2. Give your own explanation to the following words and expressions:

a) to adjust to

b) to be enveloped by

c) debris cloud

d) to alleviate

e) fatality

35

Close Encounter at mpc Buoy

Own ship was bound for the NE Spit Pilot Station and due to cross the SW Lane at the MPC Buoy. SHIP 1 was making about the same speed as own ship and she had been about 2 miles ahead for most of the Dover Strait transit. SHIP 1 originally had SHIP 2 ahead and had altered course to port , overtaking SHIP 2 close down her port side. Once past SHIP 2, SHIP 1 altered course to starboard and then appeared to head off to pass East of the Sandettie Bank.

Meanwhile, own ship was overtaking SHIP 3 at a distance of 0.5nm. I altered course slightly to port to increase CPA to about 0.6nm. SHIP 4 must have spotted this as she passed between us. By this time SHIP 2 had crossed own ship's bow and was almost abeam of the MPC Buoy. I advised Dover Coastguard of the proximity of SHIP 4 and then noticed that SHIP 2 had altered to starboard and was re-crossing my bow at about 0.9nm ahead. I swung to port to cross her stern as SHIP 4 was beside me to starboard. A minute or so later I was clear of the MPC Buoy and continued my turn to cross the SW Lane. None of the other ships crossed the SW Lane.

1. Answer the questions

1. How many ships were involved in this situation?

2. Who was bound for the NE Spit Pilot Station?

3. Which ships had the same speed?

4. Why did Ship 1 alter her course to port?

5. When did ship 1 alter her course to starboard?

6. Which ship was overtaking ship 3?

7. Who was abeam of the MPC Buoy?

8. At what distance was ship 2 re-crossing the own ship’s bow?

2. Match the expressions with their synonyms

1. to alter a. to keep away of

2. to overtake b. to be at right angles to the keel of a ship

3. to be abeam of c. to change

4. to swing d. to pass after catching up with

5. to be clear of e. to make a sharp turn

36

Collision with a Tug Wire

A vessel outbound from a port collided with a tug and barge in the entrance channel. The sailing had been delayed due to low visibility and fog but eventually the channel was opened to outbound traffic and a decision made to sail. Upon sailing, the visibility conditions continued to deteriorate and fog signals were started, however, by the time the vessel had cleared the harbour area, the visibility had reduced further. The bridge and engine room was fully manned with a Bosun and AB stationed on the bow for lookout and emergency anchor purposes.

The vessel was on full manoeuvring speed of about 12 knots. The Pilot stated that there was no traffic visible by radar and he required the speed to overcome a customary westerly set of the current in that area. On passing buoys 17 and 18 of the outer bank channel, a radar contact was observed in the channel near buoys 7 and 8 approximately 4.5 miles ahead. The Pilot attempted to contact the target on both channels 13 and 16 without success but maintained full ahead manoeuvring speed.

On passing buoys 11 and 12, the Pilot made the first successful radio contact with the unknown target and the vessel's speed was reduced to half-ahead. The Pilot explained to the Master that the target had been identified as an outbound tug with a barge in tow, and that he had agreed with the tug's master to overtake by turning to starboard.

On approaching buoy 9, the Pilot initiated the agreed starboard turn anticipating that the westerly set of the current would assist the vessel to swing to starboard. Shortly after the helm was put hard to starboard the bow lookout reported a red buoy just off the port bow (buoy 8). The Master and Pilot went immediately to the port bridge wing (in my experience, this is not a good move!! - Ed.) and, on seeing the buoy, the Master ordered hard to port in order to clear the buoy. The Pilot reminded the Master that the port turn would in effect head the vessel in the same direction that the tug was presumably turning. At this point there were further engine and helm orders to clear the tug and tow, however, the vessel crossed over the tow wire. The Pilot called the tug to release the tow wire, and when the vessel cleared the tow wire, the Master manoeuvred the vessel to anchor west of the channel in the vicinity of buoy 5.

There were no injuries on board the vessel or tugboat. After a diving survey of the vessel's hull, rudder and propeller, the attending Classification Surveyor found the vessel in all respects capable of continuing on her voyage, the only damage detected being a slight indent to one propeller blade.

Lessons Learned

Investigations showed that a comprehensive berth to berth passage plan had been prepared and executed. The Master/Pilot information exchange had been carried out in accordance with the Company Safety Management System and the Master had discussed the prevailing weather conditions and visibility with the Pilot. The abort plan was to anchor at "Anchorage X" if the visibility deteriorated and, although the visibility in the fairway was constantly monitored, it did not deteriorate drastically until the vessel was beyond the last possible abort point, at "Anchorage X".

The helmsman and Second Officer followed the instructions of the Master and Pilot, monitoring and logging the vessel's progress, however, the Second Officer was not involved with monitoring radar targets, this function being carried out by the Master and the two Pilots.