- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
Investment Banks
Just as the government is ubiquitous in the process of issuing securities, so too are
investment banks. Modern investment banks are made up of two parts: the corporate
business and the sales and trading business.
The Corporate Business.The corporate side of investment banking is a fee-for-
service business; that is, the firm sells its expertise. The main expertise banks have is
in underwriting securities, but they also sell other services. They provide merger and
acquisition advice in the form of prospecting for takeover targets, advising clients about
the price to be offered for these targets, finding financing for the takeover, and plan-
ning takeover tactics or, on the other side, takeover defenses. The major investment
banking houses are also actively engaged in the design of new financial instruments.
The Sales and Trading Business.Investment banks that underwrite securities sell
them on the sales and trading end of their business to the bank’s institutional investors.
These investors include mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies. Sales
and trading also consists of public market making, trading for clients, and trading on
the investment banking firm’s own account.
Market makingrequires that the investment bank act as a dealerin securities,
standing ready to buy and sell, respectively, at wholesale (bid) and retail (ask) prices.
The bank makes money on the difference between the bid and ask price, or the bid-
ask spread. Banks do this not only for corporate debt and equity securities, but also
as dealers in a variety of government securities. In addition, investment banks trade
securities using their own funds, which is known as proprietary trading. Proprietary
trading is riskier for an investment bank than being a dealer and earning the bid-ask
spread, but the rewards can be commensurably larger.
The Largest Investment Banks.Although there are hundreds of investment banks
in the United States alone, the largest banks account for most of the activity in all lines
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EXHIBIT1.5Top Global Underwriters, 1999
-
Proceeds
Fees
Advisor
($Billions)
Rank
Percent
# Deals
($Millions)
-
Merrill Lynch
412.3
1
12.5
2,368
2,433
-
Salomon Smith
323.2
2
9.8
1,748
1,653
Barney (Citigroup)
-
Morgan Stanley
296.3
3
9.0
2,592
2,618
Dean Witter
-
Goldman Sachs
265.2
4
8.1
1,308
2,453
-
Credit Suisse
239.3
5
7.3
1,419
1,489
First Boston
-
Lehman Brothers
202.7
6
6.2
1,104
852
Deutsche Banc
139.4
7
4.2
898
971
Chase Manhattan
131.3
8
4.0
1,158
354
JPMorgan
131.1
9
4.0
710
765
ABN Amro
102.9
10
3.1
1,230
640
Bear Stearns
94.9
11
2.9
666
519
Bank of America
81.4
12
2.5
667
193
-
Warburg Dillon
80.6
13
2.5
486
657
Read
-
Donaldson
72.7
14
2.2
475
830
Lufkin Jenrette
-
BNPParibas
53.1
15
1.6
248
355
Industry Total
3,287.7
100.0
21,724
20,943
Source: Investment Dealers Digest, Worldwide Offerings (Public 144A), with full credit to book manager, January
24, 2000, p. 31.
of business. Exhibit 1.5 lists the top 15 global underwriters for 1999 and the amounts
they underwrote. These underwriters accounted for 80–90 percent of all underwritten
offers. Although U.S. underwriters hold a dominant position in their business, foreign
underwriters, such as Nomura Securities, are strong competitors in global issues.
Result 1.3 summarizes the key points of this discussion.
-
Result 1.3
In the wake of the Great Depression, U.S. financial markets became more regulated. Theseregulations forced commercial banks, the most important provider of private capital, out ofthe investment banking business. These regulatory constraints were relaxed in the 1980s and1990s, making the banking industry more competitive and providing corporations withgreater variety in their sources of capital.
The Underwriting Process
The essential outline of investment banking in the United States has been in place for
almost a century. The players have changed, of course, but the way they do business
now is roughly the same as it was a century ago.
The underwriter of a security issue performs four functions: (1) origination, (2) dis-
tribution, (3) risk bearing, and (4) certification.
-
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Strategy, Second Edition
12Part IFinancial Markets and Financial Instruments
Origination.Originationinvolves giving advice to the issuing firm about the type
of security to issue, the timing of the issue, and the pricing of the issue. Origination
also means working with the firm to develop the registration statement and forming a
syndicate of investment bankers to market the issue. The managing or lead underwriter
performs all these tasks.
