt,sinceYel'tsinspecificallydesignedhisnewconstitutionto eliminateanyrenewedthreatfromparliamenttohisrule."StephenE. HansonandJeffreyS.Kopstein,"The

Weimar/RussiaComparison,"Post-SovietAffairs13,no. 3 (July-September1997): 271. 3. On theimpeachmenteffort,see thesectionentitled"Impeachment"below.Other

crisesinclude thepassage ofa no-confidencevotein the summerof 1995 and thegovernment'sdemand in responsethatthe Duma vote on a motionof confidence;a protractedcrisisinsummerandfall1997overa government-sponsoredpackageofmajoreco- nomicreformmeasures,overwhichthepresidenthintedthathe woulddissolvetheDuma ifitfailedto pass them,and theDuma's threatin responsetovoteno confidencein the government;theDuma's initialrefusaltoconfirmSergeiKirienko'sappointmentas head ofgovernmentin March 1998; and the Duma's refusalto acceptViktorChernomyrdin backas head ofgovernmentin September1998.

4. StephenWhite,"Russia:PresidentialLeadershipunderYeltsin,"in RayTaras,ed., PostcommunistPresidents(Cambridge,Eng.,1997), 57-61. These pointsare reinforcedby theextensiveliteratureon the"perilsofpresidentialism"generallyand therisksof"pres- idential-parliamentary"systemsin particularThe. lattercategoryhas been suggestedby MatthewShugartandJohnCareyforregimesinwhichthepresidentand parliamentare separatelyelected;a governmenthasexecutiveresponsibilityand isdependentbothupon the confidenceof parliamentand the president'sappointment;and the presidenthas legislativepowersincludingtherightsofvetoand decree. See MatthewS. Shugartand

fact,closelyapproximatesthe "president-parliamentary"typeof mixed systemthatMatthewShugartandJohnCareyconsiderthemostunstable and pronetodeadlockofmixedconstitutions;in thismodel,thegovernmentrequiresboththepresident'sfavorand theparliament'sconfidence, while the presidenthas significantlaw-makingpowers,includingthe powertodirectthegovernment,vetorightsoverlegislation,and,in Russia'scase,therighttoissuedecreeswiththeforceoflaw.5

Therefore,preciselybecause interbranchdeadlock, hypertrophied presidentialpower,and parliament'smarginalizationwere widelyexpected to resultfromthe 1993 Constitution,itis surprisingto findthat both presidentand parliamenthave expended a good deal of effortto reach agreementovertheshape oflegislationthroughcompromise.To a degree notgenerallyrecognizedbyoutsideobserversor advertisedby eitherside,theparliamentand thepresidenthavemanagedtosettletheir differencesovera widerangeoflegislativeissues.6Notonlyhas thepresidentemployedhisdecreepowertosetpolicyfarlessoftenthanobservers predictedwhen the new constitutionwas adopted, but parliament,far frombeinga "figleaf,"has become a counterweightto thepresidencyIn. thisarticle,I shallarguethatthereasonsforthisoutcomeliein thestructureof incentivesembodied in the constitutionTherefore,.ifRussia's constitutionalorder can survivethe presentperiod, the accumulated experienceof usinginformalmeans to resolveconflictsmayprovidea repertoireofinstitutionalprecedentsforfuturepresidentsfacingfuture parliaments.

Thisis nottosaythattheodds underthecurrentconstitutionnecessarilyfavorconsolidationof a stabledemocracy.Russianconstitutional politicssince the late 1980s has been drivenbythe powerstrugglesof politicianswithshorttimehorizons,and thereislittlereasontothinkthat contemporaryleadersfeelanyparticulardevotiontoEl'tsin'sconstitution. If constitutionalrulesof thegame have applied in legislative-executive relations,thereasonprobablyliesin thejudgmentofpoliticalactorsthat, forthetimebeing,theyarebetteroffabidingbytheexistingrulesthanby goingoutsidethem.To be sure,proposalstoamendtheconstitutiontoreduce the president'spowersand increasethoseof parliamentand gov-

JohnM. Carey,PresidentsandAssemblies:ConstitutionalDesignandElectoralDynamics(Cam-

bridge,Eng.,1992);JuanLinz,"PresidentialorParliamentaryDemocracy:Does ItMakea

Difference?"inJuanJ.Linz and A. Valenzuela,eds., TheFailureofPresidentialDemocracy:

ComparativePerspectives(Baltimore,1994), 3-90; ArendLijphart,ed.,Parliamentaryversus

PresidentialGovernment(Oxford,1992).

