Добавил:
ivanov666
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз:
Предмет:
Файл:Philosophy sociocultural and anthropological aspects. Educational manual for students of medical universities
.pdf
101
Affective social action example. Crying at a victory or crying
at a funeral are affective social actions. This social action is divided
into two subgroups: uncontrolled reaction and emotional tension.
In the uncontrolled reaction the person takes less account of the
feelings of others and puts the feelings of the person him / herself as
the main focus. Emotional tension is the frustration that a person may
have when not fulfilling his or her aspirations, and it is then where
the internal tension creates dissatisfaction.
3. Value-rational action.
This social action, rational action is characterized by moral or
ethical principles that are implemented collectively for the good of
society. Therefore, the rational action is guided by ideology or
collective ethics.
Rational social action with values example. Religion.
4. Rationally-Purposeful action.
These are actions that are carried out in order to achieve
a specific result.
Rational-instrumental social action example. Alina is 19 years
old and wants to study medicine, however, she is aware that she has
to take a rigorous exam in order to be able to go to university and
study what she wants to study. This exam makes Alina study every
day in order to pass the exam and finally study medicine.
If we take this everyday life example into account, we can
understand Alina’s desire to achieve her goal and what she has to do
in order to achieve it.
Alina then applies social instrumental action because each step
she takes to achieve her goal will bring a positive or negative
consequence depending on how she carries out the process, in this
case her process is one of discipline and study.
Georg Simmel in How Society Is Possible? proposes the
concept of social a priori.
Georg Simmel wrote: "Kant could propose and answer the
fundamental question of his philosophy, How is nature possible?
Only because for him nature was nothing but the
representation (Vorstellung) of nature. This does not mean merely
that «the world is my representation», that we thus can speak of
102
nature only so far as it is a content of our consciousness, but that
what we call nature is a special way in which our intellect assembles,
orders, and forms the sense-perceptions. These «given» perceptions,
of color, taste, tone, temperature, resistance, smell, which in the
accidental sequence of subjective experience course through our
consciousness, are in and of themselves not yet «nature»; but they
become «nature» through the activity of the mind, which combines
them into objects and series of objects, into substances and attributes
and into causal coherences.
As the elements of the world are given to us immediately, there
does not exist among them, according to Kant, that coherence
(Verbindung) which alone can make out of them the intelligible
regular (gesetzmessig) unity of nature; or rather, which signifies
precisely the being-nature (Natur-Sein) of those in themselves
incoherently and irregularly emerging world-fragments. Thus the
Kantian world-picture grows in the most peculiar reflection
(Wiederspiel). Our senseimpressions are for this process purely
subjective, since they depend upon the physico-psychical
organization, which in other beings might be different, but they
become «objects» since they are taken up by the forms of our
intellect, and by these are fashioned into fixed regularities and into
a coherent picture of «nature». On the other hand, however, those
perceptions are the real «given», the unalterably accumulating
content of the world and the assurance of an existence independent of
ourselves, so that now those very intellectual formings of the same
into objects, coherences, regularities, appear as subjective, as that
which is brought to the situation by ourselves, in contrast with that
which we have received from the externally existent-i.e., these
formings appear as the functions of the intellect itself, which in
themselves unchangeable, had constructed from another sensematerial a nature with another content. Nature is for Kant a definite
sort of cognition, a picture growing through and in our cognitive
categories. The question then, How is nature possible?, i.e., what are
the conditions which must be present in order that a «nature» may be
given, is resolved by him through discovery of the forms which
103
constitute the essence of our intellect and therewith bring into being
«nature» as such.
