es2

Allen /Costs of Economic Sanctions

935

Table

3

Incidence Rate Ratios

Demonstrations

Riots

Lagged

dependent variable

1.276

1.245

Polity score squared

Polity

score 1.031 1.035

0.990

0.989

Presence

of sanctions

1.745

1.306

Polity x

sanctions

1.043

1.072

Sanction

costs

0.975

1.001

ln(population)

1.356

1.568

ln(energy consumption)

1.122

1.018

Regime

durability

0.997

0.995

The

relationship between

regime type and

riots is similar to that estimated for

demonstrations. The

basic

shape of the relationship can be

seen inFigure 5. Again,

the

states

with

the

lowest

predicted

events

are

at

the

extremes?those

states

that

are most

autocratic

and

those

that

are

most

democratic.

This shape

is

slightly

more

symmetrical than

it is for demonstrations, which

suggests

that riots are

a

less

accepted means

of expressing political discontent inhighly democratic societies.

Focusing

on

the

results

related

to

sanctions,

marginal

effects

again

were

calcu

lated,

and

these

are

presented

in Figure

6. As

was

the case

with

demonstrations,

we

see that thepresence

of sanctions

increases

the likelihood of antigovernment activ

ityformost regime types. Sanctions

appear

to increase the likelihood of riots in a

statistically significantway

for stateswith regime scores greater than 1.The

lack of

statistical significance for the sanctions-indicator variable

reflects the fact that this

relationship is indistinguishable from0 for stateswith a Polity

score of 0. This

pro

vides

additional support for theAutocratic

Opportunity Hypothesis.

Sanctions do

not

appear

to affect

the

cost-benefit

calculations

of opposition

actors

in the most

autocratic

states

sufficiently

to create

incentives

for

rioting.

In

this

analysis,

the

interaction

term

between

the

presence

of

sanctions

and

Polity

score also attains statistical significance for all of

themodels,

suggesting a

positive effecton

the likelihood of riots.16Again,

the effect is strongest for import

and export sanctions and weakest

forfinancial sanctions, but the strengtheffects is

similar.17

Ifdifferenttypes of sanctions aremore

likely to alter behavior

of different types

of regimes (Brooks 2002),

thisdifference does not appear

tobe a result of domestic

political

costs.

Under

sanctions,

as states

become

more

democratic,

they are

more

likely to experience

riots. This

finding is somewhat

surprising since less violent

formsof political

action are typically associated with democratic

societies. In times

of

external

stress,

such

as

sanctions,

democratic

publics

may

feel

that their

institu

tionalized

tools are insufficientforexpressing political

discontent.

Table

4

Negative Binomial Analysis: Political Riots, 1948-1999

Variable

(Std. Err.)

All Sanctions

Financial Sanctions

Import Sanctions

Export Sanctions

Lagged

dependent

variable

0.219***

0 217***

0.220***

0.218***

(0.035)

(0.035)

(0.034)

(0.033)

Polity

score

0.034***

0.041***

0.039***

0.038***

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.010)

Polity

squared

-0.011***

-0.011***

-0.012***

-0.012***

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

Polity

x

sanctions

0.070***

0.061**

0.087***

0.088***

(0.022)

(0.027)

(0.029)

(0.028)

Presence

of sanctions

0.266

0.488**

0.454

0.323

(0.168)

(0.196)

(0.279)

(0.272)

Sanction

costs

0.001

-0.033

-0.043

-0.017

(0.025)

(0.025)

(0.039)

(0.035)

Regime

durability

-0.005**

-0.005*

-0.005**

-0.005**

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.002)

ln(energy consumption)

0.018

0.013

0.019

0.024

(0.032)

(0.031)

(0.031)

(0.044)

ln(population)

0.450***

0.0452***

0.456***

0.454***

(0.054)

(0.055)

(0.054)

(0.053)

Intercept

?4.796***

-4.806***

?4.794***

-4.815***

(0.452)

(0.473)

(0.459)

(0.452)

Disperson

parameter

ln(a)

1,174***

1.176***

1.168***

1.169***

(0.100)

(0.102)

(0.101)

(0.099)

N

5,107

5,107

5,107

5,107

Wald

x2

289.76

292.16

317.56

327.25

Prob >

x"

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Log-likelihood

-4,000.82

-4,016.66

-4,010.98

-4,014.62

Note:

Significance

levels:

* < 10%; ** < 5%;

*** <

\c,

Autocratic

governments do not face a

large increase in theprobability of politi

cal

costs

that

result

from

antigovernment

demonstrations

when

sanctions

are in

place.

