Categorical Terrorism_Goodwin

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requiresa clearanalyticdefinitionordemarcationof the phenomenonto be explained,even if,empirically,terrorism notalwayseasilydistinguishedfromcognatephenomena"Leaving. the definitionimplicitis the roadto obscurantism.(Gibbs" 1989:329)

Severalrepresentativedefinitionsof terrorismarepresentedinTable1.Thedeliberateuse of violenceinorderto influencesome audience(oraudiences)is commonto mostof these definitions,buttherearealso severalareasof divergenceFirst,. thereis no consensusas to who canpracticeterrorism:Canstates as wellas oppositionalgroupsengage interrorism? Severaldefinitions(Hoffman;the U.S.StateDepartment;Black;BergesenandLizardo)seem to implythat"stateterrorism" eithera misnomerorat leastsomethingthatneedsto be distinguishedfromterrorismproperandpresumablyanalyzedinitsown right.Second,there is disagreementas to who canbe the targetof terroristthreatsorviolence:Cananyonebe a targetof terrorism- orjustcivilians(or"noncombatants")?Severaldefinitions(Carr;Ganor; the U.S.State Department;Black;Bergesenand Lizardo)suggest that only civiliansor noncombatantscan be the targets of terrorism,properlyunderstood.Finally,there is disagreementas to whetherterrorismnecessarilyproducesterroramongsome audiencethatis, extremefearoranxiety.Severaldefinitions(Tilly;Crenshaw;Ganor;the U.S.State Department;Black;BergesenandLizardo)makeno mentionof terrororfear.Carris more ambiguous,definingterrorismas intendingto "destroythewill"of civiliansto supportcertain leadersorpolicies.Thesedefinitionsseem to implythatterrorismmaynotalwaysterrorize andhencemayinfactinfluenceaudiencesbyothermeans.

I believethat non-stateor oppositionalterrorismis most usefullydefinedas follows: Terrorismthestrategicuse of violenceandthreatsof violencebyan oppositionalpolitical group againstciviliansor noncombatants,and is usuallyintendedto influenceseveral audiences. Thisdefinition,which is fairlyconventional,agrees with those that suggest terrorisminvolvesviolenceorthreatsby civiliansagainstothercivilians,thus differentiating terrorismfromguerrillawarfare,on the one hand,and state violence,on the other.(This definitionis also agnosticas to whetherterrorismis intendedliterallyto terrorizeWhat.) we must explaininorderto explainterrorismis notwhy politicalgroupssometimes resortto violence,but why they employviolence againstciviliansor noncombatantsin particular

for violence,the state(s)thatthey wish to change,the revolutionaries'constituents,the revolutionaries'own ranks,and those otherstates and publicsthat mightinfluencethe outcomeof the conflict.

Thesedefinitionsdo not implythatstate violenceor "stateterrorism"does notexistor

shouldnotbe studied.Onthe contrary,stateterrorismis anenormouslyimportantsubject; itis incontestable,forexample,thatstateterrorismhasclaimedmanymorevictimsthanhas terrorismas I define it here.(See, for example,Hermanand O'Sullivan1989: chaps.2-3; Gareau2004).Butstate terrorismand oppositionalformsof terrorismneed to be clearly distinguishedifonlyto understandbetterthe relationshipbetweenthetwo.

Mydefinitionof revolutionaryterrorismalso hasthe advantageof demarcatinga widely

recognizedpoliticalstrategythat has been employedby revolutionarygroupswithsome frequency,especiallysincethe 1960s- a strategyclearlydistinctfrom,albeitsharingfamily resemblanceswith,such violentoppositionalstrategiesas coups d'etat,conventionaland

warfare(directedata state'sarmedforces),andeconomicsabotage.Indeed,atleast guerrilla

Terrorism "organizedpoliticalviolence,lethalornonlethal,designedto deteroppositionby

civilians-."DonaldBlack (2004:16)

Terrorism "theuse of violenceby nonstategroupsagainstnoncombatantsforsymbolic

since the 1960s, terrorismhas become partof the "repertoireof contention"(Tilly1995), whichis culturallyavailableto virtuallyallinsurgentgroupsaroundthe globe,whatevertheir

politicalgoalsmaybe.

Finally,mydefinitionof revolutionaryterrorismemphasizes,conventionally,thatthe groups thatemployterrorismareoppositionalpoliticalgroupswhichviewterrorism,forthe mostpart,

as a politicalstrategy.These groupsmayalso be nationalist,ethnic, class-based religious,

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and/orcriminalin nature,butthey seek - whatever else they may seek - to change the political (and perhaps socioeconomic) order more or less fundamentally.Revolutionarygroups that employ terrorismas a strategy (likethose which eschew it)seek, minimally,to overthrowor terminatea state's power withina specific territory(includingcolonialand militaryoccupations) or to secede from a political order and set up a new state (or join a preexisting one). Accordingly,violence directed at civilians by vigilante or paramilitarygroups that are not attemptingto change the politicalorderinfundamentalways would count, depending on the circumstances, as either state-sanctioned or oppositionalterrorism,but not as revolutionary terrorism.