Distribution.The second function an underwriter performs is the distribution, or the
selling, of the issue. Distribution is generally carried out by a syndicate of banks formed
by the lead underwriter. The banks in the syndicate are listed in the prospectus along
with how much of the issue each has agreed to sell. Once the registration is made effec-
tive, their names also appear on the tombstone adin a newspaper which announces
the issue and lists the underwriters participating in the syndicate.
Risk Bearing.The third function the underwriter performs is risk bearing. In most
cases, the underwriter has agreed to buy the securities the firm is selling and to resell
them to its clients. The Rules of FairPractice(promulgated by the National Associ-
ation of Security Dealers) prevents the underwriter from selling the securities at a price
higher than that agreed on at the pricing meeting, so the underwriter’s upside is lim-
ited. If the issue does poorly, the underwriter may be stuck with securities that must
be sold at bargain prices. However, the actual risk that underwriters take when mar-
keting securities is generally limited since most issues are not priced until the day, or
even hours, before they go on sale. Until that final pricing meeting, the investment bank
is not committed to selling the issue.
Certification.An additional role of an investment bank is to certify the quality of an
issue, which requires that the bank maintain a sound reputation in capital markets. An
investment banker’s reputation will quickly decline if the certification task is not per-
formed correctly. If an underwriter substantially misprices an issue, its future business
is likely to be damaged and it might even be sued. Astudy by Booth and Smith (1986)
suggested that underwriters, aware of the costs associated with mispricing an issue,
charge higher fees on issues that are harder to value.
The Underwriting Agreement
The underwriting agreementbetween the firm and the investment bank is the docu-
ment that specifies what is being sold, the amount being sold, and the selling price.
The agreement also specifies the underwriting spread, which is the difference between
the total proceeds of the offering and the net proceeds that accrue to the issuing firm,
and the existence and extent of the overallotment option. This option, sometimes
called the “Green-Shoe option”after the firm that first used it, permits the investment
banker to request that more shares be issued on the same terms as those already sold.6
Exhibit 1.6, which contains parts of a stock prospectus, illustrates many of the features
of the agreement.
6Since August 1983, the overallotment shares can be, at most, 15 percent of the amount issued, which
means that if the agreement specifies that the underwriter will issue 1.0 million shares, the underwriter
has the option to issue 1.15 million shares. Nearly all industrial offerings have overallotment options,
which are generally set at 15 percent. In practice, investment bankers typically offer 115 percent of an
offering for a firm going public and then stand ready to buy back 15 percent of the shares to support the
price if demand in the secondary market is weak. See Aggarwal (2000).
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EXHIBIT1.6AStock Prospectus: CoverPage
(
continued)
-
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14Part IFinancial Markets and Financial Instruments
EXHIBIT1.6(continued)AStock Prospectus: Underwriting
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15
The underwriting agreement also shows the amount of fixed fees the firm must
pay, including listing fees, taxes, SEC fees, transfer agent’s fees, legal and accounting
costs, and printing expenses. In addition to these fixed fees, firms may have to pay sev-
eral other forms of compensation to the underwriters. For example, underwriters often
receive warrants as part of their compensation.7
Classifying Offerings
If a firm is issuing equity to the public for the first time, it is making an initial pub-
lic offering (IPO). If a firm is already publicly traded and is simply selling more
common stock, it is making a seasoned offering (SEO). Both IPOs and seasoned
offerings can include both primary and secondary issues. In a primary issue, the firm
raises capital for itself by selling stock to the public; a secondary issueis under-
taken by existing large shareholders who want to sell a substantial number of shares
they currently own.8
The Costs of Debt and Equity Issues
Exhibit 1.7 shows the direct costs of both seasoned and unseasoned equity offerings as
well as the direct costs of bond offerings. Three things stand out: First, debt fees are
lower than equity fees. This is not surprising in view of equity’s larger exposure to risk
and the fact that bonds are much easier to price than stock. Second, there are economies
of scale in issuing. As a percentage of the proceeds, fixed fees decline as issue size
rises. Again, this is not surprising given that the expenses classified under fixed fees
simply do not vary much. Whether a firm sells $1 million or $100 million, the audi-
tors, for example, have the same basic job to do. Finally, initial public offerings are
much more expensive than seasoned offerings because the initial public offerings are
far riskier and much more difficult to price.9
Result 1.4 summarizes the main points of this subsection.
