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MEMORIES AND ADVENTURES
imperfect memory, I can recall that we had General Grierson,
Charles Munro, Rawlinson, I think, Captain – now General –
Swinton of Tanks fame, Delme Ratcliffe, Colonel – now General – Holman, Major – now General – Thwaites, and many
other notables both of the Army and Navy.
From the fi rst relations were strained. There was natural
annoyance when these senior offi cers found that their opposite numbers were youngsters of no experience. Then, again, at
Cologne and Munster I understand that the German military
did not show the proper courtesies, and certainly the hospitality which the whole party received until we reached England was negligible. The Germans themselves must have felt
ashamed of the difference. Personally the competitors were not
a bad set of fellows, though there were some bounders among
them. We were not all above criticism ourselves.
Of the Competition itself little need be said, as I have
treated the sporting side of it elsewhere. Some of the Germans
seemed to me to be a little mad, for they seemed consumed
by the idea that it was a race, whereas it mattered nothing
who was at the head of the procession or who at the tail, so
long as you did the allotted distance in the allotted time. I saw
a German bound into his car after some stoppage: “How many
ahead? Three Englishmen! Forwards! Forwards!” he cried. They
barged into each other, dashed furiously round corners, and
altogether behaved in a wild fashion, while our sedate old fellows pursued their course in a humdrum fashion and saved
their marks. There were, however, some good fellows among
the Germans. I have not forgotten how one of them, anony-
401
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
mously, used to place fl owers in my wife’s corner every morning.
But as an attempt at an entente it was a great failure. The
British offi cer who was compelled to spend weeks with a carload of Germans was not expansive and refused to be digested.
Some of the Germans, too, became disagreeable. I saw a large
German car – they were all Benz and Mercédès, generally 7080 horse-power – edge a little British car right off the road on
to the grass track beside it. The driver of the British car was
a pretty useful middle-weight boxer, but he kept his temper or
there might have been trouble. There was very little love lost
on either side, though I, as one of the few German-speaking
competitors, did my very best to bring about a more cordial atmosphere. But war was in the air. Both sides spoke of it. Several
of the British offi cers were either of the Intelligence branch,
or had special German experience, and they were unanimous
about it. My attempts towards peace were rejected. “The only
thing I want to do with these people is to fi ght them,” said
Colonel Holman. “Same here,” said the offi cer with him. It was
a deep antagonism on either side. They were not only sure of
the war, but of the date. “It will be on the fi rst pretext after the
Kiel Canal is widened.” The Kiel Canal was fi nished in June,
1914, and war came in August, so that they were not far wrong.
There was some little German chaff on the subject. “Wouldn’t
you like one of these little islands?” I heard a German say as we
steamed out past Heligoland and the Frisian Belt.
It was this experience which fi rst made me take the threat
of war seriously, but I could have persuaded myself that I was
misled, had it not been that I read soon afterwards Bernhardi’s
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MEMORIES AND ADVENTURES
book “Germany and the Next War.” I studied it carefully and
I put my impression of it into print in an article called “England and the Next War,” which appeared in the “Fortnightly Review” in the summer of 1913. It lies before me now, as
I write, and it is interesting to see how, as I projected my mind
and my imagination over the possibilities of the future, I read
much aright and some little wrong.
I began by epitomizing Bernhardi’s whole argument, and
showing that, however we might disagree with it, we were
bound to take it seriously, since he was undoubtedly a leader
of a certain class of thought in his own country – that very
military class which was now predominant. I demurred at his
assumption that the German Army in equal numbers must
overcome the French. “It is possible,” I remarked, “that even
so high an authority as General BernhardI has not entirely
appreciated how Germany has been the teacher of the world
in military matters and how thoroughly her pupils have responded to that teaching. That attention to detail, perfection of arrangement for mobilization, and careful preparation which have won German victories in the past may now
be turned against her, and she may fi nd that others can equal
her in her own virtues.” I then examined Bernhardi’s alleged
grievances against Great Britain, and showed how baseless
they were, and how little they could hope to gain by victory.
I quoted one poisonous sentence “Even English attempts at
a rapprochement must not blind us to the real situation. We
may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable
war until we may fairly imagine that we have some prospect
of success.” “This last sentence,” I remarked, “must come home
403
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
to some of us who have worked in the past for a better feeling
between the two countries.”
I then gave an epitome of Bernhardi’s plan of campaign as
outlined in charming frankness in his volume, and I sketched
out how far we were in a position to meet it and what were the
joints in our armour. My general conclusions may be given as
follows: –
1. That invasion was not a serious danger and that the
thought of it should not defl ect our plans.
