5. Conclusion

While the criminal proceedings in the affaire du sang contaminé were extraordinary as regards the number of victims and their vulnerability, the number and variety of alleged roles of the accused and the complexity of the proceedings, they have had a profound effect on attitudes to the responsibilities of individuals in government and the administration for safety generally and on product safety and product liability in particular. In the course of the 1990s, attention became very firmly focused on the role of individual victims of the affaire in the criminal process in terms of their claims for compensation, but even more in terms of their seeking to establish responsabilité according to the crimes which they saw as most appropriate. While their views on the characterisation of the offences were not allowed to go to trial, their power to initiate proceedings in the ordinary criminal courts was crucial to the airing of the affaire and their absence was particularly noticeable as regards proceedings in the special criminal tribunals provided by the Constitution for government ministers, whether before or after its amendment.

However, what is particularly interesting from a legal point of view is the consideration given by the courts and even more by French jurists to the problem of the proper characterisation of the criminal liability of a person who supplies a product which he knows has a very high risk of causing death. When death occurs, why is this not murder? For, while murder requires an intention to kill, this is not normally understood as requiring a desire to cause death. For the Cour d’appel of Paris in 1993, the answer lay in the nature of the relationship between the supplier or manufacturer of a product and its recipient, which is not one from which a court should infer an intention to kill even if the product was known to be potentially deadly.³³⁶ And the overall sense of the way in which the criminal proceedings in the affaire progressed suggests that the majority judicial view was that even in these circumstances the appropriate way of looking at these sorts of facts was in terms of faute par imprudence even if the faute should prove a very serious one.

Of more general significance were the changes to the definition of the fault element governing involuntary homicide and causing serious personal injuries made by the loi of 2000. While it is as yet difficult to assess with certainty their effect on the substantive basis of the criminal responsibility of manufacturers, suppliers and users of products, they are likely to reduce very considerably the incidence of the criminal responsibility (p.402) of the public controllers of the safety of products, subjecting it to more onerous tests of fault. Conversely, however, the loi of 2000s changes to the institutional relationship between criminal and civil decisions on fault may instead enhance the role of the criminal process in the compensation of personal injuries and death as long as a good case can be made out against non-administrative defendants.³³⁷

Finally, in this discussion I am struck by the pervasive significance of competing constitutional principles. On the one hand, the principle of equal treatment of citizens requires that the substantive criminal law should not distinguish between public deciders’ and others; but on the other it can distinguish between the responsibilities of local authorities according to whether or not their particularly public functions are in issue.³³⁸ Moreover, while the subjection of the Cour de justice de la République to the ordinary criminal law and control by the Cour de cassation suggests a proper sense of the principle that France is an Etat de droit, its distinctive nature both in terms of procedure and composition reflects a residual sense of the separation of powers.

Notes:

(¹) Below, pp. 380–7.

(²) ‘Causing personal injuries’ will be the name given to the French offences of ‘blessures et coups involontaires’ and see below, pp. 372 et seq

(³) Below, pp. 376–80.

(⁴) Below, pp. 374–5, 393–4. In France, compensation for personal injuries or death caused by a crime may also be available from a public fund (the Fonds d’indemnisation des victimes des actes de terrorisme et d’autres infactions) as provided for by arts. 706–3–706-15 C.P.P. Under the scheme, a person who has suffered harm caused by the facts giving rise to an offence may obtain full compensation (réparation intégrate) for this harm, where it results from offences against the person and causes either death, permanent incapacity or a total inability to work of a month or more (art. 706–3. C.P.P.). There is no restriction as to the nature of the criminal offence, it being specifically provided that compensation is available for loss caused by‘voluntary or involuntary acts which constitute the physical characteristics of an offence’ (art. 706–3 al. 1 C.P.P). While there are various excluded situations (including in respect of cases which fall within the special legislation governing motor vehicle accidents (art. 706–3 1° C.P.P)) there is no general requirement that the victim cannot obtain compensation elsewhere. Instead, after payment the fund is subrogated to any rights of successful claimants and may sue in any court to recover in respect of sums paid out, this including the right to initiate criminal proceedings by ‘constituting itself’ partie civile: art. 706–11 C.P.P, below, p. 383

(⁵) In doctrine for long a lone voice against the link was found in A. Pirovano, Faute civile et faute pénale (thése, Aix-en-Provence, 1966) .

(⁶) The phrase is Mlle. Geneviève Viney’s, below, p. 374.

(⁷) Above, p. 308.

(⁸) Below, p. 378.

(⁹) Loi no. 96–393 of 13 May 1996 (‘loi of 1996’), below, pp. 387–8.

(¹⁰) Loi no. 2000–647 of 10 July 2000 (‘loi of 2000’), below, pp. 388–94.

(¹¹) Below, pp. 391–3.

(¹²) Below, pp. 393–4.

(¹³) Arts. 111–1, 121–3 C. pén.; Pradel, Droit pénal, 240 et seq .

(¹⁴) This tripartite distinction also possesses a constitutional dimension, for crimes and délits can be created only by loi, whereas contraventions may be created by règlement: art. 111–3 C. pén. reflecting art. 34 of the Constitution of 1958.

(¹⁵) Arts. 214 & 231 C.P.P.

(¹⁶) Art. 240 C.P.P.

(¹⁷) Art. 381 C.P.P.

(¹⁸) Art. 521 C.P.P.

(¹⁹) For a useful discussion, see M.-L. Rassat, Droit pénal général (PUF, Paris, 2nd. edn., 1999), 273 et seq . Cf. Pradel, Droit pénal, 270 who sees the élément moral as going to the culpability of the offender rather than the definition of an offence.

(²⁰) All the provisions of the new code came into force on 1 Mar. 1994.

(²¹) Ancien Code pénal (A.C. pén.).

(²²) Art. 221–6 al. 2, 222–19, 222–20, art. R 622–1 C. pén. respectively.

(²³) Art. 223–1 C. pén.

(²⁴) Art. 121–2 C. pén., below, pp. 378–80.

(²⁵) Loi of 1 Aug. 1905; arts. L 213–1-213–4 C. consom.

