88 Of 174 documents

Corbin on Contracts

Copyright 2007, Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.

PART I FORMATION OF CONTRACTS

TOPIC A OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE

CHAPTER 3 ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF OFFER

1-3 Corbin on Contracts § 3.10

§ 3.10 Acceptance of a Published Offer of a Reward for Action or Contest Prize

[Go To Supp]

A published offer of a reward for some desired action is nearly always an offer of a unilateral contract.n1 The offeror makes a promise in exchange for which the requested return is action or forbearance, not for a promise to act or to forbear. Usually, the offeror does not specify the particular acts by which the desired result is to be attained; it is the attainment of the result that is sought. As is always the case, such offerors can limit the power of acceptance exactly as they see fit.n2 The offer can require the specific mode of producing the result, as well as the result itself. In the absence of such a requirement, the particular mode used is not material, but success in producing the result is essential.

The limits on the power of acceptance-the result that must be attained and the required mode of attaining it-are ascertained by interpretation of the terms of the published offer. This interpretation requires common sense instead of pedantry. It must be reasonable, so as to accord with the understanding of ordinary people to whom the offer is addressed and whose action is invited. The words of the offer are seldom so clear and detailed as to exclude all variation in interpretation and in the exact form of acceptance.n3

Thus, rewards are frequently offered for the ''arrest and conviction'' of some specified person charged with crime. In the absence of expressions showing a contrary intention, this will be interpreted so that acceptance is possible by one who does not himself do the physical acts constituting the ''arrest.'' It is obvious that acceptance does not require the acceptor to perform in person an act or group of acts called ''conviction.'' Arrest can be made vicariously by one whom the offeree employs for the purpose, and conviction is a result that can be brought about only by court procedure and the action of public officers. It may even be sufficient to give information to the public officers whose official duty it is to arrest and to prosecute, if as a result thereof the arrest and successful prosecution follow.n4 A different interpretation of the offer has been made where two separate rewards were offered, one being for the ''apprehension'' of the fugitive and the other being for ''information'' leading to the fugitive's apprehension.n5

Plenty of difficulty will be found in determining what is meant by ''information'' and whether the communications by the claimant have in fact caused the arrest and conviction. The claimant may have supplied but a single clue, one that would have been insufficient without the addition of other clues supplied by others. The information supplied will not be sufficient if the arrest and conviction would, without it, have occurred exactly as they did occur. But it may be sufficient even though, standing alone, it would not have produced the arrest and conviction. The relation of cause and effect must be established.n6 The claimant's communication must be what is generally called, perhaps unhappily, the ''proximate cause.'' However unhappy this expression may be, and whatever may be the difficulties of applying it, we cannot avoid the problem itself, or escape the labor and difficulty of decision, by merely adopting another form of words.

It is not sufficient to give information to some private citizen who is under no public duty to act upon it.n7 If the citizen is not induced thereby to act, the result for which the reward was offered is not produced and the condition of the offer not performed. If the citizen is induced thereby to act, and the desired result follows, the action of that citizen is almost certain to be regarded as such an intervening cause as to exclude the claimant. It would be otherwise if that other citizen purports to act as the agent and in behalf of the claimant who provided the clue. In the absence of some fiduciary relation, the citizen is free to act selfishly and to earn the reward by complying with the terms of the offer.

A reward for ''information'' is not earned by making a communication of facts that are already known to the offeror or to the public officers whose duty it is to perform the action and to produce the result for which the ''information'' is desired.n8

In very many of the reward cases, the requested service has been rendered by more than one person, no one of whom has done enough to justify entitlement to the whole reward. If they have consciously collaborated in their performance, so that they have produced the requested result as a ''joint enterprise,'' they are jointly entitled to the reward.n9 Frequently, however, they have acted without collaboration, each one supplying some necessary piece of information or doing some one of the requested acts, the result being produced by the sum total of their independent acts. It has been held that in such a case no one is entitled to the reward or to any part of it,n10 but there are sound cases to the contrary.n11 In some such cases, however, the offeror actually regards himself as bound and pays the money. The litigation, if any, is then as to the proper division of the reward, the action being in the nature of an interpleader, whether brought by the offeror or by some of the claimants. In these cases, the courts have divided the reward in proportion to the service rendered, roughly estimated.n12 If the claimants are found not entitled to the reward, either jointly or severally, the money is retained by the offeror, even though it may have been paid into court.n13

