
прагматика и медиа дискурс / Teun A van Dijk - Text and Context
.pdf160 SEMANTICS
Similarly, such frames provide knowledge about normal conditíons, components and consequences of states, events and actions, all of which are necessary in the operation of MACRO-RULES.
Due to their general conceptual nature, frames may have VARIABLE INSTANTIATIONS, which allows the application or use of frames in concrete cognitive contexts: there are many ways to 'execute' the action of going to and eating in a restaurant, but they will all belong to, or be subsumed by, the same RESTAURANT-frame. Similarly, in perception we will recognize a table or some specific table, whatever the visual transformations of the table due to varying positions.
It may be assumed that frames themselves are also organized in a HIERARCHICAL way. That is, some information seems to be essential for the frame, other information more or less specific and accidental. Thus, it seems essential for a shop to be a public place, usually in a building, where one can buy something, but less crucial whether there are baskets for self-service.
Thus it seems that the higher-level information of the frame will always be actualized, whereas the lower-level information will only be actualized if needed for specific tasks. Besides the frame-structure itself, we thus need rules or principles determining the USE of frames in actual cognitive behaviour. Since frames may be represented as sets or rather as ordered sequences of propositions, which may be highly complex, we surmise that they also have a MACRO-STRUCTURE, in which the level and importante of the information contained are defined.
Although there is little theoretical and experimental insight into the precise status, structure and use of frames, it may be concluded that they have hierarchical (macro-)structure, that they organize conventional and typical knowledge, that this knowledge pertains both to states (properties) and to actions and events, ¡e to procedures which are goal oriented, that they have an essential and a probabilistic (inductive) component, in which variables (or variable terminals) occur as 'slots' to be filled in different cognitive contexts.
For a linguist it might be tempting to ask how such frames differ from the conceptual knowledge of a LEXICON of the language, a question which for the psychologist is less relevant since there seems no cognitive/behavioural difference between knowledge of the language and knowledge of the world. It might be proposed, though, that the top-leve!, essential information of frames, is the conceptual information associated with the lexically expressed concepts of a language.
The analyses here and in the foregoing chapters should make it plain that a clear distinction between general MEANING POSTULATES of the language and is hard to make. Nevertheless, in semantic theory formation, we may abstract from the variable or ad hoc properties of the
actual representation, use, formation and transformation of frames, and postulate a set Fof frames fl , f2, ..., each consisting of an ordered sequence of propositions, on which macro-rules may operate. Sentences, sequences of sentences and discourse, then, would not only be interpreted, FORMALLY,
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with respect to a model structure (or sequences of rnodel structures) containing sets of possible worlds, individuals and possibly properties and relations, but also a set of frames, of which a specific frame f0 is the actual frame in the actual context of speech.
Given the MONEY-frame, for instance, the sentence I went to the bank would be assigned a non-ambiguous intensional meaning and extensional reference. On the set Fof frames we would further need a BINARY OPERATION which would allow us to CHANGE to or initiate ('actualize' in cognitive terms) another frame, similar to our change operator for topics of discourse. Note, however, the difference between frames and topics (macro-structures): frames are general and conventional, topics are particular for a specific discourse or conversation.
The point of introducíng frames into model structures 22 is that the interpretation of sentences would no longer be relative only to the sequence of previous sentences of a discourse, but also relative to the set of propositions of a particular frame. The previous sentences, then, would denote what actually was the case, the frame information would denote what will normally or could possibly be the case. We have seen that a convincing semantics of discourse needs both components in order to explicate the notions of linear and global coherence. It does so, however, only by formulating abstract semantic constructs, rules and conditions, leaving to pragmatics and cognitive psychology the specification of the communicative intentions, specific processing and memory structures.
