1. Answer the questions

1.What was the heavy lift vessel's course?

2.What kind of area was it?

3.Why did the OOW decide to alter the ship's course to starboard?

4.What was the reason for Master to decide to give hard-a-starboard rudder?

5.What is the lesson for mariners that this accident demonstrates?

2. Decide if these statements are true or false. Correct the wrong ones.

1.Own ship was a dry-cargo ship loaded with a huge rig._______________

2. The bridge was manned with Master and the OOW during the 2000-2004 watch.___________

3. The OOW (who had the con) changed the course to starboard._____________

4. The other vessel suddenly showed wrong lights indicating that she had altered to poet._________

5. This incident shows that one always has to keep a good lookout to prevent some incidents at sea.__________

24

Unsafe Speed in Congested Area

After sailing from Port Kelang, Malaysia, and joining westbound lane of the Malacca Strait TSS, my 2,824 TEU container vessel proceeded on maneuvering speed and with manned machinery space towards One Fathom Bank. It was early morning, with the 2nd. mate on watch but following my experience and good seamanship practice, I decided to remain on the bridge and not to commence sea passage until passing One Fathom Bank shoal.

Ahead of my vessel was a VLCC in ballast, heading NW with the speed of 15.5 kts. Due to having calculated the CPA in the vicinity of the narrowest part of the TSS, my vessel was keeping a safe speed in order to give way to the VLCC. Behind my vessel, also heading NW, was a rapidly closing post-panamax container vessel with the speed of over 26 knots. Bearing in mind how dangerous it is to keep the vessel on full sea speed in such traffic condition, I was thinking that she would reduce her speed or to take some another kind of action in order to avoid a close quarters situation. However, nothing happened, no action taken by the post-panamax container vessel. She was keeping full sea speed of over 26 knots and she was heading in between the two ships ahead of her with CPA of zero.

When the situation become too serious and when it was quite clear that fully laden container vessel was not aware how serious the situation was, I gave the order to alter the course to port, even to cross border of the TSS and to enter into the opposite lane. She was not responding to calls from the VTS. The only action taken was, in the very last moment, sounding her whistle and desperately calling on VHF Ch.16/88, something like: " tanker vessel ahead of me, tanker vessel ahead of me. . . "

Most probably the OOW on board the fast container vessel was thinking that my vessel was a tanker because we had a dangerous cargo light on. She passed "safely" with less then 100m in between the two vessels. The OOW on board the container vessel was most probably not sufficiently experienced to be able to manoeuvre such a large ship at such high speed in a narrow channel and close to shallow waters. The absence of the captain on the bridge was evident. The plotting of vessels in the vicinity on the bridge of the container vessel was wrong and the COLREGS were not followed.