In view of the actual custom in these cases, courts may well forbear to apply the supposed rules of mutual assent with narrow severity. Even in case the offeror fights all the claimants, a division of the reward among them is just and equitable, without regard to their collaboration or having acted in a ''joint enterprise.'' This is because they have produced the requested result and each has been induced, or apparently induced, to render part of the service by the promise of reward.n14

Where a reward is offered for the finding and return of a sum of money or other lost property, and only a part of it is found and returned, there are cases holding that the claimant is entitled to a pro tanto share of the reward.n15 This seems just and reasonable unless the offer is so worded as to make it clear that the apportionment of the reward is contrary to the offeror's intention, and if the performance requested is readily divisible and the ratio of benefit received by a part performance is determinable. Apportionment was refused where a reward was offered for the capture of two persons and the claimant captured only one of them.n16

It is universally held that a public officer who renders a service for which a reward is offered has no legal right thereto if the service was in no respect different from that which was required by the officer's legal duty.n17 This is on grounds of public policy, and it is discussed more at length in the sections dealing with consideration. The reason that the offeror's promise is not binding is not that the officer has not expressed an intention to accept or has not rendered the desired service. The law deprives the officer of the power of acceptance, even if the offeror actually intended to confer such a power on the officer.

On much the same grounds, an attorney who in response to a reward offer supplies information to the authorities provided by a client cannot claim entitlement to the promised reward.n18 However, it has been held that a private detective who commenced an investigation on behalf of a client may collect a reward offer for the information leading to arrest and conviction of the culprit when the detective's efforts persisted beyond the scope of duties to the client.n19 The public policy problem does not appear in the private detective case. Similarly, employees have been held entitled to rewards offered by their employers. Absent a danger that, in the absence of a reward offer, employees will withhold cooperation with employers concerning crimes affecting the employer's interest, neither public policy nor the doctrine of consideration ordinarily prevents the employee from being entitled to the reward.n20

There is no doubt that rewards are often voluntarily paid to faithful and efficient public officers who have rendered a requested service that was wholly within the scope of their official duties. Today, the rules of many police departments forbid police officers to accept a reward or gratuity for the performance of their official functions. Under the law of contracts, they are held to be legally entitled to such payment if the requested service rendered by them is in any material respect outside the scope of their official duties.n21 Whether the acceptance of such an entitlement is forbidden by regulations of their office depends on the terms of the regulations.

Other cases illustrating the kinds of action for which public offers of reward are often made are: the rescue of person or property in danger;n22 the winning of a race or other contest;n23 the use of the offeror's medicine followed by the catching of a disease.n24 These cases are further considered in the sections explaining unilateral contracts.

Legal Topics:

For related research and practice materials, see the following legal topics:

Contracts LawPerformancePartial PerformanceGeneral OverviewContracts LawTypes of ContractsUnilateral ContractsRewardsContracts LawPerformanceTender & DeliveryContracts LawTypes of ContractsUnilateral ContractsGeneral Overview

FOOTNOTES:

(n1)Footnote 1. Particularly relevant to the topic of rewards are §§ 3.4 and 3.5 above.

(n2)Footnote 2. An offer of a prize to the one forming the most words out of the letters included in the word ''determination,'' in accordance with stated rules, is an offer of a unilateral contract. To be a valid acceptance, the performance must comply with the stated rules. The submission of a list of 4,137 words, of which only 1,457 were formed as required by the rules, is not a valid acceptance, even though no other competitor submitted as large a list of correctly formed words. Scott v. People's Monthly Co., 209 Iowa 503, 228 N.W. 263, 67 A.L.R. 413 (1929) .

In Schreiner v. Weil Furniture Co., 68 So.2d 149 (La.App.1953) , the defendant published a prize offer to the one who would count correctly the number of dots in the printed advertisement. The plaintiff was the winner. The court held that the defendant could not alter the terms of the offer after the plaintiff's reply was submitted.

See the entertaining case of Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.1962) , facts stated under § 3.4.

See also Waible v. McDonald's Corp., 935 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1991) .

(n3)Footnote 3.

La. - Schreiner v. Weil Furniture Co., Inc., 68 So.2d 149 (La.App.1953) , involves essentially the same reasoning as the N.D. case below.

