(C) The defendants and their recourse

As has been seen, ‘administrative’ liability for public works may be imposed not merely on the public body responsible but also on those private persons who were or are involved in them, but does an injured person have a choice whom to sue? And what recourses for defendants are provided?

There are two basic rules as to whom a claimant may sue. First, a person harmed by a travail public may sue either any one of the works contractors involved in the project or the public body for whom the work is done or both jointly ‘solidairement’,¹³⁷ subject to establishing the conditions of liability applicable to his status as ‘participant’, ‘user’ or ‘third party’. In this respect, ‘works contractor’ includes all those physically involved in the work (whether directly or as sub-contractors¹³⁸) and all those whose advice or other intellectual input has contributed to the work (such as architects or other specialist advisers)¹³⁹ and their liability is not extinguished on completion of the work.¹⁴⁰ So, for example, a ‘participant’ injured in the course of a building project partly owing to the fault of the architect and partly of one of the builders may opt to sue either, being able to recover in full from the person actually sued. Secondly, a claimant who suffers accidental harm caused by an ouvrage public can sue either the person who commissioned it (its maître d’ouvrage) or the person who bore the responsibility for maintaining it.¹⁴¹

In all, therefore, the combination of the range of persons both private and public potentially liable for public works and their inability to excuse themselves by pointing to someone else more directly responsible (there being no defence of fait d’un tiers¹⁴²) has led to a remarkably generous system of compensation from a claimant’s point of view. However, the widely applicable joint liability of those involved in travaux publics gives rise to complex issues as to their means of recourse for contribution between each other. The procedural expression of such a recourse may either be an appel en garantie (where a defendant brings the other person allegedly responsible into the proceedings brought against him) or an action récursoire (where a person already held liable in full brings independent proceedings for recovery of contribution or an (p.130) indemnity).¹⁴³ In either case, a distinction is drawn according to whether the person seeking recourse is a public body or a works contractor.¹⁴⁴

A public body which has paid compensation to someone harmed by public works may sue any of the works contractors which it has employed for a full indemnity under an indemnity clause ‘clause de garantie’ in any contract between them, for contribution on breach of any contractual obligation by a works contractor, or on the basis of any extra-contractual fault committed in the course of the work.¹⁴⁵ Where the works contractor’s action was the sole cause of the harm for which the public body has been held responsible, the latter can recover a complete indemnity from that contractor even in the absence of any breach of contract or extra-contractual fault on its part.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, where a person other than a works contractor has contributed to the harm for which a public body has been held fully liable to a claimant under the law of travaux publics, that public body is subrogated to any rights which that claimant possessed against that other person, and so can claim contribution in the administrative courts if that other person is a public body or otherwise subject to the administrative jurisdiction,¹⁴⁷ but in the ordinary courts where he is not. For example, in Del Carlo the claimant was a private individual whose vehicle was damaged when another vehicle driven by another private individual, L, was directed to cross a one-way bridge at the wrong time. The Conseil d’Etat held the State liable in full to the claimant for his damage even though this was partly caused by L’’s negligence, but observed that the State would be subrogated to the claimants rights against L.¹⁴⁸ Such a claim would be governed by private law and be a matter for the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.

A works contractor held liable in full for harm caused by a travail public has a similar system of possible recourse against others responsible for it. Such a recourse for contribution would lie in the administrative courts against the public body responsible, either under the terms of the contract under which the contractor works (though not after final completion of the work)¹⁴⁹ or in respect of any fault either in its design or its supervision committed by the public body which commissioned work.¹⁵⁰ On the other hand, the proper jurisdiction for a recourse claim by one works contractor against another is more complex. Where the claim is based on a contract between them the proper jurisdiction depends on the question on whose account the defendant contractor acted: if for a public authority, the claim lies in the administrative courts,¹⁵¹ but if on its own account, then before the ordinary jurisdiction and under (p.131) the rules of private law.¹⁵² Where the claim is extra-contractual, for example, by one works contractor employed by a public body and held liable entirely for harm caused jointly with another works contractor with whom it is not contractually bound, then it comes within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts if the litigation ‘arises from the performance of a public works contract’ and opposes ‘participants in the performance of public works’.¹⁵³

