6. Time Restrictions on Claiming

There are two important restrictions on the time within which any claim under the scheme of the Directive may be brought.³⁸³

First, article 10 provides for what in English law would be seen as a period of limitation of action and in French law as a period of prescription. It provides for a limitation period of three years beginning from ‘the day on which the plaintiff became aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of the damage, the defect and the identity of the producer’.³⁸⁴ As I have noted, article 10(2) provides that ‘the laws of Member States regulating suspension or interruption of the limitation period shall not be affected by this Directive’.³⁸⁵

There are two prominent features of this provision by comparison with the general provisions of French and English law. First, the starting point from which time runs is ‘subjective’ in the sense that it starts when the claimant actually knew or ought to have known of all the elements which make claiming a practical possibility, rather than ‘objective,’ such as the time when the damage occurred or the time when any contract is breached. This is sensible as it relates a restriction on the timing of bringing proceedings to when they can reasonably be expected to be brought. In this respect, it has a good deal in common with the general French rule of prescription period for claims based on extra-contractual liability, which runs from the ‘manifestation or aggravation’ of the harm,³⁸⁶ given that the ‘manifestation of the harm’ is interpreted by the courts following the traditional maxim contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio and therefore so as not to start before the claimant ought to have known of the harm.³⁸⁷ It is also similar to the traditional approach of French courts to the starting point for the bref délai of the garantie légale in sale, which was put at the effective (p.528) discovery of the defect.³⁸⁸ It is to be contrasted, though, with the general English rule for the starting point for the running of time for claims in tort which runs from the accrual of the cause of action, which is an ‘objective’ criterion.³⁸⁹ However, this general rule does not apply to claims for personal injuries or death where the starting point is either the date of accrual of the cause of action or the date of knowledge of the person injured if this is later,³⁹⁰ the date of knowledge for this purpose being explained as when the claimant knew various elements relating to the practicability of bringing an action and therefore including ‘constructive knowledge’.³⁹¹ This was the basis of implementation of article 10 in English law.³⁹² Secondly, though, under the Directive the period during which a claimant must bring his action is relatively short—three years. In French law, the general rule is ten years for extra-contractual claims and for contractual claims where one of the parties is a commerçant,³⁹³ though of course the bref délai in sale was much shorter.³⁹⁴ In English law, the period for claims in tort or for breach of contract is in principle six years from the cause of action,³⁹⁵ but in the case of personal injuries or death this is shortened to three years coupled with a discretion in courts to allow an action to proceed notwithstanding the expiry of the limitation period if it considers that it is just and equitable to do so, taking into account six factors.³⁹⁶ This discretion has been retained as regards the limitation period for claims under Part I of the 1987 Act.³⁹⁷ Although this means that a more generous period is allowed than is provided for by article 10(1) of the Directive, this discretion could be seen as a very rough English equivalent to the sorts of situation which in other laws of the Member States are dealt with by the suspension or interruption of prescription periods.³⁹⁸

Overall, therefore, the special prescription and limitation periods which the French and the UK legislator introduced in their implementing laws and which followed article 10 of the Directive have some features that are less generous than their equivalents under the general law of extra-contractual liability/torts.³⁹⁹

Secondly, however, the 1985 Directive requires the creation of a special ten-year foreclosure period. Article 11 states that its implementing legislation shall require that ‘the rights conferred upon the injured person…shall be extinguished upon the expiry of 10 years from the date on which the producer put into circulation the actual (p.529) product which caused the damage, unless the injured person has in the meantime instituted proceedings against the producer’. This period cannot be the subject either of suspension or interruption (as can article 10’s three-year prescription period) nor can it be disapplied in a courts discretion (as in the English law of limitation of actions for personal injuries or death).⁴⁰⁰ While the period itself has been faithfully implemented in both the English and the French implementing legislation,⁴⁰¹ in French law its starting point has been changed by the loi of 1998’s definition of ‘putting into circulation’ in terms of ‘voluntary relinquishment by the producer’⁴⁰² and its provision that ‘a product may be the subject of only one single putting into circulation’.⁴⁰³ Taken together, the French implementation means in effect that the ten-year foreclosure period starts when the manufacturer puts the actual product which causes the harm into circulation (the first ‘putting into circulation’), rather than starting from the time of its ‘putting into circulation’ by each distinct category of defendant (‘own-brander’, importer or supplier) who is in fact sued. This makes sense of the purpose of article 11, which was to create a legislative full-stop to liability in respect of any particular product after ten years, even though it requires the reference in article 11 to ‘producer’ to be limited to ‘manufacturers’ and, apparently, ‘own-branders’ within article 3(1) rather than the wider usage of ‘producer’ in other parts of the Directive to refer to any person liable under the Directive.⁴⁰⁴ By contrast, the effect of the complicated implementation of article 11 in English law is that as regards manufacturers, ‘own-branders’ and EC importers, the period starts from the date of supply of the product by the defendant sued, but that as regards mere ‘suppliers’ it starts when the product was last supplied by a manufacturer, ‘own-brander’ or EC importer.⁴⁰⁵ While the period of ten years seems quite a long time, it has been criticised as too restrictive by the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, particularly in the context of health risks from products such as BSE.⁴⁰⁶

Notes:

(¹) Below, Chap. 18.

(²) Above, pp. 455–7, 461–2.

(³) [2001] 3 All ER 289, below, pp. 486–92, 499–502.

(⁴) Case C-300/95 of 29 May 1997 [1997] ECR I-2649, below, pp. 496–9.

(⁵) Case C-203/99 of 10 May 2001 [2001] ECR 1–3569 (‘Case C-203/99, Veedfald’), below, pp. 503–8.

(⁶) 1985 Directive, recital 3.

