Crosby B.C., Bryson J.M. - Leadership for the Common Good (2005)(en)

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and managers can only influence, but not control, the various implementation processes, and where much of what happens during implementation “cannot be explained by the intentions and directions of policymakers” (p. 20) because implementation has more to do with the implementers’ intentions and incentives than it does with the policy makers’ intentions and incentives.

The alternative approach, backward mapping, begins at the very bottom of the implementation process, with “a statement of the specific behavior at the lowest level of the implementation process that generates the need for a policy” (p. 21). Backward mapping is similar to the bottom-up political decision-making model presented in Chapter One. The problem-formulation and search-for-solutions phases should lay the foundation for backward mapping in implementation. That is, participants in the problem-formulation process should focus on specific behavior and outcomes that are prompting the change effort, and participants in the search for solutions should establish objectives based on possible organizational actions at the lowest level that would minimize the problem.

Keeping these objectives in mind, implementation planners can go backward up the actual or possible structure of an implementing organization and ask two questions at each level: What is the capacity of this unit to produce the behavior envisioned by the policy change? What rules, resources, and transformation relations, broadly defined, does this unit need if it is to build or enhance that capacity? Once these questions are answered, the final stage in the process is to formulate a set of policies that direct or provide the necessary resources to the units likely to have the greatest effect. The exercise must involve explicit consideration of the design and use of new or existing forums, arenas, and courts likely to produce and protect desired changes. The source of the greatest effect, in other words, will be actors in forums, arenas, and courts—particu- larly those closest to the actual behaviors that are the source of the public problem—so those settings and the kind of behavior that leaders seek to enable within them must be given careful thought. For example, Hively and her collaborators have sought to understand how existing social service systems and employment policies and practices are affecting older adults; they have explored the desires and needs of older adults and their family members; they have studied the choices that older adults make about retirement,

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from one or more rounds of implementation practice than it is to emerge in advance. As successes build, policy entrepreneurs can weave them into a story that may include the regime’s mission, basic strategies, performance criteria, important decision rules, and ethical standards. At its best, such a story is a “vision of success,” a vivid description of attainable excellence (Bryson, 2004a).

A general vision, of course, is vital at the beginning of the policy change cycle, to inspire and mobilize participants in the change process. In this phase we are talking about a more detailed vision, tied to adopted policy changes in order to be useful guidance for implementation. For example, creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) was guided by Jean Monnet’s vision of a “United States of Europe,” articulated over most of his lifetime (Monnet, 1978). The vision of success for the actual EEC (now the European Union) was an emergent phenomenon derived from, and designed to influence, practical implementation of the idea. As the political and economic integration of Europe continues, Monnet’s early sketch is being elaborated into an increasingly detailed portrait.

A vision of success should grow out of past decisions and actions as much as possible. These decisions and actions are often the record of a consensus about what the regime is and what it should do. Realization of a new future is easier if it can be shown to be a continuation of the past and present (Neustadt and May, 1986; Weick, 1995; Fiol, 2002). At the same time, a vision of success should not be just an extension of the present. It should be an affirmation in the present of an ideal and inspirational future. It should map back to the present to show regime participants how their daily actions can help the regime—and the participants them- selves—achieve success.

A vision of success offers a number of advantages in a sharedpower, no-one-in-charge situation. First, a widely accepted vision of success records enough consensus on ends and means to channel participants’ efforts in a desirable direction while at the same time creating a framework for improvisation and innovation in pursuit of regime purposes. Second, the vision is the conception that precedes perception, to use Rollo May’s insight (1969). People must have a conception of what success and desirable behavior look like before they actually can see them (Weick, 1995). A vision of success generates the conception that regime participants need if they are

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to discriminate among preferred and undesirable actions and outcomes to produce more of what is preferred, and to fashion appropriate expectations and reward systems. Third, a vision of success affirms the future in the present. It motivates adherents to live the vision in the present; they do not predict the future—a hazardous enterprise at best—but instead make it (Gabor, 1964).

Fourth, a clear vision of success allows people to work on behalf of regime aims without having to rely on direction from central or top decision makers. Finally, a widely shared vision of success takes on a moral quality that can infuse the regime with virtue. The normative self-regulation necessary for any moral community to survive and prosper is facilitated (Kanter, 1972; Mandelbaum, 2000). The vision of success, in other words, defines the substance and the extent of the court of public opinion within the community subscribing to the vision.