In all, the law governing public works shows the workings of the substantive and jurisdictional divide between French public and private law at its most complex. Public law governs the parties’ relations not simply because one or more of them are public bodies (for sometimes the law of public works applies to the relations between private persons), nor because the activity in question is peculiarly public, such as the enactment of legislation or the making of a decision affecting an individual’s rights, for constructing a building or making a road is not inherently public in this way. Instead, the ‘public element’ is defined more subtly by the definitions of travail public or ouvrage public which relate the work either to a public body or to a service public.¹⁵⁴

While the significance of this body of law for liability for products is considerable, it is not at all obvious. For liability is overtly connected to immovable property, but in practice may be imposed for products, either when they are to be incorporated or have been incorporated into a building or (and more frequently) where they are used in the operation of public works. However, in striking contrast to private law liability for the ‘deeds of things’, the basis of liability for ‘public works’ ranges overtly from liability for fault to liability without fault and the range of defendants is considerable (rather than placing liability on the thing’s gardien). This means that this impact of this special body of law in attracting claims for compensation for damage caused by an allegedly defective product depends very much on the particular circumstances in which the product was used.

Notes:

(¹) Below, as to the terminology here: pp. 121–2.

(²) Below, chaps. 7 and chap. 12.

(³) Above, pp. 51–61. The other main means was obligations de sécurité de résultat, above, pp. 22, 27–8.

(⁴) Above, pp. 52–4, 55–7.

(⁵) With the exception of ‘incorporeal products’: above, p. 52.

(⁶) A. de Laubadère, ‘Le problème de la responsabilité du fait des choses en droit administratif français’, (1959) EDCE 29; R. Chapus, ‘Principes généraux et concepts fondamentaux de la responsabilité adminis trative’ in Jur.-C1. Admin. Vol. 7, fasc. 700 (1984) § 14 . Cf. R. Chapus, Responsabilité publique et respons abilité privée (LGDJ, Paris, 1954), 265 et seq. where the author previously adopted such a category.

(⁷) Above, pp. 23–5.

(⁸) Above, p. 32.

(⁹) Below, p. 313.

(¹⁰) See below, pp. 312–5.

(¹¹) F. Vincent, ‘Responsabilité sans faute’ in Jur.-Cl. Admin. Vol. 8, Fasc. 824 (2000) 3 .

(¹²) Gaudemet, Droit administratif Tome I, 819 referring to the ‘empiricism’ of the courts. These other bases of liability may affect liability for products as in the cases concerning the liability of communes to those amateurs who undertake the lighting of fireworks at public firework displays: see Braibant and Stirn, Droit administratif fançais, 304 . Here, liability would not be imposed under the head of ‘dangerous things’ as fire works have been held to be ‘non-dangerous’: CE 30 Mar. 1979, DS 1979.552 note Richer.

(¹³) Cf. above, p. 33.

(¹⁴) As to administrative law, Gaudemet, Droit administratif Tome I, 877 who describes liability for fault as the general position (le droit commun). For the role of liability for fault in private law, see above, pp. 40–50.

(¹⁵) TC 8 Feb. 1873, S 1873.153, above, p. 31.

(¹⁶) Fairgreave, State Liability, 102 et seq.

(¹⁷) Chapus, Droit administratif général, 1385 .

(¹⁸) ‘Personal fault’ or ‘une faute détachable de la fonction is typically found by the courts where the servant’s fault has nothing to do with his public functions or where his fault is intentional and, possibly, where it counts as faute lourde: Gaudemet, Droit administratif Tome I, 784–8 .

(¹⁹) Gaudemet, Droit administratif, Tome I, 791 et seq. The leading decisions were CE Ass. 18 Nov. 1949, Dlle Mimeur, Defaux, Bethehemer, Leb. 491, D 1950.667, JCP 1950.II.5286 concl. Gazier.

(²⁰) Vedel and Delvolvé, Droit administratif, Vol. 1, 571 .

(²¹) Gaudemet, Droit administratif, Tome I, 806–07 .

(²²) CE Ass. 18 Nov. 1949, Mimeur, Leb. 491, D 1950.667, JCP 1950.II.5286 concl. Gazier (use of mili tary vehicle used on personal detour not detachable from public service for which it was entrusted to him).

(²³) Loi of 31 Dec. 1957.

(²⁴) Vedel and Delvolvé, Droit administratif, Tome 1, 700 .

