- •Terrorism and war. The continuous war in afghanistan and its controversies
- •1. Introduction
- •2. A Chronology of Key Events
- •64 Suicide attacks January 2005 - August 2006
- •2009 Election dispute
- •2010 Operation moshtarak
- •3. Taliban
- •5. Us New Strategy on Afghanistan
- •3.1 Who created Taliban?
- •4. Drug trafficking in Afghanistan
- •6. Controversies of the War
- •7. The impact of the War on Afghanistan Cultural Heritage
- •8. Us, Russia and Afghanistan
- •9. Conclusion
- •Works Cited
3.1 Who created Taliban?
In the article “How the CIA created Osama bin Laden” its author Norm Dixon accuses the United States of creating the Mujahideen movement that later transformed itself into Taliban and al-Qaeda.
In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in Afghanistan in reaction to a crackdown against the party by that country's repressive government. The PDPA was committed to a radical land reform that favoured the peasants, trade union rights, an expansion of education and social services, equality for women and the separation of church and state. The PDPA also supported strengthening Afghanistan's relationship with the Soviet Union.
Such policies enraged the wealthy semi-feudal landlords, the Muslim religious establishment (many mullahs were also big landlords) and the tribal chiefs. They immediately began organising resistance to the government's progressive policies, under the guise of defending Islam.
Washington, fearing the spread of Soviet influence (and worse the new government's radical example) to its allies in Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf states, immediately offered support to the Afghan mujaheddin, as the "contra" force was known.
Following an internal PDPA power struggle in December 1979 which toppled Afghanistan's leader, thousands of Soviet troops entered the country to prevent the new government's fall. This only galvanised the disparate fundamentalist factions. Their reactionary jihad now gained legitimacy as a "national liberation" struggle in the eyes of many Afghans.
4. Drug trafficking in Afghanistan
Washington's favoured mujaheddin faction was one of the most extreme, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The West's distaste for terrorism did not apply to this unsavoury "freedom fighter". Hekmatyar was notorious in the 1970s for throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil.
After the mujaheddin took Kabul in 1992, Hekmatyar's forces rained US-supplied missiles and rockets on that city — killing at least 2000 civilians — until the new government agreed to give him the post of prime minister. Osama bin Laden was a close associate of Hekmatyar and his faction.
Hekmatyar was also infamous for his side trade in the cultivation and trafficking in opium. Backing of the mujaheddin from the CIA coincided with a boom in the drug business. Within two years, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was the world's single largest source of heroin, supplying 60% of US drug users.
In 1995, the former director of the CIA's operation in Afghanistan was unrepentant about the explosion in the flow of drugs: "Our main mission was to do as much damage as possible to the Soviets... There was a fallout in terms of drugs, yes. But the main objective was accomplished. The Soviets left Afghanistan."
5. Us New Strategy on Afghanistan
President Obama has committed himself and his Administration from the beginning of his presidency to a foreign policy that ensures the safety of the American people. But he also refuses the false division between our values and our security; the United States can be true to our values and ideals while also protecting the American people. We will use all elements of American power to achieve objectives, and consult closely with the Congress so that our policies may have the broad and bipartisan support that makes them most effective. Finally, while there are instances and individuals who can be met only by force, the United States will be prepared to listen to and talk with our adversaries in order to advance our interests.
It is necessary to refocus on the threat from al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Following an intensive 60-day interagency review, on March 27, 2009, the President announced a new strategy with a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. The strategy is comprehensive and flexible and will need to be fully resourced. In addition to the new troops the President has chosen to deploy, the strategy calls for significantly more resources to the civilian effort and frequent evaluations of our progress.
In December 2009 President Obama made another speech on Afghanistan and announced a new, historic chapter for the mission there speaking about the deployment of 30,000 additional troops in the "epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by Al Qaeda" but also promising to begin withdrawing those forces within 18 months.
The surge of forces will bring the total American commitment to nearly 100,000. It will be composed of several combat brigades, new trainers and support troops and will be deployed at "the fastest pace possible" to be on the ground and fighting by summer, an onerous task for a military deploying forces to a landlocked country with a crude infrastructure.
The much-anticipated formal announcement of a policy in Afghanistan punctuates three months of soul-searching within the administration and, regardless of the outcome, represents an historical turning point for Afghanistan and the Obama administration.