The policy entrepreneurs in all four of the cases highlighted in this book fostered a vision of success for the regimes they sought (although they were not usually produced in tangible form). In the AIDS case, the vision of success promoted by those seeking to stop the spread of AIDS was of a public health system that poured necessary resources into researching, preventing, and treating the disease. The vision also included citizens who were both aware of how AIDS spread and willing and able to practice safe sex. In their vision, AIDS might not be eradicated, but its transmission would be sharply curtailed, effective treatment would be widely available, and people with HIV would not be stigmatized and discriminated against.

In the AAMP case, the written description of the Right Turn Project begins with a future scenario of what happens when a young man is arrested for loitering and is assigned a “systems navigator,” who is part of the project. The detailed scenario follows the young man as he works with the navigator and a mentor to develop and carry out a plan for paying past fines, getting stable housing and employment, and obtaining health care. The scenario also shows how neighborhood groups, church groups, government agencies, and a college offer assistance as the young man takes charge of his life.

If policy entrepreneurs cannot construct a vision of success for the new regime, it may not be essential to solidifying the regime. People do not have to agree on a vision to agree on next steps, as

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U.N. diplomats, labor-management relations specialists, and usedcar buyers and sellers all know (Lindblom, 1965; Thompson, 2001; Cleveland, 2002; Huxham, 2003). Simply finding ways to frame and deal with a few of the major implementation difficulties is likely to produce important progress on the social need or problem that prompted the policy change in the first place.

Managing Collaborations

In recent years, policy makers have increasingly mandated creation of formal collaboratives as a way of carrying out new policies. These collaboratives have considerable potential for focusing and aligning needed resources for achieving the policy goals—that is, for producing “collaborative advantage” (Huxham, 2003). At the same time, they can easily fall prey to “collaborative inertia” because of the built-in tension around agreeing on aims, building trust, coping with membership dynamics, managing power, and exercising leadership (Huxham, 2003). Before launching a collaboration, policy entrepreneurs should think carefully about how to deal with these tensions so that the collaborating partners achieve more together than they can separately (Huxham and Vangen, 2005).

Some of the partners might have previously collaborated informally, and those relationships can be helpful in a new formal arrangement. At the same time, formalizing relationships can bring to the fore disagreement about, for example, decision making and resource allocation that previously did not have to be explicitly addressed. Several scholars and practitioners offer helpful insights for policy entrepreneurs who are developing collaboratives for policy implementation (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Winer and Ray, 1994; Chrislip, 2002; Linden, 2002; Huxham, 1996, 2003; Gray, 2003; Huxham and Vangen, 2005). Chris Huxham and Siv Vangen emphasize that “single-mindedness of leaders seems to be central to collaborative success.” (2000, p. 1171).

Leadership Guidelines

Policy entrepreneurs in this phase should attempt to achieve the desired outcomes we have noted and avoid the typical causes of implementation failure (Peters and Pierre, 2003), among which we highlight:

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•Resistance based on attitudes and beliefs that are incompatible with the desired change; sometimes these attitudes and beliefs stem simply from the resisters’ not having participated in policy development.

•Personnel problems such as inadequate numbers, overcommitment to other activities, inadequate orientation or training, poorly designed incentives, and people’s uncertainty that involvement with implementation will help their careers.

•Incentives poorly designed to induce desired behavior on the part of implementing organizations.

•Implementing organization’s preexisting commitment of resources to other priorities, and consequent absence of uncommitted resources to facilitate new activities; in other words, there is little slack in the system (Cyert and March, 1963).

•Communication problems.

•Lack of administrative support services.

•The absence of rules, resources, and settings for resolving implementation problems; that is, the absence of forums, arenas, or courts needed to facilitate identification and resolution of these problems.

•The emergence of new political, economic, or administrative demands.

The overarching task of policy entrepreneurs in this phase is construction of a new policy regime. Formal and informal arenas are likely to be especially important, along with their associated implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and incentives designed to develop a shared set of expectations among actors about what should happen and why. Policy entrepreneurs should also attend to the design and use of formal and informal forums to facilitate communication and to create the symbolic meanings of the regime in practice. Further, formal and informal courts are necessary for residual conflict management and dispute resolution, along with enforcement of the underlying, and perhaps new, norms in the system.

