
- •§ 1.Syn Synopsis to Chapter 1: preliminary definitions 4
- •§ 2.17 Effect of Delay in the Delivery of an Offer 268
- •§ 2.17 Effect of Delay in the Delivery of an Offer 268 § 1.1 The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises
- •§ 1.2 Legal Obligation Defined
- •§ 1.3 N1 Definition of the Term ''Contract''
- •§ 1.4 Contracts of Adhesion
- •§ 1.5 Formal and Informal Contracts
- •§ 1.6 Voidable Contracts
- •§ 1.7 Void Contracts
- •§ 1.8 Unenforceable Contracts
- •§ 1.9 Agreement Defined
- •§ 1.10 ''Bargain'' as a Contractual Expression
- •§ 1.11 Offer Defined
- •§ 1.12 Simultaneous Expressions of Assent: Contracts Without Offer and Acceptance
- •§ 1.13 What Is a Promise?
- •§ 1.14 Promise and Warranty
- •§ 1.15 Expressions of Intention, Hope, Desire, or Opinion
- •§ 1.16 Letters of Intent
- •§ 1.17 Illusory Promises
- •§ 1.18 N1 Assumpsit: Implied Assumpsit, Indebitatus or General Assumpsit, Special Assumpsit
- •[A] Implied Assumpsit
- •[B] Indebitatus or General Assumpsit
- •[C] Special Assumpsit
- •§ 1.19 Express and Implied Contracts
- •§ 1.20 Contract and Quasi Contract Distinguished
- •[A] Quasi Contract as a Source of Primary Rights
- •[B] Quasi Contract as a Remedial Device for Unwinding Failed Agreements
- •§ 1.21 General Contract Law, The Uniform Commercial Code, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. [a] General contract law and the Restatements
- •[B] The Uniform Commercial Code.
- •[C] The United Nations Convention
- •§ 1.22 The Uniform Commercial Code as a Source of Common Law
- •§ 1.23 Unilateral Contracts Distinguished From Bilateral
- •Supp. To § 1.1 The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises
- •Supp. To § 1.2 Legal Obligation Defined
- •Supp. To § 1.3 Definition of the Term ''Contract''
- •Supp. To § 1.4 Contracts of Adhesion
- •Supp. To § 1.6 Voidable Contracts
- •Supp. To § 1.7 Void Contracts
- •Supp. To § 1.9 Agreement Defined
- •Supp. To § 1.11 Offer Defined
- •Supp. To § 1.13 What Is a Promise?
- •Supp. To § 1.14 Promise and Warranty
- •Supp. To § 1.15 Expressions of Intention, Hope, Desire, or Opinion
- •Supp. To § 1.16 Letters of Intent
- •Supp. To § 1.17 Illusory Promises
- •Supp. To § 1.18 Assumpsit: Implied Assumpsit, Indebitatus or General Assumpsit, Special Assumpsit
- •Supp. To § 1.19 Express and Implied Contracts
- •Supp. To § 1.20 Contract and Quasi Contract Distinguished
- •Supp. To § 1.22 The Uniform Commercial Code as a Source of Common Law
- •Supp. To § 1.23 Unilateral Contracts Distinguished From Bilateral
- •Part I formation of contracts topic a offer and acceptance chapter 2 offers; creation and duration of power of acceptance
- •§ 2.1 Preliminary Negotiation
- •§ 2.2 Preliminary Communications Compared to Offers-Interpretation
- •§ 2.3 Request for an Offer Is Not an Offer-Auctions and Solicited Offers
- •§ 2.4 N1 Offer by Publication or Advertisement
- •§ 2.5 Quotation of Prices; Estimates
- •§ 2.6 Authority or Instructions to an Agent
- •§ 2.7 N1 Offers at the Supermarket or Self-Service Shop
- •§ 2.8 Partial Agreements-Agreements to Agree and Agreements to Negotiate
- •§ 2.9 Formal Document Contemplated by the Parties
- •§ 2.10 What Constitutes a Written Contract-There May Be a Series of Communications
- •§ 2.11 Delivery of a Document as the Final Expression of Assent
- •§ 2.12 Printed Terms on Billheads, Letterheads, Receipts, Baggage Checks, etc.
