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Table 1providesthenumberofdecreesissuedeach yearsincethenew constitutioncame intoforce.It suggeststhat,withtheclearexceptionof the electionyearof 1996, the numberof presidentialdecrees has remainedfairlyconstant,witha noticeabledownturnin 1999.Inspectionof thedecreesthemselvesyieldstheimpressionofa ratherlimitedand narrowscope ofaction,in sharpcontrastto therevolutionarypace of1991-

1993,whenvastareasofpolicyweresetbydecree.Sincethen,evenin the politicalsphere,nearlyalldecreeshavebeen quitenarrowApart.fromoccasional bombshelldecreeswhenEl'tsinfiredhis entiregovernmentto getridoftheprimeminister,mostofhisdecreesin thepoliticaldomain have concernedstructuresand proceduresin thepresidentialadministrationand government.25Agrowingproportionregulatestateprizesand awards,stateemblems,holidays,and othersymbolicmatters.26

VetoPower

The presidentcanvetolawssenthimbytheFederalAssembly,27although parliamentcan overridethepresident'svetoifitcan approvetheoriginal billbya two-thirdsmajorityin each chamber.28Achievingtwo-thirdsma- joritiesineach chamberhasproventobe a highhurdle,particularlygiven theregulardisagreementsbetweentheDuma and theFederationCouncil.On thoseoccasionswhentheFederalAssemblyhassucceededinpassinga lawovera presidentialveto,however,thepresidenthas been prohibitedbytheConstitutionalCourtfromrefusingtosign.El'tsintriedthis in thecase ofthetrophyartlaw,claimingas groundsforrefusingto sign thebillafterhisvetohad been overriddenthatparliamenthad passedthe

to determinethenumberor significanceoftheunpublishedukazy.It is likelythatmany ofthemare implementing,because themissingnumbersoftenfallin listsofimplementingdecrees,suchas appointmentsMany.othersundoubtedlyconcernsensitivedetailsof theadministrationofthe"powerstructures.The" numbersare significantFor.theperiod from1994throughOctober1996,ScottParrishcountsa totalof953 publishednormative decrees,2,575 publishedimplementingdecrees,and 1,544missingor "secret"decrees.

Parrish,"PresidentialDecree Authority,"82.

25. Exceptionsincludeoccasional decreessuspendingactionsofpresidentsofconstituentrepublicsor otherlowerofficialsThese. are rare,however.There wereonlytwo

in 1999.

26. In 1999,when El'tsinappointed Stepashinas primeminister,and again later whenhe appointedPutin,he followedtheseactionsbyissuingdecreeslayingoutnewgovernmentalorganizationcharts,specifyingthe numberof ministries,statecommittees, otheragencies,and thenumbersofdeputychairsand firstdeputychairsofthegovernment.Presumablyhe didso atthebehestofthenewprimeminister,sinceineach case the actionsfollowedratherthanpreceded thechange in governmentMany.of the decrees concernminorchangesin thedesignationofparticularstateagencies,as whentheState Committeeon PhysicalEducationand Tourismwaselevatedto thestatusofMinistryfor PhysicalEducationand Tourism(Ukaz no. 724 of8June1999).

27. Since 1993,theparliamenthas been called theFederalAssemblyand consistsof twochambers:theStateDuma (thelowerhouse) and theFederationCouncil (theupper

house).

28. Note thatmajoritythresholdsare sethigh:evenifseatsarevacant,majoritiesare calculatedusingthefullcomplementofconstitutionallymandatedseatsineach chamber:

450 in theStateDuma, 178in theFederationCouncil.

lawin an unconstitutionalfashion:each chamberallowedabsentmembersto be recordedas voting-throughvotingbyfriends,in theDuma, orbymailballotintheupperhouse.The courtrejectedhisargumentand demanded thathe signthelaw,rulingthatonlythecourtwasentitledto decide theconstitutionalityoftheparliament'svotingprocedures.29

