Encyclopedia of SociologyVol._4

Hogg (1987, 1992) advocates research that will produce answers about group solidarity and social identity rather than about interpersonal relationships.

Self-categorization in a most elemental form has been demonstrated in ‘‘minimal group’’ experiments (Tajfel 1981). Subjects are divided into two groups, sometimes presumably on the basis of an arbitrary and unimportant criterion and sometimes in an obviously random manner. The participants do not interact within or between groups during the experiment. Given the task of dividing a sum of money between two persons about whom they know nothing except their group membership, subjects show a marked bias in favor of members of their own group.

Interdependence in a most elemental form has been realized in experiments with the ‘‘minimal social situation’’ (Sidowski 1957). Two subjects, each of whom controls resources that may reward or punish the other and each of whom depends primarily on the other’s behavior as a source of reward or punishment, learn to exchange rewards despite being completely unaware of the nature of the situation.

Thibaut and Kelley (1959) identified two criteria individuals use in evaluating the rewards available within a particular situation: a usual, expected level of reward to which the person feels entitled, called the ‘‘comparison level,’’ and the person’s perceived best level of reward available outside the situation, called the ‘‘comparison level for alternatives.’’ An individual’s satisfaction with his or her group membership and participation depends on the relationship of rewards available within the group to his or her comparison level, while the likelihood that one will stay in or leave a group depends on the comparison level for alternatives.

Although the value and availability of rewards are usually emphasized in assessing the attractiveness of a group, Leon Festinger has pointed out the persistence of loyalty to ‘‘lost causes’’ and the effect that insufficient reward, or even aversive experiences, can have in strengthening members’ positive attitudes. In one experiment (Aronson and Mills 1959), potential group members who were subjected to a severe initiation expressed greater liking for the group than did those who had a mild initiation. And while an equitable and balanced exchange of rewarding outcomes is considered important in sustaining interpersonal rela-

tionships and participants’ satisfaction with them, Kelley and Thibaut (1978) noted that problematic situations provide particular opportunities. Attributions about a partner’s personality and motivations and self-presentations that encode messages of commitment and concern for the other person are facilitated when behavior cannot be explained simply in terms of ‘‘rational’’ self-inter- est. Such attributions and encodings strengthen affective ties and promote interdependence of the characteristics and attitudes displayed in the relationship.

GROUP INFLUENCE

Social Facilitation and Inhibition. In a study credited as the first social psychological experiment (1897), Triplett measured the average time his subjects took to wind 150 turns on a fishing reel, working both alone and in competition with one another. Subjects working in competition wound the reels faster than did those working alone. Numerous subsequent experiments (including some with nonhuman subjects) have supported and modified these results. It was found that the mere presence of other persons (as observers or coactors, whether or not they were competitors) facilitated well-learned responses but that the presence of others interfered with the acquisition of new responses. This ‘‘audience effect’’ thus facilitates performance but inhibits learning. Various explanations of social facilitation and inhibition have been proposed, generally incorporating the idea that the presence of others increases motivational arousal. Such arousal is a basic feature of the group environment (Zajonc 1966).

Conformity. Similarities of values, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and behavior are a ubiquitous and virtually defining feature of group existence. These similarities can facilitate coordination of goal-directed activity, motivate the members, provide sources of psychological security and emotional reward, reinforce members’ identification with the group, and increase cohesiveness. They also may prevent reasoned consideration of alternatives to group decisions and the potential consequences of group actions, reduce flexibility in adapting to new circumstances, and inhibit change in general. Closed circles of conformity in cohesive groups that are isolated from dissenting view-

points, producing ‘‘groupthink’’ ( Janis 1982), have been implicated in producing military blunders, fascist atrocities, government scandals, and space shuttle disasters. Conformity (to modeled indifference or uncertainty) is a factor in the failure of bystanders to help others in emergencies.

The amount of conformity in a group may be seen as a characteristic of the collectivity. Experimental studies, however, usually have been concerned with effects on the individual. Considered from this viewpoint, conformity is defined as a change in an individual’s attitudes, beliefs, or behavior in the direction of a group norm. It is an example of social control resulting from peer influence (as distinct from, for example, obedience to a constituted authority) (Milgram 1974). Two types of conformity have been identified: belief (or informational) conformity and behavioral (or normative) conformity. Both types are increased by strong group cohesiveness.

Belief conformity involves an internalized and lasting change grounded in an individual’s dependence on social sources of information and guidance. Once they are internalized, the group’s standards and perceptions are constantly carried with the individual and constitute an ongoing element of social control.