Md. - Rosenthal v. Al Packer Ford, Inc., 36 Md.App. 349, 374 A.2d 377, 96 A.L.R.3d 897 (1977) . Al's ad in the paper offered $20,000 to anyone who could prove it was not ''absolutely true'' that Al was selling cars for $89 over factory invoice, freight and dealer preparation included. Rosenthal told Al to replace the standard AM with an AM-FM radio. Al charged $114 for this change. Rosenthal sued for the promised $20,000, claiming Al's profit on the AM-FM radio was in addition to the $89 over factory invoice. In interpreting the offer, the court concluded that the additional charge was not a breach of the promise made in the offer.

N.D. -In Grove v. Charbonneau Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 240 N.W.2d 853 (N.D.1976) , a posted offer promised an automobile ''to the first entry who shoots a hole-in-one on Hole No. 8.'' The occasion was an 18-hole tournament on a 9-hole golf course, meaning that a participant would have two opportunities to shoot for hole no. 8. Plaintiff shot a hole-in-one on the second opportunity (hole no. 17, according to defendant). Finding no golf rules, usages, or parol evidence as to whose meaning was preferable, the court construed the offer against the drafter, the party who created the ambiguity.

N.Y. -In Johnson v. N.Y. Daily News, 114 Misc.2d 1, 450 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup.Ct.1982) , a grandmother submitted a winning contest entry, using, however, the name of her minor grandson. The court dealt with two rules of the contest (printed in minuscule type). First, that all entrants must be over the age of 18 and second, that the decision of the judges would be final. As to the first rule, the court found no barrier to an adult entering a contest under a pseudonym. As to the second, the court stated that while it would not override the decision of the contest judges as to matters of content, it would review their decision as to validity of an entry. The case was reversed on the second point in 97 A.D.2d 458, 467 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dept. 1983) , aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 839, 473 N.Y.S.2d 975, 462 N.E.2d 152 , reargument denied, 62 N.Y.2d 803 .

Or. - Walker v. American Optical Corp., 265 Or. 327, 509 P.2d 439 (1973) (en banc). This is not a reward case, but is instructive on the interpretation of an offer to a unilateral contract.

Pa. - Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis, Inc., 385 Pa.Super. 587, 561 A.2d 1248 (1989) . Another hole-in-one case. The offeror posted the offer on or near the golf course. It intended it to be effective only during a charity tournament, but neglected to remove the sign after the tournament. Plaintiff, who made a hole-in-one was held to be entitled to the offered prize, notwithstanding defendant's unrevealed intention. A dissenting judge thought the ensuing bargain was illegal gambling.

(n4)Footnote 4.

Kan. - Elkins v. Board of Com'rs of Wyandotte County, 91 Kan. 518, 138 P. 578 (1914) ; Id., 86 Kan. 305, 120 P. 542 (1912); Stone v. Dysert, 20 Kan. 123 (1878) .

S.D. - Madsen v. Dakota State Bank, 79 S.D. 495, 114 N.W.2d 93, 100 A.L.R.2d 569 (1962) , plaintiff supplied the number of the get-away automobile. The reward was for ''capture.''

Tex. - Choice v. Dallas, 210 S.W. 753 (Tex.Civ.App.1919) .

Wash. - Hall v. State, 102 Wash. 519, 173 P. 429 (1918) .

Other cases have interpreted the offering words narrowly and have held that giving information is not acceptance. McClaughry v. King, 147 Fed. 463 (8th Cir.1906) .

(n5)Footnote 5.

U.S. - Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 73, 23 L.Ed. 697 (1876) .

(n6)Footnote 6.

Tenn. - Stair v. Heska Amone Cong., 128 Tenn. 190, 159 S.W. 840 (1913) .

(n7)Footnote 7.

Ark. - Chambers v. Ogle, 117 Ark. 242, 174 S.W. 532 (1915) .

In Lockhart v. Barnard, 14 M. & W. 674, 153 Eng.Rep. 646 (1845), Parke, B., said: ''According to the true construction of the advertisement, the information must be given, with a view to its being acted on, either to the person offering the reward, or his agent, or some person having authority by law to apprehend the criminal.''

Compare Reynolds v. Charbeneau, noted below.

(n8)Footnote 8.

Eng. -Lancaster v. Walsh, 4 M. & W. 16, 153 Eng.Rep. 1324 (1838).

(n9)Footnote 9.

Ark. - Chambers v. Ogle, 117 Ark. 242, 174 S.W. 532 (1915) , the relation among the claimants was here very slight.