RightofLegislativeInitiative

Unlikethe U.S. president,Russia'spresidenthas the rightto introduce billsdirectlytotheDuma. Thisisa weakpower,however,enjoyedalso by a numberofotherinstitutionsIt.ensuresonlythatpresidentialproposals willbe considered.Boththepresidentand thegovernmentlackcontrol overtheagenda, suchas governmentsmightenjoyin parliamentarysystemswheretheycan forcea take-it-or-leave-voteiton a proposal.There are no "package"votesor otherrestrictiveproceduresin Russianlegislativeprocessesas thereare,forinstance,in Franceor Britain.30Indeed, in theDuma therearealmostno opportunitiestoforcean up-or-downvote on a particularbill.Asa result,thesimplerighttointroducebillsgivesthe presidentno strategicadvantagein shapingoutcomes.

RightofDissolution

The presidentmaydissolvetheDuma undercloselyspecifiedconditions but maynot dissolvethe FederationCouncil under anycircumstances. The conditionsunderwhichthe presidentmaydissolvethe Duma are narrowerthantheirequivalenttermsin thepreviousconstitutionsand in earlierdraftsofthepresentconstitutionThey.are also subjectto certain limitsThe. presidentmaynotdissolvewithinone yearofthelastdissolu-

29. PostanovlenieKonstitutsionnogosudaRossiiskoiFederatsii,"Podeluo razreshenii sporamezhduSovetomFederatsiii PrezidentomRossiiskoiFederatsii,mezhduGosudar-

stvennoiDumoi i PrezidentomRossiiskoiFederatsiiob obiazannostiPrezidentaRossiiskoi Federatsiipodpisat' priniatyiFederal'nyizakon 'O kul'turnykhtsennostiakh,peremeshchennykhvSoiuzSSRvrezul'tateVtoroimirovoivoinynakhodiashchikhsiana territorii RossiiskoiFederatsii,"'Sobraniezakonodatel'stvaRossiiskoiFederatsii,no. 16 (20 April1998), item1879,rulingof6 April1998,pp. 3624-30.

In May1999 thecourtruledon thepresident'spetitionto strikedownthelawboth on substantiveand proceduralgrounds.The courtheld thatthelawwasnotunconstitutionalitself,althoughpartsofitwereunconstitutionaland thereforeinvalid.Astotheuse ofirregularvotingprocedures,thecourtineffectdecided towinkatthepractice,holding thatitwouldnotruleon theconstitutionalityofpastlegislationthatmayhavebeen passed throughtheuse ofvotingforabsentcolleagues,butwarnedtheDuma thatifitwishedto use thispracticein thefuture,itwouldneed toestablisha procedurefordoingso.

30. On the implicationsof restrictiveproceduresin France,see John D. Huber, RationalizingParliament:LegislativeInstitutionsandPartyPoliticsinFrance(Cambridge,Eng., 1996). The absence of"blocked"or packagevotesin Russia,likethepresident'sinability tocallreferenda,isanotherinstanceinwhichRussia'sexecutivebranchisweakerin relationto thelegislativebranchthanis thecase in France.There has been speculationthat thegovernmentin Russiamightpledge itsconfidenceon a particularlegislativepackage and forcetheDuma topassiton thepainoffacingdissolutionand earlyelection.The constitutiondoes notpreventsucha procedurebutdoes notexplicitlyprovideforit.

tionifthathas occurredthroughtheresignationofthegovernment,nor maythepresidentdissolveiftheDuma hasvotedtoremovethepresident throughimpeachment(note thata voteto forman impeachmentcommissiondoes notqualifyforthisrestriction)The. presidentmaynotdissolvewithinsixmonthsoftheend ofhisorhertermofoffice,orifa state ofemergencyor martiallawhas been declared throughoutthecountry. The presidentmustdissolvewhen the Duma has refusedto confirma nomineeforprimeministerthreetimesand maydissolveifithasrefused confidencein thegovernmenttwice.The president'sdissolutionpoweris restrictedbycomparison,forinstance,withthedraftEl'tsin'steamproposed inspring1993,whoselanguagewouldhavegiventhepresidentthe powerto dissolvetheDuma "inothercases as well,whena crisisofstate powercannotbe resolvedon thebasis ofproceduresestablishedbythe