(²⁵) TC 11 Dec. 1972, Spathis, JCP 1974.II.17669 note Moderne; TC 15 Oct. 1973, Barbou, AJ.1974.94 concl. Braibant.

(²⁶) Below, p. 141 et seq.

(²⁷) The commune is the smallest unit of local authority.

(²⁸) CE 12 Oct. 1973, Commune de Saint-Brévin-les-Pins, RDP 1974.1137 note Waline.

(²⁹) The CE rejected the diver’s claim on the basis of ‘public works’ on the ground that the diving stage was not an immovable, cf below, p. 124.

(³⁰) RDP 1973.1137.

(³¹) CE 18 Jan. 1974, Leb. 48.

(³²) Below, pp. 118–21, 121–31.

(³³) Above, Chaps. 4 and 5.

(³⁴) Below, Chap. 7.

(³⁵) TC 22 Jan. 1921, Bac d’Eloka, Leb. 91. Cf. CE 10 May 1974, Denoyez, AJDA 1974.298, chron. Jurisp. Franc et Boyon where a ferry service was held to be a service public administratif.

(³⁶) Below, p. 135.

(³⁷) Above, pp. 27–8.

(³⁸) Above, p. 28.

(³⁹) This had been suggested by some members of la doctrine but was not adopted by the ordinary courts: above, p. 28. A strictly contractual approach to workers’ compensation was not open to the Conseil d’Etat given that not all public servants in a broad sense work under contracts: Chapus, Droit administratif, Tome 2 (1999), 17–18, 53 et seq.

(⁴⁰) Civ. 16 Jun. 1896, S 1897.1.17 note Esmein, D 1897.1.433 note Saleilles and see above, p. 26.

(⁴¹) CE 21 Jun. 1895, Cames, D 1896.3.65 concl. Romieu. While this example of the imposition of administrative liability without fault became redundant when pensions for permanent public servants were introduced by legislation (loi of 26 Dec. 1964 and déc. of 28 Oct. 1966; Vedel and Delvolvé, Droit adminis tratif, Tome 1, 602–03) it inspired other examples where liability without fault is imposed for the benefit of collaborateurs occasionnels du service public: e.g. CE 25 Sept. 1970, Tesson, D 1971.55 concl. Morisot.

(⁴²) Above, p. 28.

(⁴³) Below, pp. 118–21.

(⁴⁴) Gaz de France (‘GDF’).

(⁴⁵) Electricité de France ‘EDF’.

(⁴⁶) Below, p. 136. See also the liability of SNCF, the French railway company below, pp. 139–40.

(⁴⁷) Below, p. 136 et seq.

(⁴⁸) CE Ass. 2 Feb. 1973, Trannoy, Leb. 94, concl. Rougevin-Baville; arts. 1792 and 2270 C. civ.

(⁴⁹) See generally Fairgrieve, State Liability, 138–42 .

(⁵⁰) Above, p. 52. Cf. those cases where they require the ‘thing’ to possess its own ‘dynamism’: above, p. 54.

(⁵¹) J. Moreau, ‘Rapport sur les choses dangereuses en droit administratif français’, in Travaux de l’Association Henri Capitant, Tome XIX (1967), 256, 258 .

(⁵²) Cf. Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome I, 1337–41; F. Vincent, ‘Responsabilité sans faute’ in Jur.-Cl. Admin. Vol. 8, Fasc. 824 (2002) 3 . Chapus, Responsabilité publique et responsabilité privé, 278–9 attributed this difference of approach between two jurisdictions to their institutional differences: whereas at the time the Conseil d’Etat was practically the sole forum for the imposition of administrative liability and could itself control its practical expression, if the Cour de cassation had defined dangerousness, this would have led to ‘anarchie jurisprudentielle’ in the lower courts.

(⁵³) Below, pp. 119–21.

(⁵⁴) Below, pp. 120–1.

(⁵⁵) CE 1 Aug. 1919, D 1920.III.1 note Appleton.

(⁵⁶) Moreau, op. cit. n. 51, (1967), 256, 283–284. Where no legislative scheme covers the claimant’s harm the jurisprudence of Regnault-Desroziers has been applied: CE Ass. 21 Oct. 1966, SNCF, D 1967.164.