(⁷) 1985 Directive, arts. 2, 15(1)(a).

(⁸) The French version of recital 3 uses the term ‘biens mobiliers’. On the Amending Directive, above, p. 446.

(⁹) 1999 Directive, art. 1, below, p. 589; General Product Safety Directive, art. 2(a).

(¹⁰) 1985 Directive, recital 4 refers explicitly to liability extending to suppliers of ‘raw material’. Cf. C-203/99, Veedfald, where A.-G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer at para. 13 of his opinion considered that the Directive was restricted to ‘movables which have been manufactured industrially’ and not therefore to the case referred to the court in which a professional had prepared a product specially for a medical transplant operation. While the Court did not advert specifically to this point (which had not been referred to it) its decision held the Directive applicable to the case before it: Case C-203/99 paras. 11–18 and see below, p. 504.

(¹¹) N. Molfessis, ‘Les produits en cause’ Petites affiches, La Loi No. 155 (28 Dec. 1998), 20 at 23–4 who gives as an example shares in a company (though it is difficult to see how their ‘defects’ would cause physical harm).

(¹²) Whittaker (1989) ; Stapleton, Product Liability, 323–36 .

(¹³) Whittaker (1989), 135–7 .

(¹⁴) Cf. ibid., 133–5 . F. X. Testu and J.-H. Moitry ‘La responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux, Commentaire de la loi 98–389 du 19 mai 1998’ Dalloz Affaires (16 Jul. 1998) Supplément to No. 125 (‘Testu and Moitry’), 5 take a similarly nuanced view.

(¹⁵) 1987 Act, s. 1(2) ‘product’; s. 45(1) ‘goods’ (emphasis added).

(¹⁶) H.C. Taschner, ‘La future responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux dans la Communauté européenne’ Rev. marché commun (1986) 257 , 259.

(¹⁷) Whittaker (1989), 129 ; Markovits, 164; Molfessis, op. cit. n. 11, 22–3 .

(¹⁸) Above, p. 438.

(¹⁹) For examples, see above, pp. 137–8.

(²⁰) Below, p. 481.

(²¹) HL Deb. Vol. 483 cols. 868–9 (Lord Lucas).

(²²) Here, there may be difficulties of contributory negligence on the part of a person who relied on a public supply for such a purpose.

(²³) Cf below, pp. 523–7 on the definition of supplier.

(²⁴) Cf. below, pp. 481, 488, 490.

(²⁵) Above, pp. 162–3.

(²⁶) Above, pp. 52–9, 121–9.

(²⁷) Cf. Veedfald v Århus Amtskommune, below, pp. 503–8.

(²⁸) Art. 2.

(²⁹) Markovits, 169 .

(³⁰) 1985 Directive, art. 9(b). If the argument concerning the liability of the suppliers of products such as gas outlined above, p. 480, were accepted, where the gas pipe belonged to the gas supplier a person injured could sue the gas supplier in respect of the ‘defective gas supply’ as well as the manufacturer of the pipe in respect of the defective pipe.

(³¹) In France, the implications had been pointed out very clearly by P. Malinvaud, ‘L’application de la directive communautaire sur la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux et le droit de la construction ou le casse-tête communautaire’ D 1988 Chron. 85 (‘Malinvaud (1988)’); P. Malinvaud, ‘La loi du 19 mai 1998 relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux et le droit de la construction D 1999 Chron. 85 (‘Malinvaud (1999)’).

(³²) Art. 1386–6 al. 3 C. civ. and see above, pp. 104–8 for an outline of the scheme.

(³³) Malinvaud (1999), 86 .

(³⁴) Larroumet, D 1998 Chron. 311, 314 and above, pp. 106–7.

(³⁵) This failure seems little noticed in la doctrine, but see Huet, principaux contrats spéciaux, 389 , note 1016.

(³⁶) Cf. Malinvaud (1999), 86 .

(³⁷) Above, p. 460 as to the lawfulness of this extension.

(³⁸) 1987 Act, s. 46(3).

(³⁹) Ibid., s. 46(4).

(⁴⁰) Cf. above, p. 470.

(⁴¹) Testu and Moitry, 6. Cf. above, p. 452.

(⁴²) This is true of the French (‘notamment’) and the German versions (‘insbesondere’) of the Directive.

(⁴³) Above, pp. 69–79 and below, pp. 580–1.

(⁴⁴) 1985 Directive, recital 6.

(⁴⁵) Ghestin (1986) 136–7 : Markovits, 183 et seq. L. Leveneur, ‘Le défaut’ in Petites affiches, No. 155 (28 Dec. 1998) 28 , 36 Cf. 1985 Directive, recital 6.

(⁴⁶) Markovits, 203 , citing Taschner, op. cit. n. 16, 257 ; C. Jamin, RTDCiv. 1998.763 , 765 (who criticises the test severely).

(⁴⁷) Art. R. 5133 C. santé pub. implementing EC Dir. 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 Nov. 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, art. 10(1)(a)(ii).

(⁴⁸) Testu and Moitry, 6 ; Leveneur, op. cit. n. 45, 36 who concludes that ‘it would be more in keeping with reality to call it “liability for the deeds of products not offering sufficient safety”’ (emphasis added).

(⁴⁹) This was proposed by Fauchon, Rapport, 34 and could be thought to be found in TGI Aix-en-Provence 2 Oct. 2001, D 2001.IR.3092 (explosion of chimney insert allowed court to find lack of safety in this product even though the cause of the accident was not established).

(⁵⁰) Above, p. 57.

(⁵¹) Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz, 330 ; Carbonnier, Obligations, 483 .

(⁵²) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 770–1 .

(⁵³) 1985 Directive, art. 7: ‘The producer shall not be liable if he proves…’.

