DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
DIVERGECanada allocates decision-making downward (except not to municipalities)
The principle is adaptivity
Profit tax is federal, but provinces can add to it
The chart below evolved:
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RUSSIAN FEDERALISM: EXPERIMENTATION
Centralized Soviet command economy Decentralization in the early 1990s
Recentralization in late 1990s, vertical imposed
Post 2012 re-decentralization
The 83 Regions:
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ЛЕТНИЙ КАМПУС АКАДЕМИИ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РФ -2012 |
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RUSSIA’S FAST ADVANCING |
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ЛЕТНИЙ КАМПУС АКАДЕМИИ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РФ -2012 |
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WHY MANY COUNTRIES STILL FOLLOW CENTRALIZED MODEL
Regions can be greatly influenced by interest groups, and devolution can lead to extreme inequality
Regional interests can dominate over classic views of efficiency (example—regions in Canada resist the VAT)
Also, provincial voters can be unsure about trade- offs (education vs health care—young/old voters)
Also, this system is expensive: Russia is still moving toward an improved administration
But regions may eventually acquire the profit tax revenue
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ЛЕТНИЙ КАМПУС АКАДЕМИИ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РФ -2012 |
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DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE
TRENDS
BOULDING TRIANGLE
State (polity=C) has shrunk
Society (society=A) has expanded
New actors link all three
Policies are shared
Technologies “co- evolve”
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ЛЕТНИЙ КАМПУС АКАДЕМИИ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РФ -2012 |
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EXPERIMENTAL
SuppleGOVERNANCEpublic and private organizations
Capable of regularly redistributing responsibility according to the nature of the task rather than on the basis of a rigid authority structure.
Spontaneous determination of the most appropriate level for wielding power and taking responsibility
Weakening the attribute of most prevailing governance systems--hierarchical or top-down methods for determining goals and means
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ЛЕТНИЙ КАМПУС АКАДЕМИИ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РФ -2012 |
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ЛЕТНИЙ КАМПУС АКАДЕМИИ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РФ -2012 |
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REGIONAL GENERAL ISSUES
Water Electricity Sewage Police Roads Education
Care: disabled, elderly, unemployed Emergencies: floods
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ЛЕТНИЙ КАМПУС АКАДЕМИИ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РФ -2012 |
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SPECIAL ISSUES
Diversification in energy abundatnt regions
Ecology-Exploration Trade-off in Arctic
Agricultural infrastructure Drought and Flood Transportation One-industry Towns Corruption and Trust
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ЛЕТНИЙ КАМПУС АКАДЕМИИ ПРИ ПРЕЗИДЕНТЕ РФ -2012 |
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EACH SPHERE HAS BUNDLE
OFForTASKSexample, Human Resources
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