currentConstitution."'31

31. The constitutionalassemblyconvenedbyEl'tsinin summer1993weakenedthe powersthatEl'tsin'spreviousdrafthad assignedthepresident.In theassembly'sdraft,the presidentcould issueedicts,butthesewerenottocontradictfederallawor theconstitution;thepresidentwouldnothavethebroadpowertodissolvetheparliamentifitwasunable toovercomea crisisinstatepower;and thepresidentcould no longerbe the"arbiter" ofdisputesinrelationsbetweenthecentralgovernmentand lowergovernmentsoramong lowergovernmentsInstead,.thepresidentwas now to use "conciliationprocedures"to settlesuchdisputes,and,ifthedisputecould notbe settledbymediation,wastoreferthe issue to the courts.The assembly'sversiongave the presidentthe rightto dissolvethe Duma underonlytwocircumstances:itsrefusaltoconfirm,on thethirdattempt,thepresident'snomineeforhead ofgovernment,and aftera secondvoteofno confidencebythe Duma inthegovernmentwithinthreemonths.Withslightmodifications,theseprovisions survivedintotheDecemberdraftthatwasapprovedin thereferendumStill.othermajor issues,suchas thepresident'spowertocalla referendum,werefinessedbybeingreferred tofuturelegislationAll.oftheseweakenedpowerssurvivedintothedraftthatwasratified bytheDecembervote.See Konstitutsiia(Osnovnoizakon)RossiiskoiFederatsii:Proekt(Moscow, 1993),article74.

Note thatthe1993constitutiondistinguishesbetweenoptionaland automaticdissolution triggersIf. the Duma denies the governmentitsconfidencetwicewithinthree months,thepresidentchooses betweendissolvingtheDuma and dismissingthegovernment.IftheDuma failstocarrya motionofconfidenceputbythegovernment,thedissolutiontriggerisautomaticallyinvoked.The confirmationprocedurecontainsa similarautomatictriggerIn. thiscase, ifthe Duma failsto confirmthe president'scandidatefor primeministerthreetimes,thepresidentdissolvestheDuma and callsnewelections.

The Duma,however,hasattemptedtoprotectitselfagainsttheautomaticdissolution mechanismin the eventitfailsto approvea motionofconfidencein thegovernment. ClearlytheDuma deputieswould much preferto allowa no-confidencemotionto fail thana confidencemotiontopass-electorally thelatterisfarmorepainfulthantheformereveniftheconstitutionalconsequencesareidentical.Accordingly,November1995 thedeputiesamendedtherulesso thatifthegovernmentdemandsa voteon a confidence motion,theCounciloftheDuma mustimmediatelyrespondbyorganizingan expertevaluationofthelegal and substantivebasisforthedemand.Meanwhile,ifitshouldhappen that"duringthe period"when the governmentproposesa confidencevote,the Duma itselfdecides toconsidera voteofno confidence,theconfidencevoteis postponeduntil theno confidencevoteisheld.Iftheno confidencevotepasses,thentheconfidencevote demandedbythegovernmentisputoffforthreemonths.Moreover,ifa confidencevote isheldand failstopass,thentheDuma voteson no confidence.Ifthatvotefails,thenthe entirematteris dropped. In short,theDuma has effectivelyprotecteditselfagainstthe

RighttoAppointandDismisstheGovernment

Thispowerhasproventobe a bone ofcontentionbetweenpresidentand parliamentsince1991-no lessunderthe1993 constitutionthanbefore it.The presidentnamestheprimeministerand considerstheprimeminister'srecommendationson thecompositionoftheremainderofthegovernment.The president,on hisor her ownauthority,also has theright to dismissthegovernmentThe. governmentand itsmembersare thereforeresponsibletothepresidentThey.arealsoresponsibletoparliament, however,becauseparliament'sconsentisrequiredforconfirmationofthe primeminister,and because theconfidence/noconfidencemechanism can denythegovernmentparliamentarysupportand triggerthegovernment'sresignation.32

