5. Compensation for Accidents at Work

Both obligations de sécurité and liability for the ‘deeds of things’ were invented by French jurists so as to allow employees injured at work to recover compensation without the need to prove fault.¹⁹⁰ It is ironic, therefore, that despite their later success neither still govern this area, as legislation has gradually replaced employer’s liability with a special regime of social insurance to which the employer contributes.¹⁹¹

Under the present scheme, which has its origins in 1946,¹⁹² liability for accidents at work rests on a public social fund, the Caisse de sécurité sociale, and employers enjoy an all but complete immunity, bearing liability only in the case of intentional or inexcusable fault¹⁹³ or an intentional fault on the part of an employee.¹⁹⁴ An employee’s intentional fault will exclude recovery under the scheme and his ‘inexcusable fault’ may reduce it.¹⁹⁵

(p.62) Compensation by the Caisse is partial, being fixed according to a fixed scale (forfaitaire): in particular it does not cover non-pecuniary losses.¹⁹⁶ The ambit of the scheme is a wide one, applying both to ‘accidents’ and to certain illnesses caused by the conditions of work.¹⁹⁷ ‘Accidents at work’ covers those which occur during working hours at the workplace and those which occur during a task outside the workplace, for example, a car accident while a company representative on his rounds.¹⁹⁸ The scheme also applies to injuries to employees while on their way to and from work (accidents de trajet),¹⁹⁹ including, of course, those resulting from motor vehicle accidents. This means that an employee injured in a motor vehicle accident in the course of employment can recover some compensation from the Caisse, but he will not be able to recover damages for any uncompensated losses against his own employer as gardien of the vehicle, thereby losing the benefit of the very strict regime of liability for motor vehicle accidents put in place in 1985 (though exceptionally and rather oddly, an employee injured on the way to or from work may do so).²⁰⁰

However, this regime of compensation does not rule out liability arising by application of the general law of civil liability in someone other than the employer in respect of injuries occurring at work or while on the way to work.²⁰¹ Two examples of such a ‘third party’ may be found in the case of the gardien (other than the employer himself) of a motor vehicle which is implicated in the accident injuring the employee and in the case of the manufacturer of machinery which has injured the employee. Where such a defendant can be made out, both the injured employee himself (to recover the difference between their social security payments and damages recoverable under the general law²⁰²) and the Caisse de sécurité sociale (to recover damages to cover the cost of any payments it has made) may claim.²⁰³ Where a ‘third-party’ is liable in this way, he may not claim contribution from the employer unless the latter committed an ‘intentional fault’:²⁰⁴ here, therefore, an employer’s residual liability differs as between a claim by the employee himself and a third party claiming contribution.

Notes:

(¹) Bell, Boyron and Whittaker, 358–9 .

(²) Below, pp. 186–200.

(³) Below, pp. 539–41.

(⁴) Below, pp. 78–9, 482–4.

(⁵) Art. 543 N.c.pr.civ. An exception is made for small claims at present set at Ĩ3,800: Art. R 311–2 C. org. jud.

(⁶) Arts. 604–5 N.c.pr.civ. (from decisions of last resort).

(⁷) It does have the power to decide the case on the basis of facts ‘sovereignly found’: art. 627 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁸) Vincent and Guinchard, Procédure civile, 1064–5 .

(⁹) Striking examples may be found in French treatment of the interpretation of contracts and the measure and quantification of damages: Bell, Boyron and Whittaker, 332–3, 349–51 and 395–7 .

(¹⁰) Below, pp. 78–9.

(¹¹) Above, pp. 23–4.

(¹²) M. Planiol, ‘Etudes sur la responsabilité civile’ (1905) Rev. crit. 277, 287 .

(¹³) Malaurie, Aynès and Stoffel-Munck, Obligations, 28 ; Flour, Aubert and Savaux, Fait juridique, 94 . Cf. Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 326 et seq. who explain cases where no legal duty is broken or legal right violated as ones of ‘extra-contractual duties created by la jurisprudence’.

(¹⁴) Flour, Aubert and Savaux, Fait juridique, 95 ; Tourneau and Le Cadiet, Droit de la responsabilité, 1047 .