-
Result 1.4
Issuing public debt and equity can be a lengthy and expensive process. For large corpora-tions, the issuance of public debt is relatively routine and the costs are relatively low. How-ever, equity is much more costly to issue for large as well as small firms, and it is espe-cially costly for firms issuing equity for the first time.
Types of Underwriting Arrangements
Firm Commitment vs. Best-Efforts Offering.Apublic offering can be executed on
either a firm commitment or a best-efforts basis. In a firm commitment offering, the
underwriter agrees to buy the whole offering from the firm at a set price and to offer
it to the public at a slightly higher price. In this case, the underwriter bears the risk of
not selling the issue, and the firm’s proceeds are guaranteed. In a best-efforts offer-
ing, the underwriter and the firm fix a price and the minimum and maximum number
of shares to be sold. The underwriter then makes the “best effort” to sell the issue.
7
See Barry, Muscarella, and Vetsuypens (1991). Also, Chapter 3 discusses warrants in more detail.
8Sometimes the term secondarymeans any non-IPO, even if the shares are primary. To avoid
confusion, some investment bankers use the term add-on, meaning primary shares for an already public
company.
9The costs associated with initial public offerings of equity will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
-
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© The McGraw
56 HillMarkets and Corporate
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Strategy, Second Edition
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Part IFinancial Markets and Financial Instruments |
EXHIBIT1.7 |
Direct Costs as a Percentage of Gross Proceeds forEquity (IPOs and SEOs) and Straight and Convertible Bonds Offered by Domestic Operating Companies,1990–1994 |
-
Equity
Bonds
-
Proceeds
IPOs
SEOs
Convertible Bonds
Straight Bonds
(millions
of dollars
GSa
bc
c
c
c
ETDC
GSE
TDC
GSETDC
GSETDC
$2–9.999.05%7.91%16.96%7.72%5.56%13.28%6.07%2.68%8.75%2.07%2.32%4.39%
10–19.997.244.3911.636.232.498.725.483.188.661.361.402.76
20–39.997.012.699.705.601.336.934.161.956.111.540.882.42
40–59.996.961.768.725.050.825.873.261.044.300.720.601.32
60–79.996.741.468.204.570.615.182.640.593.231.760.582.34
80–99.996.471.447.914.250.484.732.430.613.041.550.612.16
100–199.996.031.037.063.850.374.222.340.422.761.770.542.31
200–499.995.670.866.533.260.213.471.990.192.181.790.402.19
500 and up5.210.515.723.030.123.152.000.092.091.390.251.64
Average7.31%3.69%11.00%5.44%1.67%7.11%2.92%0.87%x3.79%1.62%0.62%2.24%
Note:
aGS—gross spreads as a percentage of total proceeds, including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession.
bE—other direct expenses as a percentage of total proceeds, including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession.cTDC—total direct costs as a percentage of total proceeds (total direct costs are the sum of gross spreads and other direct expenses).Source: Reprinted with permission from the Journal of Financial Research,Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 59–74, “The Costs of RaisingCapital,” by Inmoo Lee, Scott Lochhead, Jay Ritter, and Quanshui Zhao.
Investors express their interest by depositing payments into the underwriter’s escrow
account. If the underwriter has not sold the minimum number of shares after a speci-
fied period, usually 90 days, the offer is withdrawn, the money refunded, and the issu-
ing firm can try again later. Nearly all seasoned offerings are made with firm commit-
ment offerings. The more well-known firms that do IPOs tend to use firm commitment
offerings for their IPOs, but the less established firms tend to go public with best-efforts
offerings.
Negotiated vs. Competitive Offering.The issuing firm also can choose between a
negotiated offering and a competitive offering. In a negotiated offering, the firm nego-
tiates the underwriting agreement with the underwriter. In a competitive offering, the
firm specifies the underwriting agreement and puts it out to bid. In practice, except for
a few utilities that are required to use them, firms almost never use competitive offer-
ings. This is somewhat puzzling since competitive offerings appear to have lower issue
costs.10
Shelf Offerings.Another way to offer securities is through a shelf offering. In 1982,
the SEC adopted Rule 415, which permits a firm to register all the securities it plans
to issue within two years. The firm can file one registration statement and make offer-
ings in any amount and at any time without further notice to the SEC. When the need
10For
a discussion of this matter, see Bhagat and Frost (1986).