5. Shugartand Carey,PresidentsandAssembliesIn. hisreviewofthepowersofpresi-

dentsin twenty-fourpostcommunistcountries,TimothyFryeobservesthatRussia'spresi-

denthas thelargestnumberofformaland residualpowersofall ofthem.TimothyFrye,

"A Politicsof InstitutionalChoice: Post-CommunistPresidencies,"ComparativePolitical

Studies30,no. 5 (October 1997): 523-52.

6. Cf.SilviavonSteinsdorff,"KalkulierterKonfliktund begrenzteKooperation:Zum

VerhailtnisvonPraisident,Regierungund Parlamentin RuBland,"Osteuropa1 (1999): 16-

34. Steinsdorffemphasizestheelementofposturingin president-Dumarelations,where

each side frequentlyfindsitpoliticallyexpedientto accentuatedifferencesin theirpub-

licstancesbuttoseeknegotiatedagreementswhentheypreferlegislativeactiontothesta-

tusquo.

ernmentwerewidelydiscussedafterEl'tsin'sunceremoniousdismissalof a seriesofprimeministersin 1998 and 1999.7Buttheconstitution'sprovisionsmakeamendmentsextremelydifficultto enact.Furtherconstitutionalchange,unlessitresultsfromforce,isthereforemorelikelytocome about throughthe accumulationof precedentthanbythe adoption of constitutionalamendments.The actual record of executive-legislative relationssince 1993 showsthatmanypolicyconflictshave been resolved throughconstitutionalmeans,oftenthroughtheuse ofad hoc bargainingmechanismstoreachnegotiatedagreementsLet. us thereforeexamine therecordoflegislative-executiverelationsoverthepastsixyearsto identifythe reasonsthatpresidentand parliamenthave oftenfoundit moreexpedienttobargainand compromiseoverlegislationthantopress theprocessto thepointofdeadlockand breakdown.I shallconcentrate on tworeasonsin particular:the uncertaintythatpoliticalleaders face about the potentialconsequences of constitutionalbreakdownin the eventofa head-oncollisionbetweenthebranches,and thelimitationson thepresident'slaw-makingpowers.

Conflict,Calculation,and Uncertainty

Let us startbyconsideringthe effectof uncertaintyon the behaviorof Russianpoliticalleaders.Sometimesthe pervasiveuncertaintyin which ordinarycitizensand elitesoperatein a periodofrapidregimechangeis thoughtto have paralyzingeffectson economic and politicalactors,resultingin frenzy,exhaustion,and irrationalityOther.8scholars,however, havefoundthatactorshaverespondedtouncertaintybybehavingin entirelyrationalways,byhedgingtheirbetsand minimizingtheirexposure to adversedownsiderisks.Rivalpoliticalcamps,uncertainofhow their interestswillbe affectedbyalternativeelectoralsystemsor constitutional schemes,may,forexample,agreetoadoptmixedsystems,combiningele-

7. Forexample,see Segodnia,13August1999,whichreviewsseveralcurrentproposals forrestrictingpresidentialpowerthroughconstitutionalamendmentcirculatedfrom thepro-reformcamp.Amongproponentsofsuchchangesare SergeiShakhrai,whowas instrumentalin draftingthe1993constitution;GeorgiiSatarov,directorofINDEM and a longtimepoliticaladvisertoPresidentEl'tsin;and SergeiKirienko,theformerprimeminister,whowasone oftheprimeministersabruptlyreplaced.Centristfiguressuchas Egor Stroev,chairmanoftheFederationCounciland governorofOrel,havemade similarproposals.Needlessto say,thelefthas longsincedemanded constitutionalreformreducing thepresident'spowerand expandingparliament'spowerstocontrolgovernmentElFtsin's. decisionsto removehisprimeministerswithoutwarningor consultation-ViktorCher- nomyrdinin March1998,thenSergeiKirienkoinAugust1998,thenEvgeniiPrimakovin May1999,thenSergeiStepashinin August1999-created a near-consensusamong the politicalelitethatthepresident'sarbitraryand capricioususe ofhispowerto dismissthe governmentrequireda constitutionalremedy.