HighHurdlestoConstitutionalAmendment

The 1993 constitutionis difficultto amend. The constitutionalamendmentprocedureensuresthatamendmentshavethesupport,bothofthe lowerand upperhouses,and ofa majorityoftheregionalpoliticalestablishmentsAmendments.to theportionsoftheconstitutiondealingwith politicalinstitutionsrequireapprovalbya two-thirdsvotein theDuma, a three-quartersvotein theFederationCouncil,and passagebythelegislativebodies oftwo-thirdsofthesubjectsofthefederationSuccess,.there- fore,wouldrequirethatone politicalcampholda sizablemajorityinboth chambersof parliamentand in two-thirdsof the constituentterritories ofthefederationRealistically,.then,to carryout a significantshiftin the constitutionalbalance betweenthe branches,the Duma would need to agree withthe presidentto reconcentratepowerlostto the regions,or withtheregionson a redistributionofpowerawayfromthepresidency. Buttheregionaland republicleadersarehardlylikelytogiveup powerto thefederalcentertomaketheDuma stronger,and a presidentisunlikely torelinquishpowertotheDuma forthesakeofa strongerfederalcenter. In effect,El'tsin'sconstitutionhasgivenvetorightsoverconstitutionalrevisiontoeach ofthethreesidesin thistriangleofrelations.

Nonetheless,proposals to alterthe balance betweenpresidentand parliamentthroughconstitutionalamendmenthave gained widespread

government'sconstitutionalrightto demand a voteofconfidence.ReglamentGosudarstvennoiDumy Federal'nogo Sobraniia RossiiskoiFederatsii,Article 153, in Sobranie zakonodatel'stvaRossiiskoiFederatsii,no.7 (16 February1998),item801,adopted22January 1998,p. 1675.

32. The lawon thegovernment,whichcame intoforceatthebeginningof1998,detailedtherespectivepowersofpresident,parliament,and governmentfurtherIt. limits

slightlythepresident'spowerstoappointand dismissthegovernmentand expandsslightly theparliament'srightstodeterminethestructureofthegovernmentUnder.thelaw,the presidentappointstheprimeministerbutmaydismisshimor heronlyiftheprimeministerasksto resignor is unable toperformhisor herduties.ClearlyPresidentEl'tsinhas

flagrantlyignoredthisprovision,since he has repeatedlydismissedhis primeministers withoutwarning,letalone consultation."O pravitel'stveRossiiskoiFederatsii,"Rossiiskaia

gazeta,23 December 1997.

minister,theparliamentmustvote on the appointment.35These differences appear to be significantWeimar.Germany'spresidentcombined the unlimitedrightof dissolution36withthe rightto issue decrees as a meansofavoidingengagementwithparliamentoverlegislationand made decrees a routineformoflegislationin the early1930s;in effect,when parliamentwasnotinsession,thepresidentcouldand didrulebydecree. There is a strongcorrelationbetweenthedecreasingnumberofdaysthe Reichstagsat,thedecreasingnumberoflawsitpassed,and theincreasing numberofpresidentialdecreesissued,between1930 and 1932.37Such a descentinto presidentialrule bydecree has not occurred-so far-in Russia.

Let us brieflysummarizethepowersofparliamentundertheconstitutionbeforeturningtoan examinationofhowthisarrayofinstitutional rightsmightaffectthepoliticalstrategiesofpresidentand parliament.

ParliamentaryPowers

ApprovalofLegislation

Laws-zakony (correspondingto the Englishterm"statutes")-may be enactedonlywithparliamentaryconsent.38Ordinaryfederallawsrequire a simplemajority(oftheabsolutenumberofmandates)ineach chamber followedbythe president'ssignature,but the constitutionprovidesfor overridemechanisms.The Duma mayoverridetheFederationCouncil's rejectionofa billwitha two-thirdsmajorityvote,and thetwochambers mayoverridea presidentialveto,as we saw,bya concurrenttwo-thirds majority.

