- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
22.6Hedging with Swaps
The last section noted that many financial contracts have a shorter term than the com-
mitments they try to hedge. The success of the swap market is due in part to swaps
typically having longer-term maturities than the contracts offered in the futures and
forward markets.
Review of Swaps
Swaps, discussed in detail in Chapter 7, are agreements to periodically exchange the
cash flows of one security for the cash flows of another. In addition to specifying the
terms of the exchange and the frequency with which exchanges take place, the swap
contract specifies a notional amount of the swap. This amount represents the size of
the principal on which the cash flow exchange takes place. The most common swaps
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are interest rate swaps,which exchange the cash flows of fixed- for floating-rate bonds,
and currency swaps,which exchange the cash flows of bonds denominated in two dif-
ferent currencies.
Swaps can be used to hedge a variety of risks. For example, corporations often
employ basket swaps to hedge currency risk. Basket swapsare currency swaps that
exchange one currency for a basket of currencies. Typically, this basket of currencies
is weighted to match the foreign currency exposure of the corporation.
Hedging with Interest Rate Swaps
Banc One’s use of interest rate swaps described by Backus, Klapper, and Telmer (1995)
illustrates how swaps are used for risk management. According to a 1991 issue of
Bankers Magazine,Banc One viewed itself as the McDonald’s of retail banking. Banc
One’s franchises, which consisted originally of a set of acquired Midwestern banks,
grew in the 1980s and early 1990s to include banks in the West, Southwest, and East.
All of these “franchises” have decentralized management whose decisions resulted in
a situation in which the collective assets of the franchises are more short term than
their liabilities. As a consequence, Banc One’s liabilities are more sensitive to interest
rate movements than its assets.10
Backus, Klapper, and Telmer computed that a 1 percent decline in interest rates in
the early 1990s resulted in an equity decline of about $180 million for Banc One. As
a result of this interest rate sensitivity, headquarters management at Banc One assumed
positions in interest rate derivatives in the 1990s, using mainly interest rate swaps with
a notional amount of almost $40 billion. Banc One reported that a 1 percent decline in
interest rates decreased net income by 12.3 percent without the swaps, but increased
net income by 3.3 percent with the swaps.
The Interest Rate Risk of an Interest Rate Swap.The key to interest rate hedging
with interest rate swaps is that the present value of the floating side of the swap has
virtually no sensitivity to interest rate risk, while the PVof the fixed side has the same
kind of interest rate risk as a fixed-rate bond. Hence, a swap to pay a fixed rate of
interest and receive a floating rate of interest generates the same interest rate sensitiv-
ity as the issuance of a fixed-rate bond. Conversely, a swap to pay a floating interest
rate and receive a fixed interest rate generates the same interest rate sensitivity as the
purchase of a fixed-rate bond. As a result, an interest rate swap can effectively change
positions in fixed-rate bonds into positions in floating-rate bonds and vice versa. Ignor-
ing credit risk considerations, rolled over positions in short-term debt have the same
risks as floating-rate debt. Thus, interest rate swaps can also be thought of as vehicles
for converting short-term debt into long-term debt and vice versa.
Converting Fixed to Floating.If the present value of the assets of a firm is insen-
sitive to interest rates, financing with a fixed-rate debt instrument creates interest rate
exposure, increasing equity value when interest rates rise and decreasing equity value
when interest rates fall. An interest rate swap can effectively convert the fixed-rate lia-
bility into a floating-rate liability, as Example 22.8 illustrates.
10In
contrast to Banc One, in the absence of hedging most large banks have income that increases
when interest rates decrease.
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Example 22.8:Using Swaps to Convert a Fixed-Rate into a Floating-
RateLiability
Assume that First Federal Bank has issued a 5-year $1 million fixed-rate bond at the 5-year
Treasury rate 200 basis points (bp), paid semiannually, with principal due in five years.
First Federal would like to convert this into a floating-rate loan.How can it achieve this?
Answer:First Federal should enter into a $1 million national swap to receive a fixed rate
equal to the 5-year Treasury yield plus 200bp and pay LIBOR plus a spread.The receipt of
the Treasury yield plus 200bp effectively cancels out the fixed-rate payments on the First
Federal bond.The payment of the floating rate on the swap is all that remains.
The swap spreadfor a five-year swap is the number of basis points in excess of
the five-year on-the-run Treasury yield that the payer of the fixed rate must pay in
exchange for LIBOR. Hence, in Example 22.8, if the swap spread for First Federal is
50bp, the bank would convert a five-year fixed-rate loan at the five-year Treasury yield
plus 200bp into a floating-rate loan at LIBOR 150bp (200bp 50bp).
Converting Short-Term Debt to Long-Term Debt.If the assets of the firm are
highly sensitive to interest rate risk, the firm might desire fixed-rate debt financing to
offset this risk. However, as Chapter 21 discussed, a firm may expect its credit risk to
improve, and thus prefer rolling over short-term debt. The firm could then use a swap
to hedge the interest rate risk that arises with this strategy. This possibility is examined
in Example 22.9.
Example 22.9:Hedging Interest Rate Risk
Kaiser Automotive needs to finance a project that requires $100 million for five years.The
firm can obtain a fixed-rate loan for the five-year period with an interest rate of 10 percent
which is three percentage points above the five-year Treasury note rate.Alternatively, Kaiser
can roll over one-year bank loans to finance the project.Its current borrowing cost from such
a loan is 9 percent, which is three percentage points above the one-year Treasury note rate.