Two types of terrorism need to be analyticallydifferentiated, both of which differfrom conventional and guerrillawarfare,insofar as the latterare directed against a government's armed forces, state-sanctioned paramilitariesor armed civilians(see Table2).1Of course, as Donald Black points out, "those popularlyknown as guerrillas may sometimes engage in terrorism[whenthey attackcivilians],and those popularlyknown as terroristsmay sometimes engage in guerrillawarfare[when they attack militaryfacilities or personnel]."(2004:17)

One type of terrorism,which we may call "selective"or "individualized,"is directedagainst noncombatants who are targeted because of theirindividualidentitiesor roles; in fact, these individualsare typically known by name to at least some members of the revolutionary movement. These individualstypicallyinclude politiciansand (unarmed)state officials,usually those held responsible, directly or indirectly,for the social and politicalarrangements and government policies that the revolutionariesoppose (including"counter-terrorist"policies). They may also include competing oppositional leaders and political activists, presumed governmentcollaboratorsand spies, unsympatheticintellectualsandjournalists,and common criminalswho prey upon the revolutionaries'supporters.Thistype of terrorism- essentiallya strategy of "targeted assassination" - was employed by some 19th-century Russian revolutionaries,a number of anarchist groups and several radicalEuropeangroups of the 1960s. Terrorismof this type, especiallywhen targeted at realor imaginedcollaboratorswhom the government cannot (or will not) protect, may result in an exceedingly large number of casualties, as in Peruduringthe 1980s and Algeriaduringthe 1990s (see, e.g., Kalyvas1999).

Table2:ThreeTypesof ArmedStruggle

Targetedassassination or selective terrorismis verydifferentfrom "indiscriminate"orwhat Iterm "categorical"terrorism,which is directed against anonymous individualsby virtueof

called indiscriminateor "random"terrorism because it makes no distinctions among the individual identities of its targets. In another sense, however, such terrorism is very discriminate, being directed against specific categories of people and not others. Forthis reason, "categoricalterrorism"is a more accurate labelthan "indiscriminateterrorism"forthis strategy.Revolutionarieswho practiceterrorism,whether selective or categorical,also display varyingdegrees of tolerance for harminganonymous bystanders,that is, people who are not the individual,or who do not belong to the category, targeted for violence. The U.S. military

refersto such casualties as "collateral damage."

Followingthe general definition of terrorismgiven above, categorical terrorismmay be defined as the strategic use of violence and threatsof violence, usuallyintended to influence several audiences, by oppositionalpolitical groups against civiliansor noncombatants who belong to a specific ethnicityreligiousornationalgroup, social class orsome othercollectivity, withoutregardto theirindividualidentitiesorroles. Inmuch, if not most, populardiscourse, as well as for many scholars (e.g., Turk1982; Senechal de la Roche 1996; Black 2004),

practiced(or not) by revolutionarymovements, is what Iseek to explainwith my own theory of categoricalterrorism.

There is substantial variationin the extent to which revolutionarymovements employ categorical terrorismas a strategy. Table3 lists some of the more important revolutionary groups that arose during the period since World War IIas well as their principalviolent

strategies (excludingeconomic sabotage). Of course, revolutionarygroups generallyemploy a numberof both violent and nonviolentstrategies in pursuitof their goals, and their mix of strategies typicallychanges over time. Forthis reason, it can be quite misleadingto describe

a ratherlimitedview of what any movement is allabout - butalso interms of just one of their strategies at any given moment.

The first five sets of revolutionarygroups listed in Table 3 perpetrated or continue to perpetrate extensive categorical or indiscriminateterrorism.The other listed organizations were (orare)generallymuch more selective or individualizedintheiruse of terrorism;at least one group, the Sandinista National LiberationFront in Nicaragua, employed virtuallyno terrorismto speak of. The IrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)and Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA)are borderlinecases. Before it went on cease-fire in 1997, the IRAtypicallyengaged in attacks on security forces as well as some selective terrorism,but it also occasionally carried out bombings and other sectarian killingsof ordinaryProtestantsin both NorthernIrelandand

and police presence in the Basque region and against politicians of parties that oppose Basque independence. However,it has also engaged in occasional bombings and attempted bombings against civilians(Clark1984).