(⁵⁴) 1985 Directive, art. 6(1)(c).

(⁵⁵) Above, pp. 40–6.

(⁵⁶) Above, p. 51.

(⁵⁷) 1985 Directive, art. 7(d); art. 1386–10 C. civ.

(⁵⁸) Viney and Jourdain Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 793 . Similarly, Testu and Moitry, 7, 10 .

(⁵⁹) Above, pp. 203–4.

(⁶⁰) Ibid.

(⁶¹) Above, p. 160.

(⁶²) Markovits, 201, 212 ; Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 770 .

(⁶³) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 769 noting the travaux préparatoires of the European Convention, above, p. 434.

(⁶⁴) Carbonnier, Obligations, 483 .

(⁶⁵) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 793 .

(⁶⁶) Testu and Moitry, 7 .

(⁶⁷) Above, p. 67.

(⁶⁸) Fauchon, Rapport, 19–20 ; Carbonnier, Obligations, 483 .

(⁶⁹) Larroumet, D 1998 Chron. 311, 315 referring to the affaire du sang contaminé and the need not to expose French industry to greater risks than their competitors in Europe.

(⁷⁰) J. Ghestin, ‘La directive communautaire et son introduction en droit français’ in Ghestin, Sécurité des consommateurs, 111, 118; Markovits, 200 ; Larroumet, D 1998 Chron. 311, 315 .

(⁷¹) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 770 ; Testu and Moitry, 7 .

(⁷²) Above, pp. 78–9.

(⁷³) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 770 .

(⁷⁴) C. Jamin, RTDCiv. 1998.763, 765 . Similarly, Taylor (writing from the point of view of a comparison with English legal commentators’ interpretation of ‘defect’ in terms of a cost/benefit analysis) observes that the absence of any reference to this sort of way of thinking in the Directive or the loi of 1998 themselves ‘will permit French courts to ignore these considerations when they think that the circumstances require the victim to be compensated’: Harmonisation communautaire, 59 .

(⁷⁵) Ibid. and see above, pp. 48, 78.

(⁷⁶) For the English position, above, p. 243.

(⁷⁷) Whittaker, (1985) 242–6 ; J. Stapleton, ‘Products Liability Reform—Real or Illusory?’ (1986) 6 OJLS 392 ;Stapleton, Product Liability, Chap. 10 esp. at 236, 271–2 ; A. Stoppa, ‘The concept of defectiveness in the Consumer Protection Act 1987: a critical analysis’ (1992) 12 LS 210 (who distinguishes the position as to manufacturing defects where liability is strict);G. Howells, Comparative Product Liability (Dartmouth, 1993), 36, 38 ; J. Stapleton, ‘Products Liability in the United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform’ (1999) 34 Texas International Law Journal 45 ;G. Howells, Law of Product Liability (Butterworths, 2000) 228 et seq.

(⁷⁸) E.g. C. Hodges, Product Liability: European Law and Practice (1993) para. 3.019; E. Deards and C. Twigg-Flesner, ‘The Consumer Protection Act: Proof at last that it it is protecting consumers?’ (2001) 10 Nottingham LJ 1 .

(⁷⁹) Richardson v LRC Products Ltd. [2000] PIQR P164; Worsely v Tambrands Ltd [2000] PIQR P95; Abouzaid v Mothercare UK Ltd. [2000] All ER (D) 2436; Foster v Biosil (2001) 59 BMLR 178; A v The National Blood Authority [2001] 3 All ER 289; B v McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd. [2002] EWHC 490; 2002 WL 347509. XYZ v Schering Health Care Ltd. [2002] EWHC 1420; (2003) 70 BMLR 88 was disposed of by the court and the parties by determination of a crucial issue of fact.

(⁸⁰) [2000] PIQR P164.

(⁸¹) Ibid., at P170.

(⁸²) Ibid., at P171.

(⁸³) [2000] All ER (D) 2436; C. Hodges, ‘Product Liability for Old Products’ (2001) NLJ 424 .

(⁸⁴) [2000] All ER (D) 2436 at [27].

(⁸⁵) Ibid. at [24]–[25].

(⁸⁶) Ibid. at [27].

(⁸⁷) Ibid. at [38].

(⁸⁸) Recitals 5 and 6, quoted ibid. at [44].

(⁸⁹) Wright J agreed: ibid. at [53].

(⁹⁰) [2001] 3 All ER 289. On which see R. Goldberg, ‘Paying for Bad Blood: Strict Product Liability after the Hepatitis C Litigation (2002) 10 Med. L.Rev. 165, 170 (criticising Burton J’s approach as ‘overly intuitive’); C. Hodges, ‘Compensating Patients’ (2001) 117 LQR 528 ; G. Howells and M. Mildred, ‘Infected Blood: Defect and Discoverability, A First Exposition of the EC Product Liability Directive’ (2001) 65 MLR 95 ; P. Giliker, ‘Strict Liability for Defective Products: The Ongoing Debate’ (2003) Business L. Rev. 87 .

(⁹¹) Below, pp. 499–501.

(⁹²) [2001] 3 All ER 289 at [2] per Burton J., and see below, p. 498.

(⁹³) Ibid. at [97].

(⁹⁴) Ibid. at [96].

(⁹⁵) Ibid. at [31], [35].

(⁹⁶) Whittaker (1985) ; Stapleton, Product Liability, 233–6 . And see above, pp. 193–200.

(⁹⁷) Whittaker (1985), 242 ; Stapleton, Product Liability, 234 .

(⁹⁸) [2001] 3 All ER 289 at [45], [63].

(⁹⁹) Ibid. at [63].

(¹⁰⁰) Ibid. at [56].

(¹⁰¹) Ibid. at [69].