On theotherhand,thepresidentialadministrationhasbeen nurturingan alternative constitutionalreform,whichifadoptedwouldlengthenthepresident'stermofofficeSee. Segodnia,29January2000.

8. ValerieBunceandMariaCsanadi,"UncertaintytheTransition:Post-Communism in Hungary,"EastEuropeanPoliticsandSocieties7,no. 2 (Spring1993): 240-75.

mentsofpluralityand proportionalrepresentationin the electoralsystem,or ofpresidentialismand parliamentarismin the constitution.By9 thesame token,itis reasonableto suppose thatuncertaintyin post-1993 Russiamayexerta restraininginfluenceon actorswhoare unsureabout how otherswould respondin the eventof a constitutionalbreakdown. Failureofan attemptto overthrowtheconstitutionbyforcecould be far morecostlythandefeatsincurredwhileplayingbytheconstitutionalrules ofthegame.Therefore,althoughthetemptationtodiscardtheconstitutionalrulesand resortto armedstruggleis considerablyhigherthanin settleddemocracies,uncertaintyaboutwhatmightfollowtendsto favor observanceoftheconstitutionalstatusquo. BothEl'tsinand hisoppositionseriouslymiscalculatedtheirstrengthinthe1991to1993period.The disastrousexperienceofOctober 1993clearlytemperedbothsides' sub-

sequentbehavior.

Forexample,El'tsinwasrelativelyconfidentin 1991-1993 thatin any directcontestagainsthiscommunistand nationalistopposition,hewould be successfulifhe could takehiscase tothepeople ina referendum,particularlyifhe controlledthewordingof thequestions.In turn,the oppositionwasreasonablysurethatshocktherapy'sunpopularitycould be turnedagainstEl'tsin,evenin a referendum,as longas parliamentcould controlthewordingofthequestions.ButneitherEl'tsinnor hisoppositioncouldbe certainhowmuchpowertheywouldhaveiftheychosetogo outsideconstitutionallimitsin theirstruggleAfter.theparliamentrepudiateditsagreementto hold a popular referendumon a new constitutionat theEighthCongress,El'tsinmade his March 1993 televisionannouncementthathewasissuinga decreedeclaringa "specialstateofrule" and partiallydissolvingparliamentThis.mayhavebeen intendedas a trial balloon-a deliberateeffortto conductan instantreadingof eliteand popularsentimentin theeventhe did suspendtheconstitutionThe. reactiongavehiman indicationofwhowouldbe againsthimand whofor himifhe carriedouttheseactions.He musthaveconcludedthattheprice ofsuspendingtheconstitutionat thattimewouldbe unacceptablyhigh, butthathe could probablycounton publicsupportifhe could finda way toputtheissuetothepeople ina referendumAt.theNinthCongress,the chairmanof theSupremeSoviet,RuslanKhasbulatov,miscalculatedhis strengthwhenhe proposedearlyparliamentaryelectionsin exchangefor earlypresidentialelections.Thisproposalwasquicklyrejectedbytheparliament,and Khasbulatovhimselfnearlylost his chairmanship.When El'tsinfinallydid act to dissolveparliament,theKremlinadministration

wasdeeplyuncertainaboutthelikelyreactionin Russiaand abroad.The hesitationshownbythearmywhenfacedwiththeuprisingof3- 4 Octo-

bershowsthattheyhad good reasonforconcern.