Sherif (1935) asked individual subjects to judge the apparent movement of a pinpoint of light in an otherwise totally dark room. Under these conditions the light, which in fact was stationary, appeared to most people to move. Different individuals perceived different amounts of movement. Assembled in small groups viewing the light together, the subjects began to agree on the amount of movement they perceived: A group norm emerged in an ambiguous situation. After the group interaction, subjects were asked to view the light, again in isolation. They continued to see the amount of movement agreed on by the group rather than the amount they originally perceived individually. The group’s perceptions apparently had been internalized.

The strength of belief conformity varies with the ambiguity and unfamiliarity of the situation, the individual’s trust in the credibility of the group, the individual’s attraction to and identification with the group, and the individual’s prior experience and confidence.

Behavioral conformity is grounded in the potential rewards and punishments dispensed by the group and in the individual’s previous experience with the consequences of conformity and nonconformity. The consequences of agreeing with others’ judgments and opinions, emulating others’ behaviors, and following the customs of a group are usually pleasant, while disagreement and deviancy generally lead to unpleasant effects. Group members who hold deviant opinions typically receive, at first, greater than normal amounts of communication in an attempt to influence them to conform. If these efforts fail, they are likely to be isolated or rejected, depending on the severity of the deviance. Monitoring of behavior is necessary if reward or punishment is to depend on its occurrence; thus this type of influence is effective only if and when an individual’s actions are known to the group.

Experiments conducted by Asch (1951) demonstrated behavioral conformity. The subjects engaged in a perceptual estimation task that required them to pick out lines of the same length printed on boards that were presented side by side. The boards were presented in pairs, and the judgment of each pair constituted one experimental trial. In a typical experiment there was only one genuine subject; the other participants were employed by Asch, and their judgments were prearranged. After a number of trials in which correct judgments were given, the confederate ‘‘subjects’’ began stating unanimous wrong judgments. The genuine subjects conformed to a substantial extent by expressing judgments that agreed with those of the group. When removed from the group or allowed to state judgments in private, the real subjects did not persist in making these errors. Their conformity occurred only when it was witnessed by the other group members.

The strength of behavioral conformity varies with the size and unanimity of the group, the importance of the group to the individual, and the disclosure of relevant judgments or behaviors to the group.

Belief and behavioral conformity can be distinguished analytically (and empirically under some laboratory conditions), but in natural situations they operate in conjunction. The group member not only is rewarded for conforming but also depends on others as models for behavior and

guides for judgments and opinions. While it is common to think of beliefs and attitudes as existing before the behaviors that reflect them, a large body of research indicates that people come to believe the opinions they express. ‘‘Mere’’ behavioral conformity can lead to internalization.

Conformity effects usually are thought to reflect the majority influence in a group, but evidence shows that a determined minority can prevail. Minority influence seems especially relevant in regard to internalization (Moscovici 1980).

Group Polarization. Early theories of ‘‘group contagion’’ and the madness of crowds notwithstanding, a general assumption has been that conformity processes within a group operate to bring extreme opinions and judgments in toward the center of the range of opinions and judgments. However, a body of research has contradicted the notion that group actions are more moderate than those of individuals.

The experimental procedure called for individual subjects to evaluate each of twelve ‘‘choice dilemmas,’’ situations in which a person was asked to choose between a highly desirable risky alternative and a less desirable but certain alternative. The subjects were instructed to indicate for each dilemma, the lowest probability of success they would accept in recommending that the desirable risky alternative be chosen. Probabilities were averaged for each subject over all dilemmas to generate a ‘‘riskiness’’ score for that person. Small groups of subjects were then formed and instructed to discuss each situation, reach a group decision, and indicate the group riskiness score for the dilemma. A group’s scores were averaged over the twelve situations, and that value was compared to the mean of the individual scores of the group members.

Initial research that employed the choice dilemmas procedure found a significant ‘‘risky shift’’ in the group decisions compared to the mean of the individual scores. Numerous experiments and further analyses followed that extended and qualified those findings (Cartwright 1973). Certain kinds of choice dilemma scenarios produced risky shifts, while others produced conservative shifts or showed no significant difference. Shifts tended to move in the direction of the initial inclinations of the group: The interaction resulted in a collective outcome more extreme than might have been predicted on

the basis of the individual positions, but the individual positions forecast the nature of the shift.

Group polarization, as the effect is now called, has been theoretically interpreted in terms of risk as a cultural value, the persuasive influence of ‘‘risky’’ individuals, and the diffusion of responsibility in group action. However, the effect can be explained as being due to the normative and informational influences involved in conformity processes (McGrath 1984).