As

result,

the decision

to resist

sanctions

is

less costly

in

these states.

When

predicted

events

were

generated

for violent

acts

of

antigovernment

behavior,

sanc

tioned autocracies

had

fewer

riots

than

nonsanctioned

autocracies.

Under

sanctions, the relationship between

regime

type and political

activity is

not

a

simple

one.

The

empirical

evidence

presented

here

supports

the

political

opportunity idea thatpatterns of violence

under sanctions differ by regime type.

This

pattern holds

for both nonviolent and

violent

actions?the

latter of which

should

be

more

costly

for

targeted

governments.

The

economic

deprivation

created

by

sanctionsmight

slightly increase the likelihood of antigovernmental activity?

both

violent and nonviolent.

That

increase,

however,

is much

more

pronounced

in

Allen /Costs of Economic Sanctions

937

938

Journal of Conflict Resolution

open

societies

than

in

closed

ones.

Sanctions

appear

to

encourage

publics

to

use

their

political

opportunities

for

antigovernment

action,

rather

than

create

them.

These

resultsmost

closely

support thePolitical Opportunity Hypothesis.

These

results also

help us

to understand why

democracies

are more

likely to

concede

to

sanctions

pressure.

Only

these

leaders

are

likely

to face

domestic

politi

cal

costs

because

of

domestic

antigovernment

activity.

Sanctions

are

not costly

to

autocratic

leaders

in thisway.

In fact, violent antigovernment activity is less likely

under

sanctions

in

these

states,

suggesting

that

sanctioned

autocrats

may

use

the

sanctions

as

an

excuse

for

further

curtailment

of

opposition

activities.

Discussion

One

possibility not considered

in the initial discussion

of thedomestic

political

effects of sanctions

is the idea that sanctions might

lead

to an

increase

in political

cohesion within the target state.Group

cohesion

can be

enhanced by conflictwith

an

external

group

(Simmel

1955; Coser

1956),

and

thismodel

of

in-group/out

group behavior

has been

applied

to state leaders throughgame-theoretic, principal

agent models

(Downs

and Rocke

1994;

Smith

1996).

International events

are

thought

to

spark

a

rise

in

popularity

for

the

government,

or

a

so-called

"rally

'round theflag" effect (Mueller

1970,

1973; Ostrom

and Job 1986). The

possibility

that sanctions will

cause

a rally effect ishypothesized

byGaltung

(1967).

The

imposition of sanctions enables

targeted leaders topinpoint a clear external

threat,which

can be used

as a focal point for a

leader tounify the state (Miyagawa

1992). Leaders

can also place

theblame

foreconomic

hardship on the sender state

rather than on

their own

economic policies,

leading

some to posit

the idea

that

rather than rally

'round the flag,

sanctioned

populations

might

rally against

the

enemy or sender state (Stein 2003).

create a rally is appealing. In the early

Anecdotally,

the idea

that sanctions will

1960s, Robert Hurwich,

the State Department's

officer overseeing Cuban

affairs,

noted that thedesired effectof the embargo on

theCuban

economy

"might trans

late itself into open

active opposition

to the regime"

(quoted

inKaplowitz

1998).

Instead,

during

the past

forty

years,

the U.S.

sanctions

have

been

used

as

a

rallying

point by theCuban

regime. Saddam Hussein

used the decade-long U.N.

sanctions

as a

scapegoat

for the economic

devastation wrought on

the Iraqi economy by his

own

excesses

and

penchant

for war-making.

The

results presented here indicate that ifdomestic

populations are rallying that

Allen /Costs of Economic Sanctions

939

in states in which

the political

opportunity exists

for antigovernment

action

to

potentially be effective.