9. For instance,see ArendLijphart,"Democratizationand ConstitutionalChoices in Czecho-Slovakia,Hungaryand Poland, 1989-91,"JournalofTheoreticalPolitics4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Frye,"APoliticsofInstitutionalChoice";and BarbaraGeddes,"Initiation ofNewDemocraticInstitutionsin EasternEurope and LatinAmerica,"inArendLijphart and CarlosH. Waisman,eds.,InstitutionalDesigninNewDemocracies:EasternEuropeandLatin America(Boulder,Colo, 1996), 1542.

reachinguse ofhisconstitutionaldecree power(undertheamendments creatingthepresidencyin 1991) and stillmoreoftheemergencydecree powershewasgrantedinlate1991bytheparliamentwhenhe enactedvir- tuallytheentireeconomicstabilizationprogrambydecree-with theencouragementofwesternadvisers.'7

But the 1993 constitutionenumeratesa numberof domainswhere policymusttaketheformoffederallaw,thatis,notpresidentialdecree. Amongtheseare taxation,pensionsand social benefits,conditionsgoverningtheuse ofland,principlesforthestructureofstatepowerin the territorialsubjectsofthefederation,ruleson electionsto theDuma and theformationoftheFederationCouncil,theappointmentofjudges,and theorganizationoftheprocuracy.'8The presidentmaynotissuea decree thatcontradictstheconstitutionorfederallaw.Moreover,in anydomain wherestandinglegislationexists,suchlegislationmayonlybe changedby legislation,notbydecree.Thuspriorpassageofa lawon a subjecttiesthe president'shands.Andwhena lawis passed,itsupersedesa presidential decree.Manydecrees,in fact,are issuedtoannulsomeor all ofthepreviousdecreesthathavebeen supersededthroughlegislation.19Thuswhere a policyissetbylaw,onlya lawmayalterit.The sphereofdecreepowerisrestrictedbytheexpandingsphereinwhichlegislationhas setpolicy.20

Moreover,theRussianpresidentdoes nothavetherighttobypassparliamentand submitan issuetoa nationalreferendum.2'Onlyifa citizens' initiativesucceedsingatheringtwomillionsignaturesmaya ballotpropo-

17. WesternadvisersfounditexpedientthatAnatoliiChubaisand EgorGaidarwere able toimplementmajordecisionsquicklybyobtaininga presidentialdecree.As Maxim Boycko,AndreiShleifer,and RobertVishnywrote,once theparliamentpassed theinitial privatizationprogram,"everysubsequentmajorregulationofprivatizationwasintroduced bypresidentialdecreeratherthanparliamentaryaction."MaximBoycko,AndreiShleifer, and RobertVishny,PrivatizingRussia(Cambridge,Mass.,1995), 5.

18. Note thatthereis a loophole in thislimitation,however.Under a rulingbythe ConstitutionalCourtinApril1996,thepresidentmayuse thisdecreepowerto"filla gap" in existinglegislation,even in cases wherethe constitutionrequiresa law.See Sobranie

zakonodatel'stvaRossiiskoiFederatsii,no. 19 (6 May1996),item2320,rulingof30April1996, p. 4953.The majorityofthecourtheld that:"The presidentismade theguarantorofthe

ConstitutionoftheRussianFederationand ensuresthecoordinatedfunctioningand cooperationoftheorgansofstatepower.Asa result,thepresident'sissuingofukazythatfill gaps in thelegal regulationofquestionsdemandinga legislativesolutiondoes not contradicttheConstitutionoftheRussianFederationso longas suchukazydo notcontradict theConstitutionoftheRussianFederationand federallaws,and theiractionislimitedin timeuntilsuchtimeas correspondinglegislativeactsare adopted."

19.In 1999,40 percentofnormativepresidentialdecreesrescindedoramendedpreviousdecrees,someaffectingdozensofearlierdecreesatonce. In manycases,thechanges are requiredbecause a lawhas been passed thatsupersedesthepriordecrees.

20.Thomas F.Remington,StevenS. Smith,and Moshe Haspel, "Decrees,Laws,and Inter-BranchRelationsin theRussianFederation,"Post-SovietAffairs14,no. 4 (October-

December 1998): 287-322.