GROUP INTERACTION AND

PERFORMANCE

Group performance in terms of problem solving, productivity, or effectiveness is a subject of both practical and theoretical concern that has generated numerous studies and a large body of theory. Productivity may refer to the quality of a group product, the efficiency of output per unit time or progress toward a group goal, or the realization of group potential. The establishment of an appropriate basis of evaluation is often problematic, and expected outcomes depend heavily on the type of task undertaken. When groups fall short of what (from some standpoint) it is felt they should accomplish, the failure often is attributed to ‘‘process losses’’ resulting from problems in interaction.

Steiner (1972) distinguished between tasks that require a coordinated division of effort, which he labeled ‘‘divisible,’’ and those with a single outcome or product, which he called ‘‘unitary.’’ Disjunctive unitary tasks are those which can be accomplished successfully by one individual alone. In such cases the group should be as ‘‘good’’ as the best member. Conjunctive unitary tasks require all the members to contribute successfully; in these tasks, the group can be only as good as the worst member. Tasks in which members’ contributions are simply summed to produce the group outcome are called additive, and group performance should depend on the ‘‘average’’ member. Numerous laboratory studies of ad hoc groups performing a wide range of judgment tasks have been conducted. Overall, the results indicate that groups seldom do as well as the best member but usually do better than the average member.

Field studies of industrial workers in natural settings illustrate how influence processes in the group can regulate behavior. Work groups de-

velop norms with respect to what they, not the company, regard as an appropriate day’s output. While pay, potential promotion, and retention or termination may be controlled by the employer, the immediate group controls powerful social rewards and sanctions that are brought to bear on a day-to-day basis. Those who exceed the group’s production norm (‘‘rate busters’’) and those who fail to produce an acceptable amount or attain an acceptable standard of quality are subjected to group pressure ranging from ‘‘kidding’’ and mild criticism to serious harassment. Since group cohesiveness increases conformity, some companies find it desirable to move workers frequently and attempt in other ways to inhibit the formation of interpersonal ties and identification with the group. Other organizations attempt to mobilize small group processes to support their goals.

Successful performance requires that a group have the necessary resources (material resources and members’ skills, knowledge, and competencies) and time needed to accomplish its tasks. In addition, issues of coordination and motivation arise. When it confronts a disjunctive unitary task, the group simply must assure that the ‘‘best’’ member has the opportunity, recognition, and authorization to function and is motivated to do so. The only coordination needed may be to prevent interference from other members. For other types of tasks the quality, sequence, and articulation of many or all members’ contributions are important (Miller and Hamblin 1963).

Allocation of opportunity to participate and evaluation of members’ actions constitute elements of the status structures of groups. The explanation of how interaction inequalities in task groups are developed and maintained is the concern of expectation states theory (Foschi 1997; Foschi and Lawler 1994).

Group members hold expectations about the nature, quality, and value of each other’s performances. Their expectations influence the quality of those performances and affect the evaluation of performances after they occur; they are in this sense self-fulfilling prophecies.

Though expectations may derive from firsthand task experience within the group, they also are based on ‘‘external’’ status characteristics of the members. Diffuse status characteristics such as age, race, gender, or perceived social rank may

influence expectations whether or not they are objectively relevant to the group’s task and goals. Inequalities in participation, evaluation of performance outputs, and influence over the group’s decisions reflect inequalities in status characteristics that members bring to the group. These inequalities tend to be maintained within the group regardless of their pertinence. Evaluations of performance output depend on previous evaluations, and expectations that arise out of group interaction influence subsequent interaction to produce their own confirmation (Berger et al. 1972, 1980). Thus the degree of influence exerted by group members and the impact of their contributions to the group’s effort may not be highly correlated with their task-related competence and abilities.

Processes of influence and conformity may degrade performance quality. Majorities generate social pressure whether or not they are competent. Techniques have been devised to control these effects by regulating the kind of interaction that can take place. Some procedures, such as MultiAttribute Utility Analysis, require the clear identification of task elements and their accomplishment in specified sequences. Group members can interact freely but must adhere to the task stages. Other approaches impose rules for communication in decision-making processes.