(n10)Footnote 10.

Tenn. - Stair v. Heska Amone Cong., 128 Tenn. 190, 159 S.W. 840 (1913) .

But cf. Goldsborough v. Cradie, 28 Md. 477 (1868) .

(n11)Footnote 11. Reynolds v. Charbeneau, 744 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Civ.App.1988) . Reward ''to anyone who can help solve the baffling murders ...'' Plaintiff was given information by Charbeneau as to a confession by Charbeneau's roommate. Plaintiff urged Charbeneau to tell the authorities and told the authorities that Charbeneau had information about the murders. Thus compelled by plaintiff's initiatives, Charbeneau divulged the information to the authorities. Both the plaintiff and Charbeneau were entitled to some part of the reward although the offeror apparently resisted payment to either.

(n12)Footnote 12.

Iowa - Maggi v. Cassidy, 190 Iowa 933, 181 N.W. 27 (1921) .

Kan. - Board of Com'rs of Montgomery County v. Johnson, 126 Kan. 36, 266 P. 749 (1928) .

Mich. - Bloomfield v. Maloney, 176 Mich. 548, 142 N.W. 785 (1913) .

N.H. - Whitcher v. State, 68 N.H. 605, 34 A. 745 (1895) .

N.Y. - Fargo v. Arthur, 43 How. Pr. 193 (N.Y.1872) .

Or. - Umatilla County v. Estes, 105 Or. 248, 208 P. 761 (1922) .

Tex. - Rochelle v. Pacific Exp. Co., 56 Tex.Civ.App. 142, 120 S.W. 543 (1909) .

Wis. - Kinn v. First Nat. Bank, 118 Wis. 537, 95 N.W. 969 (1903) .

In Story v. United States, 105 F.Supp. 693, 123 Ct.Cl. 265 (1952) , the land of the defendant was sold through the efforts of two separate brokers. The defendant recognized that the commission should be paid to someone and put the amount in trust for the purpose. The court thereupon divided the commission equally between the two brokers.

(n13)Footnote 13.

Kan. - Taft v. Hyatt, 105 Kan. 35, 180 P. 213 (1919) , reh'g denied, 181 P. 561 .

(n14)Footnote 14. ''If the act for which the reward has been promised has been performed several times, the reward belongs to the person who has first performed the act.

''If the act has been performed by several persons simultaneously, an equal share of the reward belongs to each. If the reward is in its nature indivisible, or if by the terms of the promise only one person is to receive it, it is decided by lot.'' German Civil Code, sec. 659.

''If several persons have contributed to the result for which the reward is promised, the promisor shall divide the reward among them equitably with regard to the share of each claimant in the production of the result. The division is not binding if it is evidently inequitable; in such a case it is made by judicial decree.

''If the division of the promisor is not recognized as binding by one of the claimants, the promisor is entitled to refuse fulfillment until the claimants have settled the dispute among themselves as to their respective rights; each of them may demand the reward to be lodged for the benefit of all.

''The provision of 659, par. 2, sentence 2, applies.'' German Civil Code, sec. 660.

Compare Reynolds v. Charbeneau, above.

(n15)Footnote 15.

Iowa - Hawk v. Marion County, 48 Iowa 472 (1878) .

La. - Deslondes v. Wilson, 5 La. 397 (1833) .

Mass. - Symmes v. Frazier, 6 Mass. 344 (1810) .

(n16)Footnote 16.

Tex. - Blain v. Pacific Express Co., 69 Tex. 74, 6 S.W. 679 (1887) .

(n17)Footnote 17.

U.S. -In United States v. Matthews, 173 U.S. 381, 384, 19 S.Ct. 413, 414, 43 L.Ed. 738 (1899) , the court said: ''It is undoubted that both in England and in this country it has been held that it is contrary to public policy to enforce in a court of law, in favor of a public officer, whose duty by a virtue of his employment required the doing of a particular act, any agreement or contract made by the officer with a private individual, stipulating that the officer should receive an extra compensation or reward for the doing of such act. An agreement of this character was considered at common law to be a species of quasi extortion, and partaking of the character of a bribe.'' Although this quotation focuses on reward offers by private individuals, the same vice attaches to attempts by public officers to claim reward offers by public entities.

Fla. - Slattery v. Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp., 366 So.2d 157 (Fla.App.1979) . A polygraph operator retained by the state attorney or police department cannot provide information developed in the scope of his retainer and claim entitlement to a reward therefor.