Where

leaders

possess

strong

repressive

tools, sanctions

will

not

have

the

effect

of increasing thedomestic political

costs

these leaders face. If sanctions are going

to alter

the

behavior

of such

leaders,

the costs

must

come

from

outside

the targeted

state.

Rather

than

creating

sizeable

domestic

costs,

in

these

cases,

itmay

be

neces

sary

for

senders to create

international

economic

costs

that

are

larger

than

would

be

required in states where

accompanying

domestic

political

pressure

could

create

additional

leverage

to change

theproscribed policy.

hope)

that sanctions will

lead to increased political

fragmentationwithin

the target.

This assumption suggests thatdomestic political

costs are an importantpredictor of

sanctions

outcomes,

but

the

linkage

has

not

been

clearly

understood.

From

this

analysis,

it is apparent

that

sanctions

can

lead

to an

increase

in mass

political

action, but that increase seems tobe

limited in autocratic

states.Only

in stateswith

some degree

of political openness

and opportunity do

sanctions

increase thewill

ingness

of

the public

to

take

antigovernment

action.

The

empirical analysis presented here does not clearly support a simple relation

ship of economic

pain

to political

change. While

the presence

of

sanctions may

lead to an

increase inpolitical

activity, the impact ismitigated

by thepolitical

insti

tutions in the target state. Sanctions

do not provide

an

impetus for local opposition

actors

to take

action

against

their

leaders,

particularly

in

states

where

political

free

doms

are

limited.

If sanctions are not creating domestic

political

costs for autocratic leaders, it is

imperative

for sanctions

senders

to find ways

to

create

external

international

costs

for autocrats

who

refuse

to

comply

with

sanctions

pressure.

Without

facing

some

political cost associated

with

sanctions, these leaders will

have

littleor no incentive

to alter

their behavior.

Freezing

the

personal

assets

of

leaders,

curtailing

travel,

and

limiting exposure

to the international community can focus the hardship of sanc

tions

more

directly

on

these

leaders

themselves.

This

may

be

necessary,

as

these

results suggest that sanctions themselves will

not

lead

to domestic

costs in these

states,

at

least

not via

political

pressure

from

the

general

public.

These

resultshelp

sortout and test thenumerous ad hoc explanations of thepoli

tical

consequences

of

sanctions

in the

target

state and

give

increased

leverage

over

the question

of when

sanctions will

be

useful

tools for bringing about political

change.

Just as significantly, this article

suggests

several

important avenues

for future

research.

The

most

obvious

and

important

extension

would

be

to explore

whether

decisions

made

by

leaders

about whether

and

when

to

concede

to economic

sanc

tions. Does

antigovernment

activity have

any

impact

on

the actions

of targeted

gov

ones whose

antigovernment

behavior

increases.

Several

well-known

sanctions

cases,

such as South Africa

and Rhodesia,

suggest thepossibility thatgroups privileged by

sanctions (or at

least, those protected by

the sanctioned government) might

rally,

while

the groups

thatare hurt by

sanctionsmight respond with violence. A

cross

national studyof these dynamics would

add significantlytoour understanding of the

domestic political dynamics

incountries targetedby sanctions.

of the target state are

To

crafteffective sanctions policy,

thepolitical dynamics

a critical

element

of

the mechanisms

that underlie

sanctions

effectiveness.

Sanc

tions

response

is not

uniform

across

target

states.

The

expectation

that

sanctions

in

all target stateswill

lead to an outpouring ofmass

political action

thatwill,

in turn,

create

a

sense

of

duty on

the part

of

the targeted

government

is not

supported.

Dif

ferences

in response

are

largely

because

of

the

impact

that

sanctions

have

on

the

political

processes

within

these

states.

Efforts

to

implement

targeted

sanctions

may

improve

the

effectiveness

of

sanc

tions

against

autocratic

regimes.

While

comprehensive

sanctions

affect the

entire

1While.

signaling may

also be

an important function of sanctions,

senders

typically describe their

intentions in terms of

imposing costs of targets.