Many studies have been concerned with evaluating the effects of different patterns of interaction, primarily communication, on performance. ‘‘Brainstorming,’’ a group interaction technique in which members generate as many ideas as possible within a given time period without evaluation or criticism, is intended to overcome inhibiting social influence processes while taking advantage of those which stimulate creativity. However, research indicates that a brainstorming group is generally less effective in producing ideas than are the same number of individuals working alone. The Delphi Method and the Nominal Group Technique are two approaches to regulating the combination of individual effort with group feedback or interaction to reduce the deleterious effects of social relations within the group, conformity, and personalized conflict. In the Delphi Method individuals, without communicating with each other, make judgments that are combined into a group ‘‘product.’’ The results are made known to the participants, who then make another round of judgments. This procedure is repeated until a final

group judgment is attained. The Nominal Group Technique, which is used for developing plans or ideas or for choosing a correct or best solution, begins by having individuals work separately to generate plans, ideas, or judgments. The group then collectively lists and evaluates the material that was produced individually. These methods have advocates, but the desirability of some of their results is questionable and the time and cost involved in their utilization may be significant (McGrath 1984).

A substantial body of research has compared the relative effectiveness of structured networks of communication available to members of problemsolving groups. Typically, groups of three to five persons were required to combine information distributed across the individual members, communicating only through channels provided by the experimenters. Various networks of communication channels have been investigated to see how they affect a group’s efficiency and the members’ satisfaction. The networks differ in terms of how centralized or open they are. The most centralized network compels all messages to flow through one position, while the most open permits direct communication among all the members.

The conclusions from this research are that centralized networks are most efficient in dealing with simple tasks but that group members tend to be dissatisfied, except for the person occupying the central position. In more complex tasks the advantages of centralization are lost. Burgess (1969) suggested that the network experiments were basically flawed in failing to provide meaningful consequences for group performance and in studying groups only for brief periods, while they were learning to use the networks. His research demonstrated that when subjects had enough time to learn to use the channels provided, and received rewards based on performance, the type of network made no difference. Given time and motivation, groups adapted efficiently to overcome the structural constraints.

A type of process loss observed in both physical and cognitive tasks is the reduction in effort people put into group performance compared with the effort they make when working individually. This effect, called social loafing, has been observed in numerous cultures and is related to group size: As groups get larger, individual effort

tends to diminish. Social impact theory explains social loafing in terms of a conflict between a person’s sense of responsibility and his or her feeling that inaction is the safest or least costly course of behavior. Diffusion of personal responsibility occurs in group situations and reduces the blame for inaction. Also, a lack of individual identification and the absence of evaluation by others become more likely as group size increases. Thus both rewards for effort and punishment for lack of effort become less certain and less consistent. While laziness and ‘‘goldbricking’’ often occur in individual situations, those behaviors can be concealed more easily in a crowd. Nonetheless, members who identify with and value a group and hold strongly to its norms will exert effort on behalf of the group (Hogg 1992). As was noted above, there is a positive association between group cohesion and productivity in groups with norms that support good performance. This relationship is reciprocal: Group success tends to increase cohesion.

The social loafing effect is confounded with problems of coordination, since both increase as the number of persons involved in a task gets larger. In addition, members’ impatience and/or frustration with coordination problems can undermine their motivation and sense of responsibility, exacerbating social loafing.

Although researchers have paid much attention to process loss, there also are many significant process gains in group interaction. Social facilitation, stimulation, learning, socioemotional support, development and reinforcement of identity, and even conformity processes can enhance creativity, productivity, and effectiveness. While questions of individual versus group superiority may be provocative, most human endeavor occurs in group contexts and requires group effort.

The recognition that productivity can be affected substantially by the functions and quality of leadership in a group has stimulated much research and theorizing about leadership styles and effectiveness. An early experimental program conducted by Lewin et al. (1939) systematically varied the behavior of adult leaders of clubs of 11-year- old boys engaged in craft work and recreational activity. The leaders were trained to enact democratic, authoritarian (autocratic), and laissez-faire styles of leadership, and those styles were experienced by each club for several weeks. The resulting

changes in the boys’ task performance, social relationships and interaction, and motivation as well as some aspects of group ‘‘climate’’ were intensively documented and analyzed. The results of the study, while complex, generally favored the democratic leadership style both for producing increased motivation and originality and for fostering more mutual friendliness and groupmindedness among the boys. Group members preferred the democratic leader to either the autocratic or the laissez-faire leader.

A contingency model of leadership effectiveness has been developed by Fiedler (1981), whose concepts of task-motivated versus relationship-moti- vated style recall Bales’s identification of instrumental and socioemotional leadership functions. A leader’s effectiveness results from the combination of style and situation: Task leaders are most effective in situations that are either highly favorable or unfavorable, while relationship leaders are most effective in middle-range situations. The contingency model, though supported by a large body of research, is questioned by some who feel that effective leaders are those who deal with both task and relationship elements of group situations.

COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

IN GROUPS

Two different orientations are evident in research on competition and cooperation within groups. In one approach cooperation and competition are treated as imposed external conditions that influence the quality of group interaction and task performance. Alternatively, cooperation and competition have been studied as dependent behaviors that are affected by reward and risk contingencies, the availability of communication, and other situational factors.

Numerous studies have compared the productivity and efficiency of groups working under cooperative conditions (defined as working for group goals) and competitive conditions (defined as working for individual goals). The concept of cooperation in early research usually specified only mutual dependency of outcomes, with little attention paid to the interdependency of the members’ task activities. The findings indicated that the efficiency of work under competition was greater than that under cooperation for tasks that did not require coordination of effort. Some research indicated

that cooperative groups worked together more frequently and were more highly coordinated.

Analysis of research focusing on the nature of tasks used as criteria in comparing cooperative and competitive reward structures points to the importance of ‘‘means interdependence,’’ the degree to which group members are reliant on one another (Schmitt 1981, 1998). When tasks are simple, requiring no division of labor or sharing of information or resources, the advantage of cooperative contingencies seems to hold. However, cooperative contingencies are typically superior for tasks high in means interdependence involving distribution of effort, coordination of responses, or information sharing. Also, the long-term consequences of different reward structures may be substantial in natural groups, involving issues of morale and sustained member motivation that seldom arise in relatively brief laboratory studies. Such consequences can depend on the way in which competitive payoffs are determined; the possibility that some group members may become perpetual ‘‘losers’’ while others are constant winners will affect the efforts of all the members.

In a number of cases an additional element of competition between groups has been found to increase the productivity of internally cooperative groups. Turner (1987) observed that competition (for mutual distinctiveness) can develop between groups even in the absence of conflicts of interest. This striving to enhance positive social identity increases group cohesiveness and solidarity, making cooperation more likely.

Laboratory research treating cooperation as a dependent effect has focused on the participants’ choice of cooperative rather than competitive behaviors and the distribution and coordination of responses. The effects of threat and communication were investigated in a well-known ‘‘trucking game’’ study (Deutsch and Krauss 1962). Two subjects could cooperate by taking turns using a ‘‘short route’’ to reach a destination and thus make money. Cooperation was reduced when one subject could block the route with a gate (‘‘unilateral threat’’) and was extremely rare when both subjects had gates (‘‘bilateral threat’’). Communication between subjects did not increase cooperation under the threat conditions.

Communication sometimes has been found to increase cooperation in some of the many studies

using the ‘‘Prisoner’s Dilemma.’’ In this situation, two participants benefit moderately if both choose to cooperate and lose substantially if both ‘‘defect.’’ If either one chooses to cooperate while the other defects, the cooperator suffers a very large loss and the defector’s outcome is highly favorable. Thus, cooperation involves risk while defection implies motives of self-protection, exploitation, or both. The structure of outcomes is paradoxical: The rational choices of each individual lead to poor collective consequences.

The rates of cooperation observed in these studies are low. The Prisoner’s Dilemma epitomizes the class of situations called social traps, in which individual (usually short-term) ‘‘rational’’ self-interest conflicts with the (usually longer-term) well-being of the group, leading to collective irrationality (Kollock 1998).

Inequity of outcomes and the presence of risk have been found to reduce cooperation across a wide range of experimental research (Marwell and Schmitt 1975). Beneficial effects of communication were dependent on the timing of its availability and the pattern of behavior that had occurred before communication took place.

Studies of cooperation and competition have addressed problems of motivation and coordination, issues of equity, the effects of short-term and long-term consequences, and the relationship of individual outcomes to collective outcomes. The analysis of these topics is a notable feature of recent small group research, particularly as concern with social traps and dilemmas resonates with the environmental and social issues facing contemporary society.

REFERENCES

Aronson, Elliot, and Judson Mills 1959 ‘‘The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group.’’ Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 59:177–181.

Asch, Solomon E. 1951 ‘‘Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments.’’ In H. Guetzkow, ed., Groups, Leadership, and Men.

Pittsburgh: Carnegie.

Bales, Robert F. 1950 Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Addi- son-Wesley.

——— 1970 Personality and Interpersonal Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

———, and Stephen P. Cohen 1979 SYMLOG: A System for the Multiple Level Observation of Groups. New York: Free Press.

Berger, Joseph, Bernard P. Cohen, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1972 ‘‘Status Characteristics and Social Interaction.’’ American Sociological Review 37:241–255.