(¹⁵) An important supporter of this position was P. Esmein: see ‘Le fondement de la responsabilité contractuelle rapproché de la responsabilité délictuelle’ 1933 RTDCiv. 627 and his edition of Aubry et Rau, Droit civil, Vol. VI (Lib. Techniques Juris-Classeurs, Paris, 6th. edn, 1951), 396 where la faute délictuelle is defined as ‘un acte donnant lieu à reproche’. A very different definition appears in the 7th edition of 1975 (by A. Ponsard and N. Dejean de la Batie, Vol. VI, 520) where la faute is said not to involve a moral assessment but rather to consist of ‘faits défectueux générateurs d’un trouble social auquel le droit se doit se remédier’.

(¹⁶) Art. 489–2 C. civ. enacted by the loi no. 68–5 of 3 Jan. 1968, which declares that ‘a person who has caused harm to another while under the influence of a mental problem is on that ground not the less obliged to make compensation of the harm’.

(¹⁷) Civ. (2) 8 Jul. 1954, JCP 1954.IV.122 (profession); Paris 25 Jan. 1956, D 1956.184.

(¹⁸) Ass. plén. 9 May 1984, JCP 1984.II.20256 note Jourdain, D 1984.525 note Chabas.

(¹⁹) Flour, Aubert and Savaux, Fait juridique, 107 . Malaurie, Aynès and Stoffel-Munck, Obligations, 30–1 refer to ‘degrees of foreseeability’, but in the context of the different types of faute.

(²⁰) See M. Villey, ‘Esquisse historique sur le mot responsable’ in Archives de philosophie du droit, Tome 22, La responsabilité (Paris, 1977), 45 at 55–6 (attributing the traditional position in responsibility for fault to a starting point in the morality of Aquinas, the Spanish scholastics and the ‘professors of morality’ of the seventeenth century supplemented by an influence of Kant). Esmein, argued for its link to sin: op. cit. n. 15, 1933 RTDCiv. 627, 631–2. Moreover, most French jurists continue to justify la responsabilité contractuelle on the basis of une faute contractuelle, where the fault consists simply in the failure to perform the contractual obligation as the debtor ought, a characterisation of the basis of contractual liability which operates at a higher level of generality than the distinction between obligations de résultatand obligations de moyens (where une faute in the sense of manque de diligence is necessary for liability to arise): Larroumet, Contrat, 594 et seq.

(²¹) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 318 .

(²²) Malaurie, Aynès, and Stoffel-Munck, Obligations, 376 ; e.g. Com. 13 Mar. 1979, Bull. civ. IV no. 100. Another example may be found in the law governing civil liability for concurrence déloyale as here competitive behaviour will not be held ‘at fault’ unless it is unfair (déloyal): Starck, Roland, and Boyer, Responsabilité délictuelle, 114 , who refer to the fact that ‘la concurrence doit être déloyale, la grève illicite, la critique malveillante, la séduction dolosive, la rupture de fiançailles intempestives, etc’.

(²³) See below, p. 159.

(²⁴) Flour, Aubert, and Savaux, Fait juridique, 114 ; Civ. 28 Feb. 1910, S 1911.1.329 note Appert, DP 1913.1.43; Civ. (2) 7 Jun. 1962, D 1962.721 note Savatier; Civ. (2) 25 Nov. 1965, Bull. civ. II no. 935.

(²⁵) Civ. (2) 7 Mar. 1973, D 1973.IR.104, JCP 1973.IV.153.

(²⁶) Flour, Aubert and Savaux, Fait juridique, 95 . ‘Mieux vaut done convenir, de façon moins ambitieuse, que la notion de faute est inévitablement assez vague. Elle constitue ce que l’on appelle parfois un “standard”, c’est-à-dire une directive relativement générale pour l’application de laquelle le juge ne peut pas ne pas bénéficier d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation.’ According to G. Ripert, ‘ce mot[la faute], venu au droit de la morale, n’a pu acquérir la précision technique de certains termes juridiques’ and for this reason has not received any satisfactory definition: La règie morale dans les obligations civiles (LGDJ, Paris, 4th. edn., 1949) 199 .

(²⁷) Carbonnier, Obligations, 414 (emphasis added) .

(²⁸) E.g. Civ. (2) 29 Jun. 1972, Bull. civ. II no. 204.

