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72 Marjut Johansson & Eija Suomela-Salmi

grammar to pronunciation.2 There are three basic concepts: enunciation, the act of producing an utterance, or for short, the act of uttering; énoncé, the product of an act of uttering, i.e. an utterance; and enunciator, speaker, locutor or utterer depending on the theoretical approach to enunciation. In other words: an act, its product and its producer. In this theory, the basic view of language is that it is communicative: its object of study is language in use from the point of view of the speaker – how the speaker, or rather, the speaking subject expresses her/his subjectivity in spatio-temporal situations and how the speaking activity leaves traces in the utterance. Enunciation theory is also a theory about subjectivity, the speaking subject being in the centre of interrogation, not as a unified subject, but a heterogeneous one. This speaking subject is not autonomous, but depends on the situation of communication. In enunciation theory, different trends in the study of language use and its explanation depend on whether description is based on actual language use as documented in corpora, or whether theoretically oriented linguistics is the starting point. Moreover, depending on the theoretical premises, approaches or schools in French pragmatics can vary considerable: from cognitively oriented to sociolinguistic ones.

In this article, we first trace the context in which French enunciation theory has developed, and we survey its traditions and the formulation of its main concepts from a historical point of view up to the present day. This is done in order to examine the basic theoretical claims and assumptions the theory makes more generally, and to see how it is situated vis-à-vis neighbouring disciplines. Secondly, we present its main concepts from the point of view of their basic features and as they are used in research today.

2.  Historical overview – from the pre-theoretical to the present phase

2.1  Origins and the pre-theoretical phase

In the development of the theory of enunciation, chronologically, a pre-theoretical phase and three different rather fragmented phases can be distinguished. During the pre-theoretical phase the term ‘enunciation’ itself is not introduced, but the underlying notion shows up in ways of pragmatic thinking that led to the theoretical concept of enunciation (Nerlich & Clark 1996). The origins of enunciation theory can be found in various directions and its roots go back to rhetoric, grammar and logic (Fuchs 1981; Groupe Relpred 1989). In the development of its pre-theoretical phase, French

.  We thank Jyri Vaahtera, Professor of Ancient Languages and Culture at the University of Turku for this information.

Énonciation 73

­pragmatic thinking was influenced by Cartesian philosophy and the Port-Royal grammar as well as by Locke’s philosophy (Nerlich & Clark 1996: 62).

In the 19th century, several linguists in Europe became occupied with problems that were essential to the development of French pragmatics, i.e. problems linked to the presence of the speaker, as in Bühler’s work. Also awareness of the interrelatedness of linguistic forms and their functions grew stronger in the protopragmatic phase in Europe (Nerlich & Clark 1996). In France, it was Ernest Renan who noted the relation between the meaning of words and their sounds (Groupe Relpred 1989), but this pragmatic thinking emerges most clearly in the work of Michel Bréal who tried to establish a theory of signs:

The fact is that most linguists have directed their attention to the form of words: the laws which govern changes in meaning, the choice of new expressions, the birth and death of phrases, have been left behind or have been noticed only in passing. Since this subject deserves a name as much as does phonetics or morphology, I shall call it semantics (…) that is, the science of meanings. (Bréal 1991: 137)

The new science of semantics was developed in the Essai de la sémantique published in 1897 in which Bréal’s pragmatic and historical perspective on language can be traced (Desmet & Swiggers 1995: 292–327). Bréal was interested in the meaning that could be called, from our contemporary perspective, ‘contextual’: he considered the spatiotemporal changes as well as the sociolinguistic factors such as professional context in the meaning of words (Bréal 1991). He also considered the subjectivity that can be seen in words or phrases, in grammatical forms and in language in general (Desmet & Swiggers 1995: 313). In fact, he shows that the language a speaker uses reflects his or her impression of the world (Bréal 1991: 174); subjectivity is also coded in language expressing the speaker’s evaluation (Desmet & Swiggers 1995: 313–319). The examples Bréal uses are interesting: in order to show how the speaker expresses different degrees of certainty, she or he can use adverbs like certainly, maybe, possibly (ibid.) – a type of analysis reproduced later by several linguists in enunciation theory.

In the following section, we discuss the main phases in the development of enunciation theory. The two first phases are easily distinguishable. According to Joly (1987), there are two generations: the first enunciation linguistics (première linguistique de l’énonciation) is the generation of linguists like Charles Bally, Gustave Guillaume, grammarians Jacques Damourette and Edouard Pichon, and Ferdinand Brunot; the second generation (seconde linguistique de l’énonciation) is that of modern ­enunciation theory. In other words, the first phase in enunciation pragmatics ­(linguistics) is that of forerunners of the theory such as Charles Bally and Gustave Guillaume. The second phase is the stage of the main theoretical foundation that was laid by Emile Benveniste over a long period of time, from the end of 1930’s up to the 1970’s. The main contribution to the development of enunciation theory is to be found

74 Marjut Johansson & Eija Suomela-Salmi

in the two volumes Problèmes de linguistique générale I–II (1966,1970), a collection of articles by Benveniste­ . In a third phase, there have been several modern developments by linguists like Antoine Culioli, Oswald Ducrot and Jacqueline Authier­ -Revuz who have either developed their own approach to enunciation or redefined some concepts that are essential to this theory. Theoretical thinking has developed ever since in several, often different directions.