Notes
1 The notion of macro-structure as it relates to the structure of discourse was first introduced (briefly) in Bierwisch (1 965b) - with respect to the plot of a story - and has since then been treated in literary theory and various attempts at constructing text grammars (see, eg, van Dijk, 1971a, 1971b, 1972a, 1972b, 1973c).Whereas of course literary theorists are, by the nature of the phenomena they describe, viz structures of literary discourse, interested in macro-structures, there has been little interest in linguistics for an analysis of the linguistic (semantic) properties of macro-structures of discourse. Below we will refer to recent developments in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. It is clear from this remark that a theory of macro-structures is still very much in its first tentative stages, even more than a theory of connection and coherence at the sequential (linear, local) level.
2 For further details about individual variables, constants and quantification over events, see Reichenbach (1947), Davidson (1967) and Bartsch (1972) among others. In our notation in [3], which is ad hoc - no precise semantics is given, nor tenses, nor specific connectives, etc - [decline (a)](f) would read 'the fact f has the property that a declines', for instance. Note that we have also used constants (a, b, c, ...) instead of bound variables, in order to avoid problems with eg the adequate logical representation of indefinite articles.
3 This definition is still far from perfect and does not make explicit al] the intuitive notions we are trying to capture under the concept of a 'topic of discourse'. Thus, several formal requirements should be met in order to guarantee that the sequences
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are ordered, not overlapping, that there are no gaps, etc. Further the notion of entailment for sequences of propositions should be made explicit.
4 Just as for the definition given in [10] it should be assumed that there actually is an immediate superconcept, and hence a topical proposition for a sequence of propositions. Provisionally we cake the rather strong view that if that is not the case, the particular passage does not have a `global meaning' or topic of discourse.
5 Although this possibility must be left open, because there is no reason why a onesentence discourse should not have a macro-structure, we may later require the macro-rules to operate non-trivially only on sequences where n> 2.
6 Just as sentences may be AMBIGUOUS, so may discourses, also at the macro-level. In that case we could have several, alternative (highest) macro-propositions for a given discourse. This does not mean that in actual language use and cognition a discourse with one theoretical macro-structure could not be assígned dífferent topics by different language users, depending on a number of factors (knowledge, interests, etc) to be discussed briefly below. Similarly, a theoretically ambiguous discourse, at the macro-level, may be unambiguous in context.
7 This story has been analysed in detail for the cognitive experiments on discourse recall and summarizing by van Dijk (1975c), Kintsch and van Dijk (1975), van Dijk and Kintsch (1977) and Kintsch (1976) - see below for some results. The text of the story is from Giovanni Boccaccio, The Decameron (ed and trans G. H. MFWilliam, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1972, pp 136-41).
8 This may be one of the semantic conditions determining the conventional use of paragraphs in written discourse or similar units (marked by specific pauses, intonation or morphemes) in spoken discourse. The unit of the paragraph in discourse has not been given special attention in this book. For recent work in this area, see the work done by Longacre and his associates (eg Longacre, 1970).
9 See for instance the work on conversation done by the ethnomethodologists mentioned in Chapter 1, note 17.
10 For a more precise formulation and for further discussion of these macro-rules, see van Dijk (1976a).
11 By •fa we denote the fact which is the value (in some w) of the expressionfa. Hence
'fa = V(fa, w) .
12 At this point the condition may become too powerful, however, because there are no (linguistic) THEORETICAL limits on these indirect semantic relations. The additional constraints to be formulated, then, are cognitive: the search for a possible link between concepts in related propositions must be feasible (either under general conditions on distance or under ad hoc personal links between concepts).
13 See note 16, Chapter 1.
14 For a detailed macro-analysis of a scientific discourse (viz a paper on social psychology), see van Dijk (1976b) and forthcoming work by Kintsch and van Dijk.
15 Recent work in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence about processing and memory representation of discourse goes back to Bartlett's seminal research (Bartlett, 1932). From the large number of papers and monographs . now being published we may mention (also for further references): Kintsch (1974), Meyer (1975), Thorndyke (1975), Freedle and Carroll, eds (1972), Crothers (1975), Carpenter and Just, eds (1977), van Dijk (1975c, 1976a), Kintsch and van Dijk (1975), van Dijk and Kintsch (1977), Kintsch (1976), Rumelhart (1975), Barnard (1974), Charniak (1972), Schank (1975).