(²⁹) E.g. Civ. 25 Nov. 1965, Bull. civ. II no. 935 (no fault in the owner and driver of a car in failing to check whether a competent garage replaced his vehicle’s wheel properly).

(³⁰) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 318 .

(³¹) Below, pp. 48–50.

(³²) Terré, Simler, Lequette, Obligations, 701 .

(³³) Bell, Boyron, Whittaker, 27–8 .

(³⁴) Cf below, pp. 201–2, 245.

(³⁵) Terré, Simler and Lequette, Obligations, 695 .

(³⁶) Ibid., 698 and see below, p. 373. Cf. Bénabent, Obligations, 364–5 who suggests tentatively that Civ. (1) 7 Oct. 1998, Bull. civ. I, no. 286 suggests that these offences form an exception, but this case is a contravention de grande voirie which is not strictly a criminal offence. This position has not been changed by the loi no. 2000–647 of 10 Jul. 2000, below, pp. 393–4, which has at least in part led to the abandonment of the ‘unity of criminal and civil faults’.

(³⁷) Cf. below, pp. 387–90, 393–4 on the effect of changes to the definition of délits.

(³⁸) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 327–8 . See similarly, Terré, Simler and Lequette, Obligations, 695 .

(³⁹) Carbonnier, Obligations, 418–19 .

(⁴⁰) Ibid., 419 .

(⁴¹) Art. 12 al. 1 N.c.pr.civ. (‘le juge tranche le litige conformément aux règies de droit qui lui sont applicables’).

(⁴²) Carbonnier, Introduction, 336 ; Cf. art. 9 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁴³) Ibid. , 346. see further G. Couchez, Procédure civile (Armand Colin, Paris, 12th edn., 2002), 189–91 .

(⁴⁴) Art. 13 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁴⁵) ‘Curia novit legem. (Le juge est censé connaître [le droit])’: Carbonnier, Introduction, 348 . see also Bell, French legal Cultures, 89–91 .

(⁴⁶) Claimants must support their allegations in this way: art. 56 2° N.c.pr. civ. See further Vincent and Guinchard, Procédure civile, 524 et seq. and esp. 537–8 discussing art. 12 N.c.pr.civ. to the effect that the courts must classify the parties’ claims (i) if the parties have not done so; (ii) where the parties have done so but wrongly; and (iii) where a court has exercised its discretion to pick up and rely in its decision on facts from the material before it which have not been specifically relied on by the parties in their submissions (so called faits adventices). On the other hand, where the parties have not relied on particular facts in their sub missions and the court has not picked them up from the faits adventices, then the court may but need not classify the facts in question, for these are facts or legal transactions which the court may legitimately ignore.

(⁴⁷) Cross and Tapper on Evidence (Butterworths, 9th. edn., 1999) 108 and see below, pp. 208–9.

(⁴⁸) Flour, Aubert and Savaux, Fait juridique, 113 . The formula that ‘la preuve…peut être faite par tous moyens’, often called, ‘libre preuve’ has the significance that there are no restrictions as to the type of evidence or type of reasoning from which a decision may be made. See below, p. 78.

(⁴⁹) E.g. liability of parents for their children before 1997, above, p. 25.

(⁵⁰) Bénabent, Obligations, 350 .

(⁵¹) Arts. 10, 11, 143, 144 N.c.pr.civ; Ghestin, Goubeaux and Fabre-Magnan, Introduction, 561–2 ; Vincent and Guinchard, Procédure civile, 540–1 .

(⁵²) Art. 3 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁵³) Art. 10 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁵⁴) Starck, Responsabilité délictuelle, 151–2 .

(⁵⁵) Cf. below, p. 385, concerning criminal offences.

(⁵⁶) Civ. (1) 6 Jan. 1971, Bull. civ. I, no. 5.

(⁵⁷) Bell, Boyron and Whittaker, 84–5 .

(⁵⁸) J. Beardsley, ‘Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure’ (1986) 34 Am. J. Comp.L. 459 .

(⁵⁹) Bell, Boyron and Whittaker, 98–100 . Evidence by deposition is called attestation, by oral evidence enquête; where the parties themselves give evidence, the process is termed comparution.

