- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
Since the risk-adjusted discount rate method uses the traded stocks of comparison firms
to estimate the betas of projects, it is important that the beta risk of the equity of the
comparison firms be truly comparable. However, it is not enough to merely use firms
in the same line of business as the project. Since the amount of debt financing a firm
takes on can dramatically affect equity betas, it is necessary to adjust for differing
amounts of debt financing in order to make appropriate beta risk comparisons.
In this section, we explore the effect of debt financing, also known as leverage, on
the beta and standard deviation of a firm’s equity. We begin by performing a financ-
ing experiment in which a firm issues risk-free debt, but does not alter the operations
of the firm. Hence, the proceeds of the debt issue are used to retire outstanding equity
while sales, EBIT, marketing, production, and so forth remain the same.
The Balance Sheet for an All-Equity-Financed Firm
Begin with an all-equity-financed firm. Exhibit 11.2 illustrates the familiar account-
ing balance sheet in T-account form. The left-hand side reflects the assets of the firm
and the right-hand side reflects the debt (liabilities) and equity. In contrast to an
-
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EXHIBIT11.2Balance Sheet foran All-Equity-Financed Firm
-
Assets
Liabilities and Equity
-
A
Debt
0 (i.e., D 0)
Equity
E
EXHIBIT11.3Balance Sheet fora Firm with Leverage
-
Assets
Liabilities and Equity
-
A
Debt
D(D 0)
Equity
E
accounting balance sheet, which reflects book values, the T-account in Exhibit 11.2
describes market values. Hence, Arepresents the market value of the firm’s assets and
Ethe market value of the firm’s equity. In the absence of leverage, Aequals Ebecause
the two sides of the balance sheet add up to the same number; that is, they balance.
This identity implies that the riskof Aand Ein the all equity-financed firm must be
the same, whether risk is measured as standard deviation (in which case ), or
AE
as beta risk (in which case ).
AE
The Balance Sheet for a Firm Partially Financed with Debt
Now, let us introduce debt. In this case, the balance sheet looks like the T-account
depicted in Exhibit 11.3. Because the two sides of the balance sheet must balance,
ADE.
In other words, the market value of the assets of the firm must equal the sum of the
market values of the debt and equity. This makes sense. All of the future cash flows
from the assets of the firm must at some point flow to the cash flow claimants. An
investor who buys up all the debt and equity of the firm has a right to all the cash
flows produced by the assets. Hence, the sum of the market values of the debt and
equity must be the same as the market value of the firm’s assets.
The Right-Hand Side of the Balance Sheet as a Portfolio
Now, view the right-hand side of the balance sheet in Exhibit 11.3 as a portfolio of
investments, with the weight on debt as D/(DE), and the weight on equity as
E/(DE). To understand the relation between asset risk and equity risk, we now use
the portfolio mathematics developed in Chapters 4 and 5 to analyze risk measures of
each of the components, A, D,and E.With risk-free debt, all of the risk is born by the
equity holders. In this case, and are both zero for risk-free debt, implying by
DD
the portfolio formulas developed earlier
DE
0
ADEDEE
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Chapter 11
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and
-
DE
0
(11.2a)
ADEDEE
Inverting these equations to place the equity risk measures on the left-hand side results
in
D
1
EEA
and
-
D
1
(11.2b)
EEA
Recall that the experiment performed is one in which altering the mix of financing
between debt and equity does not change A,the operating assets of the firm. Hence,
equation (11.2b) and the equation above it imply:
-
Result 11.3
Increasing the firm’s debt (raising Dand reducing E) increases the (beta and standard devi-ation) risk per dollar of equity investment. It will increase linearly in the D/Eratio if thedebt is risk free.
Result 11.3 stems from the equivalence of the assets of the firm to a portfolio of
the firm’s debt and equity, with respective positive portfolio weights of D/(DE) and
E/(DE). Thus
-
DE
˜ r˜ r˜
(11.3a)
r
ADEDDEE
This also means that each dollar of equity can be thought of as a portfolio-weighted
average of the firm’s assets and debt, with a long position in the assets and a short
position in debt. Here the respective portfolio weights are (1 D/E) on the assets and
D/Eon the debt; that is, upon rearranging equation (11.3a) to place ˜on the left-
r
E
hand side, we obtain
-
DD
˜ 1˜ r˜
(11.3b)
rr
EEAED
Distinguishing Risk-Free Debt from Default-Free Debt
In the previous subsection, we assumed that the debt of the firm was risk-free. Risk-free
debt is necessarily default-free debt but the reverse is not necessarily true. There are two
sources of risk associated with debt. One is interest rate risk, which is associated with gen-
eral changes in long-term interest rates, and the other is credit risk, which is associated
with the possibility of default. All long-term debt, even if it is default-free, will see its
value move inversely with long-term interest rates (bond yields), as Chapter 2 observed.
Asset values, however, also tend to move inversely with long-term interest rates, which
means that long-term debt, even if it is default-free, tends to have a positive beta (typi-
cally, around 0.2 when computed with respect to broad-based stock portfolios like the S&P
500). Risk-free debt is necessarily short-term, because it cannot have its value altered by
changes in long-term interest rates. Short-term default-free debt tends to have a beta near
zero and, for our purposes, can also be regarded as risk-free debt.
