Test 2 Russia in the modern system of international relations

Ex.1 Make the literary translation of the text.

The ussr in 1991: The Implosion of a Superpower

by Dr Robert F. Miller

If 1989 and 1990 were the years of the sudden dismantling of the Soviet empire abroad, 1991 witnessed the extension of the collapse of communist rule to the imperial heartland itself. Toward the close of the year it was not at all clear whether something resembling a unified state could even be stitched together to provide a partner for negotiating with the Western allies on the terms for the further reduction of nuclear weapons and the final ending of the cold war.

The dramatic events of 1991 had their origins in Gorbachev's decision to shift his base of political support to the right in the fall of 1990, when he abandoned the so-called '500 days' program of economic reform by his liberal economic advisors in favour of a hybrid compromise plan espoused by his Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and supported by anti-reform conservatives.

There were two basic, competing positions in the foreign policy decision-making establishment on the question of Soviet commitments throughout the world. The first, represented by Shevardnadze and the reformers, was in favour of cutting losses associated with the maintainenance of what was left of the global Soviet strategic presence. For example, in Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam and Afghanistan. The second, closely, but not exclusively, identified with the conservatives, was to preserve these links wherever possible.

The reasons for Gorbachev's shift to the right on foreign policy are not entirely clear, but the domestic factor was undoubtedly crucial. One element there was the rise to a position of independent power of his nemesis Boris Yeltsin, whose ventures into foreign policy and domestic nationalities affairs were of a decidedly liberal colouration. This was probably a significant psychological impetus to Gorbachev's determination to take a contrary position.

It is well known that Yeltsin and his policies were anathema to military and civilian conservatives. Gorbachev's adoption of a harder line in foreign policy may have been partly designed also to assure the conservatives that he was not contemplating an alliance with Yeltsin. Something they evidently anticipated with fear and loathing.

US President George Bush and other Western leaders were patently uneasy over the effects of the putsch and their implications for relations with the Soviet Union. They clearly preferred to continue to deal with Gorbachev, but they recognised the importance of opening up communications with Yeltsin and the leaders of the other key republics that were threatening to go it alone. The issue of control over nuclear weapons was obviously a crucial consideration here. The leaders of Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan, where the major part of the nuclear arsenal outside of Russia were deployed, evidently wished to keep control over these weapons as at least a short-term bargaining chip in dealings with Yeltsin and Gorbachev, on the one hand, and the West, on the other.

The economic and diplomatic implications of the post-putsch situation were particularly visible in the USSR's relations with former client states, such as Cuba, Vietnam and India. The costs of retaining even a downgraded military presence in the former two countries were now even more difficult to bear, especially in the light of Washington's threat to link economic aid to a reduction of that presence, particularly in Cuba. Accordingly, Gorbachev in mid-September announced the withdrawal, over Cuban protests, of the so-called 'training brigade' from Cuba, which had been a source of consternation in Washington ever since the Carter presidency.

The change in Soviet conduct of world affairs since the August putsch is symbolised by the radical shakeup in the composition of the high command of the armed forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is still in progress.

One of the most significant potential changes in these organisations will be a promised downgrading of the role of the KGB in personnel appointments and the operational patterns of both.

Gorbachev's personal role in foreign policy has undoubtedly been shaken, but it would be at least premature to write him off, even if, for the time being, he will have to consult with his republican colleagues and liberal advisers before taking major foreign policy initiatives to a much greater extent than was his wont in the past. He still enjoyed a considerably wider constituency of supporters abroad than he does at home, and this well known fact will probably serve him well in arguing his irreplaceability to his colleagues. For the foreseeable future Soviet energies will be considerably more heavily engaged in problems of domestic crisis-management and economic and political consolidation, and in relations with countries nearer to the borders of the USSR, than in the grandiose global strategies of the era of Gorbachev's Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk initiatives.

Ex.2 Answer the questions in writing. Try not to use the phrases from the text.

1. How can you characterize the situation in the USSR before its collapse?

2. What are the origins of the dramatic events of 1991?

3. What are the basic positions in the foreign policy decision-making establishment on the question of Soviet commitments throughout the world?

4. What are the reasons for Gorbachev's shift to the right on foreign policy?

5. What can you say about Gorbachev's personal role in the USSR foreign policy?

6. How did the August putsch influence the Soviet conduct of world affairs?

Ex.3 Having read the text, find out the translation of the following expressions from the context:

1. dismantling of the Soviet empire

2. to have a liberal colouration

3. to be anathema to military and civilian conservatives

4. to be uneasy over smth

5. client states

6. a source of consternation

7. to write smb off

8. constituency of supporters

Ex. 4 Read the text and single out:

1. The guiding principles of national interests of the Russian Federation.

2. Changes in Russian foreign policy.

3. The results of the December 1993 elections.