- •§ 2.13 Intention to Affect Legal Relations-Social Engagements, Gentlemen's Agreements, Jests and Sham Agreements
- •§ 2.14 Duration of Power of Acceptance Created by an Offer
- •§ 2.15 Missed Deadlines in Option Contracts
- •§ 2.16 Reasonable Time for Acceptance
- •§ 2.17 Effect of Delay in the Delivery of an Offer
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- •§ 2.18 Offers Are Usually Revocable
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- •§ 2.19 Notice of Revocation Necessary
- •39 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.20 Revocation Otherwise Than by Direct Notice
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- •§ 2.21 Revocation of General Offer by Publication
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- •§ 2.22 Irrevocable Offers-Meaning of ''Irrevocable''
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- •§ 2.23 Options Created by a Conditional Contract or Covenant
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- •§ 2.24 Contract to Keep an Offer Open
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- •§ 2.25 Effect of the Rule Against Enhancement of Damages
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- •§ 2.26 Offers Made Irrevocable by Statute and Public Policy
- •46 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.27 Deposits to Be Forfeited in Case of Revocation
- •47 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.28 Irrevocable Offers Under Seal
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- •§ 2.29 Revocation After Part Performance or Tender by the Offeree
- •49 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.30 Real Estate Brokerage and Other Agency Cases
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- •§ 2.31 N1 Effect of Action in Reliance That Is Not Part Performance
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- •§ 2.32 N1 Part Performance and the Indifferent Offer
- •52 Of 174 documents
- •§ 2.33 When a Standing Offer of a Series of Separate Contracts Is Irrevocable
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- •§ 2.34 Effect of Death or Insanity on Power of Acceptance
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- •§ 3.2 In a Bargaining Transaction, Only the Offeree Has Power to Accept
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- •§ 3.3 Assignment of Power by an Option Holder-Irrevocable Offers
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- •§ 3.4 Motive With Which Offeree Renders Performance
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- •§ 3.5 Knowledge of Offer as a Pre-requisite to Acceptance
- •84 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.6 Knowledge of the Offer After Part Performance Already Rendered
- •Illustration 1
- •85 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.7 Acceptance ''Subject to Approval'' by a Third Party
- •86 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.8 Acceptance by Overt Act
- •87 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.9 Unilateral Contract-Acceptance by Beginning Requested Performance
- •88 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.10 Acceptance of a Published Offer of a Reward for Action or Contest Prize
- •89 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.11 When the Words ''I Accept Your Offer'' Would Be Ineffective
- •90 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.12 Acceptance by Forbearance From Action
- •91 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.13 When Notice of Acceptance Is Necessary
- •92 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.14 Notice as a Requisite of Guaranty and Letters of Credit
- •93 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.15 Notice as a Condition Distinguished From Notice as an Acceptance
- •94 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.16 Offer of a Promise, Requesting Non-promissory Action in Return
- •95 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.17 Offer of an ''Act'' for a Promise
- •96 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.18 Silence as a Mode of Acceptance
- •97 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.19 Can Offeror Make Silence Operate as Acceptance?
- •98 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.20 Belated or Conditional Acceptance Followed by Offeror's Silence
- •99 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.21 Silence Plus Additional Circumstances
- •100 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.22 Multiple Acceptances
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- •§ 3.23 Alternative Modes of Acceptance
- •102 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.24 Acceptance by Post
- •103 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.25 Acceptance by Telephone or Other Electronic Means
- •104 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.26 Withdrawal of a Letter of Acceptance From the Mails
- •105 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.27 Acceptance by Telegraph-When Operative
- •106 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.28 Acceptance Must Manifest Assent and Be Unconditional
- •107 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.29 An Acceptance May Be Unconditional Even Though the Acceptor Makes a Conditional Promise
- •108 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.30 Acceptance Not Conditional, Even Though Grumbling or Accompanied by a Request or by a New Offer
- •109 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.31 Subsequent Erroneous Interpretation Does Not Make an Acceptance Conditional
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- •§ 3.32 Attempts by the Offeree to Restate in the Acceptance the Terms of the Offer
- •111 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.33 Attempts by the Offeree to State in the Acceptance the Legal Operation of the Agreement
- •112 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.34 Mode of Acceptance Can Be Prescribed by the Offeror
- •113 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.35 Counter-Offers and Their Effect
- •114 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.36 Power to Accept an Offer Is Terminated by a Counter-Offer or Conditional Acceptance
- •115 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.37 Conditional Acceptances and Counter-Offers Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the United Nations Convention
- •116 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.38 A Counter-Offer or Rejection by One Who Has a ''Binding Option'' or an Irrevocable Offer Does Not Terminate the Power of Acceptance
- •117 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.39 Power of Acceptance Not Terminated by a Counter-Offer if Either Offeror or Offeree So Prescribes
- •118 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.40 Inquiries and Separate Offers Distinguished From Counter-Offers
- •119 Of 174 documents
- •§ 3.41 Effect of Rejection of an Offer
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- •§ 4.2 Time of Performance Indefinite-Promises of ''Permanent'' Employment-At Will Employment
- •152 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.3 Indefiniteness of Price or Terms of Payment-Money as a Commodity
- •153 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.4 Agreed Methods of Determining the Price or Amount
- •154 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.5 N1 Reasonable Price-Quasi-Contractual Remedy After Performance
- •155 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.6 Uncertainty of Subject Matter to Be Exchanged for Price; Requirements and Output Contracts
- •156 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.7 Effect of Subsequent Verbal Clarification or Action by the Parties
- •157 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.8 Subsequent Action May Create a Quasi Contract
- •158 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.9 Mistake-Difficulty and Complexity of the Subject
- •159 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.10 Mistake as to the Words Used, or as to the Meaning Given to Words and Expressions
- •160 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.11 Mistake in Transmission of Messages
- •161 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.12 Objective and Subjective Theories
- •162 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.13 Mutual Assent-''Meeting of the Minds''
- •163 Of 174 documents
- •§ 4.14 Auction Sales-Offers to Sell and to Buy
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Corbin on Contracts
Copyright 2007, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.