(⁶⁰) Ibid., 93–6 .

(⁶¹) Arts. 138–142 N.c.pr.civ. Art. 132 N.c.pr.civ. also provides that the parties must provide the other side with documents but this applies only to documents which they intend to rely on (‘communication des pièces’): Bell, Boyron and Whittaker, 94–6 .

(⁶²) Beardsley, op. cit. n. 58, 474–5 .

(⁶³) Below, pp. 211–12.

(⁶⁴) R. Genin-Méric, ‘Mesures d’instruction exécutés par un technicien. Les trois modalités de l’intervention du technicien’, Jur.-Cl. Proc. Civ., Fasc. 662 (1995), 7–8 ; Req. 15 Jun. 1880, DP 1881.1.62. The decision to appoint an expert can be subject to appeal under art. 272 N.c.pr.civ. There are exceptions to this power to reject requests for an expertise, notably in the case of the action aestimatoire: art. 1644 C. civ.

(⁶⁵) Arts. 232 and 265 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁶⁶) Arts. 234 and 341 N.c.pr.civ. The grounds of challenge are the same as those of judges themselves.

(⁶⁷) Soc. 29 Nov. 1984, JCP 1985.IV.50.

(⁶⁸) Art. 282 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁶⁹) Art. 276 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁷⁰) Genin-Méric, op. cit. n. 64 Jur.-Cl. .Proc. Civ. Fasc. 662, 16.

(⁷¹) Beardsley, op. cit. n. 58, 483.

(⁷²) Art. 246 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁷³) R. Genin-Méric, ‘Mesures d’instruction exécutées par un technicien, Dispositions communes, L’intervention d’un technicien dans l’instruction des litiges’, Jur.-Cl. Proc. Civ. (1988), Fasc. 660, 12 (this passage does not appear in the more recent edition of this work).

(⁷⁴) Beardsley, op. cit. n. 58, 484 .

(⁷⁵) It is not a ground for nullity that an expert has not heard the evidence of all those whom the parties request should be heard, as it is for him to choose his sources of information, Genin-Méric, op. cit. n. 64, Jur.-Cl. .Proc. Civ. Fasc. 662, 20 .

(⁷⁶) Genin-Méric, op. cit. n. 64, Jur.-Cl.Proc. Civ, Fasc. 662, 19–21 .

(⁷⁷) This fundamental misinterpretation is known as dénaturation and see Civ. (3) 4 Jan. 1979, JCP 1979.IV.79.

(⁷⁸) An unpaid expert can recover his costs against the State only if he shows a faute de service in the court: Civ. (1) 21 Dec. 1987, D 1988.578 note Moussa.

(⁷⁹) Art. 284 al. 1 N.c.pr.civ. This may be increased after the report is submitted: art. 280 al. 2 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁸⁰) Art. 269 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁸¹) Soc. 2 Apr. 1981, GP 1981.2 Pan. Jur. 315.

(⁸²) Art. 271 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁸³) Art. 695 al. 4. N.c.pr.civ.

(⁸⁴) Art. 696 N.c.pr.civ.

(⁸⁵) Below, pp. 385–6.

(⁸⁶) Below, pp. 78, 484.

(⁸⁷) Below, pp. 96–8.

(⁸⁸) Above, pp. 27–9.

(⁸⁹) Above, pp. 28–9.

(⁹⁰) Below, pp. 100–1, 108–11.

(⁹¹) Below, pp. 51–9.

(⁹²) See below, pp. 374–5.

(⁹³) Below, pp. 384–6.

(⁹⁴) A buyer or sub-buyer is barred from such a claim in delict by the rule of non-cumul: below, pp. 96–7.

(⁹⁵) G. Viney, ‘L’indemnisation des atteintes à la sécurité des consommateurs en droit français,’ in Ghestin, Sécurité des consommateurs, 71 at 80 ; Ghestin, Conformity 261, Civ (3) 5 Dec. 1972, D 1973.401 note J. Mazeaud .

(⁹⁶) Req. 7 Oct. 1940, D.H.1940.180 (a case of faute lourde in the design of the vehicle’s brakes). A Fonds de garantie now covers the victims of personal injuries caused by unidentified or uninsured drivers: art. L. 421–1 C. assur.