2. That if invasion becomes impossible then any force like
the Territorials unless it is prepared to go abroad becomes useless.
3. That we should not have conscription save as a very, last
resource, since it is against the traditions of our people.
4. That our real danger lay in the submarine and in the airship, which could not be affected by blockade.
In discussing the submarine I said: “What exact effect
a swarm of submarines, lying off the mouth of the Channel
and the Irish Sea, would produce upon the victualling of these
islands is a problem which is beyond my conjecture. Other
ships besides the British would be likely to be destroyed, and
international complications would proba bly follow. I cannot
imagine that such a fl eet would entirely, or even to a very large
extent, cut off our supplies. But it is certain that they would
have the effect of considerably raising the price of whatever
did reach us. Therefore, we should suffer privation, though not
necessarily such privation as would compel us to make terms.
From the beginning of the war every home source would naturally be encouraged, and it is possible that before our external
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MEMORIES AND ADVENTURES
supplies were seriously decreased, our internal ones might be
well on the way to make up the defi ciency.”
This did, I think, roughly outline the actual course of
events.
5. That the submarines would affect military operations
should we send a force to France or Belgium.
6. That therefore the Channel Tunnel was a vital necessity.
7. That all unnecessary expenses should be at once cut
down, so that British credit should stand at its highest when
the strain came.
These are only the general conclusions. The article attracted some attention, but I do not suppose that it had any actual
infl uence upon the course of events. To reinforce it I wrote an
imaginary episode called “Danger” in the “Strand Magazine,”
to show how even a small Power might possibly bring us to our
knees by the submarine. It was singularly prophetic, for not
only did it outline the actual situation as it fi nally developed,
but it contained many details, the zig-zagging of the merchant
ships, the use of submarine guns, the lying for the night on
sandy bottoms, and so forth – exactly as they occurred. The
article was sent round in proof to a number of high naval offi cers, mostly retired, for their opinions. I am afraid that the
printed results, which I will not be so cruel as to quote, showed
that it was as well they were retired, since they had no sense of
the possibilities of the naval warfare of the future.
One result of my “Fortnightly” article was that General
Henry Wilson, late Chief of the Staff College as he then was,
desired to see me to cross-question me, and a meeting was arranged at the house of Colonel Sackville-West, Major Swin-
405
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
ton being also present. There, after luncheon, General Wilson
machine-gunned me with questions for about an hour. He was
fi erce and explosive in his manner, and looked upon me, no
doubt, as one of those pestilential laymen who insist upon talking of things they don’t understand. As I could give reasons for
my beliefs, I refused to be squashed, and when the interview
was over I went straight down to the Athenaeum Club and
wrote it all down from memory. It makes such curious reading that I give it exactly as I reported it that day, in dialogue,
with one or two comments from Colonel Sackville-West. After
saying with some asperity that I had made many statements
which I could not substantiate, and so might give the public
far too optimistic a view of the position, he said: “Why do you
say that we would never pay an indemnity to Germany?”
A. C. D. It is a matter of individual opinion. I go upon history and upon the spirit of our people.
GEN. W. Had not France equal spirit in 1870? How is it
that they paid an indemnity?
A. C. D. Because Germany was sitting on the top of them,
and she had to pay to get from under. GEN. W. Why may she
not sit on the top of us?
A. C. D. Because we live on an island and she cannot occupy
us in the same way.
COLONEL S.-W. I believe a little pressure on London
would cause us to pay an indemnity.
A. C. D. The man who suggested it would get hanged.
COLONEL S.-W. They would hang the man who made the
war.
A. C. D. No, they would back him but hang the traitor.
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MEMORIES AND ADVENTURES
GEN. W. You say that they would gain nothing by war.
What about the carrying trade of the world?
A. C. D. The carrying trade depends on economic questions
and upon geographical situation. For example, the Norwegians, who have no fl eet, are one of the principal carriers.
GEN. W. At least they could starve us out if they held the
seas.
A. C. D. Well, that is where my tunnel would come in; but of
course I am entirely with you as to the need of holding the seas.
GEN. W. Well, now, you admit that we must go to the help
of France?
A. C. D. Certainly.
GEN. W. But what can six divisions do?
A. C. D. Well, my point is that six divisions with a tunnel
are better than six divisions without a tunnel.
COLONEL S.-W. If we have a tunnel we must have a force
worth sending to send through it.