(⁵⁷) CE 22 Dec. 1924, S 1926.3.1 note Hauriou, D 1925.3.9 note Appleton, which used the terminology of presumption of fault, but allowed it to be rebutted only on proof of force majeure or faute de la victime.

(⁵⁸) For the ordinary courts, see above, pp. 52–61.

(⁵⁹) CE 17 Oct. 1952. Ville d’Arras, Leb. 453 and below, p. 121 et seq.

(⁶⁰) CE 24 Jun. 1949, Lecomte et Daramy, JCP 1949.II.5092 concl. Barbet, note George.

(⁶¹) CE Sect. 27 Jul. 1951, Aubergé et Dumont, Leb. 447, D 1952.108, concl. Gazier, note Morange. Here faute simple is enough to establish liability.

(⁶²) Claims against the police judiciaire fall within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts but are governed by administrative law principles: Vedel and Delvolvé, Droit administratif, Tome, I, 662–3 .

(⁶³) Civ. (1) 10 Jun. 1986, JCP 1986.II.20683. The Cour de cassation did not distinguish in this respect between cases where the claimant was injured by a police or by a suspect’s bullet.

(⁶⁴) CE 16 Mar. 1956, Domenech, Leb. 124 (faute lourde required).

(⁶⁵) Brown and Bell, 177 , give CE 19 Oct. 1990, Ingremeau, Leb. 284 as an example of this category, but in this decision a local authority was held liable for the injury caused by a bow and arrow used by a child in its foster care on the basis of a presumption of fault and no mention was made of the danger of either this thing or any activity. These authors rightly point out that the decision in Ingremeau is ‘not all that surprising because, in private law, parents would be liable to the victim for the acts of the child’, cit ing Ass. plén. 9 May 1984, Fullenwarth D. 1984.525 note Chabas, which imposed liability under art. 1384 al. 4 C. civ.

(⁶⁶) CE Ass. 26 May 1995, N’Guyen, Jouan, Pavan, Leb. 221, 222, AJ 1995.508 Chron. Stahl and Chavaux, JCP 1995.II.22468 note Moreau; CE 16 Jun. 1997, Assist. Publ.-Hospitaux de Paris, Leb. 242 and see below, p. 150. Cf. TA Paris 20 Dec. 1990, JCP 1991.IV.395 (nurse in Ministry of Defence psychiatric hospital contracted HIV virus after one of her patients deliberately turned a tube of his infected blood over scratches on her hand).

(⁶⁷) CE 3 Feb. 1956, Thouzellier, D 1956.596 note Auby, JCP 1956.II.9608 note Lévy; CE 13 Jul. 1967, Département de la Moselle. Leb. 341 (respectively).

(⁶⁸) CE 14 Jun. 1978, Soc. de construction pour le bêtiment, Leb. 259.

(⁶⁹) CE 15 Oct. 1990, SA Paris Touraine automobile, Leb. 279.

(⁷⁰) Ass. plén. 29 Mar. 1991, Blieck, D 1991.324 note Larroumet, JCP 1991.II.21673 concl. Dottenwille, above, p. 26.

(⁷¹) Below, p. 151 et seq.

(⁷²) See below, p. 122 for discussion of the terminology used.

(⁷³) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 545 ; de Laubadère and Gaudemet, Droit administratif, Tome 2, 437 . Cf. Vedel and Delvolvé, Droit administratif Tome 1, 171–2 who consider that the development of general administrative law has reduced the real distinctiveness of the law relating to travaux publics.

(⁷⁴) Fairgreave, State Liability, 8 .

(⁷⁵) Loi du 28 pluviose, An VIII, art. 4; Chapus, Droit administrative général, Tome 2, 545 . At the time, the ‘administrative court’ was the Conseil de préfecture. There are exceptions to this jurisdictional position, a particularly important one being where the liability in issue is that of a service public industriel et commercial towards its customers: see below, p. 138. Another example may be found in cases where harm is caused by a vehicle in the course of a travail public. Here, the Tribunal des conflits has held that since 1957 by loi the ordinary courts have possessed an exclusive jurisdiction: TC 11 May 1964, Guibert, Leb. 791.

(⁷⁶) TC 8 Feb. 1873, DP 1873.3.17, above, p. 31.

(⁷⁷) Below, pp. 129–31.

