- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
The Legal Environment
Amyriad of regulations govern public debt and equity issues. These regulations cer-
tainly increase the costs of issuing public securities, but they also provide protection
for investors which enhances the value of the securities. The value of these regulations
can be illustrated by contrasting the situation in Western Europe and the United States,
where markets are highly regulated, to the situation in some of the emerging markets,
which are much less regulated. Amajor risk in the emerging markets is that shareholder
rights will not be respected and, as a result, many stocks traded in these markets sell
for substantially less than the value of their assets. For example, in 1995 Lukoil, Rus-
sia’s biggest oil company with proven reserves of 16 billion barrels, was valued at $850
million, which implies that its oil was worth about five cents a barrel.4At about the
same time, Royal Dutch/Shell, with about 17 billion barrels of reserves, had a market
value of $94 billion in 1995, making its oil worth more than $5 a barrel. Lukoil is
worth substantially less because of uncertainty about shareholders’rights in Russia.
Although economists and policymakers may argue about the optimal level of regula-
tion, most prefer the more highly regulated U.S. environment to that in the emerging
markets where shareholder rights are usually not as well defined.
Although government regulations play an important role for securities issued in the
United States, this was not always so. Regulation in the United States expanded sub-
stantially in the 1930s because of charges of stock price manipulation that came in the
wake of the 1929 stock market crash. Congress enacted several pieces of legislation
that radically altered the landscape for firms issuing securities. The three most impor-
tant pieces of legislation were the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and the Banking Act of 1933 (commonly called the Glass-Steagall Act after
the two congressmen who sponsored it).
The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.The Securities Act of 1933and theSecuri-
ties Exchange Act of 1934require registration of all public offerings by firms except
short-term instruments (less than 270 days) and intrastate offerings. Specifically, the
acts require that companies file a registration statementwith the SEC. The required
registration statement contains:
4The Economist,Jan. 21, 1995.
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Chapter 1
Raising Capital
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General information about the firm and detailed financial data.
•
Adescription of the security being issued.
•
The agreement between the investment bank that acts as the underwriter, whooriginates and distributes the issue, and the issuing firm.
•
The composition of the underwriting syndicate,a group of banks that sell theissue.
Most of the information in the registration statement must be made available to
investors in the form of a prospectus, a printed document that includes information
about the security and the firm. The prospectus is widely distributed before the sale of
the securities and bears the dire warning, printed in red ink, that the securities have not
yet been approved for sale.5
Once filed with the SEC, registration statements do not become effective for 20
days, the so-called cooling off period during which selling the stock is prohibited. If
the SEC determines that the registration statement is complete, they approve it or “make
it effective.” If, however, the registration exhibits egregious flaws, the SEC requires
that the firm fix it. Once the SEC approves the registration statement, the underwriter
is free to start selling the securities in what is known as the primary offering. The SEC’s
approval of the registration statement is not an endorsement of the security, but simply
an affirmation that the firm has met the disclosure requirements of the 1933 act.
Because all signatories to the registration statement are liable for any misstatements
it might contain, the underwriters must investigate the issuing company with due dili-
gence. Due diligencemeans investigating and disclosing any information that is rele-
vant to investors and providing an audit of the accounting numbers by a certified pub-
lic accounting firm. If material information is not disclosed and the security performs
poorly, the underwriters can be sued by investors.
The Glass-Steagall Act.In the wake of the Depression, Congress enacted the Bank-
ing Act of 1933, commonly called the Glass-Steagall Act. This legislation changed the
landscape of investment banking by requiring banks to divorce their commercial bank-
ing activities from their investment banking activities.
Glass-Steagall gave rise to many of the modern investment banks, both living and
defunct, that most finance professionals are familiar with today. For instance, the firms
of J. P. Morgan, Drexel, and Brown Brothers Harriman opted to abandon underwriting
and instead concentrate on private banking for wealthy individuals. Several partners
from J. P. Morgan and Drexel decided to form Morgan Stanley, an investment banking
firm. Similarly, the First Boston Corporation, now part of Credit Suisse, is derived from
the securities affiliate of the First National Bank of Boston.
After Glass-Steagall, firms that stayed in the underwriting business were forced to
build “Chinese walls” to separate their underwriting activities from other financial func-
tions. Chinese wallsinvolve structuring a company’s procedures to prevent certain
types of communication between the corporate side of the bank and the bank’s sales
and trading sectors. The underwriting part of these businesses must have no connec-
tion with other activities, such as stock recommendations, market making, and institu-
tional sales.
5Because of the red ink, prior to approval the prospectus is often called the “red herring.”
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46 Titman: FinancialI. Financial Markets and
1. Raising Capital
© The McGraw
46 HillMarkets and Corporate
Financial Instruments
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
10Part IFinancial Markets and Financial Instruments
ATrend toward Deregulation.Roe (1994) advanced the provocative argument that
these three pieces of legislation and others, such as the Investment Company Act of
1940, which regulates mutual funds, and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
which allows limited banking mergers, fundamentally altered the role of financial insti-
tutions in corporate governance. Roe argued that the legislation caused the fragmenta-
tion of financial institutions and institutional portfolios, thereby preventing the emer-
gence of powerful large-block shareholders who might exert pressure on management.
In contrast, countries such as Japan and Germany, which do not operate under the same
constraints, developed systems in which banks played a much larger role in firms’affairs.
Congress and the regulatory agencies, recognizing that U.S. financial institutions
are heavily constrained, have started relaxing these constraints. The Glass-Steagall
restrictions were repealed with the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act
of 1999. Commercial and investment banks have been drawing closer to universal
banking; that is, they are beginning to offer a whole range of services from taking
deposits to selling securities. In addition, interstate banking was legalized in 1994.
Because of the fierce competition that these trends will generate, there will almost cer-
tainly be fewer commercial and investment banks in the United States in the future.
Surviving banks will tend to be bigger, better capitalized, and better prepared to serve
business firms in creative ways.