16 See the various chapters 4 Tulving and Donaldson, eds (1972), Kintsch (1974), Norman and Rumelhart, eds (1975), Bobrow and Collins, eds (1975) for empirical evidence and theoretical models for this assumption.
17 See Janice Keenan (1975).
18 See van Dijk (1975c), van Dijk and Kintsch (1975), Kintsch and van Dijk (1977). 19 Thus, Kintsch (1976) found that American Indian stories, which have a narrative
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structure which is different from that of our conventional 'Western' stories, are harder to recall for (non-Indian) subjects than the traditional Boccaccio stories. This may also be one of the reasons why Bartlett (1932) found that so much was lost in the recall of such Indian stories, especially those elements which are unfamiliar. See also Paul (1959), who replicated the Bartlett experiments and focused on personal differences of 'cognitive style' in recall and on the effect of familiarity of the topic of the discourse.
20 This insight for sentence comprehension and for 'higher' cognitive tasks in general has been elaborated especially by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960).
21 As was remarked earlier, the notion of frame has been studied frequently since Minsky (1975). See, especially, the contributions in Bobrow and Collins, eds (1975), eg Winograd (1975), Kuipers (1975).
Other, but similar concepts, such as DEMON, SCRIPT, SCHEMA, SCENARIO, etc have also been used. See Chamiak (1972, 1975), Schank (1975), Rumelhart (1975).
For a discussion about frames and macro-structures, see van Dijk (1976a).
22 See Urquhart (1972) for a brief suggestion about a similar proposal, involving information sets (though these would also include more particular, contextually determined, information).
PART II
PRAG MATI CS
Chapter 6
Some notions from the theory of action
1 Introduction
1.1
There is another domain from which a certaín number of concepts will be used in this book: the THEORY OF ACTION. It goes without saying that a sound analysis of speech acts, which is a central task of pragmaties, cannot be carried out without previous understanding of the notion of an actor action. Insight into the structure of action at the same time provides a basis for the semantic interpretation of action discourse, ¡e discourse in which actions are described, stories for example.
1.2
It should be emphasized that an application of results from the philosophy and logic of action in the analysis of speech acts is not a marginal topic in Iinguistic theory. That, by speaking we DO something, that is, something more than merely speaking, is a simple but important insight from the philosophy of language.' It should be added that the use of language is not only some specífic act, but an integral part of SOCIAL INTERACTION. Language systems are CONVENTIONAL systems. Not only do they regulate interaction, but their categories and rules have developed under the influence of the structure of interaction in society. 2 This FUNCTIONAL view of language, both as a system and as an historical product, in which the predominant SOCIAL role of language in interaction is stressed, is a necessary corrective to a 'psychological' view of language and language use, where our competence in speaking is essentially an object for the philosophy of mind. 3 To be sure, our knowledge of the language is a complex mental system. But, this mental system, like all conventional systems, on the one hand has been formed by the requirements of effective and successful social behaviour, and on the other hand is used and changes under these constraints.
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1.3
In this chapter we must provide some elementary concepts in order to be able to draw the consequences of this view for linguistic theory and grammar. We must define what actions are, and what are not actions, what the conditions of successful action are, show how actions may constitute sequences of actions and how they are part of interaction, both verbal and non-verbal, and finally how interaction depends on norms, conventions, obligations and needs.
In the next chapters we will use this more general understanding of (inter-)- action in the characterization of speech acts and communication.
2 Events, actions, processes
2.1
Although there is an enormous literature about action, it cannot be claimed that we at present possess a fully elaborated theory of action. The notions discussed below come from various studies, both from a philosophical and from a more logical approach to the various problems. ° Ahl of these concepts would require book-length treatment in order to understand their full intricacies, and it will therefore be impossible to enter into detailed discussion of exceptions or complications in the definitions given below.