(⁹⁷) Cf. Civ. (1) 22 Jun. 1971, JCP 1971.II.16881 (claimant injured by an exploding beer bottle succeeded against retailer for fault) and see below, p. 54.

(⁹⁸) Viney, op. cit. n. 95 , Ghestin, Sécurité des consommateurs, at 80 , citing Civ. 17 Oct. 1984, JCP 1984.IV.355. On obligations d’information, see below, pp. 64–9.

(⁹⁹) Below, pp. 100–4, 111–12.

(¹⁰⁰) E.g. Civ. (2) 19 Mar. 1980, D 1980. IR. 414 note Larroumet.

(¹⁰¹) So, e.g., televisual images are not themselves ‘things’ but may be produced by physical things: le Tourneau, note, Paris 27 Feb. 1991, JCP 1992.II.21809. The particular cases dealt with by arts. 1385 and 1386 C. civ. have remained outside the general liability of art. 1384 al. 1.

(¹⁰²) Ch. Réun. 13 Feb.1930, rapp. Le Marc’hadour, concl. Matter, S 1930.1.121 note Esmein, DP 1930.1.57 note Ripert.

(¹⁰³) See the notes of Ripert and Esmein, ibid.

(¹⁰⁴) As will be seen, this simple definition of force majeure was refined in response to its use in the context of art. 1384 al. 1 C. civ: below, pp. 57–8.

(¹⁰⁵) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 644 et seq.

(¹⁰⁶) See the discussion in Starck, Roland and Boyer, Responsabilité délictuelle, 31–6 .

(¹⁰⁷) R. Saleilles’s note to Civ. 16 Jun. 1896, D 1897.1.433. Cf. Req. 19 Jan. 1914, D 1914.1.303 (owner of a café liable as gardien of soda-syphon).

(¹⁰⁸) Ch. Réun. 2 Dec. 1941, S 1941.1.217 rapp. Lagarde note Mazeaud, DC 1942 25 note Ripert, S 1943.51. This left the possibility of liability in the owner for proven fault under art. 1383 C. civ, but the courts have denied the directness of the causal link between any fault in the owner and the thief’s victim’s injuries: Civ. 6 Jan. 1943, D 1945.117 note Tunc.

(¹⁰⁹) Malaurie, Aynès and Stoffel-Munck, Obligations, 99–100 ; Terré, Simler and Lequette, Obligations, 741–2 ; Viney and Jourdain, Conditions 651–2 (who note that the presumption applies only in cases where the owner is identified).

(¹¹⁰) Civ. (2) 18 Jun. 1975, Dame Luchet, D 1975.IR.211 and see also Starck, Roland and Boyer, Responsabilité délictuelle, 256 et seq.

(¹¹¹) Civ. (2) 14 Jan. 1999, JCP 1999.IV.1418.

(¹¹²) Civ. (2) 28 Feb. 1996, JCP 1996.IV.940.

(¹¹³) See above, p. 25.

(¹¹⁴) Civ. 30 Dec. 1936, arrêt Garibaldi, DP 1937.1.5 rapp. Josserand note Savatier, S 1937.1.137 note Mazeaud; Civ. (3) 20 Oct. 1971, D 1972.414 note Lapoyade Deschamps. The position is less clear where the employee acts outside the scope of his employment or the ‘thing’ in question does not belong to his employer: Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 654 . Both minors (Ass. plén. 9 May 1984, Gabillet, D 1984.525 note Chabas) and those with reduced mental capacity (art. 489–2 C.civ.) may be gardiens.

(¹¹⁵) Above, p. 25.

(¹¹⁶) Below, p. 69 et seq.

(¹¹⁷) Civ.(1) 12 Nov. 1975, JCP 1976.II.18479 note Viney; Terré, Simler, Lequette, Obligations, 746–8 ; Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 663–70 . This idea is to be distinguished from situations in which two or more persons are held to be co-gardiens: e.g. members of a hunting party as regards one hunter’s gun: Civ. (2) 15 Dec. 1980, D 1981.45 note Poisson-Drocourt.

(¹¹⁸) Civ. (1) 12 Nov. 1975, JCP 1976.II.18479 note Viney.