(¹⁰²) Ibid. at [64] (original emphasis).

(¹⁰³) Ibid.

(¹⁰⁴) Ibid. at [39].

(¹⁰⁵) Ibid. at [31].

(¹⁰⁶) Ibid.

(¹⁰⁷) Ibid. at [36].

(¹⁰⁸) Ibid. at [66].

(¹⁰⁹) Ibid. at [68].

(¹¹⁰) Ibid. at [71].

(¹¹¹) Ibid. at [72].

(¹¹²) Ibid. at [73].

(¹¹³) Ibid. at [65].

(¹¹⁴) Ibid. at [65].

(¹¹⁵) Ibid. at [31].

(¹¹⁶) Cf. art. 8(2)’s reference to the ‘fault of the injured person in providing that the liability in the producer may be reduced or disallowed, where the Directive appears to be content to refer both the issue of the possibility of reduction and the understanding of ‘contributory fault’ to the laws of the Member States: below, pp. 510–12.

(¹¹⁷) As I have explained, ‘administrative fault’ may again differ: above, pp. 311–12.

(¹¹⁸) Above, pp. 43–4, 159–60, 200–2. The ECJ has itself recognised that ‘the concept of fault does not have the same content in the various legal systems’ in the context of liability of Member States for infringement of EC law: Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany [1996] ECR I-01029 para. 76.

(¹¹⁹) European Court decisions of 2002, above, pp. 440–4.

(¹²⁰) This was apparently the effect in relation to Spanish law, above, pp. 442–3.

(¹²¹) Cf.Stapleton, Product Liability, 244–7 .

(¹²²) Art. 6(1)(c) and (2) respectively.

(¹²³) Above, pp. 488–9.

(¹²⁴) Art. 6(1)(a).

(¹²⁵) [2001] 3 All ER 289 at [66].

(¹²⁶) Above, p. 489.

(¹²⁷) [2001] 3 All ER 289 at [42].

(¹²⁸) Ibid.

(¹²⁹) [2002] EWHC 490; 2002 WL 347509.

(¹³⁰) [2002] EWHC 490; 2002 WL 347509 at [73].

(¹³¹) Ibid. at [80].

(¹³²) Ibid.

(¹³³) Abouzaid v Mothercare UK Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 2436 at [40], per Chadwick LJ.

(¹³⁴) [2001] 3 All ER 289 at [66].

(¹³⁵) Above, pp. 483–4.

(¹³⁶) See above, p. 53 (liability for the ‘deeds of things’ justified by risk even in the absence of a requirement of danger); pp. 118–21 (administrative liability for dangerous things and activities).

(¹³⁷) Above, pp. 482, 597–8.

(¹³⁸) 93/13/EC.

(¹³⁹) Case C-237/02 of 1 Apr. 2004 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft Co. KG v Hofstetter Eurtex.

(¹⁴⁰) At para. 18.

(¹⁴¹) Ibid. at para. 19.

(¹⁴²) Ibid. at para. 22.

(¹⁴³) Ibid. at para. 25.

(¹⁴⁴) [2001] 3 All ER 289 at [64].

(¹⁴⁵) Above, p. 484.

(¹⁴⁶) Above, p. 488.

(¹⁴⁷) Above, p. 458.

(¹⁴⁸) Case C-300/95 [1997] ECR 1–2649.

(¹⁴⁹) Viney and Jourdain, Conditions, 777 .

(¹⁵⁰) Flour, Aubert and Savaux, Fait juridique, 313 .

(¹⁵¹) Taylor, Harmonisation communautaire, 75 .

(¹⁵²) Above, pp. 146–7.

(¹⁵³) Above, pp. 89–90.

(¹⁵⁴) Above, p. 90.

(¹⁵⁵) Above, p. 465.

(¹⁵⁶) See, in particular, its use in relation to traffic accidents before the loi of 5 Jul. 1985, above pp. 58–9. Cf its role as an excuse for contractual non-performance owing to supervening circumstances: Nicholas, 200–05 .

(¹⁵⁷) C. Jamin, RTDCiv. 1998.763, 766–9 .

(¹⁵⁸) Above, p. 470.

(¹⁵⁹) 1987 Act, s. 4(1)(e).

(¹⁶⁰) HL Deb. Vol. 414 col. 1427 (Lord Scarman).

(¹⁶¹) Whittaker (1985) 257–60 ; Stapleton, Product Liability, 236–42 .

(¹⁶²) Case C-300/95 of 29 May 1997 [1997] ECR I-2649 (which includes the opinion of A.-G. Tesauro (‘Tesauro, Opinion’).

(¹⁶³) Above, p. 488.

(¹⁶⁴) Tesauro, Opinion, para. 14.

(¹⁶⁵) Ibid. at para. 6.

(¹⁶⁶) Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp 8 Cal.3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972), at 1162 per Sullivan J (the original English, translated by Tesauro as ‘“in odore” di negligenza’: Tesauro, Opinion, para. 16, note 6).

(¹⁶⁷) Tesauro, Opinion, para. 18, note 9 referring to G.L. Priest, ‘The current insurance crisis and modern tort law’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1521, 1589 ; G. Ponzanelli ‘La controrivoluzione nel diritto di responsabilità da prodotti negli Stati Uniti di America’ (1989) Il Foro Italiano IV, 119 et seq.

(¹⁶⁸) Tesauro, Opinion, para.16, note 6.

(¹⁶⁹) Ibid. at paras. 18–19 (contrasting an earlier version of the 1985 Directive which provided that ‘[t]he producer shall be liable even if the article could not have been regarded as defective in the light of scientific and technological development at the time when he put the article into circulation’ with its final version which included art. 7(e)).