———, Susan J. Rosenholtz, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1980 ‘‘Status Organizing Processes.’’ Annual Review of Sociology 6:479–508.

Bollen, Kenneth A., and Rick H. Hoyle 1990 ‘‘Perceived Cohesiveness: A Conceptual and Empirical Examination.’’ Social Forces 69:479–504.

Borgatta, Edgar F. 1962 ‘‘A Systematic Study of Interaction Process Scores, Peer and Self-Assessments, Personality and Other Variables.’’ Genetic Psychology Monographs 65:269–290.

——— 1981 ‘‘The Small Groups Movement: Historical Notes.’’ American Behavioral Scientist 24:607–618.

Burgess, Robert L. 1969 ‘‘Communication Networks: An Experimental Evaluation.’’ In R. L. Burgess and D. Bushell, Jr., eds., Behavioral Sociology: The Experimental Analysis of Social Process. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cartwright, Dorwin 1973 ‘‘Determinants of Scientific Progress: The Case of Research on the Risky Shift.’’

American Psychologist 28:222–231.

———, and Alvin Zander, eds., 1968 Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, 3rd ed. New York: Harper & Row.

Cooley, Charles H. 1909 Social Organization. New York:

Charles Scribner’s Sons.

Deutsch, Morton, and Robert M. Krauss 1962 ‘‘Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining.’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 6:52–76.

Evans, Charles R., and Kenneth L. Dion 1991 ‘‘Group Cohesion and Performance: A Meta-Analysis.’’ Small Group Research 22(2):175–186.

Evans, Nancy J., and Paul A. Jarvis 1986 ‘‘The Group Attitude Scale: A Measure of Attraction to Group.’’

Small Group Behavior 17:203–216.

Festinger, Leon, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter 1964 When Prophecy Fails. New York: Harper & Row.

Fiedler, Fred E. 1981 ‘‘Leadership Effectiveness.’’ American Behavioral Scientist 24:619–632.

Forsyth, Donelson R. 1999 Group Dynamics, 3rd ed. Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole-Wadsworth.

Foschi, Martha 1997 ‘‘On Scope Conditions.’’ Small Group Research 28(4):535–555.

———, and Edward J. Lawler, eds. 1994 Group Processes: Sociological Analyses. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Goffman, Erving 1959 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Hare, A. Paul 1982 Creativity in Small Groups. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

———, Herbert H. Blumberg, Martin F. Davies, and M. Valerie Kent 1992 Small Group Research: A Handbook. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex.

———, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales, eds. 1965 Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction, rev. ed. New York: Knopf.

Hogg, Michael A. 1987 ‘‘Social Identity and Group Cohesiveness.’’ In J. C. Turner, ed., Rediscovering the Social Group. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

———, 1992 The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social Identity. New York: New York University Press.

Homans, George C. 1950 The Human Group. New York:

Harcourt, Brace.

——— 1974 Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, rev. ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Janis, Irving L. 1982 Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, 2nd ed. Boston: Hough- ton-Mifflin.

Kellerman, Henry 1981 ‘‘The Deep Structures of Group Cohesion.’’ In H. Kellerman, ed., Group Cohesion: Theoretical and Clinical Perspectives. New York: Grune & Stratton.

Kelley, Harold H., and John W. Thibaut 1978 Interpersonal Relations: A Theory of Interdependence. New York: Wiley.

Kollock, Peter 1998 ‘‘Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation.’’ Annual Review of Sociology 24:183–214.

Lewin, Kurt, Ronald Lippit, and Ralph K. White 1939 ‘‘Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created ‘Social Environments.’’’ Journal of Social Psychology 10:271–299.

Marwell, Gerald, and David R. Schmitt 1975 Cooperation: An Experimental Analysis. New York: Academic Press.

McGrath, Joseph E. 1984 Groups: Interaction and Performance. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Milgram, Stanley 1974 Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper & Row.

Miller, L. Keith, and Robert L. Hamblin 1963 ‘‘Interdependence, Differential Rewarding, and Productivity.’’ American Sociological Review 28:768–778.

Moreno, Jacob L. 1953 Who Shall Survive? rev. ed. Beacon, N.Y.: Beacon House.

Moscovici, Serge 1980 ‘‘Toward a Theory of Conversion Behavior.’’ In L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances In Experi-

mental Social Psychology, vol. 13. New York: Academic Press.

Ofshe, Richard A., ed. 1973 Interpersonal Behavior in Small Groups. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Olmstead, Michael, and A. Paul Hare 1978 The Small Group, 2nd ed. New York: Random House.