PART I FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
TOPIC A OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
CHAPTER 3 ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF OFFER
1-3 Corbin on Contracts § 3.32
§ 3.32 Attempts by the Offeree to Restate in the Acceptance the Terms of the Offer
[Go To Supp]
If the purported acceptance attempts to restate the terms of the offer, such restatement must be accurate in every material respect.n1 It is not a variation if the offeree merely puts into words that which was already reasonably implied in the terms of the offer.n2 But the very form of words used by the offeror is material if the offeror so intended and so indicated in the offer. An acceptance using a different form makes no contract.n3 A variation in the substance of the offered terms is material, even though the variation is slight,n4 although an occasional forward-looking case looks to whether the variation is of any real significance to the offeror.n5
If the offer leaves the time for performance at the option of the offeree, an acceptance may be operative even though it names a specific date.n6 The acceptance of an offer to sell land making no specifications or limitations as to title is not made conditional by including a provision requiring ''marketable title.''n7 By judicial decision and conveyancing custom, unless otherwise specified in the offer, the vendor impliedly promises ''marketable title'' and the conveyance of such title is an implied condition of the purchaser's duty. But an acceptance ''subject to the approval of title by our attorneys'' is not an operative acceptance, the specified condition being materially different from any that would be implied.n8 There are many cases in which an offeree has failed to make a valid acceptance by including some provision as to quality of title that is other than mere ''marketable title.''n9
Legal Topics:
For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:
Contracts LawFormationOffersGeneral OverviewContracts LawFormationAcceptanceGeneral Overview
FOOTNOTES:
(n1)Footnote 1.
U.S. - Kurio v. United States, 429 F.Supp. 42, 66 (S.D.Tex.1970) ; United States v. Braunstein, 75 F.Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y.1947) , appeal dismissed, 168 F.2d 749 (2d Cir.) .
Kan. - Bennett v. Cummings, 73 Kan. 647, 85 P. 755 (1906) .
Mich. - Jordan Bros. v. Walker, 154 Mich. 394, 117 N.W. 942 (1908) , where offer to sell ''two tanks'' of pickles was not effectively accepted by a letter saying ''presume this is about 2000 bushels,'' pickle tanks being of varying sizes.
In Stuart v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 165 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.1948) , cert. denied, 334 U.S. 816 , a change from ''title insurance ... satisfactory to purchasers'' to ''title insurance by financially strong and reputable title insurance company'' was said to be unimportant, but a change with respect to leases constituting part of the subject matter from ''leases to bear an annual rental of 3 percent per annum'' to ''leases now bearing 3 cents per acre'' was held to be vital.
(n2)Footnote 2.
U.S. - Shea v. Second Nat'l Bank, 133 F.2d 17 (1942) ; Machine Tool & Equip. Corp. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 131 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.1942) ; Columbia Malting Co. v. Clausen-Flanagan Corporation, 3 F.2d 547 (2d Cir.1924) ; Morse v. Tillotson & Wolcott Co., 253 Fed. 340, 1 A.L.R. 1485 (2d Cir.1918) ; Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v. Wilkoff Co., 253 Fed. 165, 1 A.L.R. 1497 (6th Cir.1918) .