(⁷⁸) Vedel and Delvolvé, Droit administratif, Tome 1, 668 (liability for fault); Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 652 (where a person ‘participates’ in a travail public he may recover only on the basis of proof of fault and not on the basis of liability without fault for ‘dangerous things’.

(⁷⁹) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 527 .

(⁸⁰) Below, p. 124.

(⁸¹) M. Waline, note to CE 12 Oct 1973, Commune de Saint-Brévin-les-Pins, Rev. dr. pub.1974.1137; Art. 517 C. civ. and see J. Carbonnier, Droit civil, 3—Les biens (PUF, Paris, 19th. edn., 2000) 90 .

(⁸²) CE 10 Feb. 1978, Société Muller, Leb. 65. This follows art. 517 C. civ. according to which ‘[l]es biens sont immeubles…par leur destination’.

(⁸³) E.g. CE 18 Dec. 1931, Robin, S 1932.3.41 concl. Ettori, note Bonnard (failure to warn of submerged rock in naturally navigable river).

(⁸⁴) See below for further examples. An exception is made where the ‘thing’ used in the course of public works is a vehicle, for here the ordinary courts have an exclusive jurisdiction: TC 11 May 1964, Guibert Leb. 791 (street-cleaning vehicle spraying and damaging frontage of claimant’s shop).

(⁸⁵) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 548 .

(⁸⁶) Ibid., 550–3 .

(⁸⁷) The notion of service public ‘public service’ is a legal and not merely a descriptive category in French administrative law: see above, p. 19; below, pp. 133–4.

(⁸⁸) CE 10 Jun. 1921, D 1922.3.26, concl. Corneille.

(⁸⁹) CE 20 Apr. 1956, Leb. 168.

(⁹⁰) As ‘third parties’ to the work: see below, p. 128. By contrast, the landowners who had agreed to partic ipate in the scheme were held entitled to recover against the Ministry on the basis of contractual fault.

(⁹¹) Above, pp. 51–61.

(⁹²) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 557–61 .

(⁹³) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 559 .

(⁹⁴) CE 27 Jun. 1986, Grospiron, D 1987. 113 note Excoffier.

(⁹⁵) CE 12 Oct. 1973, Commune de Saint-Brévin-les-Pins, RDP 1974.1137 note Waline.

(⁹⁶) There is no requirement that the property in question is owned by a public body though it often is: Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 564–6 .

(⁹⁷) CE Sect. 30 Sep. 1955, Caisse rég. de séc. soc. de Nantes, Leb. 459 (railway turntable belonging to SNCF held to be an ouvrage public as set aside for use in the public railway service).

(⁹⁸) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 561–2 .

(⁹⁹) E.g. CE 20 Apr. 1956, Grimouard, Leb. 168.

(¹⁰⁰) Vedel and Delvolvé, Droit administratif Tome I, 668; de Laubadère and Gaudemet, Droit adminis-tratif Tome II, 439 .

(¹⁰¹) CE 27 Nov. 1931, DH 1932.88. Cf. CE 25 Apr. 1958, Barbaza, Leb. 228.

(¹⁰²) CE 5 Oct. 1966, Leb. 522.

(¹⁰³) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 650 et seq.; Vedel and Delvolvé, Droit administratif Tome 1, 670 et seq. Some authors prefer to apply the distinction between ‘users’ and ‘third-parties’ (see below, pp. 124–9) equally to cases of permanent harm: de Laubadère and Gaudemet, Droit adminis-tratif, Tome 2, 482–4 .

(¹⁰⁴) Vedel and Delvolvé, Tome 1, 670 ; Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 665 . E.g. CE 11 Jul. 1960, SNCF c. Goncet, Leb. 476 (houseowner recovered damages for disturbance to his enjoyment of property caused by SNCF’s extension of nearby marshalling yards).

(¹⁰⁵) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 652 et seq. Issues relating to harm to participants arise only in relation to their involvement in travaux publics, as one cannot participate in a thing (an ouvrage public) any more than one can use work in operation (a travail public): C. Lavaille, ‘Le dommage causé au participant à l’opération de travail public’, AJ 1975.540, 543. On the range of persons responsible, see below, p. 129 et seq.

(¹⁰⁶) CE 15 Feb. 1963, Minotto, Leb. 95 (electricity).