The bank has also agreed to enter into a swap contract with Kaiser in which the bank pays
Kaiser the interest rate on one-year Treasury notes, and Kaiser pays the bank 7.3 percent,
which is the interest rate on five-year Treasury notes plus 30 basis points.Kaiser is aware
that the demand for automobiles is closely tied to changes in interest rates and that it can
ill afford to be exposed to interest rate risk.However, it also believes that its cost of long-
term debt, 10 percent, is much too high given the firm’s current prospects.It believes that
within a year, its credit rating will improve and its borrowing costs will decline.What should
Kaiser do, and what are the risks?
Answer:Kaiser does not want to be exposed to interest rate risk, but it does want to
bet on its own credit rating.It can do this by rolling over short-term loans and entering
into the interest rate swap with a notional amount of $100 million.With this combined
transaction, the firm’s initial borrowing cost will be 9% 6% 7.3% 10.3%, which is
slightly higher than the cost of borrowing with a fixed-rate loan.However, if Kaiser’s credit
rating does improve next year so that its default spread is reduced from 3 percent to
2percent, its borrowing cost will drop from 10.3 percent to 9.3 percent and will not be
subject to changes in default-free interest rates.Of course, Kaiser’s projections may be
wrong and its credit rating may not improve, in which case the firm would have been bet-
ter off borrowing at a fixed rate.
Note that in Example 22.9, Kaiser is still exposed to interest rate risk on the
asset side of its balance sheet. Because of this, its default spread may be correlated
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with changes in the interest rates. Specifically, Kaiser might be concerned that a
large increase in interest rates could lead to a drop in its sales, which in turn causes
its credit rating to decline. In this sense, the swap transaction described in the exam-
ple does not totally insulate the firm’s borrowing costs from the effect of changing
interest rates.
Hedging with Currency Swaps
Currency swaps can be used to create foreign debt synthetically. As the last line of
Exhibit 22.7 indicates, the cash outflows of foreign debt can be synthesized by com-
bining domestic debt (outflows in row a) with a swap to pay foreign currency and
receive domestic currency (net outflows as row cless row b).
Creating Synthetic Foreign Debt to Hedge Foreign Asset Cash Inflows.Allen
(1987) suggested that Disney’s profits from Tokyo Disneyland (net of its yen financ-
ing liabilities) created an exposure to yen currency risk for Disney in the mid-1980s.
This yen-denominated cash inflow was estimated at ¥6 billion per year and growing.
Disney could eliminate this yen exposure by issuing yen-denominated debt to a
Japanese bank, but management saw this as prohibitively expensive. Acomparable
strategy, albeit not exactly the one Disney followed, would have the company issue
U.S. dollar-denominated debt and enter into a currency swap.
Creating Synthetic Domestic Debt to Save on Financing Costs.Sometimes, firms
wish to issue domestic debt to hedge the interest rate risk of domestic assets. Example
22.10 illustrates that currency swaps also can be used to create domestic debt synthet-
ically. If a company’s debt issue is well received in a foreign country, the transaction
can result in lower debt financing costs.
Example 22.10:Using Currency Swaps to Create Domestic Debt
Assume that Motorola can issue a 5 million Swiss franc five-year straight-coupon bond at a
yield of 5 percent.In the United States, its comparable dollar straight-coupon debt issues
are financed at 8 percent.In the currency swap market, Motorola can swap the payments
EXHIBIT22.7Creating Synthetic Foreign Debt
-
Year
1
2
3. . .
9
10
-
Net Cash Flows of $1 Million U.S.$ Debt
a.Outflows (in millions)$.09
$.09
$.09
$.09
$1.09
Future Cash Flows from 10-YearCurrency Swap $1 Million Notional Amount
b.Inflows (in millions)$.09$.09$.09. . .$.09$1.09
-
c.Outflows (in millions)
¥16
¥16
¥16
. . .
¥16
¥216
-
Total Outflows of Domestic Debt Plus Swap (in Millions) a c b
¥16¥16¥16. . .
¥16
¥216
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Chapter 22
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799
of 5 percent Swiss franc bonds for those of 7 percent U.S.dollar bonds.How can Motorola
get a US$4 million loan synthetically at a yield of 7 percent? Assume that the current
exchange rate is 1.25 Swiss francs to the dollar.
Answer:
-
1.
Issue 5 million Swiss franc (SFr) notes at 5 percent.
-
2.
Enter into a five-year US$4 million notional currency swap in which paymentsequivalent to the semiannual payments from the 5 percent Swiss franc notes (SFr
125,000) are received.In exchange, Motorola pays 7 percent in dollars (US$140,000semiannually) and an additional US$4 million at the maturity of the swap.The cash
received in Swiss francs on the swap funds the payment on the Swiss franc notes
(interest and SFr 5 million principal), leaving only the U.S.dollar payments on oneside of the swap as Motorola’s obligation.
Example 22.10 shows that Motorola saves 100bp on its financing costs, or about
US$40,000 per year, because Swiss franc investors are treating Motorola relatively
more favorably than U.S. dollar investors. There are a variety of explanations for this,
but one reason simply is that Motorola may be offering Swiss investors a unique oppor-
tunity to diversify their bond portfolios. Because the number of Swiss companies issu-
ing bonds (for example, Nestlé), is relatively small and because the transaction costs
of investing in bonds denominated in foreign currency (and then converting back to
Swiss francs) may be prohibitively large, Swiss investors may be willing to pay a pre-
mium for Motorola bonds.