It is at once suggested that it is possible to treat in an analogous
fashion the question of the aprioristic conditions on the basis of
which society is possible. Here too individual elements are given
which in a certain sense always remain in their discreteness, as is the
case with the sense-perceptions, and they undergo their synthesis into
the unity of a society only through a process of consciousness which
puts the individual existence of the several elements into relationship
with that of the others in definite forms and in accordance with
definite laws. The decisive difference between the unity of a society
and that of nature, however, is this: the latter-according to the
Kantian standpoint here presupposed-comes to existence exclusively
in the contemplating unity (Subject), it is produced exclusively by
that mind upon and out of the sense materials which are not in
themselves interconnected. On the contrary, the societary unity is
realized by its elements without further mediation, and with no need
of an observer, because these elements are consciously and
synthetically active. The Kantian theorem, Connection (Verbindung)
can never inhere in the things, since it is only brought into existence
by the mind (Subject), is not true of the societary connection, which
is rather immediately realized in the «things»-namely, in this case the
individual souls. Moreover, this societary connection as synthesis,
remains something purely psychical and without parallels with
space-structures and their reactions. But in the societary instance the
combining requires no factor outside of its own elements, since each
of these exercises the function which, with respect to the external, the
psychic energy of the observer supplies. The consciousness of
constituting with the others a unity is the whole unity in question in
the societary case. This of course means, on the one hand, not the
abstract consciousness of the unity concept, but the innumerable
singular relationships, the feeling and knowing about this
determining and being determined by the other, and, on the other
hand, it quite as little excludes an observing third party from
performing in addition a synthesis, with its basis only in himself,
between the persons concerned, as between special elements.
104
Whatever be the tract of externally observable being which is to be
comprehended as a unity, the consummation occurs not merely by
virtue of its immediate and strictly objective content, but it is
determined by the categories of the mind (Subject) and from its
cognitive requirements. Society, however, is the objective unity
which has no need of the observer not contained in itself.
The things in nature are, on the one hand, more widely
separated than souls. In the outward world, in which each entity
occupies space which cannot be shared with another, there is no
analogy for the unity of one man with another, which consists in
understanding, in love, in common work. On the other hand, the
fragments of spatial existence pass into a unity in the consciousness
of the observer, which cannot be attained by community of
individuals. For, on account of the fact that the objects of the
societary synthesis are independent beings, psychic centres, personal
unities, they resist that absolute merging in the soul of another
person, to which the selflessness (Selbstlosigkeit) of soulless things
must yield. Thus a collection of men is really a unity in a much
higher, more ideal sense, yet in a much lower degree than tables,
chairs, sofa, carpet and mirror constitute «the furniture of a room», or
river, meadow, trees, house, «a landscape», or in a painting
«a picture».
In quite a different sense from that in which it is true of the
external world, is society «my representation» (Vorstellung),
i.e., posited upon the activity of consciousness. For the soul of
another has for me the same reality which I myself have, a reality
which is very different from that of a material thing. However Kant
insists that objects in space have precisely the same certainty as my
own existence, in the latter case only the particular contents of my
subjective life can be meant; for the basis of representation in
general, the feeling of the existing ego, is unconditional and
unshakable to a degree attained by no single representation of a
material externality. But this very certainty has for us, justifiably or
not, also the fact of the thou; and as cause or as effect of this
certainty we feel the thou as something independent of our
representation, something which is just as really for itself (genau so
105
for sich ist) as our own existence. That this f or-itself of the other
nevertheless does not prevent us from making it into our
representation, that something which cannot be resolved into our
representing still becomes the content, and thus the product of our
representation-this is the profoundest psychologico-episte mological
pattern and problem of socialization.
Within our own consciousness we distinguish very precisely
between the fundamentality of the ego (the presupposition of all
representation, which has no part in the never wholly suppressible
problematics of its contents) and these contents themselves, which as
an aggregate, with their coming and going, their dubitability and
their fallibility, always present themselves as mere products of that
absolute and final energy and existence of our psychic being. We
must carry over to the other soul, however, these very conditions, or
rather independence of conditions, of our own ego, although in the
last analysis we must represent that soul. That other soul has for us
that last degree of reality which our own self possesses in distinction
from its contents. We are sure that the case stands the same way with
the other soul and its contents. Under these circumstances, the
question, How is Society possible?, has a wholly different
methodological bearing from the question, How is nature possible?
The latter question is to be answered by the forms of cognition,
through which the mind synthesizes given elements into «nature».