2.2
The notion of action is usually treated in close connection with that of EVENT. A brief intuitive 'definition' of action already shows this relationship: AN We will see below what is lacking in this 'definition', and will first try to be more precise about
events.
One basic concept involved in the definition of the notion of event is CHANGE. This change may be viewed as a relation between, or an operation on, possible worlds or states of affairs. More particularly, a change implies a DIFFERENCE between world-states or situations and hence requires a of worlds. For our purposes, we shall divide time into units described as previous or subsequent in the linear sequence of time.
Each time unit is associated with a set of possible worlds, viz one actual possible world, and a set of alternative possible worlds. Possible world-time point pairs, ie states of affairs or situations, may be represented by STATE DESCRIPTIONS, where a state description is a set of propositions. Differences between situations are thus represented as differences between state descriptions. A change occurs in a possible world, or rather between the situations <w ;, t.> and <w;, >, if their descriptions are different. A change will be called MINIMAL if these descriptions differ only in one atomic proposition, viz having —p instead of p, or p instead of —p (or: not having p instead of having p, or having p, instead of not having p, if we only admit 'positive' state descriptions), al) other things being equal. Thus, if at <w t, ti>
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the proposition 'The door is open' holds, and at <w ;, ti+ ,> the proposition 'The door is not open' or 'The door is closed', we say that an event has OCCURRED or TAKEN PLACE or that something has HAPPENED. The change in question may affect various properties of possible worlds, viz the coming into existence or disappearance of a particular individual object, the acquisition or disappearance of some property of an object, or the establishment or destruction of some relation between objects. We assume that NO change has occurred if the descriptions of <w ;, t.> and <w;, ti+ ,> are identical; this guarantees that no intermediate events have taken place between t. and t i+ 1 . If an event occurs 'between' <w i, ti> and <w;, t;+1 > these situations are usually called the INITIAL STATE and the FINAL STATE of the event, respectively. Events, just like objects, properties and (static) relations, may be defined according to CHANGE or EVENT DESCRIPTIONS, and they may have conventional narres. Since events accomplish or affect objects, they may be represented as n-place predicates. In our simple example the event type may be represented with the predicate 'to close'.
The IDENTIFICATION of events is closely linked with the conventional means we have in language for the description of events, which, as we have earlier stated, depends on the functions of such descriptions in interaction. We have a predicate 'to close' in order to denote the event between an 'open' initial state and a closed' final state, but no specific predicate to denote the event of opening (or closing) something one inch, or one inch more. Yet, the opening of a door is an event taking place GRADUALLY in (continuous) time. This holds, physically, even for the'click' or sound of the opening or closing door, identifying the initial or final state, respectively. Although events may be assigned properties (opening wide, opening slowly, etc), we still have one predicate (or several synonymous predicates) for the event of opening (or closing) as one distinct event unifying' the infinite series of intermediary PHASES of the event, because only the initial state/final state difference is RELEVANT for our actions and interactions: we may, eg, enter an open door, but not a closed door. Hence, the identification of events (as types) is not based on physical time and motion alone, but also on cognitive and conventional units.
It is also in this perspective that we may speak of a COMPOUND EVENT, jean event which is constituted by several events which are linearly ordered but which are perceived or conceived of as ONE event at a certain leve] of description. In this case, the component events may in other situations occur independently or as components in other (compound) events. In compound events the initial state is identical with that of the first component event (the initial event) and the final state is identical with that of the last component event (final event). If the final stages of the component events are identical with the initial states of the following component events, a compound event will be called CONTINUOUS. Otherwise, it is DlsCoNTINUous. The event of 'crashing' may be called compound, because it is at least coenposed of the event of 'rooving' and the event of 'breaking'. Crashing, moreover, is