- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
Many economists believe that the relatively liquid equity markets and the active new
issues market provide a competitive advantage to young firms in the United States.
Without access to good capital markets, many entrepreneurs and venture capitalists
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EXHIBIT3.4
Numberof Offerings, Average Initial Return, and Gross Proceedsof Initial Public Offerings in 1960=1999
-
Gross Proceeds,
Year
Number of Offerings
Average Initial Return,%
$ Millions
-
1960–69
2,661
21.2
7,988
1970–79
1,640
9
6,868
1980–89
4,759
15.3
80,946
1990–99
5,316
20.6
353,923
Total
14,376
17.4
449,725
Source:Professor Jay Ritter’s University of Florida Web page http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter.
would find it difficult or impossible to cash out or diversify their holdings. That in
turn would make starting a firm more expensive and reduce the rate at which firms
are created.
As an example, investors plowed $10 billion into U.S. start-up firms in 1993 as
opposed to about $4 billion in Europe, even though the economies of Europe and the
United States are about the same size.11
This means that about 3 percent of European
investments went into start-ups as opposed to 14 percent in the United States. Part of
the reason for the much larger share of U.S. investment in start-up companies is the
ease with which U.S. firms can go public and initial investors can take their money out
of the firm.
The initial public offering (IPO) market for common stock in the United States is
both large and active. During the 1990s more than 4,000 U.S. firms went public, rais-
ing more than $300 billion in the process. Exhibit 3.4 shows the annual number of
firms going public and the total annual proceeds raised by those firms. The IPO mar-
ket is extremely cyclical: In 1974, only 9 firms went public, compared with more than
900 in 1986 and several thousand per year in the late 1990s. Some of the reasons for
this cyclical behavior are discussed below.
Demand- and Supply-Side Explanations for IPO Cycles
There are both demand-side and supply-side explanations for the cyclical nature of the
IPO market. On the demand side, there are periods when an especially large number of
new firms, which are unlikely to obtain private funding at attractive terms, have invest-
ment projects that need to be funded. The Internet start-ups from 1995–1998 are good
examples. On the supply side, there might be periods when investors and institutions that
traditionally invest in IPOs have a lot of money to invest. This could happen, for exam-
ple, if a large inflow of money went into mutual funds that invest in small stocks.12
Afirm considering going public would be interested in knowing whetherhot issue
periods—periods during which large numbers of firms are going public_are driven by
a large demand for public funds by firms that need financing or, alternatively, by a large
11The Economist,Nov. 12, 1994. Statistics in the late 1990s are contaminated by privatizations of
large government-held companies in Europe. These do not qualify as start-ups, and no IPO-related data
has yet distinguished these two segments of the IPO market.
12See
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993) for a discussion and evidence on demand-side effects. Loughran
and Ritter (1995) discuss and provide evidence of supply-side explanations of the hot issue market.
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supply of public funds that need to be invested. If the hot issue periods are demand driven,
entrepreneurs may wish to avoid going public during that time because the competition
for funds would suggest that the firm might get a better price by waiting. However, the
supply-side explanation would suggest the opposite: IPOs are observed frequently in some
years and not in others because entrepreneurs are able to time their initial public offer-
ings to correspond with the greater supply of available funding and thereby get better
deals in the hot issue periods. Loughran and Ritter’s empirical study (1995) suggested
that the post-issue stock returns of firms that go public in hot issue periods are quite low,
which supports the supply-side explanation. What this means is that entrepreneurs may
benefit by timing their IPOs so that they come out in hot issue periods. From an investor’s
perspective, however, this would not be a good time to buy IPOs.
-
Result 3.2
IPOs are observed frequently in some years and not in other years. The available evidencesuggests that the hot issue periods are characterized by a large supply of available capital.Given this interpretation, firms are better off going public during a hot issue period.
The Benefits of Going Public
Although most large U.S. firms are publicly held, there are important exceptions.