(²⁶) Ordonnance No. 2004 of 9 Jul. 2004, J.O. Rép. fn. 10 Jul. 2004.

(²⁷) Loi no. 83–660 of 21 Jul. 1983, now art. L. 221–1 C. consom.

(²⁸) Arts. L. 221–2-221–9 C. consom. and see above, pp. 308–9.

(²⁹) Loi of 1 Aug. 1905; revised by the loi no. 78–23 of 10 Jan.1978; arts. L. 213–1 et seq. C. consom.

(³⁰) Bihl, Droit pénal, 7 .

(³¹) B. Bouloc, ‘La loi de 1905 en tant qu’instrument de la sécurité des consommateurs’ in Ghestin, Sécurité des consommateurs, 13 ; Bihl, Droit pénal, 108–15 .

(³²) Art. L. 213–1 C. consom. The reference to ‘substantial quality’ has clear echoes with erreur sur la sub-stance under art. 1110 C. civ: cf. above, p. 22.

(³³) Now found in art. 111–4 C. pén.

(³⁴) Delmas-Marty and Guidicelli-Delage, 579 ; Crim. 22 Jun.1977, D 1977.IR.481. It has been applied to electricity: Crim. 22 Oct. 1959, JCP 1959.II.11376.

(³⁵) Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz, 237, 299 .

(³⁶) Delmas-Marty and Guidicelli-Delage, 579 .

(³⁷) Below, pp. 395–6.

(³⁸) Art. L. 213–3 C. consom.

(³⁹) Delmas-Marty and Guidicelli-Delage, 583 .

(⁴⁰) Seine 17 Nov. 1966, JCP 1967.II.15009 note Gondre. Cf. Agen 23 Jan. 1975, D 1975.748 note Fourgoux (calves fattened with illegal injection of oestrogen)

(⁴¹) Delmas-Marty and Guidicelli-Delage, 581 .

(⁴²) Ibid., 581–2 ; Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz, 250–52 ; Pradel, Droit pénal, 112 .

(⁴³) Delmas-Marty and Guidicelli-Delage, 583–4 ; Bouloc, op. cit. n. 31, 17 .

(⁴⁴) Art. L. 214–1 C. consom. This also applies to EC regulations which fall within the scope of Chaps. II to VI of the C. consom., see art. L. 214–3 C. consom.

(⁴⁵) E.g. Paris 7 May 1968, GP 1968.2.151 (breach of regulation in treating pans with chemical which its manufacturer had indicated was corrosive and dangerous for use with kitchen equipment).

(⁴⁶) Below, pp. 372–5.

(⁴⁷) Below, pp. 372, 387, 389.

(⁴⁸) Pradel, Droit pénal, 440 , below, 397.

(⁴⁹) Ibid., 441, 445 .

(⁵⁰) Art. 221–1 C. pén. This is seen as implicit in its‘voluntary nature’ and in the presence of a distinct offence of deliberate assault causing another’s death‘without the intention to do so’: art. 222–7 C. pén.; H. Angevin, ‘Atteintes volontaires, Meutre, Empoisonnement’ Jur.-Cl. pén . Arts. 221–1 à 221–5 (2000), 11.

(⁵¹) Pradel, Droit pénal, 441 .

(⁵²) Merle and Vitu, Droit pénal, 571–2, 715–16 .

(⁵³) Crim. 8 Jan. 1991, D 1992.115 note Croisier-Nerac.

(⁵⁴) Angevin, op. cit. n. 50, 13.

(⁵⁵) See below, p. 397.

(⁵⁶) This case is described by J.-P. Delmas Saint-Hilaire, ‘Un crime d’empoisonnement: la double tromperie de l’affaire du sang contaminé cessera-t-elle enfin?’ in Pradel, Sang et droit pénal, 39 at 56 .

(⁵⁷) Below, pp. 395–8.

(⁵⁸) Arts. 319, 320 A.C. pén.

(⁵⁹) Art. R. 622–1, 625–2 A.C. pén.

(⁶⁰) Desportes and Le Gunehec, 433 .

(⁶¹) Below, pp. 388–94.

(⁶²) Crim. 13 Nov. 1962, D 1963.Somm.30.

(⁶³) Crim. 27 May 1972, GP 1972.2.719. For other examples relating to manufacturers see: Crim. 6 Jun. 1999 and Crim. 11 Apr. 1999, Droit pénal (Nov. 1991), 5 .

(⁶⁴) Merle and Vitu, Droit pénal, 739 .

(⁶⁵) Rouen 26 Feb.1969, JCP 1971.II.16849.

(⁶⁶) Crim. 24 Jan. 1956, D 1956.197.

(⁶⁷) Merle and Vitu, Droit pénal, 738 .

(⁶⁸) Bihl, Droit pénal, 135 and Above, p. 370.

(⁶⁹) Véron (9th. edn.), 74 .

(⁷⁰) Paris 3 Jun. 1958, S 1958.336 note Bredin. For the administrative law sequel to the case, see above, pp. 315, 327.

(⁷¹) Paris 3 Jan. 1958, S.1958.336 note Bredin. For the administrative law sequel to the case, at 338.

(⁷²) Viney, Introduction à la responsabilité, 260 et seq. The leading case was Civ. 19 Dec. 1912, S 1914.1.249 note Morel.

(⁷³) Above, pp. 45–6.

(⁷⁴) Loi no. 80–1042 of 23 Dec. 1980, new art. 10 C.P.P.

(⁷⁵) Guinchard and Buisson, 773 . If a victim of a crime claims first in the civil jurisdiction in principle he cannot then claim as partie civile unless he was ignorant of the criminal nature of the defendant’s behaviour and the criminal proceedings were initiated by the ministère public: ibid. 771–2 .

(⁷⁶) Since 1972, decisions of tribunaux de police have not had the force of chose jugée in respect of any action civile: art. 528–1 al. 2 C.P.P.

(⁷⁷) Art. 4 al. 2 C.P.P.