(¹⁷⁰) Ibid. at para. 26.

(¹⁷¹) Ibid. at para. 20.

(¹⁷²) Ibid. at para. 19.

(¹⁷³) Ibid. at para. 22.

(¹⁷⁴) Ibid. at para. 27.

(¹⁷⁵) Ibid. at paras 23–4.

(¹⁷⁶) Ibid. at para. 24.

(¹⁷⁷) Case C-300/95, para. 5.

(¹⁷⁸) Case C-300/95, at para. 26.

(¹⁷⁹) Ibid. at para. 27.

(¹⁸⁰) Ibid. at para. 29.

(¹⁸¹) Ibid. at paras. 33–9.

(¹⁸²) Above, pp. 20–1, 42–3, 311–14 (civil and administrative faults).

(¹⁸³) Above, pp. 188–9, 193–6.

(¹⁸⁴) It is also for this reason that a non-manufacturing defendant (such as an importer or supplier) could not rely on the defence because it could not discover the defect, even though the producer could: and see Stapleton, Product Liability , 238.

(¹⁸⁵) Cf. above, p. 497.

(¹⁸⁶) Abouzaid v Mothercare UK Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 2436 at [28]–[29] and above, p. 486.

(¹⁸⁷) Richardson v LRC Products Ltd [2000] PIQR P164 at P172, above, p. 485.

(¹⁸⁸) [2001] 3 All ER 289, above, pp. 486–91.

(¹⁸⁹) Ibid. at [50].

(¹⁹⁰) Ibid. at [49].

(¹⁹¹) Ibid. at [50]–[51].

(¹⁹²) Above, pp. 497–8.

(¹⁹³) [2001] 3 All ER 289 at [53].

(¹⁹⁴) Ibid. and see Tesauro, Opinion, para. 22, above, p. 497.

(¹⁹⁵) Ibid. at [74].

(¹⁹⁶) This phrase was used by the court to describe all data in the information circuit of the scientific community as a whole picking up A.-G. Tesauro’s example: cf. above, p. 497.

(¹⁹⁷) [2001] 3 All ER 289 at [74].

(¹⁹⁸) Ibid. at [76].

(¹⁹⁹) Stapleton, Product Liability, 237 ; Goldberg, op. cit. n. 90, 191 .

(²⁰⁰) Ibid. at [22] , above, p. 497.

(²⁰¹) Ibid. at [18] , above, p. 497.

(²⁰²) Whittaker (1985) 258 and see above, pp. 194–5.

(²⁰³) Above, pp. 487–8, 500.

(²⁰⁴) Above, pp. 489–90.

(²⁰⁵) Cf. above, pp. 483–4, 490.

(²⁰⁶) Above, p. 484.

(²⁰⁷) Above, p. 495.

(²⁰⁸) Above, p. 58, n. 150.

(²⁰⁹) Ghestin (1998), 1209 and see below, p. 522.

(²¹⁰) Above, p. 495.

(²¹¹) 1985 Directive, art. 4.

(²¹²) Below, pp. 523–7.

(²¹³) Above, p. 460.

(²¹⁴) Above, p. 472.

(²¹⁵) Above, p. 24.

(²¹⁶) Case C-203/99 of 10 May 2001, [2001] ECR I–3569 (which includes the opinion of A.-G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer (‘Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Opinion’)).

(²¹⁷) Case C-203/99, at para. 5.

(²¹⁸) Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Opinion, paras. 29–30 .

(²¹⁹) Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Opinion, paras. 33–4 .

(²²⁰) Case C-203/99, para. 25; 1985 Directive, arts. 2, 3, 6.

(²²¹) Ibid., para. 26.

(²²²) Ibid., paras. 27–8 (emphasis added). Art. 9 actually provides that ‘damage’ means…’: see above, p. 502.

(²²³) The words ‘un dédommagement adéquat et intégral are used in the French version of the Court’s judgment at para. 27 appearing in English as ‘full and proper compensation’.

(²²⁴) West v Shephard [1964] AC 326.

(²²⁵) Case C-365/88 Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH v Zeehaghe BV [1990] ECR I-1845, para. 20.

(²²⁶) Case C-271/91 Marshall v Southampton and South West Area Health Authority II [1993] ECR I-4367.

(²²⁷) Craig and de Búrca, EU Law, 239–53 , esp. at 47.

(²²⁸) Perhaps a clear example of inadequate compensation would be found in a rule which limited recovery under the legislation implementing the Directive in a way which is both not foreseen by it and not applicable to recovery of damages more generally in the law in question.

(²²⁹) Ibid., para. 32 (emphasis added).

(²³⁰) Ibid., para. 33 .

(²³¹) Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Opinion , para. 32.

(²³²) On these see Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, para. 29–16 et seq.

(²³³) Spartan Steel Alloys Ltd. v Martin Co. (Contractors) Ltd. [1973] QB 27 (damage to property).

(²³⁴) Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s. 1(3) of which defines ‘dependent’ for this purpose. The general exclusionary rule can be seen in the rejection of a business loss in Burgess v Florence Nightingale Hospital [1955] 1 QB 349.

(²³⁵) See esp. Leigh Sillivan Ltd. v Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd. [1986] AC 785 and cf. above, pp. 183–5.

(²³⁶) Viney and Jourdain, Les effets de la responsabilité, 111 et seq.; Terré, Simler and Lequette, Obligations, 860 et seq.

(²³⁷) Civ. (2) 8 Apr. 1970, Bull. civ. II no. 111, RTDCiv. 1971.660 obs. Durry.

(²³⁸) Simaan General Contracting Co. v Pilkington Glass Ltd. (No 2) [1988] QB 758 and see above, p. 184.

(²³⁹) Cf. Britvic Soft Drinks Ltd. v Messer UK Ltd. [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 20, above, p. 242.