2.2  First phase: Forerunners

2.2.1  Charles Bally (1865–1947)

Charles Bally, a disciple of Saussure and one of the editors of Saussure’s Cours de linguistique­ générale, is today considered one of the early predecessors of enunciative pragmatics even though his influence was not really recognized until the 1980’s (Chiss 1985; Lala 2006), probably because he was closely identified with Saussurian structuralism and its emphasis on langue (system) at the expense of parole (discourse) which led to the study of linguistic forms and to the elimination of the speaking subject (sujet parlant) from serious linguistic research.3 However, Ducrot himself, for example (cf. infra), acknowledges his debt to Bally for the development of his theory of polyphony (Ducrot [1986]1991). There are four aspects which relate him with enunciative pragmatics: (1) the emphasis on the synchronic study of ordinary language, (2) the inherent subjectivity in all language use and hence the inscription of the subject/s in discourse, (3) the role of interlocutors in the construction of discourse (the concept of co-énonciation developed later by Culioli, cf. infra), and (4) the relationship between language and discourse, i.e. the question of how entities belonging to the level of language (virtual entities) are actualized in discourse, or questions related to the reference of linguistic signs. In the following we will only discuss the first three, omitting the question of reference which will shortly be taken up when we discuss the insights of Gustave Guillaume (cf.infra).

Bally may be best known for his early work on stylistics (Traité de la stylistique française 1909). It must immediately be pointed out, however, that his conception of stylistics is quite original since he deliberately excluded literary stylistics from his study. In fact, he makes a distinction between literary and linguistic stylistics. According to Bally, linguistic stylistics observes and asserts whereas the aim of literary stylistics is to learn to use language for aesthetic reasons. In fact, Bally considers literary language to be a result of several individual styles used for aesthetic reasons. He also compares literary language to special languages:

.  More recent research has shown that this is not true. The interpretation must be attributed to F. Bopp (Valette 2004)

 

Énonciation

75

 

 

Literary language has first of all a social value, it is a symbol of distinction, of high

 

intellect and high education; stylistics cannot but consider it (literary language)

 

as a special language [….]. As such it has its place – a place of honour – beside

 

administrative and scientific language as well as that of sports.

(Bally 1952: 28)

 

Instead of literary stylistics, Bally is interested in the language ordinary people use when communicating orally in everyday situations. He stresses the importance of studying the ‘stylistic’ usages of a speech community instead of individual styles.

The language of ordinary people reflects, not pure ideas, but emotions, feelings, desires, impulsions, in short, it is a means of expression and action. (Bally 1952: 133)

From the above citation it becomes evident that Bally considers language as a pragmatic phenomenon – it is a means of expression and action but as we will see below, it is also a means of expressing thoughts.

He replaces the term stylistics by ‘theory of enunciation’ in the first edition of

Linguistique­ générale et linguistique française (1932) and by ‘general theory of enunciation’ in the second edition (1944). According to Chiss (1986:165), Bally’s theory of enunciation makes it possible to relate the principles of general linguistics with the theory of the linguistic specificity of a given language. As Chiss and Puech point out (1997:162), enunciation in the sense used by Bally includes all the elements that make a language a language different from any other (its specific syntactic, lexical phonetic and gestual dimensions) i.e. “all the means by which a language gives form to communicated thought”. Bally works with the linguistic resources of language (the French language), not with the actual discourses produced. Chiss and Puech propose to interpret Bally’s enunciation as semantics, which broadens the field of general linguistics integrating into it the logical, psychological and linguistic conditions of all communication (énonciation) of thoughts by means of language (ibid).

It is not always clear whether Bally’s énoncé refers to utterance as a pragmatic phenomenon or as a phenomenon belonging to the level of language structure (cf. Ducrot [1986]1991: 3). For example, when defining the process of actualization he says that “in order to become an element of a sentence a concept has to be actualized” (Bally 1944: 77) or when discussing the relation of utterance and thought he affirms that “the sentence is the simplest possible form of communication of thought” (Bally 1944: 35).

In accordance with a long and well-established philosophical tradition (cf. Ducrot [1986]1991: 4, Chiss & Puech 1997: 159), Bally is concerned with the relation of language and thought. To him, language is put into operation in order to express thoughts or rather representations.