In re Lamarre, 34 B.R. 264 (Bkrtcy.D.Maine 1983) , the vendor accepted the purchaser's offer subject to the approval of the bankruptcy court. Because the need for such approval was known to both parties, it was an implied term and therefore the acceptance was unconditional.
In Titan Group, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, Dep't of Public Works, 588 F. Supp. 938 (D.Md.1984) , aff'd, 749 F.2d 32 (4th Cir.) (construing an agreement to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act). The County offered to arbitrate pursuant to the rules of the AAA. Titan agreed on the condition that ''the arbitration be held in a neutral location where there are adequate facilities such as the City of Philadelphia, the City of New York, or the City of Washington, D.C.'' This was implied in the offer.
Ala. - Ryder v. Johnston, 153 Ala. 482, 45 So. 181 (1907) , ''good title.''
Kan. - Bennett v. Cummings, 73 Kan. 647, 85 P. 755 (1906) , weights of corn sold to be determined by reliable men.
N.M. - Pickett v. Miller, 76 N.M. 105, 412 P.2d 400 (1966) . Tenant had an option to renew. Offeror who offered to purchase knew of the option. Owner's acceptance subject to release of tenant's renewal option was not a counter-offer but only a statement of a condition implied in the purchaser's offer.
Okl. - Magna Oil & Ref. Co. v. Parkville Oil Corp., 96 Okl. 157, 221 P. 65 (1923) .
Or. - C.R. Shaw Wholesale Co. v. Hackbarth, 102 Or. 80, 198 P. 908 (1921) .
Wash. - General Lithographing & Printing Co. v. Washington Rubber Co., 55 Wash. 461, 104 P. 650 (1909) ; Northwest Television Club, Inc. v. Gross Seattle, Inc., 26 Wn. App. 11, 612 P.2d 422 (1980) , aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 96 Wn.2d 104, 634 P.2d 837 , corrected, 96 Wn.2d 973, 640 P.2d 710 .
W.Va. - Charbonnages De France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406 (4th Cir.1979) , ''pending formal [French] government approval'', where both parties were aware of the need of such approval.
Wis. - Curtis Land & Loan Co. v. Interior Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118 N.W. 853 (1908) .
Wyo. - Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, 637 P.2d 1020 (Wyo.1981) .
In Nelson v. Hamlin, 258 Mass. 331, 155 N.E. 18 (1927) , replying to an offer of $12,000 per year as chief engineer, the plaintiff wrote: ''I hereby accept ... it being understood that you wish me to stay in my present position ... until conditions make it necessary to place me elsewhere.'' This was held not conditional.
In Hansen Pacific Corp. v. Buck Mountain Logging Co., 191 Cal.App.2d 826, 13 Cal.Rptr. 82 (1961) , the acceptance of an offer to sell timber, price to be determined by a cruise the seller was then making, ''cash down payment of $400,000 or 29% of the total purchase price, whichever amount is the smaller'' was not made a ''conditional'' acceptance by a statement that the purchaser would make the cash payment ''when you have furnished us with ... a report of the cruise.'' The terms of the offer itself were such that the amount of the cash payment required could not be determined prior to the report of the cruise. Case noted also under §§ 149, 640.
(n3)Footnote 3.
U.S. - Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v. Wilkoff Co., 253 Fed. 165, 1 A.L.R. 1497 (6th Cir.1918) .
(n4)Footnote 4.
U.S. - Columbia Malting Co. v. Clausen-Flanagan Corp., 3 F.2d 547 (2d Cir.1924) , offer of ''standard malt,'' acceptance ''malt of choice brewing quality''.
Ill. - Snow v. Schulman, 352 Ill. 63, 185 N.E. 262 (1933) ; Brach v. Matteson, 298 Ill. 387, 131 N.E. 804 (1921) .
Mich. - W.C. Sterling & Son Co. v. Watson & Bennett Co., 193 Mich. 11, 159 N.W. 381 (1916) , offer of 4,000 poles is not accepted if offeree adds ''more or less''.
Nev. -In Chapp v. Peterson, 80 Nev. 555, 397 P.2d 5 (1964) , the escrow agent varied seller's terms by adding ''or more'' to monthly payment terms of $500. Buyer accepted the escrow instructions but seller refused to sign them. Held that no contract was formed as the buyer accepted a non-existent offer.
N.Y. - Barrow Steamship Co. v. Mexican Cent. R. Co., 134 N.Y. 15, 31 N.E. 261 (1892) , an offer to send about 250, acceptance ''not less than 250.''
