1. Answer the questions:

1. What was the biggest mistake in stowage of bagged copra?

2. Is it correct to give a deck stowage to dry cargo which can be easily wetted?

3. What consequences may such stowage lead to in prevailing circumstances such as adverse weather?

4. What put the master and the crew in grave danger?

5. How do you think, why was it better to use foam to extinguish bagged copra fire?

6. Will it be reasonable and justified to take legal action against Port Authorities who endangered the crew by forcing them to cast off from the berth?

2. Explain the following expressions :

1. an open-decked self-propelled barge -

2. to be stacked against -

3. fierce blaze -

4. to cast off -

5. to be exposed to -

3. Match the synonyms:

1. wharf a) self-ignition

2. athwartship b) conflagration

3. to cast off c) shipment

4. fierce blaze d) serious

5. consignment e) across

6. grave f) to let go the lines

7. combustion g) quay

4. Choose the correct answer :

1. Bagged copra must be loaded :

a) on deck

b) into holds

c) in tanks

d) in reservoirs

2. Copra is liable to produce heat when:

a) wetted

b) stowed

c) in contact with metal surface

d) heated and exposed to air

3. The worried harbour authorities forced the barge to:

a) make fast alongside

b) cast off

100. exhibit NUC shapes

d) stay adrift

4. The harbour authorities ' act was careless because:

a) the barge didn't complete loading

b) the cargo was improperly stowed

c) the master and the crew were endangered

d) another ships were waiting for vacant berth

5. Dry cargo such as copra may be loaded during adverse weather if :

a) the LOI was issued

b) it was covered with tarpaulins

c) never

d) shipper agrees

55

Collision during berthing

Own vessel, a product tanker in ballast, was moving from anchorage to her designated berth. As she passed the breakwater inwards, a tug was made fast on the port quarter. She was to berth starboard side to, astern of anchor moored vessel. After she was swung in the turning basin, she headed towards her berth at about three knots. When approaching the berth, the master and the pilot stationed themselves on the starboard wing and manoeuvring control was transferred to the bridge wing unit. When the chief officer reported from the forecastle that the distance between own ship's bow and the stern of other ship was about 100 metres, own vessel was still moving ahead at about three knots.

Realising that the speed was excessive, the master ordered slow astern, followed by full astern. However, this did not prevent the bow of own ship from making contact with the other vessel in the way of her accommodation block. Damage to own vessel consisted of indentation of the bulwark plates and a 800 mm long tear of the shell plating on the starboard bow.

Root cause/ contributory factors

1.Unsafe/excessive speed on final approach to the berth;

2.The passage plan and master/ pilot information exchange did not specify the speed of approach when approaching berth;

3.The astern movement on the main engine was ordered much too late;

4.The tug that was made fast was not used by the pilot to decelerate the ship's forward motion;

5.Ship's staff did not consider using the anchor, even though the forecastle station was manned;

6. Bow thruster and the Becker rudder were not effectively used in combination which could have avoided contact.

Corrective/preventative actions

1. Root cause analysis carried out and results explained to master;

2. Fleet instructions issued to all masters to discuss in detail with pilots the planned speeds when approaching berths,passing traffic and anchored ships. Same to be recorded in the master-pilot information exchange document;

3. During masters' debriefing, the VDR playback will be reviewed to analyse the actions taken and discuss what could have been done to avoid the contact;

4. Masters to be given more simulator training;

5. Ship staff advised to fully familiarise themselves with the operation and characteristics of the Becker rudder, because this is very advantageous during berthing/unberthing, slow speed manoeuvres, and when navigating in restricted waters;

6. Fleet circular issued with specific advice that the bridge team and master must monitor the pilot's actions closely and not hesitate to countermand pilot's orders if necessary to ensure safety;

7. The incident shall be permanently included in senior officers' pre-joining briefing;

8. On every vessel, deck officers to be given familiarisation training in emergency operation of the main engine by the chief engineer;

9. Marine superintendents shall discuss this incident with bridge team members and shall review the entries in the master/pilot information exchange form.