The former question is answered by the conditions residing a priori
in the elements themselves, through which they combine themselves
actually into the synthesis «society». In a certain sense the entire
contents of this book, as developed on the basis of the principle
announced, may be regarded as the material for answering this
question. The book searches out the procedures, occurring in the last
analysis in individuals, which condition the existence of the
individuals as society. It does not treat these procedures as
temporally antecedent causes of this result, but as partial processes of
the synthesis which we comprehensively name «society». But the
question must be understood in a still more fundamental sense. We
said that the function of achieving the synthetic unity, which with
reference to nature resides in the observing mind, with reference to
106
society passes over to the societary elements themselves. The
consciousness of constituting society is not to be sure, in the abstract,
present in the individual; but everyone always knows that the others
are connected with himself, although this knowing about the other as
the associated, this recognizing of the whole complex as a society
usually occurs with reference to particular concrete contents"4.
G. Simmel relies on the idea of a priori knowledge, formulated
by I. Kant.
A priori knowledge is knowledge obtained before experience
and independently of it, that is, knowledge, as if known in advance.
The concept of the social a priori in Simmel's philosophy
means pre-experimental premises that make possible the coexistence
of individuals in society and its knowledge.
Social a priori breaks down into three important components:
1) ability of an individual to see the Other in a generalized way
(special social type);
2) the ability of each element of the group to combine the
features of society and personality;
3) a prerequisite for fundamental harmony between the
individual and the social whole.
On the basis of the social a priori, Simel distinguishes various
forms of social life — these are domination, subordination, rivalry,
division of labor, formation of parties, solidarity, and so on.
The social exists in the field of intersubjectivity — the ability
of a person in the process of communication to establish
a relationship between several points of view — his own and
someone else's, and therefore take into account, compare, contrast
different points of view on objects and events.
Intersubjectivity is understood as a face-to-face situation. This
situation is distinguished by its bidirectionality — inward and
outward. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman talk about two sources
of reality construction — "mine and his here and now" constantly
collide with each other while the situation is "face-to-face" … I see
4
Simmel G. How is Society Possible? URL:
brocku.ca/MeadProject/Simmel/Simmel_1910.html (дата обращения:
10.07.2023).
107
him smile, then, reacting to my frown, he stops smiling, then smiles
again when he sees me smiling, etc. Therefore, it is so difficult for us
to interact remotely. The social being at this moment between us
disappears, or at least it is extremely difficult to implement.
There are numerous theories of the social based on the idea of
intersubjectivity.
For example, George Herbert Mead's theory of the generalized
other.
The generalized other is a concept introduced by George
Herbert Mead into the social sciences, and used especially in the
field of symbolic interactionism. It is the general notion that a person
has of the common expectations that others may have about actions
and thoughts within a particular society, and thus serves to clarify
their relation to the other as a representative member of a shared
social system.
Any time that an actor tries to imagine what is expected of
them, they are taking on the perspective of the generalized other.
The attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the larger
community. According to Mead, the generalized other is the vehicle
by which we are linked to society.
People see themselves through the eyes of a generalized other.
This will create the basis for thinking, is the basis of a constant
internal dialogue (reflection).
A person is constantly concerned about how he looks in the
eyes of others. He cares about what others think or say about him.
Mead believes that in the form of a generalized other, society
influences the behavior of individuals and exercises control over
their actions.
The generalized other is any organized community or social
group that participates in the process of socialization and provides
the individual with the unity of his "Ego".
In this theory, the subject essentially does not possess
consciousness, is not the creator of society, but only serves as an
intersection point for symbolic structures. By itself, a person is an
empty form that is filled with social content.
108
Thus, sociality always turns into a gap between society as
a supra-individual reality and social subjects with their
individualistic goals and attitudes. The whole question is who creates
whom: the social situation determines the social subjects or vice
versa.
3. Society as a system. The main spheres of society’s life.
Society can be studied as a large social system. It includes subsystems of a smaller level: social, economic, political and spiritual.
In Marx's theory, the most important components of this
system are production, the mode of production, productive forces and
production relations.
Production in a broad sense represents social activity, including
science, art, politics, as well as the sphere of production of the person
himself (family, education system, etc.).