(¹⁰⁷) If the worker is an ‘agent’ of the public service, then if injured he is compensated by way of an inva lidity pension, rather than by imposition of liability: see above, p. 117 n. 41.

(¹⁰⁸) See above, pp. 61–2.

(¹⁰⁹) CE 15 Feb. 1963, Minotto, Leb. 95.

(¹¹⁰) CE 24 Apr. 1981, Soc. des autoroutes du Nord et de I’Est de la France, Leb. 953.

(¹¹¹) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 1, 1251–2; Tome 2, 677–78 .

(¹¹²) There is an exception for the case where the public body sued possesses no recourse as a matter of law against a person jointly responsible for the harm, as here it will be liable only to the extent of its respon sibility (e.g. where the public authority has no recourse against a private law employer): Lavaille, op. cit. n. 105, 555 .

(¹¹³) At one time, the Conseil d’Etat held that a person who used an ouvrage public without permission or abnormally could not count as a ‘user’ and therefore should be submitted to the regime of liability of ‘third parties’ with the paradoxical result that they benefited from a strict liability: Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 641–2 . However, more recently it has held that such a person must prove fault: CE Sect. 20 Jun. 1984, Motheron, DA 1984. no. 335 and may recover nothing if the claimant’s own fault is held to be the only cause of injury: CE 12 Jun. 1998, Masse c. EDF, CJEG 1999. 36 note R. Savigant (young trespasser ignoring clear warning and climbing 2m gate of electricity station and being electrocuted). A ‘user’ of an ouvrage public is to be distinguished from a ‘usager d’un service public’ an administrative law relationship to be distinguished from the relationship of private law which a customer of a service public industriel et com mercial enjoys: see below, pp. 134–6.

(¹¹⁴) O. Renard-Payen, ‘Responsabilité du fait des travaux et ouvrages publics, Dommages subis par les usagers’, Jur.-Cl. Admin. Fasc. 932 (1994), 3 .

(¹¹⁵) Braibant and Stirn, Droit administratif frangais, 336 . This is not to suggest that a person may ‘use’ travaux publics, but rather that a user of an ouvrage public may impugn the execution of the work done (itself often a travail public, see above, p. 124) by the contractor.

(¹¹⁶) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 660 .

(¹¹⁷) E.g. CE 18 Jan. 1980, Commune d’Echirolles, Leb. 35.

(¹¹⁸) CE 8 Nov. 1968, Connac, Leb. 566.

(¹¹⁹) E.g. CE Sect. 27 Nov. 1987, Soc. provençale d’equipement, Leb. 383 (owner and tenant of premises on an industrial estate commissioned by the local commune able to recover damages for the losses which they suffered due to flooding, whether or not that flooding was caused in part by the diversion of local streams to the estate’s drains by third parties).

(¹²⁰) CE 16 Dec. 1953, Leb. 552.

(¹²¹) CE Sect. 27 Nov. 1987, Soc. provençale d′équipement, Leb. 383 is another example of liability of a bureau d′études for its bad design of an ouvrage public.

(¹²²) CE 24 Apr. 1963, Ablesom, Leb. 239.

(¹²³) CE 5 Nov. 1980, RDP 1981.1108.

(¹²⁴) CE 17 Apr. 1991, Thévenet…CE 21 Jun. 1991, Christ. 1991 RDP 1440 (failure to warn of floods on road); CE 25 Mar. 1988, Société des autoroutes du sud de la France, Leb. 1062 (failure to mobilise de-icing machines at night on motorway in time or to warn drivers of the risk). The CE has been less strict as regards trees growing by the highway whose fall occasions an accident, holding that there is no ‘failure in normal maintenance’ where the tree’s rottenness is invisible: CE 8 Nov. 1968, Connac, Leb. 566.

(¹²⁵) CE 21 Jun. 1991, Ridoin, 1991. RDP 1439. See also CE 5 Oct. 1966, Del Carlo, Leb. 522 (inade quate temporary traffic signals) and CE 18 Jan. 1980, Commune d’Echirolles, Leb. 35 (traffic lights gave insufficient time to manoeuvre safely).

(¹²⁶) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 656–7 .

(¹²⁷) CE 6 Jul. 1973, D 1973.740 note Moderne.

(¹²⁸) La Réunion is an overseas département of France.