2. For example, Marinov

(2005)

explores

the idea that sanctions may

also

be

imposed

to strengthen

the bargaining

position of the sender vis-?-vis

the target state. Senders may

use

the stick of

sanctions to

offer the carrot of

lifting the sanctions,

but even

under these circumstances,

domestic

politics

in the tar

get state are still likely to heighten the desirability

of having the sanctions

lifted.

efforts to

3. Rowe

(2001)

posits

that this increase

in support

resulted

from theRF

government's

make white economic

elites dependent

on the government.

4. Sanctions

alone

did

not cause

this inflationary pressure.

Poor economic

policy

by

the Cedras

regime created

the economic

conditions

for inflation to rise, and

sanctions

heightened

the increase.

5. This concept was

originally advanced

by Eisinger

(1973)

to explain

urban violence

by city politi

cal structure.

Allen

/Costs

of Economic

Sanctions

941

6. The

idea

of

institutions as

a moderating

variable

has

been

discussed

in the political-violence

literature, particularly

by Schock

(1996).

to control

7. Niblock

(2001)

also points

out

that the economic

power

of the government

goods

within

the sanctioned

state can

increase dependence

by the population

on

the regime, as government-run

rationing programs may

be

the only regular

source of essentials

available.

8. This

echoes

Goemans's

(2000)

sentiments about wars

thatmay

hurt states but not

the leaders in

power.

In the case

of sanctions,

thedifference

in the interests facing

leaders and statesmay

be

even greater

since

leaders often control

lucrative smuggling networks. In these cases, not only

are

leaders not hurting as

much

under sanctions

as the average

citizen,

theymay

actually be profiting from the sanctions.

9. Of

course, the possibility

also

exists thatantigovernment activitymay

occur during a sanctions epi

sode

that is completely

unrelated, and I recognize that I am

taking a risk of comparing

some

apples

(unre

lated events)

to theoranges

(sanctions-related

actions)

that I am truly interested in.One

potential

extension

for this research would

be

tomachine-code

events

data

specifically

about

sanctions-related violence. As

these data

are not available

at present, I use

these data with

the belief

that they are a good

proxy.

10. Stata

also

allows

for both

cluster and

robust to be

specified, which

allows

for nonindependence

within

clusters of observations.

This

option was

specified for this analysis

to furthercompensate

for corre

lation between

observations.

Results

produced by -xtnbreg- with

random

effects

are

similar

to those

included here. For ease

of

interpretation, the simplermodel

is presented. The

results produced

by

-xtnbreg

with

fixed effects are

slightly different,but

thismay

be

an artifact resulting from lack of variation

of the

reduction

in countries

included

in the analysis. Losing

twenty countries makes

thismodel

unappealing.

11. This

graph

and

the others presented

in this article were

created

using Clarify

(King, Tomz,

and

Wittenberg

2000).

In this case,

with

the other variables

held

at theirmean

(ormedian,

ifmore

appropri

ate),

the two polity

termswere

allowed

to vary together, and expected

counts were estimated.

12. Because

the size

and

the direction

of

the coefficients

for all

types of sanctions

are

similar, these

marginal

effects were

calculated

for themodel

with

the indicator for all

sanctions.

13.As

with

the predicted

numbers

of events, Figure 6 was

generated

using

Clarify. First, predicted

numbers

of

events

(and

associated

confidence

intervals) were

calculated

varying

only

the Polity

and

Polity

Squared

variables,

leaving

other predictors

constant at theirmeans

(ormedians).

To

examine

the

impact of sanctions

on

these predictions,

the second

set of predictions was

generated

by setting the sanc

tions variable

to

1 and

varying

thepolity variables

as well

as

the interaction term.

hardship are the trig

14. For

this type of explanation,

perceptions

of deprivation

rather than absolute

gers

forpolitical

action.

ratios were

results were

15. These

incidence

created

using

the inclusive

sanctions

variable.

Similar

obtained

using

each

sanctions

variable

type.

an

termwith

16. This

effect

is constrained

to be

linear. Adding

additional

interaction

sanctions

and

the squared

polity term leads

to extensive multicollinearity.

To

examine

the robustness

of the curvilinear

effect, I also

split the sample

and found strong statistical significance

forboth polity

terms.

17. Incidence-rate

ratios

for the riots variable

also

appear

inTable

3

for comparison

of substantive

impact across

variables

of differing scales.

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2005.

The

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