ControlovertheExecutive

Formally,the FederalAssemblylacksthe powerof "oversight"(kontrol') overthe executive.It has, however,severalotherrightsthatallowit to monitortheactionsofthegovernmentand bureaucracyand tohold officialstoaccount.Amongthesearethe"governmenthour"featureofDuma proceedings,whentheDuma summonsgovernmentministersto report on theirworkand respondto questions.Othermechanismsare parlia-

35.Shugartand Carey,PresidentsandAssemblies,68-71.

36.The onlylimitationon theGermanpresident'srightto dissolveparliamentwas thathe could notdo itmorethanonce "foranyone reason."Needlesstosay,thepresident

could alwaysfinda newreasontodissolveparliament.

37.Shugartand Carey,PresidentsandAssemblies,70.

38.Lawsare classifiedas eitherfederallawsorconstitutionallaws;thelatterare con-

sideredtocompletetheconstitution,whichspecifiesa setofmattersthataretobe enacted byconstitutionallaws.Amongtheseare lawson statesofemergency,martiallaw,thehumanrightscommissioner,thestructureofthejudicial system,and howa constitutionalassemblyis tobe convened;dependingon howone readstheconstitution'slanguage,there are around a dozen categoriesin all. The constitutionrequiresthata constitutionallaw passbya qualifiedmajorityoftwo-thirdsofthemembersoftheDuma and three-quarters ofthemembersoftheFederationCouncil.

mentaryinquiries,hearings,questionsfromthefloorputtogovernment officialswhentheypresentlegislation,theconfirmationand confidence voteproceduresdiscussedabove,and impeachment.The impeachment provisioniswortha briefdescription,in viewofitsuse againstPresident El'tsinfromJune1998toMay1999.

Impeachment

Removalofthepresidentbymeansofimpeachmentconsistsoffourbasic steps.39The StateDuma mustvote bya two-thirdsmajority(or 300 affirmativevotes)infavorofimpeachment;theSupremeCourtmustaffirm thatthepresident'sactionsconstitutegravecrimesor treason;theConstitutionalCourtmustrulethatno proceduralviolationswerecommitted in theDuma's approvalofthe decisionto impeach;and theFederation Councilmustvotebya two-thirdsmajoritytoremovethepresident.Initi- atingimpeachmentproceedingsgivestheDuma leverageoverthepresident: once the Duma has approvedthe motionto impeach bythe re- quiredtwo-thirdsmajority,thepresidentmaynotdissolvetheDuma and callnewelections.

OppositiongroupsintheDuma finallysucceededinplacingimpeachmenton the agenda in 1998. The Duma votedinJune 1998 to forma commissiontostudya seriesofaccusationsagainstEl'tsin.Therewerefive charges:thathe had committedtreasonbysigningtheagreementin December1991 to dissolvethe SovietUnion; thathe had illegallyinitiated thewarin Chechnia in 1994; thathe had illegallydissolvedtheRussian parliamentand SupremeSovietin 1993; thathe had destroyedRussia's defensecapacity;and thathe had committedgenocide againsttheRussian people bythe effectsof the economic policies of his government since1992.In March1999 thecommissionapprovedall fivechargesand submittedthemto thefullchamberforitsconsiderationThe. Duma beganthedebateon impeachmenton 13May1999,and on 15Mayvotedon thefivecharges.None gainedtherequired300votes,althoughthecharge thatEl'tsinhad illegallyinitiatedand conductedmilitaryoperationsin Chechnia came close,receiving284 votes.El'tsinused thefullrangeof carrotsand sticksat hisdisposalto avertimpeachment,offeringmaterial blandishmentstosomedeputiesin returnfortheirsupport,and reminding the Duma, as he replaced EvgeniiPrimakovwithInteriorMinister SergeiStepashinas hisnewprimeministeron theeve ofthevote,thathe stillhad othertrumpcardsin hishand. Daysaftertheimpeachmentvote