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Chapter 1
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EXHIBIT1.8Daily Prices forthe 1991 Time WarnerRights Offer
-
Stock
Rights
Exercise
Price
Price
Value
Difference
Date
(a)
(b)
(c)
(c) – (b)
-
July 15
$88.750
$5.500
$8.750
$3.250
-
July 16
86.750
7.250
6.750
–0.500
July 17
87.625
8.250
7.625
–0.625
July 18
88.125
8.875
8.125
–0.750
July 19
87.250
8.250
7.250
–1.000
July 22
86.500
7.000
6.500
–0.500
July 23
85.375
6.375
5.375
–1.000
July 24
83.750
4.625
3.750
–0.875
July 25
84.875
5.500
4.875
–0.625
July 26
83.750
4.250
3.750
–0.500
July 29
82.500
2.500
2.500
$0.000
July 30
82.750
3.125
2.750
–0.375
July 31
84.750
4.750
4.750
$0.000
Aug. 1
85.750
5.625
5.750
$0.125
Aug. 2
85.000
5.000
5.000
$0.000
Aug. 5
85.000
4.500
5.000
$0.500
Source: ©1996 American Bankers Association. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
for financing arises, the firm simply asks an investment bank for a bid to take the secu-
rities “off the shelf” and sell them. If the issuing firm is not satisfied with this bid, it
can shop among other investment banks for better bids.
Rights Offerings.Finally, for firms selling common stock, there is a possibility of a
rights offering. Rights entitle existing shareholders to buy new shares in the firm at
what is generally a discounted price. Rights offerings can be made without investment
bankers or with them on a standby basis. Arights offering on a standby basisincludes
an agreement by the investment bank to take up any unexercised rights and exercise
them, paying the subscription price to the firm in exchange for the new shares.
In some cases, rights are actively traded after they are distributed by the firm. For
example, Time Warner used a rights offering to raise additional equity capital in 1991.
As the case study below illustrates with respect to this offering, the value of a right is
usually close to the value of the stock less the subscription price, which is the price
that the rights holders must pay for the stock.
The Time WarnerRights Offer
The Time Warner rights offer gave shareholders the option to purchase one share at $80 per
share for each right owned. Time Warner issued three rights for each five shares owned. If
you purchased the stock on July 16, 1991, or later, you did not receive the right. The rights
expired on August 5, 1991.
Exhibit 1.8 shows Time Warner’s stock price [column (a)], the price at which the rights
traded [column (b)], the exercise value of a right [column (c)], and the difference, which is
calculated as the exercise value, estimated as the stock price minus the exercise price of a
-
Grinblatt
60 Titman: FinancialI. Financial Markets and
1. Raising Capital
© The McGraw
60 HillMarkets and Corporate
Financial Instruments
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
18Part IFinancial Markets and Financial Instruments
right, minus the market price of a right. After July 15, the last date at which the stock price
is worth both the value of the stock and the value of the right, the stock price drops,
reflecting the loss of the right. From July 16 on, the market price of a right is close to its
exercise value.
The Time Warner rights offer was unusual in many respects. First, it was one of
the largest equity offerings. Second, the original structure of the deal was unique.
Finally, only rarely do U.S. firms choose to use rights offerings to issue new equity.
Some financial economists are puzzled that so few firms use rights offerings since
the direct cost of a rights issue is substantially less than the direct cost of an under-
written offering. Aplausible explanation for this is that rights offerings, when used, are
less expensive because firms using them have a large-block shareholder who has agreed
to take up the offer. This is true in Europe, where large-block shareholders, who are
likely to agree to exercise the rights, are more prevalent.11
Where rights are not used,
there may be no large-block shareholders, which would make the rights offering more
expensive. In addition, studies of the costs of rights offers examine only the costs to
the firm and ignore the costs to the shareholders, which could conceivably be quite
large.