Schmitt, David R. 1981 ‘‘Performance under Cooperation or Competition.’’ American Behavioral Scientist

24:649–679.

———, 1998 ‘‘Effects of Reward Distribution and Performance Feedback on Competitive Responding.’’

Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 69:263–273.

Sherif, Muzafer 1935 ‘‘A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception.’’ Archives of Psychology 27, no. 187.

Sidowski, Joseph B. 1957 ‘‘Reward and Punishment in a Minimal Social Situation.’’ Journal of Experimental Psychology 54:318–326.

Steiner, Ivan D. 1972 Group Process and Productivity. New York: Academic Press.

Tajfel, Henri 1981 Human Groups and Social Categories. Cambridge; UK: Cambridge University Press.

Thibaut, John W., and Harold H. Kelley 1959 The Social Psychology of Groups. New York: Wiley.

Triplett, N. 1897 ‘‘The Dynamogenic Factors in Pacemaking and Competition.’’ American Journal of Psychology

9:507–533.

Turner, John C. 1987 Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Whyte, William F. 1955 Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Zajonc, Robert B. 1966 Social Psychology: An Experimental Approach. Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole.

ROBERT W. SHOTOLA

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ELITES

At one level, elites can be defined simply as persons who hold dominant positions in major institutions or are recognized leaders in art, education, business, and other fields of achievement. Such individuals exist in all societies, but beyond this mundane observation, social scientists are interested in why particular individuals attain positions of status and power. Does achievement reflect superior talent, or is it a product of social or

cultural advantage? Why are some achievements valued over others? How does the distribution of elite positions in society reflect the particular social structures in which they exist? These questions are the focus of much research on stratification and social inequality.

In the social sciences, the concept of elites refers to a more specific issue as well: the concentration of societal power—especially political power—in the hands of a few. At the heart of theoretical debates and empirical research on elites is the famous assertion of Mosca (1939, p. 50): ‘‘In all societies . . . two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled.’’ One can distinguish the conception of ‘‘functional elites’’ in a variety of institutional contexts from that of a ‘‘ruling’’ or ‘‘political’’ elite that in some sense wields societal-level power. Then the key questions concern the existence and nature of this dominant group. Is power over the major institutions of society highly concentrated, or is it broadly dispersed as ‘‘pluralists’’ claim? If a cohesive ruling elite exists, then who is in it and what is the basis of its power? What is the extent of its power in relation to the nonelite ‘‘masses’’? Does this societal elite exercise power responsibly in the interests of society as a whole, or do elites maximize their own interests against those of subordinate groups?

CLASSICAL ELITE THEORY

Social thought on elites goes back at least to Plato and Aristotle, but contemporary debates usually begin with the ‘‘neo-Machiavellians’’ Pareto (1935), Mosca (1939), and Michels ([1915] 1959). Reacting to the turmoil of European society in the early twentieth century, each developed arguments supporting the inevitability of elite rule in opposition to classical democratic theory, Marxian class analysis, and socialist political movements. For Pareto, elites in general were those holding leadership positions in business, politics, education, and other areas of accomplishment. Those individuals could be distinguished from the rest of ‘‘nonelite’’ society. He further distinguished between the ‘‘governing elite’’—the segment of the elite with broad political power—and the nongoverning elite. His best known statements concerned the former group. Though famous for his work in mathematical economics, Pareto believed that most human behavior was nonrational, the expression of

deep-seated ‘‘sentiments’’ and their observable manifestations, or ‘‘residues.’’ These motivational orientations led to behaviors that were then ‘‘explained’’ through our post hoc rationalizations, or ‘‘derivations’’ (1935, chap. IX). For Pareto, the governing elites were those with dominant talents or leadership skills derived primarily from superior individual attributes. Borrowing from Machiavelli, he distinguished two ideal types of political leaders on the basis of their dominant personal qualities and motivations (‘‘residues’’). ‘‘Lions’’ appealed to the conservative instincts that were most common in the masses, relying on tradition, strength, and coercion to rule. ‘‘Foxes’’ were more innovative leaders who relied on cunning, new ideas, and manipulation. Both types were necessary, but Pareto tended to see a cyclical pattern of rule in societies in which ‘‘foxes’’ dominated in periods of upheaval and transition, only to be displaced by ‘‘lions’’ after the restoration of social order (1935, chap. XII).