21. BothCharlesde Gaulleand hissuccessorGeorgesPompidouignoredtheFrench constitutionalrequirementthatwhenthepresidentsubmitsa matterto thepopulace for a referendum,eitherthegovernmentorone ofthetwochambersofparliamentmustpropose itas well.Theirsuccessorshavenotdared tofollowtheirexample.See Shugartand Carey,PresidentsandAssemblies,59.

sitionbe puttotheelectorate;thepresidenthasno righttoeitherholdor block a referendumon his or her own authorityNote. thatparliament

facesthesameconstraint.22

Interviewswithpolicymakersin Moscowhave suggestedthatbesides strictlyconstitutionalrestrictions,thereare other,political,limitations thataffectthepresident'sabilityto makepolicybydecree.A decreeis less crediblethana lawin theeyesofbureaucratsandprivateagentsFor.example,

presidentialdecreesaffirmingtherightsofmembersofcollectivefarmsto treattheirsharesofland as propertyhave had littlereal effect,because (accordingto a seniormemberofthestaffoftheagrariancommitteein an interview)banksrefusetolendmoneyon thestrengthofrightscreated

bya decree.23A decree has less credibilitythana lawbecause it can be more readilyoverturned;courtsmaystrikedown unconstitutionaldecrees,and a subsequentpresidentialdecreemayannulanyparticulardecree.A conspicuousexampleisthecase oftheAugust1996decreethatrescindedfiftydecreesofthespringthathad committedthegovernmentto

liberaltaxexemptionsand spendingpromises-electorallyhelpful,but ruinousforthe budget. The president'sown arbitraryuse of decrees

thereforeunderminestheeffectivenessofthedecreepower,sincedecrees can be readilyoverturnedbylaterdecrees.Decrees havebeen usefulfor electoralcampaigning,forestablishingregulationsthatimplementlaws,

and fordirectingnationalsecuritypolicy(includingthe major case of sendingfederaltroopsintoChechnia) butoverthe1994-99 period,they havenotgenerallybeen substitutesforlegislation.

These considerationshelp accountforthefactthat,in sharpcontrast to the1991-92 period,thepresident'suse ofthedecree powersincethe adoptionofthenewconstitutionseemstohavebecome routine.Fewdecreesconcernmajorpolicychoices.24

22. But,ifbothchambersofparliamentapprovea proposaltoamend chapters1,2, or9 oftheconstitution,theyconvenea ConstitutionalAssembly,whichmayinturnchoose

tohold a nationalreferendumtoratifythechange (Article135,paragraphs2 and 3).

23.Remington,Smith,andHaspel,"Decrees,Laws,andInter-BranchRelations,"319.

24.Presidentialdecrees are classifiedinto "normative"and "implementing"cate-

gories.In additionto decrees,thepresidentalso issuesorders(rasporiazheniia)thatare bindingbutoflowerlegal status.Normativedecreesare consideredrule-making;imple- mentingdecreesconcernindividualsand othercasesoflimitedapplication.Examplesare

appointmentsofindividualstoparticularposts,and thegrantingofstateprizestospecific individualsIn. anygivenyear,thereare likelytobe 8 or9 timesas manyimplementingas

normativedecrees.

Note thatmanynormativedecreesare extremelynarrowin scope. A decree in September1999retroactivelyreviseda numberofpreviousdecreestobringtheirwordinginto conformitywiththe renamingof the "head of the stateheraldryadministrationof the president-the stateheraldmeisterintotheStateHeraldricCouncil."

The figuresmustbe interpretedwithcaution,howeverIt.isclearfromexaminingthe

numbersofthepublisheddecrees,bothnormativeand implementing,thata largeproportionofdecreesarenotpublished.PresumablythereasonisthattheyareclassifiedFor. instance,in 1999,theadministrationtooktheunprecedentedstepofpublishingfourde-

creesfrompreviousyearsthathad been classified"forofficialuse only"(theyconcerned thestatusofKaliningrad,thestatusofa closed city,on theuse ofwiretappingofcriminal

suspects,and socialbenefitsforcertaincategoriesofstateemployees).Thus itis difficult