(⁷⁸) G. Viney, Les obligations, La responsabilité: conditions in J. Ghestin (ed.) Traité de droit civil (LDGJ, Paris, 1982) 186 . The phrase ‘speck of fault’ was frequently used in the travaux préparatoires of the loi of 2000 Below, pp. 388–9.

(⁷⁹) Loi no. 83–608 of 8 Jul. 1983, new art. 470–1 C.P.P. E.g. Crim. 17 Feb. 1987, Bull. crim. no. 74 (loi of 5 Jul. 1985); Crim. 3 Mar. 1993, Bull. crim. no. 96 (obligation de moyens).

(⁸⁰) Below, pp. 393–4.

(⁸¹) Bihl, Droit pénal, 137 ; Merle and Vitu, Droit pénal, 680 et seq. P. Fauchon, Rapport sur la proposition de loi de M. Pierre Fauchon, tendant à préciser la définition des délits non intentionnels, Sén. No. 177 (20 Jan. 2000) (‘Fauchon, Rapport, Sén. No. 177’) para. I (B)4.

(⁸²) E.g. Crim. 23 Oct. 1931, GP 1931.2.934; Crim. 20 Nov.1969, GP 1970.1.97.

(⁸³) H. L. and J. Mazeaud, Leçons de droit civil, Tome II, Vol. I Obligations, théorié générale (Montchrestien, Paris, 8th. edn., 1991 by F. Chabas) 651–2 and see Below, p. 390.

(⁸⁴) J. Carbonnier, Droit civil, Tome 4 , Les Obligations (PUF, Paris, 18th. edn., 1994), 352 .

(⁸⁵) Merle and Vitu, Droit pénal, 691 .

(⁸⁶) Crim. 9 Jan.1979, JCP 1980.II.19272 note Chabas; Crim. 14 Feb. 1996, Bull. crim. no. 78; Véron (9th. edn.) 78 et seq.

(⁸⁷) Merle and Vitu, Droit pénal, 688 .

(⁸⁸) Dijon 4 Jul.1958, JCP 1958.II.10714.

(⁸⁹) Crim. 11 Dec. 1957, JCP 1958.II.10423. Cf. below, pp. 389–93.

(⁹⁰) Crim. 23 Oct. 1931, GP1931.2.934. The deputy engineer and chief mechanic were acquitted.

(⁹¹) Paris 3 Jun. 1958, S.1958.336 note Bredin, above, pp. 315, 327, 373.

(⁹²) Véron (9th. edn.), 80 .

(⁹³) Ch. Mixte 28 Jan. 1972, JCP 1972.II.17050 concl. Lindon.

(⁹⁴) Merle and Vitu, Droit pénal, 776 et seq.

(⁹⁵) Below, pp. 378–80.

(⁹⁶) J.-C. Vindreau, La responsabilité pénale du fabricant de produit (thèse, Lille, microfiche, 1984) 165 and see Crim. 19 Dec. 1977, JCP 1979.II.19227 note Robert.

(⁹⁷) Pradel, Droit pénal, 369 et seq. ; Delmas-Marty and Guidicelli-Delage, 50 et seq.

(⁹⁸) Desportes and Le Gunehec, 487 et seq.

(⁹⁹) Ibid., 492–4 .

(¹⁰⁰) E.g. Crim. 27 May 1972, GP 1972.2.719.

(¹⁰¹) Delmas-Marty and Guidicelli-Delage, 67–8 . Cf. below, pp. 390–1.

(¹⁰²) Crim. 20 Oct.1971, JCP 1971.IV.267 (car dealer who sold a car with a damaged chassis which caused an accident liable for the injuries to road user); Trib. corr. Pointoise 11 Feb. 1980, Versailles 5 Dec. 1980, noted by J. Nguyen Thanh-Bourgeais,‘La sécurité des consommateurs. Réflexions sur l’affaire du talc Morhange’ D 1981 Chron. 87 (where a baby-talc killed 36 babies and injured 167 others because it contained a very high propor tion of a toxic bactericide-individuals from the companies which supplied the bactericide, manufactured the talc and owned its trademark were all convicted and ordered to pay damages to the parties civiles).

(¹⁰³) Trib. corr. Lyon 20 Nov. 1972, GP 1973.1.3, Lyon 13 Jul. 1973, GP 1973.2.830, Crim. 14 Mar. 1974, GP 1974.1.417.

(¹⁰⁴) These are now found in art. 2212 al. 2 C.G.C.T. and see above, p. 308.

(¹⁰⁵) Above, p. 167. For the administrative law sequel in which some of the defendants’ insurers claimed contribution from the commune and the State, see CE 7 Mar. 1980, DS 1980.320 note Laurent Richer, above, pp. 327–9.

(¹⁰⁶) Loi no. 74–646 of 18 Jul. 1974; J. Robert, ‘La loi du 18 juillet 1974 et les crimes et délits imputables aux maires dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions’ JCP 1975.I.2714.

(¹⁰⁷) Loi no. 93–2 of 4 Jan. 1993, art. 102.

(¹⁰⁸) F. Desportes and F. Le Gunehec, Le Nouveau droit pénal, Tome. I, Droit pénal général (Economica, Paris, 1994) 421–2 .

(¹⁰⁹) R. Badinter, the Garde des sceaux in introducing the Criminal Code bill, quoted by M.-E. Cartier, contribution to ‘La responsabilité pénale des personnes morales’ in P. Méhaignerie (ed.) Le nouveau Code pénal, enjeux et perspectives (Dalloz, Paris, 1994), 37 at 42 .

(¹¹⁰) Art. 121–2 C. pén.

(¹¹¹) The following discussion draws heavily on Desportes and Le Gunehec, 525 et seq.

(¹¹²) While originally the criminal responsibility of legal persons only concerned certain crimes, it applied from its inception to involuntary homicide and causing personal injuries and legislation gradually extended its application to more and more criminal offences until in 2004 it was applied to all offences of whatever type and nature: Loi no. 2004–204 of 9 Mar. 2004, art. 54.

(¹¹³) Desportes and Le Gunehec, 536–7 .

(¹¹⁴) Cartier, op. cit. n. 109, 38 ; Pradel, Droit pénal, 475 .

