Exclavity under globalization. Selected works
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Special region of Russia
Table 13
A desirable status of the region in the future (according to age) (%)
A desirable status of the |
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Age |
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Un- |
From |
From |
From |
From |
Over |
The |
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region in the future |
der |
24 to |
31 to |
41 to |
51 to |
entire |
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23 |
30 |
40 |
50 |
60 |
60 |
sample |
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An independent state |
12.3 |
15.1 |
10.4 |
14.0 |
5.9 |
3.3 |
10.8 |
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(11.1)* |
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A republic within Russia |
18.9 |
6.8 |
11.7 |
16.3 |
21.6 |
10.0 |
14.3 |
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(15.8) |
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An area that is within the |
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19.8 |
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joint administration of the |
27.4 |
16.4 |
29.9 |
14.0 |
11.8 |
13.3 |
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(14.5) |
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RF and the European Union |
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A region within the RF |
8.5 |
9.6 |
7.8 |
15.1 |
11.8 |
36.7 |
14.1 |
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(10.3) |
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A region with the rights of |
25.5 |
45.2 |
37.7 |
36.0 |
45.1 |
21.7 |
34.4 |
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the SEZ |
(39.3) |
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Difficult to answer |
7.5 |
6.8 |
2.6 |
4.7 |
3.9 |
15.0 |
6.6 |
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(8.4) |
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*In brackets the data of 2001 are given.
Some differences in the points of view on the region’s status are found between the “conventionally indigenous” citizens of the region and the migrants of the past decade. The respondents who moved to the region quite recently choose the option “a region within the RF” half as often, but a little more often “an independent state” and “an area that is within the joint administration of the RF and the European Union” (Table 14).
The increase mentioned above in the anxiety of the population in connection with the changes in external conditions of the region’s development affects attitudes to migration. On the whole in the sample the share of answers in the affirmative to the question concerning migration from the region increased: in 2003 it is 17% as opposed to 14% in 2001. The share of those who answered
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Exclavity under globalization
“yes” to the question whether the respondent is going to leave the region increased, as well as the share of those who responded “sooner yes than no”. In the groups of young respondents (of under 23 and from 24 to 30 years of age) the share of those who answered “yes” and “sooner yes” to this question reached 27%, also higher, though not significantly, than the index of two years ago.
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Table 14 |
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The desired status of the region in the future (%) |
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Duration of residence in |
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The desired status of the region in the future |
Kaliningrad region |
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Migrants |
More than |
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of 1992-2002 |
10 years |
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An independent state |
14.4 |
9.9 |
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A republic within Russia |
18.9 |
13.0 |
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An area of joint administration of the RF |
24.4 |
18.8 |
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and the European Union |
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A region within the RF |
7.8 |
15.7 |
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A region of the RF with the rights of the |
26.7 |
36.2 |
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SEZ |
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Difficult to answer |
7.8 |
6.4 |
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And the share of definitely negative answers to the question about migration from the region is not that high, at 12%. The majority of the respondents (57%) chose the option “sooner no than yes”, which presupposes the unlikelihood of leaving the region (Table 15).
It should be added that among students the share of those who answered in the affirmative to the question about migration is almost one third, also the share of the respondents who consider leaving the region is quite high among entrepreneurs, managers and specialists. The share of migrants of the past decade who answered in the affirmative to the question about migration is almost twice as high as the similar index for the “conventionally indigenous” inhabitants.
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Special region of Russia
Table 15
Plans to migrate from the region (according to age group) (%)
Are you planning |
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Age |
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to leave the region |
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From |
From |
From |
From |
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for some other |
Under |
Over |
The entire |
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Russian regions or |
23 |
24 to |
31 to |
41 to |
51 to |
60 |
sample |
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30 |
40 |
50 |
60 |
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for other countries? |
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Yes |
7.5 |
6.8 |
3.9 |
5.8 |
7.8 |
0.0 |
5.5 |
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(4.5) |
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Sooner yes than no |
19.8 |
20.5 |
11.7 |
7.0 |
3.9 |
1.7 |
11.9 |
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(9.7) |
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Sooner no than yes |
41.5 |
52.1 |
57.1 |
64.0 |
62.7 |
73.3 |
56.8 |
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(62.1) |
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No |
6.6 |
6.8 |
9.1 |
14.0 |
19.6 |
23.3 |
12.1 |
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(9.5) |
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Difficult to answer |
24.5 |
13.7 |
18.2 |
9.3 |
5.9 |
1.7 |
13.7 |
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(14.2) |
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*The corresponding data of 2001 are given in brackets.