Additionally, policy entrepreneurs must focus on stabilization of desired new patterns of behavior and attitude, particularly

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through use of positive and negative sanctions and incentives; and continuation or creation of a coalition of implementers, advocates, and supportive interest groups.

The leadership guidelines presented here should be kept in mind as the adopted policy change moves into the implementation phase. The guidelines are divided into general guidance, communication and education, personnel, and direct versus staged implementation.

General Guidance

Policy implementation and evaluation must be thought about every bit as carefully and strategically as policy formulation.

Consciously and Deliberately Plan and Manage Implementation

An implementation planning process may or may not be mandated by the policy makers who have adopted the policy being implemented. Regardless, such planning should occur, and policy entrepreneurs should stay involved, either directly or as monitors of the planning process. This involvement is especially important when the adopted policy is more or less imposed on implementers.

Think Strategically About Implementation

How will you achieve important public purposes in practice? Implementation strategy may be defined as the pattern of purposes, policy statements, plans, programs, actions, decisions, or resource allocations that define what a policy is in practice, what it does, and why it does it, from the standpoint of various affected stakeholders (Bryson, 2004a; 2004b). Both forward and backward mapping approaches to implementation planning should be tried so as to find the strategies most likely to produce the outcomes envisioned by the advocates of change. Working from the top to the bottom of the implementation chain and vice versa—and then trying to reconcile the resulting differing views of what will work—is a helpful discipline. The process should include efforts to understand and accommodate the history and inclinations of key implementing

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individuals and organizations (Neustadt and May, 1986). Several authors offer additional detailed advice (Nutt and Backoff, 1992; Bryant, 2003; Friend and Hickling, 1997; Rosenhead and Minger, 2001; Bryson, 2004a).

Develop Strategy Documents and Action Plans

Be sure to develop strategy at four basic levels:

1.Grand strategy for the new regime as a whole

2.Strategy statements for the units (typically organizations) that make up the regime

3.Program or service strategies that prompt collaboration, coordination, and cooperation across the organization

4.Functional strategies (financial, staffing, facilities, information technology, procurement) that also facilitate interorganizational coordination

Strategies should be tied to the overall purpose of change and delineate the goals or objectives to be accomplished by the action plan. Typically, an action plan covers a period of a year or less. It outlines specific tasks, resources necessary to accomplish them, persons responsible, and a desired completion date. Without action planning, strategy is likely to remain a mere dream (Randolph and Posner, 2002). Remember to think of an action plan as building up the small wins that can nurture trust and produce large gains in the long run (see, for example, Huxham, 2003 ).

To guide stakeholder involvement in the action plan, you can use an implementation stakeholder grid (adapted from Meltsner, 1972; Coplin and O’Leary, 1976; Kaufman, 1986; and Christensen, 1993). The grid builds on information revealed by previously created diagrams of bases of power and directions of interest (Exercise 7.2), stakeholder-support-versus-opposition grids (Exercise 9.2), stakeholder role plays (Exercise 9.3), and grids of policy attractiveness versus stakeholder capability (Exercise 9.4). It can help your group refine strategies and develop action plans that tap stakeholder interests and resources. Exercise 11.1 explains how to develop such a grid.

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Start with Quick Changes

Start with changes that can be introduced easily and rapidly. As part of the action planning, identify the changes likely to encounter little resistance and pay off quickly, and make it a point to start with them. Look for the parts of the adopted policy that:

•Are conceptually clear

•Are based on a well-understood theory of cause-and-effect relationships

•Fit with the values of key implementers

•Can be made real to the bulk of implementers prior to implementation (in other words, implementers can be helped to see what they are supposed to do before they have to do it)

•Are administratively simple, with minimal bureaucracy and red tape, minor organizational restructuring, minor impact on resource allocation patterns, and minimal skill readjustments or retraining

•Allow a start-up period during which people can learn about the adopted change and engage in any necessary retraining, debugging, and development of new norms and operating routines

•Include adequate incentives to ensure that implementers wholeheartedly embrace the changes

Build in enough people, time, attention, money, administrative and support services, and other resources. Be sure that implementation plans include resources for:

•Key personnel

•“Fixers”—people who understand the relevant policy systems and how to fix things when they go wrong (Bardach, 1977)

•Additional necessary staff

•Conversion costs

•Adequate information and communication technology

•Orientation and training costs

•Technical assistance

•Inside and outside consultants