To think is to react to a representation by asserting it, by appreciating it or by desiring it. Thought is thus not just pure and simple representation without any active participation by the thinking subject. (Bally 1944: 35)

76 Marjut Johansson & Eija Suomela-Salmi

For Bally there are two kinds of mental representations, that is, ideas and feelings (sentiments). According to Bally, ideas reflect the intellectual component of representations, but they are nevertheless not the primary aspect in language use. The main function of language would, according to Bally, be the expression of feelings (Gouvard 2005). For Bally, language is a two-level system of communication composed of (1) expressions of ideas and (2) expressions of feelings, the latter being divided into individual (sentiments individuels) and collective (sentiments sociaux). The aim of stylistics is, in Bally’s view, to describe the emotive, subjective, dynamic and fugitive nature of language.

Nearly all representations of reality are subjectively coloured and deformed as they penetrate language; furthermore language deforms itself constantly. What do you expect to remain of reality in an image that has gone through such a double prism?

(Bally 1952: 155)

Since the function of language is to express thought (representation of reality) it necessarily­ implies that the speaking subject is engaged in the activity either explicitly or implicitly (Durrer 1998: 109). Bally emphasizes the relation of the speaking subject to his utterance (énoncé) since an utterance is not a true representation of the extralinguistic reality but a reaction of the speaking subject to a representation. The reaction may be intellectual, affective or volitional. One does not necessarily exclude the other, and it is not a question of dominance but of degrees (Durrer 1998: 115). It follows from this, according to Ducrot [1986]1991:4) that “all thought breaks down into an active or subjective element – the reaction – and a passive or objective element – the representation”. This brings us to the dichotomy of modus and dictum. According to Bally, every utterance contains a content (dictum) and the attitude of the speaking subject towards this content (modus).

An explicit sentence consists of two parts: the first one corresponds to what constitutes the representation (for example the rain) and this we call in accordance with the logicians, the dictum. The other is the master piece of the sentence, without which there would be no sentence, in other words the expression of modality, corresponding to the operation of the thinking subject. The modality has as its logical analytic expression a modal verb and its subject, the modal subject. The two together constitute the modus.

(Bally1944:36)

According to Ducrot (1991:5), Bally’s meaning of a sentence can be expressed in the form,: “X has this particular reaction to this particular representation” where “X has this particular reaction” is the modus and the type of reaction is expressed by the modal verb. The dictum is the representation of the object of the reaction. The modal subject is the subject to whom the communicated thought is attributed, but it is not necessarily identical with the speaking subject even if the speaking and the modal subjects coincide in most cases like in the following examples:

Énonciation 77

(1)I want you to leave (Je veux que vous sortiez)

(2)I think that the accused is innocent (Je crois que l’accusé est innocent)

But the modal subject can also be different from the speaking subject, it can encompass­ several subjects, or remain vague:

(3)We don’t think it is going to rain (Nous ne croyons pas qu’il pleuvra)

(4)Galileo and astronomers think that the earth rotates (Galilée, les astronomes pensent que la terre tourne)

(5) They think that the king is dead (On croit que le roi est mort)

(Bally1944:37)

The distinction between modal and speaking subject makes it also possible to describe negation as a dialogic phenomenon, even if Bally does not develop this line of thought further. According to Bally, negation is a refusal to accept an assertion. The meaning of a negative utterance such as “The sun does not rotate around the earth” is, according to Bally, equivalent to “I deny, it is false (to say) that the sun rotates around the earth” (1944:219). Such an assertion comes close to the concept of polemic negation ­developed by Ducrot much later (cf. infra and Ducrot 1984).

But even in cases where the thinking subject is identical with the speaking ­subject, care must be taken not to confuse personal thought (pensée personnelle) and communicated thought (pensée communiquée). This distinction is of utmost importance and it can be explained by the nature and function of the linguistic sign itself. In fact, the subject can communicate a thought that he pretends to be his own even if it is not (bien qu’elle lui soit étrangère (1944: 37)). Bally calls this split personality (dédoublement de la personnalité) a concept that bears some resemblance to AuthierRevuz’s dédoublement énonciatif (cf. infra). As examples of such instances, Bally mentions deliberate lies and irony.

Since utterances are bound to express subjectivity inherent in all language use, it is obvious that what Bally considers most worthy of analysis is the modus. Not all utterances, however, are explicitly modalized, but there is a continuum from explicit to implicit marking of modality. Even the implicit marking of modality is, however, not a problem since “the spirit (l’esprit) can easily complete the insufficiencies of expression and thus nothing essential is left out of the utterance” (1944: 41). Such a line of thought seems to anticipate speech act theories, especially those of indirect speech acts, their illocutionary force and the interferences made by interlocutors.

In Bally’s view, an utterance is, in the first place, the result of the intentions of the speaking subject but at the same time it is the result of interaction between the speaker and his interlocutors, be they real or imagined.

One can hardly speak without speaking to someone. [….] Language should be seen as expression of a thought communicated to someone else or having in mind the