(²⁴⁰) Above, pp. 440–1.

(²⁴¹) Above, p. 460.

(²⁴²) Above, p. 441.

(²⁴³) 1999 Directive, art. 8(2), below, p. 568.

(²⁴⁴) Below, pp. 575–6.

(²⁴⁵) Zimmermann, Liability for Non-Conformity, 29–30 .

(²⁴⁶) Below, pp. 565–6, 591–2.

(²⁴⁷) Above, p. 441.

(²⁴⁸) Above, p. 442.

(²⁴⁹) 1985 Directive, recital 9.

(²⁵⁰) Cf. F. Chabas, ‘La responsabilité pour défaut de sécurité des produits, dans la loi du 19 mai 1998’ GP 1998.2.1111, 1114 who sees this ‘inelegant expression’ as referring to commercial losses.

(²⁵¹) Terré, Simler, Lequette, Obligations, 690–2 .

(²⁵²) Civ. (1) 16 Jan. 1962, D 1962.199 note Rodière, JCP 1962.II.12557 note Esmein.

(²⁵³) Case C-168/00, Leitner v TUI Deutschland Gmbh & Co. KG, [2003] ECR 1–2631 interpreting Dir. 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours.

(²⁵⁴) Case C-203/99, above, p. 504.

(²⁵⁵) See above, pp. 161–2.

(²⁵⁶) The Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease Litigation, Group B Plaintiffs v General Medical Council [2000] BMLR 92, [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 161, above, pp. 298–9.

(²⁵⁷) Above, p. 504.

(²⁵⁸) For earlier discussion of particular causal issues see above, pp. 54–9 (liability for the ‘deeds of things’); pp. 86–91, 247–50 (liability in the French and English laws of sale); and pp. 375–6, 388–92 (French criminal responsibility).

(²⁵⁹) Here, we are concerned with causation of the damage by the defect. Causation may also be seen to be relevant elsewhere, e.g., in art. 7(d) which grants a defence where the defect was due to (caused by) compliance with mandatory public regulation.

(²⁶⁰) 1985 Directive, art. 8(1).

(²⁶¹) Above, pp. 33–4, 172–3 and below, pp. 546–7.

(²⁶²) Above, pp. 322–4.

(²⁶³) Above, p. 34.

(²⁶⁴) Art. 1386–14 C. civ. provides that the producer’s liability towards the victim is not reduced by the act of a third party which contributed to the causing of the damage.

(²⁶⁵) The 1987 Act provides that a producer or supplier is liable to the primary victim (who suffers the relevant type of harm) whether it was ‘caused wholly or partly by a defect in a product’: s. 2(1). Any claim for contribution brought by a person held liable on some legal basis apart from Part I of the Act would fall within the provisions of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the 1987 Act.

(²⁶⁶) Emphasis added.

(²⁶⁷) Art. 15.

(²⁶⁸) Art. 16(1) (ceiling on liability).

(²⁶⁹) Art. 1386–13 C. civ.; 1987 Act, s. 6(4).

(²⁷⁰) Above, pp. 199–200. The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, s. 1 appears to use ‘fault’ and ‘negligence’ interchangeably.

(²⁷¹) Above, pp. 42–3, 186–8.

(²⁷²) Cf. above, Veedfald, Case C-203/99, para. 31.

(²⁷³) Above, p. 59.

(²⁷⁴) AN No. 1395, 9; Fauchon, Rapport, Sén. No. 226, 41 .

(²⁷⁵) Above, pp. 59, 200.

(²⁷⁶) Here, the change in terminology used by the English version of the Directive (‘responsible’ rather than ‘liable’) does not help as the same word (‘responsable’) is used in the French for both.

(²⁷⁷) Above, pp. 165–6.

(²⁷⁸) Above, pp. 25–6.

(²⁷⁹) Whittaker (1985), 252–3 .

(²⁸⁰) A. M. Honoré, ‘Causation and Remoteness of Damage’ in Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol. XI (ed. A. Tunc) (J.C.B. Mohr, 1981) Chap. 7; Taylor, Harmonisation communautaire, 83–97 .

(²⁸¹) Above, pp. 375–6, 388–92.

(²⁸²) Above, p. 86.

(²⁸³) Civ. (1) 9 May 2001, Bull. civ. no. 130, D 2001.2149 note P. Sargos.

(²⁸⁴) Loi no. 2002–303, art. 102 (and see above, p. 152).

(²⁸⁵) Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2002] UKHL 22; [2003] 1 AC 32.

(²⁸⁶) Ibid. at [47], per Lord Hoffmann. This is very much a summary of the complex judgments: see further J. Stapleton, ‘Lords A’Leaping Evidentiary Gaps’ (2003) 10 Tort LR 276.

(²⁸⁷) [2002] UKHL 22 at [40].

(²⁸⁸) Ibid. at [36], per Lord Nicholls.

(²⁸⁹) See W. Van Gerven, J. Lever, P. Larouche, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law (Hart, Oxford, 2000) 441 and 461 quoted by Lord Bingham in Fairchild [2002] UKHL 22 at [24]. Cf. Taylor, Harmonisation communautaire, 95–97 .

(²⁹⁰) Hoge Raad 9 Oct. 1992, B v Bayer Nederland B., NJ 1994/535.

(²⁹¹) C. von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts (OUP, Oxford, 2000), Vol. 2, 441–3 .

(²⁹²) Com.(1999)396 final (28 Jul. 1999), 22.

(²⁹³) EC Commission, Second Report, para. 3.2.1.

(²⁹⁴) Art. 3(1)’s reference to ‘finished product’ is misleading as it suggests that the product has had work done to it, whereas raw materials are included. ‘Final product’ would be more accurate as the sense is the product as it is ‘put into circulation’ by the producer.