The prospects of the regionís development in the context of the values of the population
In order to determine the prospects for the region’s development, a study of the system of values of the regional socium was continued in the survey. As was the case two years ago, we were interested in the situation with the two “ideal” types of value orientations described by Inglehart in his theory of the cultural shift1, and we again made use of the simplest and the most popular method of measuring the prevalence of the ideas of materialism and post-materialism.
1 Andreichuk N.V., Gavrilina L.M. The influence of culture on the personality under the conditions of Kaliningrad socium // Kaliningrad socium in the European context. Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad State University Publishing House, 2002.
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Exclavity under globalization
The applied method consists of one question about the objectives that in the respondent’s view should be set for the country for the next few years. Three possible answers were given, corresponding to the materialist and post-materialist orientations.
Among the materialist options were the following: maintaining order in the country, combating the rise in prices, a stable economy.
Among the post-materialist the following options were given: providing ample opportunity for citizens to express their opinion when making important state decisions, widening of the population’s participation in decision making at work and at home, and protection of freedom of speech.
The respondent had an opportunity to make two choices: first from the six answers offered, and then from the remaining five.
Depending on the chosen answer options four combinations are possible, each of which has a given meaning: “pure materialist” (both of the chosen options are materialist ones), “mixed materialist” (the first choice is materialist and the second is post-material- ist), “mixed post-materialist” (the first choice is post-materialist, and the second – materialist), “pure post-materialist” (both choices are post-materialist).
When answering the question about the strategic objectives of our country, the respondents, as was the case two years ago, primarily chose the “materialist” options. Again the greatest number of respondents (44.7%) preferred the option “maintaining order in the country” as their first choice. It was followed by “a stable economy” (this option was chosen by 28.6% of the respondents, a little lower than the result of two years ago (36.6%)) and “combating the rise in prices” (13.9%). The other “post-materialist” options again received a negligible number of choices (from 2.4% to 6.4%). In the second choice the three “leading” options also include only “materialist” answers reflecting the fact that these issues are the most significant for people today (Table 11).
The objectives that are of top priority for our country in the next 5-10 years are shown in Table 16.
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Special region of Russia
Table 16
The choice of objectives that are of top priority for the country (%)
Strategic objectives |
The first |
Rank- |
The sec- |
Ranking |
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choice |
ing |
ond |
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choice |
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Maintaining order in the country |
44.7 |
1 |
20.0 |
3 (2)* |
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(43.5) |
(22.5) |
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Giving wider opportunities for citi- |
6.4 |
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8.4 |
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zens to express their opinion when |
4 |
4 |
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(3.9) |
(6.1) |
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making important state decisions |
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Combating prices increases |
13.9 |
3 |
24.0 |
2 (3) |
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(8.9) |
(20.8) |
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Protection of the freedom of speech |
2.4 |
6 |
6.6 |
5 |
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(2.8) |
(6.4) |
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Widening of the population’s par- |
4.0 |
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4.6 |
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ticipation in the decision making at |
5 |
6 |
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(2.8) |
(5.2) |
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work and at home |
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A stable economy |
28.6 |
2 |
34.6 |
1 |
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(36.6) |
(32.4) |
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Difficult to answer |
0.0 |
- |
1.8 |
- |
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(1.9) |
- |
(6.6) |
- |
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*The corresponding data of 2001 are given in brackets.
Like in the survey two years ago, the most urgent issues for our respondents are order and the stability of the economy. The difficulties in ensuring security and survival are so great that the issues of protection of the freedom of speech and democratic participation are of little interest to them.
At the same time, the indices in question changed a little over the course of two years. Thus, for example, the share of the respondents who chose the option “providing more opportunities for citizens to express their opinion when making important state decisions” grew almost 1.5 times, that is 1.5 times higher taken all the choices in the aggregate. The share of those who chose the variant “increasing the population’s participation in the decision making at work and at home” also increased. But one cannot yet call it a typical shift because the total number of those who chose these options is still small.