Material production is the process of creating material goods
necessary for the normal life of people in society. Material goods
created in production are things or objects consumed by a person and
intended for the further development of production. Spiritual
production is understood as the production and consumption of
spiritual values — ideas, scientific knowledge, ideals, etc.
The mode of production is an organic unity of the productive
forces and production relations. This is the basis of society.
Productive forces as a side of the mode of production are
a combination of people with their skills and experience,
qualifications, objects and tools. It is clear that at different stages of
the development of society, these two elements of the productive
forces do not remain unchanged, they are constantly being improved,
an indicator of which is both the development of the workers
themselves and the means, tools of labor.
The relations of production, as the other side of the mode of
production, are represented by the relations that develop between
people in the process of production. They are characterized by in
whose hands and to what extent the means of production, objects and
tools of labor are located, the products of labor are distributed, what
opportunities various groups of people have to satisfy their needs.
Production relations are characterized by forms of ownership, forms
109
and amounts of wealth received, types and structure of consumption
of material, spiritual and other benefits.
Thus, considering society as a system, it is possible to single
out the constituent parts of the system — the base and the
superstructure, the main structural elements of society from the point
of view of socio-economic formations. The basis is the economic
structure of society, formed by the totality of production relations
that underlie the entire social structure. The superstructure is a set of
ideological attitudes and views, it has an active influence on the basis
and the whole society. The basis and superstructure are in dialectical
unity and can act as independent factors of social development.
P. Sorokin approached the social structure of society from
a different position. He proposed the theory of social stratification as
a hierarchical division of the population into groups with an uneven
distribution of rights, wealth, privileges, responsibilities, duties, and
power.
According to Sorokin, the main forms of stratification are the
following: economic (determined by income level, standard of
living), political (determined by attitude to power, the opportunity to
participate in solving state issues), professional (prestige of
professional duties performed). He called the change in the social
position of a person or an entire social group social mobility.
Sorokin considered the main types of mobility to be the
transition of an individual to a new social stratum (stratum);
changing its position within the stratum; change in the social status
of the stratum as a whole. After analyzing a large historical material,
he came to the conclusion that Marx's conclusion about future social
equality is an unfounded hypothesis. In his opinion, a society left to
itself shows a tendency towards greater differentiation, at the same
time losing stability. Under these conditions, there are forces that
equalize the social space, but it will never be flat.
A significant stage in the development of a systematic
approach is the structural functionalism of T. Parsons. He defined
society as a system of relations between people, the connecting
beginning of which are norms and values. According to Parsons, any
110
social system has the following functions: adaptation, goal
achievement, integration and reproduction of the structure.
These functions are provided by various subsystems. So, within
the social system, the function of adaptation is provided by the
economic subsystem, the function of goal achievement is provided
by the political subsystem, the function of integration is provided by
legal institutions and customs, the function of reproduction of the
structure is provided by the system of beliefs, morality and
socialization bodies, including education systems and institutions.
Thus, the following can be noted as the essential features of
society: autonomy and self-regulation, the ability to maintain its
existence through the reproduction of connections, consistency and
structure, integration and integrity, goal-setting and functionality.
At the level of society, its elements form a new quality —
coordination and subordination. The ability to maintain its existence
through the reproduction of connections means that a society can
function normally when it reproduces the entire complex of
connections represented by relations between its most diverse
subjects (individuals, groups, communities).
Goal-setting as an essential system feature of society involves
the choice and real definition of goals, as an image of the present and
future results of people's activities in society. Goal-setting is
associated with the realization of various social needs of people.
Functionality in relation to society means the implementation
of the roles that certain social institutions or processes perform in
relation to society. For example, the functions of the state, law,
family, etc. Integration and performance of various functions
predetermines the integrity and existence of society as a single social
organism.
4. The crisis of modern society.
In Jean Baudrillard's "In the Shadow of the Silent Majority, or
the End of the Social" written in 1982, the author questions the
possibility of society. He characterizes the main features of
modernity, such as the "silent majority" (black hole of the masses),
conformism, the collapse of the "social body", terrorism, the advent
of the era of simulation and hyperreality.
Соседние файлы в предмете [НЕСОРТИРОВАННОЕ]