(²⁹⁵) Case C-203/99, Veedfald, para. 15.

(²⁹⁶) Arts. 3(2) and 3(3) respectively.

(²⁹⁷) Art. 3(2).

(²⁹⁸) Art. 3(3).

(²⁹⁹) And see above, p. 509.

(³⁰⁰) 1985 Directive, recital 8.

(³⁰¹) In French law: art. 1315 C. civ. and Ghestin, Goubeaux and Fabre-Magnan, Introduction générale, 615 ; English law: Constantine Line v Imperial Smelting Corpn. [1942] AC 154, 174; M.N. Howard (gen. ed.) Phipson on Evidence (15th. edn., Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) para. 4–03 (C. Hollander) .

(³⁰²) 1985 Directive, art. 12; art. 1386–15 al. 1 C. civ; 1987 Act, s. 7.

(³⁰³) Art. 3(2) deems such a person to be a producer where he ‘imports into the Community a product for sale, hire, leasing or any form of distribution in the course of his business’. Here, therefore, acting in the course of a business is made a condition of an importer’s liability arising, rather than a defence under art. 7(c).

(³⁰⁴) E.g. Dir. 93/13/EC, art. 2(c); 1999 Directive, art. 2(c).

(³⁰⁵) Above, p. 85.

(³⁰⁶) Above, pp. 236–7.

(³⁰⁷) Cf. Dir. 93/13/EC art. 2(c) which refers to a ‘trade, business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned’.

(³⁰⁸) Above, pp. 514–15.

(³⁰⁹) Veedfald v Århus Amtskommune Case C-203/99, [2001] ECR 1–3569, above, p. 503.

(³¹⁰) Ibid., para. 20.

(³¹¹) Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Opinion, para. 26 (emphasis added) .

(³¹²) Ibid.

(³¹³) Case C-203/99, para. 21.

(³¹⁴) Ibid., para. 20.

(³¹⁵) Similar expressions are found in the other Romance versions of the Directive: e.g. the Italian (‘sua attività professionale’) and the Spanish (‘su actividad profesional’).

(³¹⁶) Cf. above, p. 85.

(³¹⁷) H. Gaumont-Prat, Note, JCP 2002.II.1014, p. 1637.

(³¹⁸) Case C-41/90, Höfner v Mactron GmbH, [1991] ECR 1–1079, para. 21.

(³¹⁹) Case C-203/99, para. 13.

(³²⁰) Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Opinion, para. 22 .

(³²¹) Case C-203/99, para 15.

(³²²) Ibid., para. 17 .

(³²³) Unlike art. 7(c) which distinguishes between manufacturers (first limb) and manufacturers and distributors (second limb), s. 4(1)(c) of the 1987 Act distinguishes between manufacturers, ‘own-branders’ and EC importers on the one hand and all those who supply on the other.

(³²⁴) And Part I of the Act binds the Crown to the extent to which it can be liable under the Crown Proceedings Act 1947: 1987 Act, s. 9.

(³²⁵) E.g. Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s. 14(1); Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 61(1).

(³²⁶) [2001] 3 All ER 289, above, pp. 486–9.

(³²⁷) 1987 Act, s. 46(1)(b).

(³²⁸) 1987 Act, s. 46(1)(e).

(³²⁹) Above, p. 517.

(³³⁰) Cf. above, p. 498.

(³³¹) Art. 1386–6 al. 1 and al. 2; art. 1386–7 al. 1 C. civ.

(³³²) Art. 1386–11 3 °C. civ.

(³³³) Above, pp. 460–1.

(³³⁴) Above, p. 460.

(³³⁵) Above, pp. 142–6, 151.

(³³⁶) Above, pp. 460–1.

(³³⁷) P. Keyser, note, D 2001.3065; Gaumont-Prat, note, JCP 2002.II.10741.

(³³⁸) Below, pp. 536–7.

(³³⁹) Art. 1386–11 1°C.civ.

(³⁴⁰) Art. 1386–5 C. civ.

(³⁴¹) Cf. above, pp. 517–18.

(³⁴²) Above, p. 459.

(³⁴³) Ibid.

(³⁴⁴) Emphasis added.

(³⁴⁵) Above, p. 514.

(³⁴⁶) 1987 Act, s. 1(2) ‘producer’. Taylor, Harmonisation communautaire, 67 .

(³⁴⁷) 1987 Act, s. 4(1)(d) and (e), (2) achieved by reference to a special definition of the ‘relevant time’.

(³⁴⁸) 1987 Act, s. 4(2)(b).

(³⁴⁹) Above, pp. 476–7.

(³⁵⁰) 1985 Directive, art. 7(f).

(³⁵¹) Art. 1386–11 al. 2 C. civ; 1987 Act, s. 4(1)(f).

(³⁵²) Above, pp. 494–502.

(³⁵³) Art. 7(c).

(³⁵⁴) Lovells, Report, 51 .

(³⁵⁵) General Product Safety Directive 2001, art. 3(2).

(³⁵⁶) Ibid., art. 3(1).

(³⁵⁷) Art. 3(2).

(³⁵⁸) Taschner, op. cit. n. 16, 260 .

(³⁵⁹) Above, pp. 520–1.

(³⁶⁰) Case C-300/95, Commission v UK, para. 27, above p. 498.

(³⁶¹) Above, p. 195.

(³⁶²) Stapleton, Product Liability, 242–4 .

(³⁶³) European Convention, art. 3(3); Explanatory Report, para. 27.

(³⁶⁴) The Explanatory Report, para. 27.

(³⁶⁵) Case C-52/00, Commission v France, para. 40.