Pareto also noted that individuals in positions of power often attempt to maintain their privileged positions by closing off access for others. This risks social disruption by shutting off avenues of achievement and power to other talented individuals, who then mobilize to affect change. The ‘‘circulation of elites’’ refers to the process by which the ruling class is renewed periodically by superior individuals from other ranks. For Pareto, obstacles to elite circulation often resulted in the stagnation of the ruling class. Closed aristocracies and caste-like systems fostered tension, conflict, and eventually social change.

Like Pareto, Mosca began with the assertion that elite rule is an empirical fact in all societies. Although he also noted the superior individual attributes of the ‘‘ruling class,’’ his analysis was considerably more sociological than that of Pareto. Mosca emphasized the organizational advantages of the ruling elite in that they represented a relatively cohesive and easily organized minority against the disorganized masses (Mosca 1939, p. 53). He also discussed the role of the ‘‘subelite,’’ a technocratic stratum of managers, intellectuals, and bureaucrats that was increasingly important for elite rule in modern societies (1939, pp. 404–409; see also Marger 1987, p. 54). Mosca’s conception of social change and the circulation of elites was also more sociological. Social, economic, and technological

changes often generated new opportunities and called forth new talents, bringing new elites into prominence. Mosca agreed with Pareto that closed systems of rule threatened social stability, since a stagnant elite impeded adaptation to change.

In Political Parties ([1915] 1959), Michels traced the necessity of elite rule in modern societies to the imperatives of complex organization. His classic study analyzed the German Social Democratic Party, but his arguments have been applied to a variety of organizational contexts. Influenced by Weber’s ([1921] 1968) work on politics and bureaucracy, Michels’s most famous conclusion is summarized in his ‘‘Iron Law of Oligarchy,’’ the argument that large-scale organizations necessarily concentrate power in the hands of a few at the top. Once in power, leaders in organizations such as labor unions and political parties act to preserve their positions. Those who rise from lower levels in the organization are co-opted in a process that preserves the structure of power. The resources available to institutional leaders and their relative unity of interest and perspective give them numerous advantages in maintaining their power over the unorganized rank and file. Over time, leaders develop similar interests and intraelite attachments that reflect their elevated position and separate them from the masses. For their part, Michels saw the masses contributing to elite rule through their general apathy and acquiescence. With his focus on organizational factors, Michels has been very influential in the development of contemporary elite approaches to power (see Marger 1987, pp. 56–58; Burton and Higley 1987).

C. WRIGHT MILLS AND THE ELITE-

PLURALIST DEBATE

Among elite theorists there is an important distinction between those who see the concentration of power as inevitable or desirable and those who do not. The former group includes the classical elite theorists and those who have extended their ideas (see Field and Higley 1980; Burton and Higley 1987). In contrast, ‘‘critical’’ or ‘‘radical’’ elite theorists recognize the concentration of power in society but argue that this condition is neither inevitable nor desirable. Unlike the classical theorists who emphasized mass apathy or incompetence, critical elite theorists argue that elite domination

is maintained through the manipulation and exploitation of nonelites.

The most influential representative of the critical elite perspective is Mills (1956). Mills, Hunter (1953), and other critical elite theorists developed their work in response to the dominance of ‘‘pluralist’’ studies of political power in the United States. Pluralism, as represented in the work of Dahl (1956), Truman (1951), Riesman (1950), and others, held that power in modern democratic societies was widely dispersed and that those in decision-making positions were subject to significant mass pressures (through electoral or other processes) or the countervailing power of other institutional elites or organized interest groups. For Mills, the notion of a pluralist balance of power between competing interest groups was a romantic ideal rather than a description of political reality in the United States. He acknowledged the activities of labor unions, farm groups, professional associations, and other organized interest groups but argued that those groups operated mainly at the secondary, local, and ‘‘middle levels’’ of power. The power to make decisions of national and international scope rested with a ‘‘power elite’’ of individuals in top positions of authority in major corporations, the executive branch of government, and the military. Congress was consigned to the middle levels of power, along with most of the interest groups studied by pluralist social scientists. Mills traced the historical consolidation of the power elite to the growth of the federal government in the 1930s and especially during World War II, as industrial production was coordinated with military needs through the government. That institutional alignment was strengthened in the Cold War years as the state expanded its commitment to national security, social welfare, and the direction of economic policy. By the 1950s there was a significant shift in power from Congress to the executive branch, reflecting an expansion of government that required a complex informationgathering and administrative capacity. Congress lacked the resources and coherence required for modern state administration.

Mills argued that most of the members of the power elite had similar values and interests, which reflected their similar backgrounds, common schools, shared membership in elite social clubs, and informal social interaction. He also empha-