(¹¹⁹) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 665 . But while it has not been applied to pharmaceuticals (below, p. 147) it has been applied to trees: Civ. (2) 18 Jun. 1975, Bull. civ. II no. 190, RTDCiv. 1976.146 note Durry It has not been applied to motor vehicles: Versailles 27 Jan. 1983, JCP 1983.II.20094 note Dupichot.

(¹²⁰) P. Dupichot, note to Versailles 27 Jan.1983, JCP 1983.II.20094.

(¹²¹) F. Lawson and B. Markesinis, Tortious Liability for Unintentional Harm in the Common Law and the Civil Law (CUP, 1982), Vol. 1, 106 . For a discussion of these theories, see H.L.A. Hart and T. Honoré, Causation in the Law (OUP, 2nd. edn., 1985) , Chaps. XVI–XVII. For a comparative discussion of their application to French and English law see P. Catala and J.A. Weir, ‘Delict and Torts: a Study in Parallel, Part IV, Causation,’ (1965) 39 Tul. L.R. 701 .

(¹²²) Carbonnier, Obligations, 395–6 .

(¹²³) The criminal courts take a different approach again: below, pp. 375–6, 388–91.

(¹²⁴) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 151 et seq.

(¹²⁵) Carbonnier, Obligations, 391, 397 .

(¹²⁶) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 167 .

(¹²⁷) Marty and Raynaud, Obligations, 680 .

(¹²⁸) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 215 .

(¹²⁹) E.g. Civ. (2) 6 Feb. 1980, Duplissy, JCP 1980.IV.157.

(¹³⁰) Civ. (2) 6 Feb. 1980, Laydacia, JCP 1980.IV.157.

(¹³¹) Carbonnier, Obligations, 391 .

(¹³²) Above, p. 26.

(¹³³) Saleilles, note to Civ. 16 Jun. 1896, D 1897.1.433.

(¹³⁴) H. Capitant, ‘La responsabilité du fait des choses inanimées d’après des Chambres réunies du 13 février 1930’ DH Chron. 1930.29 at 32.

(¹³⁵) Civ. 9 Jun. 1939, DH 1939.449.

(¹³⁶) Cf. Civ. 19 Feb. 1941 and Civ. 24 Mar. 1941, DC 1941.85 note Flour.

(¹³⁷) See J. Boré, note to Civ. (2) 29 May 1964 (2 cases), JCP 1965.II.14248, followed by Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 635–44 ; Terré, Simler and Lequette, Obligations, 753–5 .

(¹³⁸) Below, pp. 60–1.

(¹³⁹) For an example outside the context of road accidents see Paris 9 Feb.1968, JCP 1968.II.15653 note Prieur.

(¹⁴⁰) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 640 . E.g. Civ. (2) 8 Jul. 1971, D 1971.690; Civ. (2) 11 Jan. 1995, JCP 1995.I.3853 no. 7 note Viney. Cf. Malaurie, Aynès and Stoffel-Munck, Obligations, 96 arguing that the requirement of ‘abnormality’ has been abandoned by the courts, at least for moving things, pointing to Civ. (2) 2 Apr. 1997, Bull. civ. II no. 109.

(¹⁴¹) Not always: art. 1384 al. 1 has been applied to a landslide: Civ.(2) 15 Nov. 1984, Lantonnais Van Rhodes, D 1985.20 concl. Charbonnier.

(¹⁴²) Civ. (2) 19 Nov. 1964, JCP 1965.II.14022 note Rodière, D 1965.93 note Esmein. See also Civ. (2) 11 May 1966, D 1966.735 note Azard; Civ. (2) 7 Mar. 1979, D 1980.IR.35 note Larroumet.

(¹⁴³) Civ. (2) 19 Jul. 1972, D 1972 Somm. 212, JCP 1972.IV.234, RTDCiv. 1973. 352 obs. Durry; Civ. (2) 30 Nov. 1994, JCP 1995.IV.283; Civ. (2) 7 May 2002, Bull. civ. I no. 92 (staircase not ‘dangerous’). Typical older examples concerned stationary motor vehicles, but this context is no longer current after the loi of 5 July 1985, below, p. 60.

(¹⁴⁴) Terré, Simler and Lequette, Obligations, 702 .

(¹⁴⁵) Carbonnier, Obligations, 477 .