Clearly,any adequate theory of categorical terrorismneeds to explainthe wide variation shown in Table 3. That is to say, it is necessary but not sufficient to explain why some revolutionarymovements have practicedcategoricalterrorism;an adequate theory must also

done so relativelyinfrequently.

opposedto otherpoliticalstrategies.Grievancesmay be a necessarycause of collective action,butitis less clearhowtheycause peopleto act inthewaysthattheydo. Infact,ends do notexplainmeansanybetterthantheyjustifythem.Thus,as theyaretypicallyarticulated, grievance-basedaccountsof terrorismareat best incompleteandatworstquitemisleading (Goodwin2004).

Aftergrievance-basedexplanations,perhapsthe mostfrequentlycitedhypothesisis that terroristsare very weak, lack popularsupport,and yet are desperate to redress their grievancesThis. claimorrationalizationalsoseems verypopularamongmanygroupsthat employterrorismThe. core idea here is that groups that lackthe capacityto organize nonviolentprotestsorconventionalorguerrillawarfareagainstrepressivegovernments,or whichfailto attaintheirgoalswhentheydo employthese strategies,willturnto terrorismas a "lastresort."MarthaCrenshaw,forexample,suggests that"Terrorismthe resortof an elitewhenconditionsarenotrevolutionaryterrorism... mostlikelyto occurpreciselywhere mass passivityandelitedissatisfactioncoincide."(1981:384)Forthese reasons,Rubenstein (1987)callsterrorists"alchemistsof revolution."

Disaffectedelites, accordingto Crenshaw,turnto terrorismbecause it is easier and

cheaperthanstrategiesbasedon mass mobilization,especiallywhengovernmentrepression makesmass mobilizationdifficultif not impossible."Insituationswherepathsto the legal

oppositionare blocked,but where the regime'srepressionis inefficient, revolutionaryterrorism doublylikely,as permissiveanddirectcauses coincide."(Crenshaw

1981:384)Revolutionarygroupswillpresumablyemploycategoricalterrorism,moreover,

leader,forexample,butsettingoff a bombina puborbus maybe relativelysimpleandwill also producemorecasualties."Theobservationthatterrorismis a weapon of the weak," Crenshawconcludes,"ishackneyedbutapt.Atleastwhen initiallyadopted,terrorismis the strategyof a minoritythatbyitsownjudgmentlacksothermeans.Whenthegroupperceives its optionsas limited,terrorismis attractivebecauseit is a relativelyinexpensiveandsimple alternative,and because its potentialrewardis high."(1981:387)(Forsimilarviews, see

Therearea numberof logicalandempiricalproblemswiththistheoryof terrorismMost.

importantly,this theoryby itself does not explainwhy attackingor threateningordinary civilianswouldbe perceivedby revolutionariesas beneficialinsteadof detrimentalto their

needto knowwhatrevolutionariesbelievetheywillgainbyattackingspecificcategoriesof civiliansWhat.aretheirstrategicgoals and expectations?Wouldnot attackson civilians

group.TheLTTEhassometimesevenemployedmethodsof conventionalwarfareagainstSri

andmanyothersdrivenintoexile,the ANCestablishedanarmedwingcalledUmkhontowe

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Sizwe("Spearof the Nation"or MK)The. ANCexplicitlyadopted"armedstruggle"as one of its mainpoliticalstrategies.Bymostaccounts,however,thisarmedgroupfailedto become aneffectiveguerrillaforce,as the SouthAfricanDefenseForceswere simplytoo strongand effective.Andyet MKdidnotadopta strategyof terrorism,despitethefact,as GaySeidman pointsout, that,"Ina deeplysegregatedsociety,it wouldhave been easy to killrandom

whites. whiteschools,segregatedmovietheaters,segregatedshoppingcenters Segregated

meantthatifwhitedeathswerethe onlygoal,potentialtargetscouldbe foundeverywhere."

terroristtacticsthatspecificallytargetednoncombatantwhites."(Davis1987:121)Thethenpresidentof the ANC,OliverTambo,"evenwent to the extentof signinga protocolof the GenevaConventionwhichlegallyboundthe ANCto avoidattackson civiliantargets,andto