Cargill, a multibillion dollar grain dealer in Minneapolis, and Koch Industries, a major
energy firm in Kansas, are privately owned firms. Large firms like these that were pri-
vately owned since inception have always existed. However, during the 1980s, a num-
ber of large publicly traded firms were transformed into private companies. Most of
these firms, such as Safeway and RJR Nabisco, subsequently went public again.
Firms go public for a number of reasons. First, firms may be able to obtain capi-
tal at more attractive terms from the public markets. For example, emerging Internet
firms may have found public markets to be a cheaper source of financing because of
investor enthusiasm for their products. However, a number of firms that go public issue
very few shares in their initial public offering and do not really need the capital that
is raised. This was the case when Microsoft went public.13
Microsoft stated that one reason it went public was to provide liquidity through the
public markets to the firm’s managers and other insiders who were previously com-
pensated with shares and who might otherwise be locked into an illiquid investment.
Similarly, the stock of a publicly traded firm may be considered a more attractive form
of compensation than the stock of a private firm, making it easier for the public firm
to attract the best employees. Being public means that the original owners, investors,
and old and new managers can cash out of the firm and diversify their portfolios.
An additional advantage to being public is that stock prices in the public markets
provide a valuable source of information for managers of the firm. Every day, investors
buy and sell shares, thereby rendering their judgments about the firm’s prospects.
Although the market isn’t infallible, it can be a useful reality check. For example, a
manager would probably think twice about expanding the firm’s core business after its
stock price fell. Afalling stock price indicates that a number of investors and analysts
have unfavorable information about a firm’s prospects, which would tend to imply that
an expansion would not be warranted.
Finally, some managers believe that going public is good publicity. Listing the
firm’s stock on a national exchange may bring name recognition and increase the
firm’s credibility with its customers, employees, and suppliers. In some businesses,
13For
a discussion of Microsoft’s initial public offering (IPO), see Uttal (1986).
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this kind of credibility matters very little. However, the reputation effect of having a
public company with a buoyant stock price was probably very important for many of
the emerging Internet companies in the late 1990s.
The Costs of Going Public
It costs a lot of money to go public. An obvious cost is hiring an investment banker,
attorneys, and accountants, but by far the largest expense is the underwriting fee. As
Exhibit 1.7 in Chapter 1 shows, the total direct costs associated with taking a firm pub-
lic are about 11 percent of the amount of money raised.
While direct costs may be large, there exists an additional and equally important
cost of going public. The price at which the investment banker sells the issue to the
original investors is generally 10 to 15 percent below the price at which the stock trades
in the secondary market shortly thereafter. Regardless of the reason for the observed
underpricing of new issues, firms should add the typical 10 to 15 percent underpricing
to their cost of going public. Taking all of these costs into account, the total cost of
going public could exceed 25 percent of the amount raised in the initial public offer-
ing. However, firms often raise very little in the initial public offering, so the cost as
a fraction of the firm’s total value is generally considerably smaller.
Once a firm is public, it faces other costs that private firms do not bear. Public
firms are required to provide proxy statements and quarterly and annual reports. They
also must hold shareholder meetings and communicate with institutional shareholders
and financial analysts. Because a public firm’s communication with its shareholders
must be relatively open (even more so since the SEC’s Regulation FD changed public
disclosure rules in 2000), any information provided to shareholders also will be avail-
able to competitors, which may put the firm at a competitive disadvantage.
Because a public corporation is more visible than a private company, it may be
pressured to do things in ways that it would not otherwise do. For example, Jensen and
Murphy (1990) advanced the idea that the required revelation of managerial compen-
sation by public companies constrains them from paying their executives too much. In
addition, shareholders may put pressure on managers to make “socially responsible”
investment choices they might not otherwise consider. Examples include shareholder
pressure to pull investments out of South Africa before the abandonment of apartheid
or pressure to avoid using nuclear energy.
Result 3.3 summarizes the discussion in the last two subsections.
Result 3.3The advantages and disadvantages of going public are as follows:
Advantages
•Better access to capital markets.