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Exclavity under globalization
Thus, on the whole within the sample the materialist orientations prevail. 68.5% of the respondents can be characterized as “pure materialists”, another 17% as “mixed materialists”. “Pure” and “mixed” post-materialists make up a little more than one tenth of the whole sample (2% and 10% respectively).
Since the last survey the value orientations did not change greatly. And this is quite natural: the period between the surveys is only two years, and the formation of the preconditions necessary for this shift is taking place slowly, partly due to the slow pace of change in the value system – ensuring security and confidence in the material well-being of their future, and guaranteeing protection from the risks affecting it for each citizen.
At the same time, the results changed slightly: the share of pure and mixed post-materialists increased a little, and the share of pure and mixed materialists dropped insignificantly. This could be a consequence of statistical error, but we would like to hope that this is a sign of the growing tendency towards a more serious shift.
This point is backed by the results of the analysis of differences in the value orientations between the respondents of different ages (Table 17).
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Table 17 |
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The type of value orientations (according to the age) (%) |
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The type |
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Age |
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Under |
From |
From |
From |
From |
Over |
The entire |
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of orientation |
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23 |
24 to 30 |
31 to 40 |
41 to 50 |
51 to 60 |
60 |
sample |
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Pure materialist |
60.4 |
65.8 |
67.5 |
72.1 |
68.6 |
81.7 |
68.5 |
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(74,7)* |
(68,9) |
(73.1) |
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Pure post- |
5.7 |
1.4 |
0.0 |
3.5 |
2.0 |
0.0 |
2.4 |
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materialist |
(2,2) |
(2,3) |
(1.9) |
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Mixed |
22.6 |
19.2 |
19.5 |
11.6 |
17.6 |
10.0 |
17.2 |
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materialist |
(15,4) |
(24,4) |
(17.0) |
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Mixed |
11.3 |
12.3 |
10.4 |
10.5 |
9.8 |
5.0 |
10.1 |
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post-materialist |
(7,7) |
(4,4) |
(8.0) |
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Difficult to an- |
0.0 |
1.4 |
2.6 |
2.3 |
2.0 |
3.3 |
1.8 |
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swer |
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*The corresponding data of 2001 are given in brackets.
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Special region of Russia
As can be seen from the table, the share of pure materialists grows with the age increase (from 60% in the group of the young of under 23 to 82% in the group of the respondents over 60 years of age). Among the young respondents the pure and mixed postmaterialists are seen more often (thus, the share of the pure materialists in the group of the youngest respondents is 6%, more than twice as high than the average index for the entire sample).
For us, however, it is not the absolute indices that are of importance (considering that for the characteristic “pure materialists” they are not at all high), but their trend within the group of the young (of under 23) during the last two years. And this trend is much more noticeable than among the other age groups: the share of pure materialists among the young of under 23 dropped by a quarter since 2001 (for comparison: the average drop in the entire sample was approximately 7%), of the mixed materialists the share decreased by approximately one third, while the shares of the postmaterialists grew – of the “pure” post-materialists 2.5 times, and of the “mixed” almost 1.5 times. Thus, as we can see, a new generation is gradually growing up in the region, whose views on life and the type of value orientations are somewhat different from those of the older compatriots.
Generally, summing up the survey and the comparative analysis of the obtained data with the results of 2001 the following conclusions can be made.
The social identification with the country as a whole and with the region of residence is not significantly more urgent than the other kinds for Kaliningraders (identification with the primary groups, with communities of people having common features (sex, age, occupation, etc.)).
The “Russian” identity is of relatively high importance for the region’s inhabitants as a result of the identification of him/herself with the country, and with the Russian people as a whole. “The Russian” identity prevails over the local and the regional, and the local prevails over the regional identity within the pattern of the social identification of the region’s citizens. Thus, the main socioterritorial “we” groups for the region’s inhabitants are the Russians and the local community. Under the conditions of existence and
127
Exclavity under globalization
exaggeration of the threat of the region’s “separation” from the rest of Russia one can observe the increase in the significance of the Russian identity and the decrease in the regional.
The identification with Europe, which still does not occupy a leading position among the other kinds of socio-territorial identity for the citizens of the region, is nevertheless gaining greater significance for them.