(¹¹⁵) Desportes and Le Gunehec 537–41 and see Crim. 12 Dec. 2000, affaire du Drac, Bull. crim. no. 371.

(¹¹⁶) Desportes and Le Gunehec, 541–2 .

(¹¹⁷) Ibid., 542 .

(¹¹⁸) Above, pp. 377–8.

(¹¹⁹) Fauchon, Rapport , Sén. No. 177, para. I(B)2.

(¹²⁰) Above, pp. 307–10.

(¹²¹) Above, p. 309–10.

(¹²²) Art. 121–2 al. 1 C. pén.

(¹²³) Desportes and Le Gunehec, 571 . In the case of a société, these are the gérant, président-directeurgénéral, the conseil d’administration or the directoire, the directeurs généraux, the conseil de surveillance and the assemblé générale.

(¹²⁴) Ibid., 573–5 .

(¹²⁵) Cartier, op. cit. n. 109, 41 .

(¹²⁶) Desportes and Le Gunehec, 577 .

(¹²⁷) Below, pp. 381–2, 388.

(¹²⁸) For introductions to the French criminal process see J.R.R. Spencer, ‘French and English Criminal Procedure: A Brief Comparison’ in B.S. Markesinis (ed.) The Gradual Convergence (OUP, 1993) 33 ; Bell, Boyron, Whittaker, 122 et seq.

(¹²⁹) Arts. 1 al. 1 & 31 C.P.P The ministère public is represented by different officers in the different courts, e.g. procureur de la République in the Tribunal correctionnel.

(¹³⁰) Pradel, Procédure pénal, 123 et seq.

(¹³¹) The inspecteurs de travail: art. L. 611–1 et seq. Code du travail.

(¹³²) Art. 215–1 C. consom.

(¹³³) Arts. L. 215–3–215-4, 222–1–222-3 C. consom. Various other administrative officers are given the same powers. In principle, the ordinary police are not excluded from the investigation of these offences special to the product context: Crim. 22 Jun. 1977, D 1977.IR.496 (in the context of misleading advertising).

(¹³⁴) Bihl, Droit pénal, 171 ; Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz, 252 .

(¹³⁵) I shall use action civile to refer to a civil claim brought by a victim in respect of a crime in a criminal court, though it is sometimes used more broadly so as to include a claim brought by such a victim in a civil court.

(¹³⁶) Arts. 388–1, 531 C.P.P. The courts apply art. 1384 als. 4–7 C.civ. to determine the liabilities of these non-criminals: Pradel, Procédure pénale, 283–4 , above, pp. 25–6.

(¹³⁷) Art. 388–1 C.P.P.

(¹³⁸) Arts. 2 & 85, C.P.P.

(¹³⁹) ‘plainte avec constitution de partie civile’. The procedure in respect of a contravention is termed citation directe.

(¹⁴⁰) This effect of a victim’s declaration of himself as partie civile was first established by the courts: Crim. 8 Dec. 1906, arrêt Thirion, D 1907.1.207, rapp. Laurent-Attalin and Crim. 28 May 1925, arrêt Bencker, DP 1926.1.121, note Leloir. And see arts. 1 al. 2, 85 et seq. C.P.P. Its roots are in pre-revolutionary practice: Viney, Introduction à la responsabilité, 112–13, 128 .

(¹⁴¹) Pradel, Procédure pénale, 180 . There are two further preventative controls on this power in the victim: (i) where the ministère public considers the claim insufficiently justified he may require the victim to be heard by a juge d’instruction (art. 86 al. 3 C.P.P); and (ii) he may set in motion a procedure by which proceedings start against an unknown defendant with the person accused by the victim appearing as a witness (réquisition non dénommée); art. 86 al. 2 C.P.P. For other restraints on the action civile, see Below, pp. 386–7. For more general discussion of the role of the parquet and juge d’instruction, see Bell, French Legal Cultures, 110–12, 115, 135–9 .

(¹⁴²) The victim of a crime can also trigger an investigation where the offender is unknown at the time: Pradel, Procédure pénale, 230 .

(¹⁴³) Arts. 176, 177 C.P.P.

(¹⁴⁴) Arts. 178 al. 1, 179 al. 1, 181 al. 1 C.C.P.

(¹⁴⁵) Art. 177 al. 1 C.P.P

(¹⁴⁶) Art. 185 C.P.P.

(¹⁴⁷) Art. 186 al.1 C.C.P.

(¹⁴⁸) Art. 186 al. 2 C.C.P.

(¹⁴⁹) Below, pp. 395–6.

(¹⁵⁰) Viney, Introduction à la responsabilité, 128 et seq. ; Pradel, Procédure pénale, 225–6 and F. Boulan, ‘Le double visage de l’action civile exercée devant la juridiction repressive’ JCP 1973.I.2563 .

(¹⁵¹) E.g. Crim. 15 Mar. 1977, JCP 1979.II.19148. For the immunity, see above, pp. 61–2.

(¹⁵²) Crim. 29 Nov. 1966, JCP 1967.II.14979 note PC.

(¹⁵³) Loi no. 73–1193 of 27 Dec.1973 (‘Loi Royer’) art. 46. These provisions, much amended, now appear in art. L. 411–1 et seq. C. consom. On the wider role of other types of associations as parties civiles, see Bell, French Legal Cultures, 140–2 .

(¹⁵⁴) Nguyen Thanh-Bourgeais, op. cit. n. 102 , D 1981.Chron.87, 92 referring to consumers’ association as ‘auxiliaires au ministère public’. See further Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz, 597–9 who note that usually consumers’ associations join existing proceedings rather than initiate their own.

(¹⁵⁵) Pradel, Procédure pénale, 249–52 .

(¹⁵⁶) Art. 434–1 C. pén. and see Crim. 2 Mar. 1961, D 1962.121 note Bouzat.

(¹⁵⁷) Merle and Vitu, Procédure pénale, 95 .

(¹⁵⁸) Above, pp. 370–1.

(¹⁵⁹) Pradel, Procédure pénale, 237, 292–3 ; art. 10 al.1 C.P.P.