A. C. D. If you are going to couple the tunnel with compulsory service, you will get neither one nor the other.
GEN. W. I think, so far as submarines go, that the British
patrols would make it a very desperate service. Some desperate
man might get his boat through.
A. C. D. Some desperate man might command a fl otilla and
get it through.
GEN. W. Many things seem possible theoretically which
cannot be done in practice, but no doubt there is a danger
there. In your view the Territorials are simply a support for
the fi ghting Army?
A. C. D. Yes.
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ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
GEN. W. But they are too untrained to go into action.
A. C. D. They would be reserves and have time to train.
GEN. W. Your idea of troops coming back in case of a raid
through the tunnel is impossible. You could not withdraw
troops in that way from their positions.
A. C. D. Well, with all respect, I do not believe either in
a raid or in an invasion.
GEN. W. A war with Germany would be short and sharp –
seven months would see it fi nished.
A. C. D. You mean, no doubt, the continental part. I could
imagine the naval part lasting ten years.
COLONEL S.-W. If your fl eet was crushed, you would have
to give in.
A. C. D. A fl eet can never be annihilated as an army is.
There always remain scattered forces which can go on fi ghting. I don’t think we need give in because the fl eet Is crushed.
GEN. W. You don’t suppose that the Englishman is a better
soldier by nature than the Frenchman or the German?
A. C. D. At least he is a volunteer.
GEN. W. How would that affect the matter?
A. C. D. I think he would rally better if he were beaten.
There would be no end to his resistance, like the North in the
American War.
GEN. W. Don’t you think, if war were declared with Germany, that the public, fearing an invasion, would clamour
against any regular troops going abroad at all?
A. C. D. I think the public would leave it to the War Offi ce.
In the South African War they allowed our troops to go 6,000
miles away, and yet there was a danger of a European coalition.
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MEMORIES AND ADVENTURES
COLONEL S.-W. But our Navy was supreme then. A. C. D.
Not against a coalition.
GEN. W. When Cervera’s fl eet got loose, the Americans
would not allow their troops to embark. COLONEL S.-W.
Even the Pacifi c coast was terrifi ed. A. C. D. Well, surely that
is the reductio ad absurdum. COLONEL S.-W. Still, the fact remains.
GEN. W. If we could send fi fteen divisions we could stop
a war.
A. C. D. But that means compulsory service. GEN. W. Why
not?
A. C. D. Because I am convinced that you could not get it.
I have twice stood for Parliament, and I am sure no candidate
would have a chance on such a platform.
GEN. W. Our descendants will say, “Well, you saw the danger, and yet you made no effort.”
A. C. D. Well, we have doubled our estimates. Surely that is
an effort and must represent power somewhere.
We parted quite good friends, but the General’s evident
desire to rope me in as a compulsory-service man was vain.
I venture to think that Lord Roberts’ efforts in that direction
were a great mistake, and that if he had devoted the same great
energy to the line of least resistance, which was the Territorial
force, we could have had half a million in the ranks when war
broke out.
From the time that I was convinced by my experiences at
the Prince Henry race and by carefully reading German literature that a war was really brewing, I naturally began to
speculate as to the methods of attack and of defence. I have an
409
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
occasional power of premonition, psychic rather than intellectual, which exercises itself beyond my own control, and which
when it really comes is never mistaken. The danger seems to
be that my own prejudice or reasonings may interfere with it.
On this occasion I saw as clearly as possible what the course of
a naval war between England and Germany would be. I had no
doubt at all that our greatest danger – a desperately real one –
was that they would use their submarines in order to sink our
food ships, and that we might be starved into submission. Even
if we won every fl eet action, this unseen enemy would surely
bring us to our knees. It all worked out in exact detail in my
mind – so much so that Admiral Capelle mentioned my name
afterwards in the Reichstag, and said that only I had accurately
seen the economic form which the war would assume. This
was perhaps true, so far as the economic side went, but Sir
Percy Scott had spoken with far more authority than I on the
growing power of the submarines in warfare.
I was made very uneasy by this line of thought, and all the
more so because I asked several naval offi cers for some reassurance and could get none. One of them, I remember, said
that it was all right because we should put a boom across the
Channel, which seemed to me like saying that you could keep
eels from going down a river by laying a plank across it. Among
others I spoke to Captain Beatty, as he then was, whom I met
at a weekend party at Knole, and though he could give me no
reassurance about submarines he impressed me by his vivid
and alert personality, and I felt that a Navy with such men
in command was safe enough where fi ghting was concerned.
It could not, however, fi ll the platter if there was no loaf to
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