A special group in the Kaliningrad socium is made up of the migrants, especially those who came to the region relatively recently. Gradually, with the increase in the duration of residence here the migrants successfully join the regional socium occupying, in general, quite high social positions. The specific features of the region as an exclave and as a “European” part of Russia are perceived variously by the “new” migrants. Some of them (for example, as concerns the pre-war history of the region) are indifferent, and others are enthusiastic. Thus, for the migrants of recent years the identification with Kaliningraders is less important, but they more often consider themselves among the Europeans than the indigenous citizens of the region. They also more often view the region as an area that is because of its status to a greater or lesser extent independent of Russia. On the whole, the duration of an individual’s residence in the region positively affects his/her degree of identification with the regional socium.
When considering the extent of the urgency of different kinds of identities, it is necessary to take into account a serious differentiation in this respect within the regional socium. The pattern of identification of the region’s citizens, their heterogeneity and significance turn out to be connected with different factors – the age, the place of residence, the extent to which a person feels that his roots are in the regional socium. Besides, one can not but take into consideration the fact that identity in modern society is a mobile situational aspect of a personality, within which a particular feature can be in the foreground depending on the circumstances.
Further research in this direction is necessary for a deeper understanding of the processes of social identification in the Kaliningrad region, including comparative studies with other Russian regions and external Europe.
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FROM AN ISOLATED EXCLAVE ≠
TO A ØDEVELOPMENT CORRIDORø.
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
OF THE RUSSIAN EXCLAVE ON THE BALTIC SEA*
Introduction
The Kaliningrad region is a Russian exclave which is situated on the Baltic Sea. It has an absolute analogue in history. Between World War I and World War II East Prussia was a German exclave, which bordered Poland and Lithuania. It also had difficulties concerning isolation from mainland Germany and was financed by the central government in Berlin.
After World Was II the northern part of East Prussia was given to the USSR and it became an exclave which bordered Poland to the south and Lithuania to the north and east. Although Lithuania was a part of the USSR, it still possessed considerable autonomy. Besides, unlike Lithuania, the Kaliningrad region was an area closed to foreigners as there was a large military presence there. In 1991, after the collapse of the USSR, an administrative border between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region became a frontier between the Russian Federation and Lithuania. Thus, the Kaliningrad region became a real Russian exclave which was entirely cut off from the rest of Russia by the Baltic States. The straight line distance between the Kaliningrad region and the nearest Russian region, which is the Pskov region, is more than 370 km. In order to get from Kaliningrad to Moscow by land one has to cross the territories of two independent states – Lithuania and Byelorussia. As the border regime was established gradually, for some time the Ka-
* Klemeshev Andrey, Fedorov Gennady. From an isolated exclave – to a “development corridor”. Alternative development strategies of the Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea. Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad State University Publishing House, 2004.
Exclavity under globalization
liningrad region was considered to be an exclave de jure, but not de facto. Only after the introduction of the visa regime for Kaliningraders visiting Lithuania and the “Facilitated Transit Agreement” for people passing through Lithuania in order to get to mainland Russia, did the Kaliningrad region became an de facto exclave in 2003.
During the relatively short historical period since 1945, the Kaliningrad region’s economy was restructured more than once. First destroyed by the war, the East Prussian market economy was replaced by a planned command economy. During a short period of time a strong fishing industry complex was established, which changed the industrial and later the socioeconomic image of the region. In the 1970s the machine-building complex and agricultural complex started to be developed. In addition to dairy farming, poultry farms and pig-breeding farms were set up. In the beginning of the 1990s, immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the formation of a transitional economy and the introduction of the free economic zone (FEZ) “Yantar”, a partial de-industrialization took place and the development of many industries were put in doubt. But since 1998, right after the adoption of the law “On the Special Economic Zone in the Kaliningrad region”, a similar economic regime led to the formation of the new regional import-oriented economy.
The issues and prospects of the Kaliningrad region are the subject of constant monitoring both in Russia and Europe. Discussions regarding the region's development are stimulated by the process of European integration. Due to the accession of Poland and Lithuania in the EU, on May 1st, 2004, the Kaliningrad region became an enclave within the European Union and problems of the development became even more wide-ranging. After the accession of Poland to NATO in 1999, and of the Baltic States in 2004, the region became а Russian enclave surrounded by members of this military and political organization. Also certain changes will take place in connection with Russia's forthcoming membership of the World Trade Organization. The Russian Federation should therefore take additional measures to ensure the viability of its exclave in these new conditions and to ensure that the Kaliningrad region doesn't become depressed and isolated from mainland Russia inside the developing European Union.
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