(¹⁶⁰) Arts. 3 and 6 al. 1. C.P.P.

(¹⁶¹) Arts. 7–9 C.P.P. respectively. For this tripartite distinction see above, p. 369.

(¹⁶²) above, pp. 370–2.

(¹⁶³) Art. 2270–1 C. civ., above, p. 34.

(¹⁶⁴) Art. 10 al.1 C.P.P., as modified by loi no. 80–1042 of 23 Dec. 1980.

(¹⁶⁵) Above, p. 24.

(¹⁶⁶) Guinchard and Buisson, 598, 613 .

(¹⁶⁷) Art. 3 al. 2 C.P.P. A person who suffers damage to property alone may not claim as partie civile in respect of these offences against the person: Crim. 16 Mar. 1964, JCP 1964.II.13953 obs. PC.

(¹⁶⁸) Crim. 29 Nov. 1966, JCP 1967.II.14979 note PC. So, in the affaire Morhange (above, n. 102 n. 102) the relatives of the babies who died were denied damages for their grief: Nguyen Thanh-Bourgeais, op. cit. n. 102, 91.

(¹⁶⁹) Crim 9 Feb. 1989 and Crim 21 Mar. 1989, D 1989.614 note Bruneau (dommage moral in respect of witnessing serious injury to members of the family).

(¹⁷⁰) Pradel, Procédure pénale, 248–9 . On their right of recourse in general, above, p. 38.

(¹⁷¹) Ibid., 247–8 .

(¹⁷²) Art. 388–2 C.P.P.

(¹⁷³) Above, pp. 372–6.

(¹⁷⁴) Merle and Vitu, Procédure pénale, 16 (authors’ emphasis).

(¹⁷⁵) Above, pp. 46–8.

(¹⁷⁶) Pradel, Procyédure pénale, 306 .

(¹⁷⁷) Art. 85 C.P.P. This stage is compulsory for crimes, and only possible for contraventions if required by the procureur de la République: arts. 79 and 44 C.P.P.

(¹⁷⁸) This term includes all those public authorities whose duties include the investigation of offences: arts. 14–16 C.P.P.

(¹⁷⁹) Art. 179 C.P.P.

(¹⁸⁰) Above, p. 381.

(¹⁸¹) Art. 81 al. 1 C.P.P.

(¹⁸²) Art. 80–1 C.P.P. (which sets its conditions).

(¹⁸³) Pradel, Procédure pénale, 564–5 ; art. 156 C.P.P. The court nominates an expert normally from an official list: art. 157 al. 1 C.P.P.

(¹⁸⁴) Arts. 92 and 94 C.P.P.

(¹⁸⁵) Art. 97 C.P.P. (‘perquisition’). This rule is qualified in order to protect the defendant’s rights: Pradel, Procédure pénale, 356 et seq.

(¹⁸⁶) Pradel, Procédure pénale, 408 .

(¹⁸⁷) Ibid., at 230 .

(¹⁸⁸) Guinchard and Buisson, 444 et seq.

(¹⁸⁹) Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme of 27 Aug. 1789, art. 9; Guinchard and Buisson, 444 et seq. ; Spencer, op. cit. n. 128, 33 et seq.

(¹⁹⁰) Merle and Vitu, Procédure pénale, 155 . Cf. Guinchard and Buisson, 446 (‘the slightest doubt must benefit the accused’).

(¹⁹¹) Below, p. 423.

(¹⁹²) Art. 427 C.P.P. (‘The court decides according to its intimate conviction’) and see Guinchard and Buisson, 463 et seq.

(¹⁹³) E.g. Paris 7 May 1968, GP 1968.2.151 (two defendants acquitted of tromperieas there was doubt as to their bad faith).

(¹⁹⁴) Above, pp. 374–5.

(¹⁹⁵) Pradel, Procédure pénale, 230 ; G. Stefani, G. Levasseur and B. Bouloc, Procédure pénale (Dalloz, Paris, 19th. edn., 2000), 247 .

(¹⁹⁶) Merle and Vitu, Procédure pénale, 20 .

(¹⁹⁷) Art. 464 C.P.P.

(¹⁹⁸) Ibid.

(¹⁹⁹) Arts. R. 92–93 C.P.P. This also applies to expertises ordered after judgment on the action publique and concerned solely with a victim’s harm as these remain subject to the rules governing criminal procedure: Paris 19 Oct. 1968, D 1969 Somm. 31.

(²⁰⁰) Art. 800–1 N.C.P (loi no. 93–2 of 4 Jan. 1993, art. 120).

(²⁰¹) E.g. €90 in the case of proceedings in the Tribunal correctionnel: art. 1018-A Code général des impôts.

(²⁰²) Pradel, Procédure pénale, 854 et seq.

(²⁰³) Arts. 216, 375, 475–1, 543 C.P.P. Cf. art 700 N.c.pr.civ.

(²⁰⁴) Art. 800–2 C.P.P. (as inserted by loi no. 2000–516 of 15 Jun. 2000, art. 88).

(²⁰⁵) Bell, Boyron, Whittaker, 133–4 .

(²⁰⁶) Guinchard and Buisson, 1056–7 . There is an even greater reliance on oral evidence for the most serious offences tried by the Cour d’assises: ibid., 1070 .

(²⁰⁷) For the Tribunal correctionnel: arts. 442, 442–1 C.P.P. The accused and the partie civile can put questions to witnesses only through the court: art. 442–1 al. 2 C.P.P.

(²⁰⁸) Guinchard and Buisson, 1081 .

(²⁰⁹) C. Roca, ‘Nouvelle définition de l’infraction non intentionnelle: une réforme qui en cache une autre plus importante’ Petites affiches (26 Oct. 2000) no. 214, 4, 4–5 .

(²¹⁰) Above, pp. 381–2.

(²¹¹) Art. 88, 177–2 C.P.P

(²¹²) Above, p. 382.

(²¹³) Art. 226–10 C. pén. Art. 91 C.P.P. provides a further independent ground for recovery of damages against a partie civile who initiates proceedings which are negligent or in bad faith where the juge d’instruction orders that there is no case to be tried.