Pa. - Servicised Premoulded Products, Inc. v. American Insulation Co., 104 Pa.Super. 469, 159 A. 228 (1932) , offer specified that shipments should be as offeror should later determine, acceptance fixed the dates.
Wash. - Johnson v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 9 Wash.App. 202, 511 P.2d 1370 (1973) . The offer stated ''bank of our choice''; the acceptance changed this to ''Bank of Tacoma.''
Eng. -Jordan v. Norton, 4 M. & W. 155 (1838), buyer offered to buy mare if ''sound and quiet in harness,'' seller said ''sound and quiet in double harness''.
It is not a variation merely to add words that make more certain the description of the subject matter, as where the offeree indicates the county in which land offered for sale to him is located. Curtis Land & Loan Co. v. Interior Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118 N.W. 853 (1908) .
(n5)Footnote 5. In Thomsen v. Glenn, 81 Nev. 56, 398 P.2d 710 (1965) , an offer was made on a form provided by the broker, but supplied to the broker by a title company whose name was pre-printed as the escrow agent. The defendant's reply was arguably a counter-offer. The plaintiff's acceptance therefore was by conduct, depositing money with a title company as escrow agent. The use of a different escrow agent from that specified in the offer was held immaterial and, therefore, not a counter-offer.
(n6)Footnote 6. Collin v. Wetzel, 163 Md. 194, 161 A. 18 (1932) .
(n7)Footnote 7.
U.S. - Townsend v. Stick, 158 F.2d 142 (4th Cir.1946) .
Ala. - Ryder v. Johnston, 153 Ala. 482, 45 So. 181 (1907) .
Ga. - Whelchel v. Waters, 152 Ga. 614, 111 S.E. 25 (1922) .
Wash. - Northwest Properties Agency v. McGhee, 1 Wash.App. 305, 462 P.2d 249 (1969) . Defendant offered to deliver title ''free of encumbrances and defects.'' Plaintiff added: ''provided that no restrictions to the utilization of the property exists by virtue of its proximity to the freeway.'' This was held to be implicit in the offer.
Wis. - Curtis Land & Loan Co. v. Interior Land Co., 137 Wis. 341, 118 N.W. 853 (1908) , tax liens to be removed.
It is otherwise, however, if ''perfect title'' is required.
Ill. - Corcoran v. White, 117 Ill. 118, 7 N.E. 525 (1886) .
In Wheaton Bldg. & Lumber Co. v. Boston, 204 Mass. 218, 90 N.E. 598 (1910) , a contractor's bid on public work was accepted by the commissioners, subject to the approval of the mayor. As the bidder himself knew, the statutes required such approval. The acceptance was not invalidated by expressing this condition.
In Magna Oil & Refining Co. v. Parkville Oil Corp., 96 Okl. 157, 221 P. 65 (1923) , the acceptance specified shipment in ''insulated'' cars, but this was already required by law.
(n8)Footnote 8.
U.S. - Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F.2d 415 (1st Cir.1929) , cert. denied, 280 U.S. 601 .
N.C. - Richardson v. Greensboro Warehouse & Storage Co., 223 N.C. 344, 26 S.E.2d 897, 149 A.L.R. 201 (1943) . But in Burkhead v. Farlow, 266 N.C. 595, 146 S.E.2d 802, 16 A.L.R.3d 1416 (1966) , an acceptance of an option to purchase land subject to a title examination was held to be no more than a request for marketable title and therefore an unconditional acceptance, citing this section.
(n9)Footnote 9. See:
Fla. - Mehler v. Huston, 57 So.2d 836 (Fla.1952) , additional requirement that abstract of title be furnished.
Ill. - Corcoran v. White, 117 Ill. 118, 7 N.E. 525 (1886) , ''provided the title is perfect''; Bolton v. Huling, 195 Ill. 384, 63 N.E. 140 (1902) , ''if title proves satisfactory''.
Mass. - Lawrence v. Rosenberg, 238 Mass. 138, 130 N.E. 189 (1921) , limitation as to title added.
Mich. - Thomas v. Ledger, 274 Mich. 16, 263 N.W. 783 (1935) , ''warranty deed free and clear of all encumbrances and taxes as well as an abstract''.
Okl. - Landrum v. Jordan, 100 Okl. 272, 229 P. 182 (1924) , ''good and sufficient title in fee simple, clear of all liens and encumbrances''.
Or. - Flegel v. Dowling, 54 Ore. 40, 102 P. 178 (1909) , clear title, warranty deed, and abstract.