39. Note thatalthoughthereis a formalparallelbetweenthedivisionoflabor betweenHouse and Senatein theUnitedStates,and Duma and FederationCouncilin Russia,theRussianusage of thetermimpeachmentcomprehendsboththe "indictment"and the "removal"stages,whereastheU.S. procedureapplies the termonlyto thedecision bytheHouse toapprovethecharges.In theUnitedStates,theHouse considersand presentsthe charges,whilethe Senate determineswhetherthe chargeswarrantthe president'sremovalfromoffice;in Russia,theDuma decideswhethertoapprovethebringing ofthecharges,and theFederationCouncildecideswhethertoremovethepresident.

tionsbetweenDuma factionleaders and the presidenthave been employedsporadicallyas well.Ratherthanallowinga highlydivisiveissueto paralyzetheDuma, thisconsultativemechanismhas allowedthefaction leaderstohammeroutface-savingcompromisesthatcan thenbe passed in thefullchamber.The same procedurealso allowsparliament'schairman togivethegovernmentand thepresidenta reliableestimateofthe balance of forcesin the Duma, crediblyassuringthe president,forinstance,thata particularcandidateforprimeministeris unacceptableor thata particularlegislativepackagewillneed sweetenerstobe madepalatable toa majority.

In additionto thesead hoc consultativeforums,bothpresidentand governmentmaintainliaisonofficesin parliamentto manage day-to-day legislativerelations.Togetherwiththeirstaffand withtheministries'own envoysto theDuma, theseliaisonstructuresconstitutea forceofaround 100 officialsworkingdailyto linkexecutiveand legislativebranches.Indeed,thechallengetothepresidentand thegovernmentistoensurethat theseofficialsadheretothegovernment'spolicylineratherthanallywith factionsand committeesin parliamentto lobbyfortheirownministerial

interests.

Bothparliamentaryleadersand thepresidenthaveperiodicallycalled forinstitutionalizingtheinformalconsultativearrangementsDuma. leadersand EvgeniiPrimakovmade a concertedefforttowinacceptanceof a "pact"governinglegislative-executiverelationsin thewakeofthecrisis overEl'tsin'sattemptinAugust-September1998toforcetheDuma toacceptViktorChernomyrdinagainas primeministerAfter.El'tsinretreated and withdrewChernomyrdin'snomination,insteadproposingPrimakov as hiscandidateforprimeminister,governmentand Duma leadersdiscussed the termsof a new workingarrangementin whichparliament

would give the governmentitssupportifthe presidentwould commit himselfto allowboththeDuma and thegovernmentto functionunim-

peded. In effect,itwould have been a tacitlimitationofthepresident's powerin favorofa moreparliamentaryformofgovernmentIn. theend, however,no setofarrangementscould be foundthatwas acceptable to bothEl'tsinand thecommunists,and theagreementfailedon thefloor oftheDuma on 7 April1999.42Nonetheless,theproposalreflectsa constitutionalmiddle ground thatmay become a precedentforworking relationsin thefuture,or a constitutionalamendment,movingthebalance oflegislative-executivepowertowarda moreFrench-style"premier- presidential"model.43

42.Foraccountsofthenegotiations,see Segodnia,31August1998;RFE/RL Newsline, 25 and 28 August1998,and 27January1999;Segodnia,3 and 6 March1999;and RFE/RL Newsline,17 and 22 Marchand 8 April1999.

43.Shugartand CareycharacterizetheFrenchsystemas "premier-presidential":the

presidentis popularlyelectedand has broad powers,althoughthepresident'slegislative powersare limitedand he or shemaynotremovecabinetministers;thecabinetdepends on the confidenceof the parliamentarymajorityThey. showthatsuch a systemcan be stable.Shugartand Carey,PresidentsandAssemblies,23-26.