(²¹⁴) Above, pp. 377–8.

(²¹⁵) J. Pradel, evidence to the Sénat’s Commission des Lois in Fauchon, Rapport , Sén. No. 177, Annex 1.

(²¹⁶) Cf. Above, p. 369 on the jurisdiction for délits.

(²¹⁷) Loi no. 96–393 of 13 May 1996, art. 1.

(²¹⁸) Arts. 2123–34, 3123–28, 4123–28 C. G.C.T.: Desportes and Le Gunehec, 441–2 .

(²¹⁹) Desportes and Le Gunehec, 439–40 .

(²²⁰) Ibid., 442–3 .

(²²¹) Crim. 24 Jun. 1997, Bull. crim. no. 251.

(²²²) Above, p. 373.

(²²³) Desportes and Le Gunehec, 443 citing Crim. 2 Apr. 1997, Bull. crim. no. 132.

(²²⁴) J. Pradel, ‘De la véritable portée de la loi du 10 juillet 2000 sur la définition des délits non intentionnels’ D 2000 Point de vue , V. Similarly, Y. Mayaud, ‘Intervention sur la loi du 10 juillet 2000’ GP 31 Jul. 2000, 1193, 1194; Véron, (9th. edn.) 71, 75 (who sees the change as ‘purely formal’).

(²²⁵) S. Petit (Conseiller référendaire at the Cour de cassation) ‘La responsabilité pénale des agents publics et des élus’ GP 1999. 2. 1746, 1749–51.

(²²⁶) J.-P Gauzer (representing the Association des maires de France), evidence to Sénat’s Commission des Lois in Fauchon, Rapport, Sén. No. 177, Annex 1 .

(²²⁷) Loi no. 2000–647 of 10 Jul. 2000.

(²²⁸) Proposition de loi tendant à préciser la définition des délits non intentionneh, exposé des motifs, Sén. No. 9 (7 Oct. 1999).

(²²⁹) This was the view of the report to the Garde des sceaux by J. Massot(chair), Le groupe d’etude sur la responsabilité pénale des décideurs publics (8 Jun. 1999) (available at 〉http://www.sante-publique.org/Massot/massot.htm〈) Chap. II (2)(A) 2° and 3°. Fauchon himself was unconvinced: Fauchon, Rapport, Sén. no. 177, I (B) (4).

(²³⁰) Ibid. III(C) .

(²³¹) S. Petit, evidence to Commission quoted in Fauchon, Rapport , Sén. No. 177, Annex 1.

(²³²) J.-D. Nuttens, ‘La loi Fauchon du 10 juillet 2000 ou la fin de la confusion de la faute civile et de la faute pénale d’imprudence’ GP 2000.2.1740, 1744–5 referring to J.O. Rép. fr. 2nd séance of 5 Apr. 2000, 3125 (speech of the garde des Sceaux).

(²³³) Crim. 12 Dec. 2000, affaire du Drac, Bull. crim. no. 371.

(²³⁴) Art. 121–3 al. 4 C. pén. as inserted by the loi of 2000, art. 1.

(²³⁵) It was extended to govern the fault element of the contravention of causing less serious personal injuries in 2001: art. R. 610–2 al. 2 C. pén. On the debate see in particular: Pradel, op. cit. n. 224, D 2000 Point de vue, V; V. Similarly, Mayaud, op. cit. n. 224, 1193; Nuttens, op. cit. n. 232.

(²³⁶) The loi of 2000 made a possibly significant change to art. 121–3 al.3 by replacing ‘réglements with ‘règlement’, this being seen as changing its significance from rules generally to règlements in the constitutional sense: cf. Above, p. 387. However, this change is very small given the breadth of imprudence and négligence: Ministre de la justice, Présentation des dispositions de la loi no. 2000–647 du 10 juillet 2000, Circulaire No. 1796–6B of 11 Oct. 2000 (‘Circulaire of 2000’), para. 1.2.1.

(²³⁷) Below, pp. 391–2.

(²³⁸) Y. Mayaud, ‘Retour sur la culpabilité non intentionnelle en droit pénal’ D 2000 Chron. 603, 606. For the courts’ earlier and still general approach, above, pp. 375–6.

(²³⁹) G. Viney, evidence quoted in Fauchon, Rapport, Sén. No. 177, Annex 1 . For other critics, see C. Ruet, ‘La responsabilité pénale pour faute d’imprudence après la loi du 10 juillet 2000 tendant à préciser la définition des délits non intentionnels’ Droit pénal (Jan. 2001) ; P.J. Pansier and C. Charbonneau, ‘Commentaire de la loi sur la responsabilité pénale des élus’ Petites affches (Jul. 2000) .

(²⁴⁰) J. Pradel, evidence quoted in Fauchon, Rapport, Sén. No. 177, Annex 1 ; Constitution of 1958, art. 34.

(²⁴¹) Ibid. para. 2.3.1.

(²⁴²) P. Mistretta, ‘La responsabilité pénale médicale à l’aune de la loi du 10 juillet 2000. Evolution ou révolution?’ JCP 2002.I.149. E.g. Crim. 29 Oct. 2002, Bull. crim. no. 196; Crim. 13 Nov. 2002, Bull. crim. no. 203.

(²⁴³) For examples: TGI La Rochelle 19 Sept. 2000, Rennes 19 Sept. 2000, Pettites affiches no. 234 (23 Nov. 2000) 11 note Vital-Durand .

(²⁴⁴) Circulaire of 2000, para. 2.3.2.

(²⁴⁵) Rennes 19 Sept. 2000, cit., (headteacher and junior teachers criminally responsible for death of child on expedition for failing to take appropriate precautions).

(²⁴⁶) P. Conte, ‘Le lampiste et la mort’ Droit pénal (Jan. 2001) 10 .

(²⁴⁷) Circulaire of 2000, para. 2.3.4 referring to R. Dosière, Rapport, AN no. 2266 (22 Mar. 2000) 41 .

(²⁴⁸) Crim. 11 Apr. 1999, Droit pénal (Nov. 1991), 5.