(¹⁴⁶) Below, p. 58.

(¹⁴⁷) A. Tunc, ‘Force majeure et absence de faute en matière délictuelle,’ RTDCiv. 1946.171, 194–5.

(¹⁴⁸) E.g. Civ. (2) 29 May 1996, JCP 1996.IV.1633.

(¹⁴⁹) French courts have accepted that a claimant’s acceptance of risks may affect recovery, but in practice this has been applied to participants in sporting competitions and has the effect of subjecting liability to a proof of very serious breach of the rules: Malaurie, Aynès and Stoffel-Munck, Obligations, 61–3 .

(¹⁵⁰) Art. 1148 C. civ. The Code itself refers to cas fortuit and cause étrangère, but it is generally accepted that there is no substantial difference between these terms and force majeure. More recently writers and courts have reduced the significance of the requirement of ‘unforeseeability’, considering it relevant only where it allows a gardien or contractual debtor to avoid the event allegedly constituting force majeure: Terré, Simler, Lequette, Obligations, 560 ; Com. 1 Oct. 1997, Bull. civ. IV no. 240.

(¹⁵¹) Civ. 16 Jun. 1896, S 1897.1.17 note Esmein, D 1897.1.433 note Saleilles.

(¹⁵²) Req. 22 Jan. 1945, S 1945.1.57. This was later applied to obligations contractuelles de résultat: Poitiers 16 Dec. 1970, GP 1971.1.264, below, p. 100.

(¹⁵³) Civ. (2) 6 Mar. 1959, GP 1959.2.12.

(¹⁵⁴) E.g. Civ. (2) 25 Jan. 1956, JCP 1956.II.9153 and see further Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 242–4 ; Malaurie, Aynès and Stoffel-Munck, Obligations, 97 .

(¹⁵⁵) Civ. (2) 10 Apr. 1964, D 1965.169 note Tunc.

(¹⁵⁶) Civ. (2) 28 Oct. 1965, D 1966.137 note Tunc.

(¹⁵⁷) Civ. 30 Nov. 1960, S 1961.142.

(¹⁵⁸) Civ. 2 Jul. 1969, JCP 1971.II.16582.

(¹⁵⁹) Civ. (2) 17 Dec. 1963, D 1964.569 note Tunc.

(¹⁶⁰) F. Leduc, ‘L’état actuel du principe général de responsabilité délictuelle du fait des choses’ in F. Leduc et al., La responsabilité du fait des choses, réflexions autour d’un centenaire (Economica, Paris, 1997) 54–5 .

(¹⁶¹) Ass. plén. 9 May 1984, Derguini, D 1984. 525 concl. Cabannes, note Chabas.

(¹⁶²) Notably, by A. Tunc, ‘Les causes d’exonération de la responsabilité de plein droit de l’article 1384 alinéa 1 er du Code civil’ D 1975 Chron. 83.

(¹⁶³) Carbonnier, Obligations, 476 (citations omitted). See also A. Tunc, ‘“It is wise not to take the Civil Codes too seriously.” Traffic accident compensation in France’ in P. Wallington and R.M. Merkin, (eds.) Essays in Memory of Professor F.H. Lawson (London, 1986) 71 at 78 .

(¹⁶⁴) Tunc, ibid. at 79 .

(¹⁶⁵) Civ. (2) 21 Jul. 1982, D 1982.449 concl. Charbonnier, note Larroumet.

(¹⁶⁶) Civ. (2) 15 Nov. 1984, D 1985.20 concl. Charbonnier (3 cases).

(¹⁶⁷) No. 85–677 and below, p. 60.

(¹⁶⁸) Civ. (2) 6 Apr. 1987, Chauvet, Bardèche, Belzedhoune, GP 1987.1.440; Civ. (2) 6 Apr. 1987, Waeterinckx, JCP 1987.II.20828 note Chabas, D 1988.32 note Mouly.

(¹⁶⁹) Malaurie, Aynès and Stoffel-Munck, Obligations, 96 .

(¹⁷⁰) Below, p. 511.

(¹⁷¹) Loi of 31 Dec. 1957.