Iowa - Maggi v. Cassidy, 190 Iowa 933, 181 N.W. 27 (1921) .

Kan. - Taft v. Hyatt, 105 Kan. 35, 180 P. 213 (1919) , reh'g denied, 181 P. 561 ; Thacker v. Smith, 103 Kan. 641, 175 P. 983 (1918) .

Ky. - Denney v. Reppert, 432 S.W.2d 647 (Ky.1968) . A deputy sheriff acting outside his county was entitled to claim a reward, but policemen working within their area of jurisdiction were not.

Mass. - Pool v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 219 (1849) .

N.J. - Gray v. Martino, 91 N.J.L. 462, 103 A. 24 (1918) .

Ohio - Somerset Bank v. Edmund, 76 Ohio St. 396, 81 N.E. 641 (1907) .

W.Va. - Maryland Cas. Co. v. Mathews, 209 F.Supp. 822 (S.D.W.Va.1962) . The claimant was an investigator employed in the office of the county prosecutor. Working after hours, and during lunch periods, claimant investigated a robbery that had occurred in the state capitol building. After piecing together sufficient information to implicate the perpetrator, the investigator turned over this information to the police investigating team that was also looking into the robbery. Claimant did not turn over the pieces of information developed along the way because the goal was to solve the case singlehandedly so as to collect the reward. Recovery was denied on grounds of public policy. This was affirmed in 361 F.2d 899 (4th Cir.1966) , which makes the further point that the fact that another claimant, the wife of the culprit, was not barred by her marital status from making her own claim.

(n18)Footnote 18. Alexander v. Russo, 1 Kan.App.2d 546, 571 P.2d 350 (1977) . The thief's mother supplied information to her attorney. The attorney supplied the information to the authorities. The mother without any knowledge of the offer and under compulsion confirmed the information. Neither the mother nor the attorney were allowed to recover.

(n19)Footnote 19. State v. Avis, 41 Conn.Sup. 385, 577 A.2d 1146 (1990) . The detective was retained by the attorney for a codefendant.

(n20)Footnote 20.

Ga. - Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Williams, 139 Ga.App. 302, 228 S.E.2d 230 (1976) . The jury found that despite claimant's supervisory status the services went beyond the claimant's employment duties.

Ky. - Denney v. Reppert, 432 S.W.2d 647 (Ky.1968) . Employee-victims of bank robbery, despite admirable and heroic conduct cannot recover reward offered by a third party, a banking association, because of absence of consideration. A questionable decision, if they were ''at will'' employees, they provided consideration. Moreover, they owed no duties to the offeror, a stranger to the employment relationship.

N.Y. - Braun v. Northeast Stations & Services, 93 A.D.2d 994, 461 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1983) . Employee who was the victim of a robbery was eligible for reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the robber.

(n21)Footnote 21.

Ark. - Chambers v. Ogle, 117 Ark. 242, 174 S.W. 532 (1915) .

Iowa - Maggi v. Cassidy, supra.

Mass. - Hartley v. Granville, 216 Mass. 38, 102 N.E. 942 (1913) .

Pa. - McCandless v. Allegheny Bessemer Steel Co., 152 Pa. 139, 25 A. 579 (1893) .

Eng. - England v. Davidson, 11 A. & E. 856 (1840) .

(n22)Footnote 22.

Wis. - Reif v. Paige, 55 Wis. 496, 13 N.W. 473 (1882) .

(n23)Footnote 23.

Ind. - Alvord v. Smith, 63 Ind. 58 (1878) .

Iowa - Scott v. People's Monthly Co., 209 Iowa 503, 228 N.W. 263, 67 A.L.R. 413 (1929) .

In Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 77 Nev. 25, 359 P.2d 85, 87 A.L.R.2d 645 (1961) , the owner of a golf course offered to pay $5,000 to any person who, having paid the admission fee of 50 cents, shot a hole-in-one. The plaintiff complied with the conditions and was given judgment for the amount promised. The court held that the contract so made was not a wager. See § 1489. This appears not to have been an offer of a prize to the winner of a contest. The offer could be accepted by more than one person at any time before it was revoked by adequate notice. The payment of the 50 cent fee would make the offer irrevocable as to parties paying it until they had the opportunity to make the trial as specified in the offer.

(n24)Footnote 24.

Eng. - Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 .