(²⁴⁹) Crim. 10 Jan. 2001, Bull. crim. no. 2.

(²⁵⁰) The cleaner did not appeal from his conviction.

(²⁵¹) Cf. Com. 20 Mar. 2001, Bull. crim. no. 71. (shipbuilder convicted of involuntary homicide for deaths when ship sank for fault in the design of one of the electrical panels allowed water in, thereby stop ping the pumps; case sent to be re-tried on the basis that the new law provided for a special test of fault where damage was indirect).

(²⁵²) Crim. 6 Jun. 1999, Droit pénal (Nov. 1991), 5 .

(²⁵³) Art. 121–3 al. 4 C. pén. in fine.

(²⁵⁴) Desportes and Le Gunehec, 453 .

(²⁵⁵) Ibid., 453 and see J.-M. Bizat, ‘Les députés corrigent la réforme sénatoriale de la pénalisation desfautes non intentionnelles’, Le Monde 7 Apr. 2000 .

(²⁵⁶) Crim. 4 Jun. 2002, D 2003.95 note Petit.

(²⁵⁷) Pradel, op. cit. n. 224, D 2000, VII.

(²⁵⁸) The central authorities on the basis that the State cannot be criminally responsible; the local authorities on the basis that these powers are not ones which they can‘delegate’ within the meaning of art. 121–2 al. 2 C. pén.

(²⁵⁹) Above, p. 390.

(²⁶⁰) Above, p. 315.

(²⁶¹) Above, pp. 391–2.

(²⁶²) Crim. 24 Oct. 2000, (no. 00–80.378) in Y. Mayaud, ‘Sommaire de jurisprudence sur les violences non intentionnelles après la loi du 10 juillet 2000’ Revue de science criminelle (2001) 156, 162–3 .

(²⁶³) Mayaud, ibid., 163 ; Circulaire of 2000, para. 1.2.2.1; Ruet, op. cit. n. 239, 8–9 .

(²⁶⁴) So, Mayaud, op. cit. n. 224 ; Nuttens, op. cit. n. 232 ; A. Dorsner-Dolivet, ‘Que devient le principe de l’identité des fautes civiles et pénales aprés la loi du 10 juillet 2000?’ Revue de la recherche juridique (Aix-en-Provence, 2002–1) 199 .

(²⁶⁵) Art. 4–1 C.P.P. inserted by loi of 2000, art. 2.

(²⁶⁶) Cf. above and see Fauchon, Rapport, Sén. no. 177 ,

(²⁶⁷) P. Jourdain, ‘Autorité’ de la chose jugée au pénal et principe d’unité des fautes: la rupture est consommée entre faute civile et faute pénale, mais l’est-elle totalement’ D 2001 Somm. comm. 2232, 2233 ; Circulaire of 2000, para. 1.1.1.

(²⁶⁸) Pradel, Droit pénal, 462 .

(²⁶⁹) Jourdain, op. cit. n. 267, 2233 .

(²⁷⁰) Crim. 28 Sept. 1999, Bull. crim. no. 198 (absence of criminal fault does not prevent civil liability for contractual fault); art. 470–1 C.P.P.; Roca, op. cit. n. 209, 5.

(²⁷¹) Roca, , ibid., passim.

(²⁷²) Above, pp. 384–6.

(²⁷³) For proceedings in the civil and administrative courts, see above, pp. 149–51, 315–19, 324.

(²⁷⁴) Below, pp. 395–8.

(²⁷⁵) Below, pp. 398–401.

(²⁷⁶) Below, pp. 396–7, 399.

(²⁷⁷) Two others were charged with refusal to prevent the commission of a délit under art. 63 al. 1 A.C. pén.: the former Director General of Health and the former Director of the National Health Laboratory. The former was found guilty and sentenced to four years’ suspended sentence of imprisonment; the latter was acquitted. Their part in the proceeds is omitted in the following discussion.

(²⁷⁸) Crim. 22 Jun. 1994, JCP 1994.II.41 note Rassat quoting the decision of the Cour d’appel of 13 Jul. 1993.

(²⁷⁹) H. Légal, concl. to CE Ass. 9 Apr. 1993, D 1993.312 (above, pp. 315–19).

(²⁸⁰) Arts. 301, 302 A.C. pén. and see A. Prothais, note to Paris (Chambre d’accusation) 19 Sept. 1991 and Trib. corr. Paris 23 Oct. 1992, D 1993.222, 223. They had also earlier alleged a failure to assist some one in danger under art. 63 A.C. pén.

(²⁸¹) Above, p. 369.

(²⁸²) Paris (Chambre d’accusation) 19 Sept. 1991 D 1993.222 note Prothais.

(²⁸³) Art. 63 al. 1 A.C. pén. (now art. 223–6.1 C. pén.).

(²⁸⁴) Under art. 319 A.C. pén. (and see above, p. 372).

(²⁸⁵) Art. 186 C.C.P; Crim. 1 Dec.1964, Bull crim. no. 318 and see above, p. 382.

(²⁸⁶) Below, pp. 397–8.

(²⁸⁷) Merle and Vitu, Procédure pénale, 686 et seq. ; Pradel, Procédure pénale, 105–108 .

(²⁸⁸) Trib. corr. Paris 23 Oct. 1992 (extracts), 2éme esp., D 1993.222 note Prothais. Garetta’s sentence was the most severe which the law allowed in the aggravating circumstances found in art. 2 al. 1 of the loi of 1 Aug. 1905.

(²⁸⁹) Paris 13 Jul. 1993, D 1994.18 note Prothais; Crim. 22 Jun. 1994, JCP 1994.II.22310 note Rassat (Allain’s pourvoi). The réquisitions of A.-G. Perfetti and the rapport of the conseiller Blin are reported in Pradel, Sang et droit pénal, 111 and 145 respectively .

(²⁹⁰) Ibid.

(²⁹¹) Prothais, note, D 1993.222 at 224 and cf. above, pp. 370–1.