•Shareholders gain liquidity.
•Original owners can diversify.
•Monitoring and information are provided by external capital markets.
•Enhances the firm’s credibility with customers, employees, and suppliers.
Disadvantages
•Expensive.
•Costs of dealing with shareholders.
•Information revealed to competitors.
•Public pressure.
In general, a firm should go public when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs.
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The Process of Going Public
Taking a company public is a lengthy process that usually requires several months.
The Registration Statement.Once the firm chooses an underwriter, it begins assem-
bling the data required for the registration statement. This includes the audited financial
statements and a complete description of the firm’s business: products, prospects, and
possible risks (for example, reliance on major customers or contracts and dependence
on key personnel). The underwriters are legally responsible for ensuring that the regis-
tration statement discloses all material information about the firm. Material informa-
tionis information that, if omitted, would significantly alter the value of the firm.
Marketing the Issue.The underwriter is also responsible for forming the underwrit-
ing syndicate, marketing the stock, and allocating shares among syndicate members.
Marketing the stock may involve “road shows” in which the firm’s management and
the underwriter explain and try to sell the IPO to institutional investors. These presen-
tations not only enable investors to get a feel for management, but also, and equally
important, they enable the underwriter to form an estimate of the demand for an issue.
Although “expressions of interest” from potential buyers are nonbinding, they influ-
ence the offer price, number of shares, and allocations to particular investors.
Pricing the Issue.Once the SEC approves the registration statement, the process of
going public can move into its final stage of pricing the issue, determining the num-
ber of shares to be sold, and distributing the shares to investors. In many cases, the
IPO is oversubscribed. An oversubscribed offeringmeans that investors want to buy
more shares than the underwriter plans to sell. For example, when Netscape went pub-
lic, the underwriters had five million shares to sell. However, the issue was substan-
tially oversubscribed and the underwriters probably could have sold many times that
number of shares at the offering price. In oversubscribed offerings, U.S. underwriters
have discretion to allocate the shares as they see fit. Individual investors who are not
regular buyers of IPOs are unlikely to be allocated shares in oversubscribed offers. As
we will discuss below, in many countries outside the United States, the underwriter is
required to allocate some shares to all investors who request them.
Book Building vs. Fixed-Price Method.The preceding description of the way in
which investment bankers price and market a new issue is called the book-building
process. The important thing to note about a book-building process is that it allows the
investment banker to gauge the demand for the issue and, as a result, to price the issue
more accurately. This book-building process is used for all but the smallest U.S. IPOs
and has become increasingly popular for foreign IPOs that are marketed internationally.
Until recently, most non-U.S. IPOs were sold with the fixed-price method. For
example, fixed-price offerings in the United Kingdom advertise the number of shares
and the offer price by prospectus 14 days before accepting applications from interested
investors. The important distinction between the fixed-price and book-building meth-
ods is that with the former method the investment bank is less able to gauge investor
demand. In addition, investors in fixed-price offerings are generally allocated shares in
oversubscribed offerings using some fixed formula. For example, if a company offers
one million shares to investors, and investors, in the aggregate, request two million
shares, then each investor may receive only half what he or she requested. In other
words, shares may be allocated on what is called a pro rata basis. There are, however,
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frequent deviations from these pro rata allocations. For example, in some cases under-
writers can discriminate in favor of small investors, giving them a larger proportion of
the shares they request. In contrast to the book-building method, where the underwriter
has considerable discretion, in fixed-price offerings, investment banks generally have
little leeway in how to allocate the shares of new issues.
During the 1990s book-building’s popularity increased throughout the world, par-
ticularly in Europe and South America, where governments typically do not limit the
choices of issuers. In Asia, where regulations tend to be more restrictive, the shift to
book building has not been as rapid. In many countries the underwriter uses a hybrid
method_a book-building method for allocating the shares to institutions and a fixed-
price method for allocating shares to individual investors. There has also been a small
number of IPOs that are sold through auctions on the Internet.14