Inshort,weakrevolutionarygroupsdo notnecessarilyadopta strategyof terrorism,and strongrevolutionariesdo notnecessarilyeschew thisstrategyAs. Turkconcludes,"Because anygroupmayadoptterrortactics,it is misleadingto assume eitherthat'terrorism the weaponof the weak'orthatterroristsarealwayssmallgroupsof outsidersorat most a

haveengagedinterrorism,to the extentthattheybotherto addressissues of causation,also pointto a typeof weaknessas thesourceof terrorismOne.ideainthisliteratureis thatpoor,

and poorlyeducated,people are especiallylikelyto become terroristsbecause they are desperatefor resources,status or power,but lackthe abilityto use otherstrategiesfor securingthese. Theevidenceforthisclaim,however,is quiteweak.Infact,as Crenshaw's thesissuggests,muchresearchdemonstratesthatthe membersof revolutionarygroupsthat

seem to takeuparmsaftertheyhaveconcludedthatnonviolentpoliticscannotworkorthat

groupsdo notengageinterrorismIt.wouldseem irrationalnotto do so. Anotherhypothesisclaimsthatterrorismis a responseto stateterrorismLeftist.analysts

of terrorismoftenmakethisclaim,anditis mentionedbyHermanandO'Sullivan(1989).They suggest that the "retail"terrorismof oppositionalgroups is caused or provokedby the "wholesale"or"primary"terrorismof states,especiallypowerfulWesternstates,aboveallthe UnitedStates.Theterms"wholesale"and"retail,"whichhavealso beenemployedbyNoam Chomsky,aremeantto remindreadersthatstateterrorismhasbeen muchmoredeadlythan oppositionalterrorismThis.claimcertainlyhas an intuitiveplausibilityWhy.else would oppositionalgroupsturnto violenceexceptwhentheyconfronta governmentorstatethat is itselfunmovedbyandindeeduses violenceagainstpeacefulprotesters?Avengingsuch state violence, or tryingto deter its futureuse, would seem to be reason enough for

It is certainlytruethat indiscriminatestate violence,especiallywhen perpetratedby relativelyweak states, has historicallyencouragedthe developmentof revolutionary

stateterrorism,whywouldrevolutionariesnottargetonlythestate?Stateterrorismwould seem to be a betterexplanationfora strategyof guerrilla(orconventional)warfarethanfora

of terrorism. strategy

Empirically,one canalso pointto revolutionaryorganizationsthathavearisenincontexts of extremestateviolencewhichhavenonethelesseschewed the strategyof terrorismFor.

example,CentralAmericanguerrillamovementsof the 1970s and 1980s, includingthe Sandinistas(FSLN)inNicaraguaandthe FarabundoMartiFrontforNationalLiberation(FMLN) inElSalvador,confrontedstatesthatengagedinextensiveviolenceagainstnoncombatants, yet neitherrevolutionarygroupengagedincategoricalterrorism,andtheSandinistasengaged invirtuallynoterrorismof anytype.Anothersuch exampleis, once again,the ANCinSouth Africa.Interestingly,HermanandO'Sullivan'sbookdevotes considerableattentionto both SouthAfricanandIsraelistateterrorism(1989:chap2). .Andyet, whiletheynotethe "retail" terrorismof the PalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO)duringthe 1970s and 1980s -

theorywouldseem to predict.Infact,as we havenoted,the ANCsimplydidnotcarryout much terrorismState. terrorism,clearly,does not always cause or provokecategorical terrorism.

Havingsaidthis,itis indeeddifficultto pointto a revolutionarygroupthathas carriedout extensiveterrorismwhichhasnotarisenina contextof considerablestateviolence.Leaving

asideforthe momentthe case of al-Qa'ida,allof the groupsinTable3 thathaveengagedin extensivecategoricalterrorismaredrawnfrom,andclaimto acton behalfof,populationsthat have themselves sufferedextensiveand often indiscriminatestate repression(in French

A finalhypothesisworthconsideringis thatterrorismis the resultof extreme"social polarization"between groups.Such polarizationis said to exist when such groups are relationallydistant(i.e.,theyhavelittleifanyintimatecontact),culturallydistant(i.e.,theydiffer in terms of language,religion,dress and other"expressive"characteristics),functionally independent(i.e.,theydo notcooperatewithordependon one anotherfortheirwell-being), andextremelyunequalintermsof wealth,statusandpower(Senechalde la Roche1996).

"Enduringgrievances"against,or"intractableoffenses"by,sociallydistantgroupsallegedly providethe motivefororganizingterroristattacksagainstthem.Thus,"terrorismmostlikely in polarizedconflictswherethe grievanceendures."(Senechalde la Roche1996:120;see also Black2004:18)Bycontrast,"closercivilianssuchas thoseofthesame orsimilarethnicity arelargelyimmuneto terrorism,especiallyitsdeadlierforms.Ifclosercollectiveconflictslead to violenceat all,they producedifferentformswithfewer civiliancasualties,such as riots,

wouldengage ina violentconflictifthey haveextensiveface-to-facecontact,belongto the same ethnicgroup,speakthe same languageandworshipthe same god, dependon one

hate,andevenviewas inherentlyevil,membersof a dominatinggroupwithwhomtheyhave littleintimatecontactand who belongto a different"race,"speak a differentlanguage,