(³⁶⁶) Ghestin (1986), 136 .

(³⁶⁷) 1987 Act, s. 3(3) which requires the injured person to request the supplier to identify one or more of the persons article 3(3) has in mind within a reasonable period ‘after the damage occurs and at a time when it is not reasonably practicable for the person making the request to identify those persons’.

(³⁶⁸) Above, pp. 503–4.

(³⁶⁹) Art. 1386–7 al. 1 C. civ. After revision of this provision, these persons are simply stated to be liable under the same conditions as the producer ‘only if the latter remains unknown’: loi of 9 Dec. 2004, art. 29.

(³⁷⁰) 1987 Act, s. 46(1).

(³⁷¹) 1987 Act, s. 46(2).

(³⁷²) 1987 Act, s. 46 and cf. above, pp. 518–19.

(³⁷³) 1987 Act, s. 46(1)(d) and (e).

(³⁷⁴) Stapleton, Product Liability, 317–19 .

(³⁷⁵) Art. 2(a) ‘product’ and see recitals 6 and 9.

(³⁷⁶) EC Dir. 92.59/EEC of 29 Jun. 1992 on general product safety.

(³⁷⁷) Case C-52/00, Commission v France, para. 47.

(³⁷⁸) E.g. Dir. 93/13/EC art. 2(c), on whose interpretation see Chitty on Contracts, para. 15–013 et seq.

(³⁷⁹) Above, pp. 523–4.

(³⁸⁰) Above, pp. 515–17.

(³⁸¹) Above, pp. 517–18.

(³⁸²) Above, p. 517.

(³⁸³) Taylor, Harmonisation communautaire, 185–95 .

(³⁸⁴) 1985 Directive, art. 10(1).

(³⁸⁵) For the French law, see Terré, Simler, Lequette, Obligations, 1369 et seq. There is little English law in the books on the ‘interruption or suspension of the running of periods of limitation (e.g. as to disability), but the starting point of any period will be delayed in cases of fraud, mistake or deliberate concealment by the defendant: Limitation Act 1980, s. 32. Moreover, where a defendant ‘acknowledges’ a debt, the limita tion period starts running again (Limitation Act 1980, s. 29) and in an appropriate case he may be estopped from relying on the defence of limitation: Wright v John Bagnall&Sons Ltd. [1900] 2 QB 240.

(³⁸⁶) Art. 2270–1 C. civ.

(³⁸⁷) F. Chabas, Le droit des accidents de la circulation (Litec, Paris, 2nd. edn., 1988) 317–18 .

(³⁸⁸) Above, pp. 91–2.

(³⁸⁹) Limitation Act 1980, s. 2. The accrual of the cause of action varies according to the nature of the claim but in claims for torts actionable only on proof of damage, it does not begin to run until some damage actually occurs: Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 33–06 et seq .

(³⁹⁰) Limitation Act 1980, s. 11(4).

(³⁹¹) Ibid., s. 14; Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, para. 33–32 et seq.

(³⁹²) Limitation Act 1980, s. 11A(4).

(³⁹³) Art. 2270–1 C. civ; art. 110–4 C. com.

(³⁹⁴) Above, p. 92. For reform of the bref delai, see below, p. 583.

(³⁹⁵) Limitation Act 1980, ss. 2, 5. In the case of contractual claims accrual of the cause of action is generally held to be the breach of contract: Battley v Faulkner (1820) 3 B.&Ald. 288; Chitty on Contracts, para. 28–032 .

(³⁹⁶) Limitation Act 1980, s. 33(1) and 33(3) explained in Nash v Eli Lilly&Co. [1993] 1 WLR 782 in the context of claims for damages in respect of the drug ‘Opren’.

(³⁹⁷) Limitation Act 1980, s. 33(1A) (a silentio and not applying it to claims for damage to property).

(³⁹⁸) 1985 Directive, art. 10(2).

(³⁹⁹) In French law: art. 1386–17 C. civ. (as inserted by loi of 1998); in English law, Limitation Act 1987, s. 11A(4).

(⁴⁰⁰) Above, p. 528. Hence, the Limitation Act 1980, s. 33(1A)(a). Cf. SmithKline Beecham plc v Horne-Roberts [2001] EWCA Civ 2006 [2002] 1 WLR 1662 where the CA held that a power in the court in the Limitation Act 1980, s. 35(3) to add a new party after the expiry of the ten-year period to proceedings commenced within that period was not incompatible with art. 11 of the 1985 Directive, relying on its recital 11’s provision that it was ‘without prejudice to claims pending at law’.

(⁴⁰¹) Limitation Act 1980, s. 11A(3) as inserted by 1987 Act, s. 6(6), Sch. 1. Art. 1386–16 C. civ. does, however, oddly except the position where the producer is at fault. To the extent to which this refers to liability under the general law of arts. 1382–1383 C. civ. it is redundant.

(⁴⁰²) Art. 1386–5 C. civ. al. 1.

(⁴⁰³) Art. 1386–2 C. civ.

(⁴⁰⁴) Notably, art. 7 (defences); art. 8(2) (no reduction of liability by reason of contribution of third party to damage); art. 12 (no exclusion or limitation of liability).

(⁴⁰⁵) This is the combined effect of the Limitation Act 1980, s. 11A(3) as inserted by 1987 Act, s. 6(6), Sch. 1 and the 1987 Act, s. 4(2) defining ‘relevant time’. Special provision is made for electricity where the ‘relevant time’ is the time ‘at which it was generated, being a time before it was transmitted or distributed’: 1987 Act, s. 4(2).

(⁴⁰⁶) D. Roth-Behrendt, EU Parliament, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC [etc.] PE 225.962fin. (28 Sep. 1998) para. 4.4 , above, p. 446.