(²⁹²) Delmas Saint-Hilaire, op. cit. n. 56, in Pradel (ed.), Sang et droit pénal, 39 at 41 ; J.H. Robert, Droit pénal 1994.somm. no. 12 .

(²⁹³) Delmas Saint-Hilaire, op. cit. n. 56, 58–9 .

(²⁹⁴) Art. 302 A.C. pén. specified the death penalty, but this was generally abolished in France and replaced by life imprisonment by the loi no. 81–908 of 9 Oct. 1981. Under 221–5 C. pén., poisoning is punished by a maximum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment.

(²⁹⁵) Delmas Saint-Hilaire, op. cit. n. 56, 58.

(²⁹⁶) Loi no. 91–1406 of 31 Dec. 1991, art. 47 on which see S. Durfort, ‘La procédure légale d’indemnisation des victimes’ in B. Feuillet-Le Mintier (ed.) Le Sida, Aspects juridiques (Economica, Paris, 1995), 111 ; J.-M. Pontier, ‘Sida, de la responsabilité à la garantie sociale (à propos de la loi du 31 Décembre 1991)’ RDFA 8 (1992) 533 .

(²⁹⁷) It was later so decided: Crim. (2) 26 Jan. 1994, Bull. civ. II no. 41. Some of the parties civiles were infected by HIV before the time when the defendants were aware of its dangers and reliance on tromperie avoided the problem of whether their‘sur-contamination’ had caused them any harm. On this idea, cf. below, p. 400.

(²⁹⁸) Trib. corr. Paris 23 Oct. 1992, quoted by Blin, op. cit. n. 289, 168.

(²⁹⁹) Trib. corr. Paris 23 Oct. 1992, cit.

(³⁰⁰) It fell within a section headed ‘Murder, assassination, parricide, infanticide, poisoning’ which starts by defining murder as‘homicide commis volontairement’: art. 295 A.C. pén.

(³⁰¹) Art. 301 A.C. pén. used the phrase‘an attempt on the life’ of a person: M. Danti-Juan, ‘Sang contaminé, tromperie et empoisonnement. Trop et trop peu n’est pas mésure…’ in Pradel, Sang et droit pénal, 61 at 66 .

(³⁰²) Prothais, note, D 1993.222 at 226.

(³⁰³) Prothais, ibid., and note D 1994.118; Delmas Saint-Hilaire, op. cit. n. 56; id.,‘Homicide Assassiné (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour de Paris rendu le 13 juillet 1993 dans l’affaire dite “du sang contaminé”)’ GP 1994.1.173.

(³⁰⁴) Delmas Saint-Hilaire, op. cit. n. 56, 54.

(³⁰⁵) op. cit. n. 303.

(³⁰⁶) Above, p. 372.

(³⁰⁷) Paris 31 Jul. 1993, D 1994.118.

(³⁰⁸) op. cit. n. 303, at 175.

(³⁰⁹) op. cit. n. 289, 138–142.

(³¹⁰) Ibid., 140–2.

(³¹¹) Crim. 22 Jun.1994, whose judgment is published in full in Pradel, Sang et droit pénal, 171 et seq.

(³¹²) J.Y. Chevallier, ‘L’affaire du sang contaminé’ in Pradel, Sang et droit pénal, 23 at 35 .

(³¹³) Ibid., 30–2 and see Le Monde 11 Sept. 1999 .

(³¹⁴) Blin, op. cit. n. 289, 151 .

(³¹⁵) Constitution of 1958, art. 67 (as promulgated).

(³¹⁶) Under art. 63 al. 2 A.C. pén. now arts 223–6.1 & 223–7 C. pén.

(³¹⁷) The possibility of charges on this basis had been raised in the Sénat but expressly excluded from the motion by which the special criminal proceedings were commenced: P. Truche, procureur général before the Commission d’instruction of the Haute Cour de Justice, réquisitions reported in Droit pénal Mar. 1993. Chron. no. 8, 3 .

(³¹⁸) Haute Cour de Justice (Commission d’instruction) 5 Feb. 1993, D 1993.261 note Pradel.

(³¹⁹) Ibid., 264.

(³²⁰) Ibid., 264–5.

(³²¹) Constitution of 1958, art. 68.

(³²²) Loi constitutionnelle no. 93–952 of 27 Jul. 1993.

(³²³) Loi organique no 93–1251 of 23 Nov. 1993, art. 12.

(³²⁴) Constitution of 1958, art. 68–1.

(³²⁵) Ibid., art. 68–2.

(³²⁶) Ibid., art. 68–1 al. 3; Loi organique no. 93–1251 of 23 Nov. 1993, arts. 33, 34.

(³²⁷) Loi organique no. 93–1251 of 23 Nov. 1993, art. 13 al. 2; C. Lienhard ‘La Cour de justice de la République et sa procédure à l’épreuve de sa première expérience’ JCP 1999.I.505, 506.

(³²⁸) Constitution of 1958, art. 68–3.

(³²⁹) Cour de justice de la République 9 Mar. 1999, D 1999 IR 86, and see the comments in Le Monde, 10 Mar. 1999, 6–7 which records the size of majority of the votes cast by the judges and comments on the political aspects of the decision.

(³³⁰) Le Monde, 11 Mar. 1999 .

(³³¹) J. Pradel, ‘Cour de justice de la République: oui mais…’ JCP Dernière actualité (15 Apr. 1999) no. 15, 1.

(³³²) C. Prieur, Le Monde, 14 Nov. 2000 . On the loi of 2000, see above, pp. 389–93.

(³³³) Paris (Ch. instr.) 4 Jul. 2002, D 2003.164 note Prothais.

(³³⁴) Crim. 18 Jun. 2003, Bull. crim. no. 127, JCP 2003.II.10121 note Rassat. And the Cour de cassation declared that‘the crime of poisoning can be constituted only if the defendant has acted with the intention to bring about death, this élément moral of poisoning being in common with other voluntary offences against human life’.

(³³⁵) Le Monde, 20 Jun. 2003 .

(³³⁶) Paris 31 Jul. 1993, above, p. 397.

(³³⁷) Above, pp. 388–94.

(³³⁸) Above, pp. 378–9, 388.