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518 SlavicReview

InterbranchRelationsandtheLegislativeProcessinPractice

We haveseen thatthepresidenthas reasontoworkthroughlegislationif policygoalscan be achievedthatwaywithoutconcedingtoo muchtothe opposition.The politicalweaknessofthedecreepowerand theconstitutionalrestrictionson itsuse makeitdesirableforthepresidenttoseeklegislationwherepossibleas a meansofenactingpolicyand makingchanges fromthestatusquo. In sucha case,compromiseon legislation,ifthepresidentdoesnotconcede toomuchtotheopposition,ispreferabletoeither a decreeor todeadlock.

The evidenceon law makingsince 1993 tendsto bear out thisperspective.More oftenthan not, presidentand parliamentsettletheir differencesthroughnegotiation.The greatmajorityof lawspassed by theDuma are eventuallysigned:about three-fourthsof the lawspassed in 1994-95, and about 70 percentof thelawspassed in 1996-99, were signedbythepresident.44Manylawsweresignedbythepresidenton the second,third,orfourthtimetheyreachedhisdesk,and someweresigned on evenlaterrounds.On manymatters,thebargainingprocessmaytake years.45Some bills-such as thosethatwouldestablishfirmguaranteesof propertyrightsin landdo ofcourseend in deadlock.Impressiveis the numberofitemson whichagreementisfound,some ofwhichare highly

contentious.46

It is also noteworthythatforall the conflictbetweenthe branches, billsoriginatingwiththepresidenthavethehighestprobabilityofpassage in the Duma, followedbybillsinitiatedbythe governmentBills.sponsoredbydeputies,bytheFederationCouncil,and byregionalassemblies havefarlowerchancesofpassagein theDuma. FortheperiodfromJanuary1996throughMarch1997,forinstance,47 percentofpresidentially initiatedbillspassed in thirdreading,as did 40 percentofgovernmentsponsoredlegislation.Only 21 percentof deputy-initiatedbillspassed, 12percentofbillsoriginatedbytheFederationCouncil,and 5 percentof regionallysponsoredbills.47Even allowingforthefactthatmanyof the presidentiallysponsored bills are internationaltreatiessubmittedfor

44. In his concludingstatementto theDuma on 24 December 1999,reviewingthe four-yeartermof the Duma of the second convocation,ChairmanGennadii Seleznev reportedthattheDuma had passed 1,036laws,ofwhich715 had come intoforce(that is,been signedbythepresident).StateDuma, ReportofSession,Biulleten',no. 306 (448) (24 December 1999): 1-2.

45. Data for1994-95 aretakenfromRemington,Smith,and Haspel, "Decrees,Laws, and Inter-BranchRelations,"301. Data for the period betweenJanuary1996 and June1999are takenfromcalculationsbytheDuma's internalresearchunit,publishedin Federal'noe Sobranie-parlament Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Analiticheskoeupravlenie,GosudarstvennaiaDuma vtorogosozyvav vesenniuiusessiiu1999 goda.Informatsionno-analiticheskiibiulleten',no. 6 (Moscow,1999), 4.

46. Examplesincludelegislationon mortgagedebt,commercialbankruptcy,privati- zationofstateenterprises,regulationofproduction-sharingagreements,principlesoftax- ation,thecourtsystem,and a fullrangeofelectorallaws.

47.A. M. Biriukovet al., eds., "Problemyorganizatsiizakonodatel'nogoprotsessa

vsvetestatisticheskikhdannykh(po itogam 1996 g.-1 kvartala1997 g.)," Analiticheskii vestnik,no. 14 (Moscow,1997).

ratification,itis thecase (and interviewsconfirmit) thatbillssponsored bypresidentand governmentaregenerallyaccordedhigher-prioritycon- siderationthanotherbills.48

SummingUp

As manyobservershave argued,Russia'smixed "president-parliamen- tary"constitutionpossessesconsiderablepotentialforinterbranchdeadlockand crisisbecause oftheextensivepowersgiventothepresident,the weaknessofparliamentas a countervailingsourceofpoliticalinfluence forthecommunistopposition,and theintermediatepositionofgovernment,thesurvivalofwhichrequiresbothparliament'sconfidenceand the president'sfavor.It is thereforenoteworthyto findthatthesearrangementshavewithstooda seriesofpoliticalconflictsin thefirstsixyearsof theirexistence.In thisarticle,I havesuggestedtworeasonswhythepresidentand parliamentmayhavechosentoturntobargainingand compromiseto resolvemanyof theirdifferencesoverpolicy:uncertaintyabout the costofa catastrophicbreakdownthatmightbe broughtabout bya head-on collisionbetweenthe branches,and the constitutionallimitationson thepresident'spowersin settingpolicythatmakeitdesirableto seeklegislativedecisionswhentheyare attainableatreasonablecost.Frequentlylegislativeand executiveleadershavealso devisedad hoc institutions,suchas "bigfour"and "roundtable"talks,throughwhichtheyhave hammeredoutagreementson politicallysensitiveissues.Overthe199499 period,theywerenot able to reach agreementon some of the most divisiveissues,such as whetherto legalize privatepropertyin land, but on otherstheyhavefoundcompromisesolutions.In turn,thepracticeof suchconsultationshasgivenan impetustoperiodicproposalsfora more permanentlimitationon the president'spowersthatwould shiftpower towardtheparliamentand bringthepoliticalbalance closerto thatofa "premier-presidential"model.

Myanalysisherehasemphasizedthestrategiccalculationsofthemain playersincentral-levelpolitics,ratherthantheirbeliefsorvalues,orcon- textualeconomic,social,or internationalconditions,as themajorinfluence on thestabilizationofRussianpoliticsunderthe1993 constitution. The premiseis thatconstitutionalarrangementsare stableto theextent thatno importantpoliticalcampjudges thatitwouldbe betteroffbyoverturningthosearrangementsthanitis byachievingwhatitcan underthe constitutionalrules of the game. In 1993-94, uncertaintyconcerning

whethera miscalculationmightlead toa full-scalebreakdownofpolitical orderhad a deterrenteffecton bothEl'tsinand hisopponents,whowere deeplydividedideologicallyand mistrustfulofone another'sintentions. Commitmentto abidingbytheconstitutionalruleswas thereforehighly conditional.In 2000,as VladimirPutintakesoverthepresidency,uncertaintyabout therelativestrengthofeach camp is farlower,butthecon-

48. Of billstakenup forconsiderationbytheDuma in thesame period,53 percent weresubmittedbydeputies,7 percentbythepresident,23 percentbythegovernment, 6 percentbytheFederationCouncil,and 11 percentbyregions.

stitutionalframeworkhas provenitselfcapable of givingeach camp at leastsomesuccesses.Thus,althoughpoliticaldisorderand theriskofcon-

stitutionalbreakdownstillremaintoo greatto permitone to speak ofa consolidationofdemocracy,thehistoryofthepastsixyearssuggeststhat a setofworkingpracticesand precedentshavearisenthatenable all sides tosettlemostoftheirdifferenceswithintheframeworkofthisconstitution.