(¹⁷²) Loi no. 85–677 arts. 1–6 (‘loi of 5 Jul. 1985’); R. Redmond-Cooper, ‘The Relevance of Fault in Determining Liability for Road Accidents: The French Experience’, (1989) 38 ICLQ 502 .

(¹⁷³) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 1100–04 ; Civ. (2) 28 Jan. and 4 Feb. 1987, D 1987.187 note Groutel. The new regime does draw on earlier jurisprudence, notably as to the definition of gardien and for issues such as the assessment of damages.

(¹⁷⁴) F. Chabas, Le droit des accidents de la circulation (2nd. edn., Paris, 1988), 155 .

(¹⁷⁵) Loi of 5 Jul. 1985, art. 3 al. 1.

(¹⁷⁶) ‘Inexcusable fault’ has been defined as ‘a voluntary fault of an exceptional seriousness which exposes without any valid reason the injured party to a danger which he ought to have been aware of’: Civ. (2) 20 Jul. 1987 (11 cases) GP 1988.1.26 note Chabas.

(¹⁷⁷) Loi of 5 Jul. 1985, art. 3 al.& 2 3 al. 3.

(¹⁷⁸) Chabas, op. cit., n. 174, 176.

(¹⁷⁹) Loi of 5 Jul. 1985, art. 6.

(¹⁸⁰) Ibid., art. 4.

(¹⁸¹) Ibid., art. 5.

(¹⁸²) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 1121–8 .

(¹⁸³) H. Groutel, ‘L’implication du véhicule dans la loi du 5 juillet 1985’ D 1987 Chron. 1.

(¹⁸⁴) Chabas, op. cit. n. 174, 97; Flour, Aubert and Savaux, Fait juridique, 330–40 .

(¹⁸⁵) Civ. (2) 23 Mar. 1994, D 1994.IR.96.

(¹⁸⁶) Civ. (2) 5 Jan. 1994, Zemmour, JCP 1994.IV.79; Civ. (2) 15 Jan. 1997, JCP 1997.II. 22883 note Chabas.

(¹⁸⁷) Above, pp. 56–7.

(¹⁸⁸) Bénabent Obligations 417–19 .

(¹⁸⁹) Viney and Jourdain Conditions 1122 ; P. Jourdain ‘Implication et causalité dans la loi du 6 juillet 1985’ JCP 1994.I.3794.

(¹⁹⁰) Above pp. 26 28.

(¹⁹¹) For earlier legislation see loi of 9 Apr. 1898 and A. Tunc La responsabilité civile (Economica Paris 2nd ed. 1989) 27–8 .

(¹⁹²) Loi of 30 Oct. 1946, integrating the scheme into art. L 411–1 et seq. C. séc. soc; Terré, Simler and Lequette, Obligations, 872 . For a comparative discussion M. Voirin, ‘De la responsabilité civile à la sécurité sociale pour la réparation des dommages corporels: extension ou disparition de la branche accidents du travail?’ 1979 RIDC 541 .

(¹⁹³) This has been defined as a ‘fault of exceptional gravity, deriving from a deliberate act or omission, with an awareness of its dangerousness and the absence of any justification for it’: Ch. réun. 15 Jul. 1941, DC 1941.117 note Rouast and see art. L. 231–8 C. trav.

(¹⁹⁴) Art. L. 452–5 C. séc. soc. An employer may insure against this liability: art. L. 452–4 al. 3 C. séc. soc.

(¹⁹⁵) Art. 453–1 C. séc. soc.

(¹⁹⁶) Terré, Simler and Lequette, Obligations, 878–9 ; art. 431–1 C. séc. soc. et seq.

(¹⁹⁷) Only those maladies professionnelles which are on a list drawn up by regulation are included: art. R. 461–1 et seq. C.séc. soc.

(¹⁹⁸) Terré, Simler and Lequette, Obligations, 873–4 .

(¹⁹⁹) Art. L. 411–2 C. séc. soc.

(²⁰⁰) Loi of 6 Aug. 1963.

(²⁰¹) Art. 454–1 C. séc. soc.

(²⁰²) Ass. plén. 22 Dec. 1988, JCP 1989.II.21236, concl. Monnet, obs. Saint-Jours.

(²⁰³) Cf. above, p. 38.

(²⁰⁴) Art. 452–5 C. séc. soc.