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The main goal of this section is to analyze the effect of debt on beta and expected
return. In particular, and as the next section illustrates, it is useful to isolate the impact
of credit risk on bond and equity betas for high-leverage ratios. To avoid confounding
the effect of interest rate risk and credit risk, we have deliberately chosen to analyze
risk-free debt, which has a beta of zero.
It is straightforward to modify the analysis of the effect of leverage when debt has
a positive beta. Again, viewing the firm as a portfolio, equation (11.2a) would gener-
alize to
DE
ADEDDEE
implying that equation (11.2b) generalizes to
DD
1
EEAED
Equation (11.3b) remains unchanged.
Graphs and Numerical Illustrations of the Effect of Debt on Risk
Exhibit 11.4 illustrates the beta of equity as a function of the leverage ratio, D/E.When
the debt is default free, the firm’s equity holders bear all of the risk from swings in
asset values. By equation (11.2b), the beta of equity as a function of D/Eshould graph
as a straight line in this case. When debt default is possible, debt holders bear part of
the risk, implying that equity holders bear less risk. As a result, the beta risk of equity
becomes a curved line.
To explore Result 11.3 further, we illustrate numerically why equity holder (beta
or standard deviation) risk per dollar invested increases with leverage. First, note that
if a firm’s total cash flows are independent of its capital structure—that is, its mix
of debt and equity financing—the total risk borne by the aggregation of the investors
of a firm, debt holders plus equity holders, does not change when the firm changes its
EXHIBIT11.4Equity Beta as a Function of the Firm’s Leverage Ratio
-
Beta
ß
D/E
-
No default
Default
leverage ratios
possible
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Chapter 11
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capital structure. Thus, an all-equity financed firm with assets that change from a value
of $100 million in 2001, to $110 million in 2002, and then to $88 million in 2003, has
equity that experiences the same value changes. Per dollar invested, such equity hold-
ers experience value changes amounting to a 10 percent increase from 2001 to 2002
and a 20 percent decrease from 2002 to 2003.
However, if the same assets had been financed with $75 million in risk-free debt,
implying an initial debt-to-equity ratio of 3, the equity jumps from $25 million ($100
million $75 million) in 2001 to $35 million ($110 million $75 million) in 2002.
The equity increase of 40 percent ($25 million to $35 million) is four times larger per
dollar invested than the 10 percent equity increase of the all-equity firm ($100 million
to $110 million). Thus, leverage benefits the firm’s stockholders when asset values
appreciate but, from 2001 to 2002, when the assets drop from $110 million to $88 mil-
lion, a 20 percent decrease, the equity of the levered firm goes from $35 million in
2001 to $13 million in 2002, a 63 percent decrease.8
The Cost of Equity, Cost of Debt, and Cost of Capital as a Function of the Lever-
age Ratio.The cost of equityfor a firm is the expected return required by investors
to induce them to hold the equity. Since the firm’s equity beta increases linearly as
the amount of default-free debt financing increases, it should not be surprising that
the firm’s cost of equity capital also increases linearly as a function of the leverage
ratio, D/E.Specifically, taking expectations of equation (11.3b) and grouping terms
yields:
-
Result 11.4
The cost of equity
rr(D/E) (r r)
EAAD
increases as the firm’s leverage ratio D/Eincreases. It will increase linearly in the ratio D/E
if the debt is default free and if r, the expected return of the firm’s assets, does not change
A
as the leverage ratio increases.9
In Result 11.4, the expected (and actual) return of a firm’s debt r,its cost of
D
debt, equals rfor moderate leverage ratios. As long as the firm’s debt is default
f
free, the cost of equity capital increases linearly in the firm’s leverage ratio. How-
ever, when firms take on extreme amounts of debt, r,the expected return on risky
D
debt, rises as D/Eincreases. Since debt holders share part of the risk in this case,
the cost of equity increases more slowly as D/Erises than it does with default-free
debt. Again, the risks of the assets are shared by both debt holders and equity hold-
ers when default is possible, but they are borne only by equity holders when default
is not possible.
Exhibit 11.5 summarizes the findings of this section. It plots the cost of equity
r,the cost of debt r,and the cost of capital r,as functions of the leverage ratio
EDA
D/E.
8The 63 percent decrease for the leveraged firm is not quite four times the 20 percent decrease
experienced by the assets because the debt-equity ratio is smaller than three to one in 2002.
9Result 11.4 also applies when expected returns are determined by factor betas in a multifactor
setting. In this vein, note that interest rate risk, discussed earlier in this chapter, may make the beta of
default-free fixed-rate debt non-zero, but only default risk can generate the curvature seen in Exhibits
11.4 and 11.5.
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11. Investing in Risky
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780 HillMarkets and Corporate
Projects
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
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Part IIIValuing Real Assets EXHIBIT11.5Cost of Debt, Equity, and Capital as a Function of D/E |
-
Expected
return
r E
r A
r D
D/E
-
No default
Default
leverage ratios
possible