(¹²⁹) O. Renard-Payen, ‘Responsabilité du fait des travaux et ouvrages public, Dommages subis par les usagers’, Jur.-Cl. Adm. Fasc 932 (1994) 3 .

(¹³⁰) CE Sect. 5 Jun. 1992, Epoux Cala, Leb. 224; CE 20 Apr. 1966, Rivière, Leb. 276; CE 8 Nov. 1968, Connac, Leb. 566 respectively.

(¹³¹) CE 10 Feb. 1961, Ville de Béziers, Leb. 113.

(¹³²) CE 7 Nov. 1952, Grau, JCP 1953.II.7448 note PL.

(¹³³) CE 15 Oct. 1986, Commune des Saintes, D 1987 Somm. 283 obs. Terneyre. See also CE 22 Oct. 1971, Ville de Fréjus, Leb 630 (claimants’ properties damaged when a dam burst); CE. 13 Jul. 1965, Leb. 442, Arbez-Gindre, D 1966.88 concl. Braibant (fire in school belonging to commune spread to neighbours’ properties). For more examples, see below, p. 138 concerning the liability of services publics industrieh et commerciauxfor harm caused by water, gas or electricity to non-customers.

(¹³⁴) CE Sect. 7 Nov. 1952, Leb. 503, JCP 1953.II.7448 note PL.

(¹³⁵) Above, p. 122.

(¹³⁶) TC 4 Feb. 1974, DS 1975.214 note Despax.

(¹³⁷) CE 4 Mar. 1955, Ville d’Orléans Leb. 140 and see Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 673 et seq. There is an exception where a public body concedes by contrat de concession a travail public to a private person, as here anyone harmed by the work can sue either the works contractors or the ‘concessionary’ who (if solvent) is substituted to the public body itself: CE 10 Feb. 1961, Ville de Béziers, Leb. 113.

(¹³⁸) CE 13 Nov. 1987, Dame Cabrera, DA 1987 no. 679.

(¹³⁹) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 674–5 .

(¹⁴⁰) CE 27 Nov. 1987, Soc. provençale d′équipement, Leb. 383.

(¹⁴¹) De Laubadère and Gaudemet, Droit administratif, Tome 2, 456 . On the complex issues which arise concerning which public body bears this responsibility, see O. Renard-Payen, ‘Responsabilité du fait des travaux et ouvrages publics, Mise en Œuvre de la responsabilité’, Jur.-Cl. Adm. Fasc. 930 (1994), 3 et seq.

(¹⁴²) Above, pp. 126, 128.

(¹⁴³) A broader term for the latter can be recours en garantie and this enables actions récursoires to be used to describe ‘independent claims’ as distinct from subrogated claims (actions subrogatoires).

(¹⁴⁴) Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 679 et seq.

(¹⁴⁵) CE 4 Mar. 1955, Ville d’Orléans, Leb. 140; Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 697 et seq. A public authority cannot claim an indemnity by way of subrogation to the rights of a works contractor where the latter acts on behalf of another public body: CE 27 Nov. 1987, Soc. provengale d′equipement, Leb. 383.

(¹⁴⁶) CE 5 Feb. 1988, Epoux Le Baot, Leb. 51.

(¹⁴⁷) CE 9 Dec. 1964, GDF c. Flecq, Leb. 632.

(¹⁴⁸) CE 5 Oct. 1966, Del Carlo, Leb. 522.

(¹⁴⁹) CE 27 Nov. 1987, Soc. provengale d′equipement, Leb. 383.

(¹⁵⁰) CE 6 Jan. 1971, Soc. Enterprise Cracco, Leb. 1126, 1232. There is an exception in the case of a works contractor of one travail public suing a public body responsible for a distinct ouvrage public, on which see CE 7 Nov. 1952, Grau, JCP 1953.II.7448, above, p. 128.

(¹⁵¹) CE 27 Nov. 1987, Soc. provengale d′equipement, cit. and see the discussion in Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 680–1 .

(¹⁵²) TC 20 Jan. 1986, Soc. Bouillet Ingénierie, D. adm. 1986 no. 159.

(¹⁵³) CE 24 Nov. 1997, Soc. de Castro c. Bourcy et Sole, Leb. 540 (claim by works contractor against architect) and see Chapus, Droit administratif général, Tome 2, 601–02 .

(¹⁵⁴) Above, pp. 123–4.