Five key points:
1. An end in sight. The most important aspect of the new Afghanistan strategy is that Obama is pledging to begin to end the American commitment there by July 2011. While he said his exit plan is "conditions based," he is also pledging to begin pulling those forces out.
"After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home," according to Obama's prepared remarks before an audience of cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. "These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan." However, in his March 2010 speech when Obama visited the country there was not any definite date of withdrawal mentioned. He only said that the troops are there till the enemy is defeated.
That provision of the plan has already sparked pointed criticism among some conservatives who fear that it telegraphs to insurgents that they can wait out American troops.
But administration officials don't see it that way. Instead, the July 2011 date creates a goalpost the military must try to meet in terms of arresting the deteriorating security situation and training Afghan forces.
2. More Afghan forces. Predictably, a large component of the American strategy is training the Afghan forces. Democrats, in particular, have pushed the administration to make training the indigenous force a centerpiece to the strategy so American forces can ultimately leave. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, had asked to double the size of the army and police to a force of about 400,000 (the Afghan Army has about 92,000 troops currently and the police has 84,000). But the administration is not wanting to bite off more than it can chew. Instead, Obama wants to undertake the massive training effort in smaller increments, one year at a time, and re-evaluate as needed.
3. An accelerated pace. Under pressure to show success to a wary and war-weary American public, Obama has directed that the surge of forces will occur quickly, contrary to what Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at the Pentagon just last week.
Under the Obama plan announced Tuesday, the US military will deploy 30,000 troops to Afghanistan over the course of eight months. That's ambitious. The surge of 30,000 forces to Iraq in 2007 took five months, but that relied heavily on Iraq's sophisticated road network, a willing partner in Kuwait, and the Iraqi port near Basra. Landlocked Afghanistan with its crude road network will offer no such welcome mat to American forces.
"The situation in Afghanistan is very different than the situation we faced in Iraq in the sense that we do not have the same kind of transportation access to Afghanistan that we did in Iraq, where we were able, over a five-month period or so, to bring in five brigade combat teams."
4. Hamid. Obama's speech made little mention of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, seen as corrupt and ineffectual and re-elected in a fraudulent election this fall. Many believe he is incapable to be a reliable "partner" to which the US and the international community can hitch its wagon.
But American officials recognize they have little choice but to reinvent their relationship with Mr. Karzai. They will cajole and negotiate, push and force the Karzai government to operate more effectively so that it can take over governance and security within the next few years.
"Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground," Obama said. The US will continue to advise the Afghan security forces to ensure they will "succeed over the long haul." But, he said. "It will be clear to the Afghan government, and, more importantly, to the Afghan people, that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country."
5. Listening only in part to his generals. McChrystal asked for about 40,000 troops for Afghanistan, seen as a middle ground between a higher, albeit unlikely request of 80,000, and a smaller request of about 12,000 to suit a narrower mission. In agreeing to deploy 30,000 troops, Obama has taken a middle ground in terms of the numbers, and has embraced a plan largely authored by Secretary Gates.
For days, however, administration officials have tried to explain that the strategy is less about the number of forces than it is the counterinsurgency strategy itself. But a properly resourced counterinsurgency relies on numbers of troops to secure the population, choke the insurgency, and train the indigenous forces. And in fact, the 30,000 troops Obama announced Tuesday is on top of an additional 21,000 forces that have deployed to Afghanistan since Obama took office in January.
Although Afghanistan has long been an under-resourced conflict, in their totality, the number of new forces deployed to Afghanistan represents a number far greater than the surge of about 30,000 deployed to Iraq in 2007 under President Bush.
On March 29th, 2010 President Obama visited Afghanistan. Barack Obama has told US forces on his first visit to Afghanistan as US president that they are there to help Afghans to forge a "hard-won peace". Addressing soldiers and civilians at Bagram air base near Kabul, he thanked them for their service and said they would prevail against their enemies. They were there, he said, to "keep America safe and secure". On a trip lasting just a few hours, he met Afghan President Hamid Karzai and stressed the need to tackle corruption. Mr Obama said he wanted to see progress continue on Afghan efforts to fight against drug-trafficking.
