- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
21.10Summary and Conclusions
While we believe, as a general guideline, that most firmsoil firm would not want to completely hedge away the vari-can benefit by hedging, the gains from hedging differability in profits because that would leave it short of fundsacross firms. Firms can gain from hedging that reduceswhen favorable investment opportunities exist.their probability of being financially distressed, especiallyIn addition, firms may choose not to hedge those risksin those industries where financial distress costs are theabout which they have private information or which theyhighest. There are also tax reasons for distressed firms topartially control. In this respect, firm are similar to individ-hedge, and gains that come from the fact that a firm’s re-uals buying auto insurance. The safest drivers choose to beported cash flows and profits are more informative whenunderinsured since they regard insurance as overpriced.the firm has hedged out extraneous risks.Recognizing this tendency, insurance companies raise the
This chapter also considered situations where firmsrates for drivers wanting full insurance. In most cases,should not hedge. When excellent investment opportuni-these considerations do not affect whether firms hedge inties tend to arise at times when existing assets (unhedged)derivatives markets because firms are unlikely to have im-are most profitable, they may be better off remaining un-portant private information about currency and commodityhedged or only partially hedged. For example, an oil firmprice movements. However, these considerations do affectis likely to find more high-NPVexploration projects whenwhether firms insure against firm-specific risk or choose li-oil prices and hence unhedged profits are the highest. Anability streams that leave them exposed to changes in their
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own credit ratings. For the same reason that the safest driv-ers often choose to be underinsured, managers who believethat their firms are less risky than their credit rating reflectswill choose to borrow short term in hopes that their creditrating will improve in the future. In other words, the safestfirms will be overexposed to the risks connected withchanges in their credit rating.
Our discussion of both foreign exchange and liabilityrisk management indicated that implementing a sound riskmanagement strategy requires a good understanding of therelations between interest rate changes, exchange ratechanges, and inflation. The appropriate interest rate hedg-ing strategy depends on the extent to which interest ratevolatility is due to changes in the rate of inflation. Similarly,the appropriate foreign exchange hedging strategy dependson the extent to which currency fluctuations are due todifferences between domestic and foreign inflation rates.
This chapter presented our view of how firms can userisk management tools to maximize firm value, whichmay differ from current practice. This difference is partlydue to the limited experience many managers have indealing with derivatives markets and risk managementproblems and partly due to potential incentive problems(see Chapter 18). For example, if managers get a largeshare of their compensation from stock options—to solveone kind of incentive problem—they may choose tospeculate rather than hedge, since option values increasewith risk.
Again, we must stress that risk management, like allcorporate finance decisions, cannot be viewed in isolation.Corporations must view their risk management choices aspart of an overall strategy that includes their choice of cap-ital structure and executive compensation as well as con-siderations of overall product market strategy.
Key Concepts
Result |
21.1: |
If hedging choices do not affect cash |
management, the firm will probably want |
|
|
flows from real assets, then, in the |
to hedge its earnings or cash flows rather |
|
|
absence of taxes and transaction costs, |
than its value. However, if the firm is |
|
|
hedging decisions do not affect firm |
hedging to avoid the costs of financial |
|
|
values. |
distress, it should implement a hedging |
Result |
21.2: |
Hedging is unlikely to improve a firm’s |
strategy that takes into account both the |
|
|
value if it does no more than reduce the |
variance of its value and the variance of |
|
|
variance of its future cash flows. To |
its cash flows. |
|
|
improve a firm’s value, hedging also |
Result 21.9:Corporations should organize their |
|
|
must increase expected cash flows. |
hedging in a way that reflects why they |
Result |
21.3: |
Because of asymmetric treatment of |
are hedging. Most hedging motivations |
|
|
gains and losses, firms may reduce their |
suggest that hedging should be carried |
|
|
expected tax liabilities by hedging. |
out at the corporate level. However, the |
|
|
|
improvement in management incentives |
Result |
21.4: |
Firms that are subject to high financial |
|
|
|
|
that can be realized with a risk |
|
|
distress costs have greater incentives to |
|
|
|
|
management program are best achieved |
|
|
hedge. |
|
|
|
|
when the individual divisions are |
Result |
21.5: |
Firms that find it costly to delay or alter |
|
|
|
|
responsible for hedging. |
|
|
their investment plans and that have |
|
|
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|
Result 21.10:Managers have private information only |
|
|
limited access to outside financial |
|
|
|
|
in exceptional cases. Given this, they |
|
|
markets will benefit from hedging. |
|
|
|
|
almost always should be hedging rather |
Result |
21.6: |
The gains from hedging are greater when |
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|
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|
than speculating. |
|
|
it is more difficult to evaluate and |
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|
Result 21.11:Afirm’s liability stream can be |
|
|
monitor management. |
|
|
|
|
decomposed into two components: one |
Result |
21.7: |
Firms have an incentive to insure or |
|
|
|
|
that reflects default-free interest rates and |
|
|
hedge risks that insurance companies and |
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|
|
|
one that reflects the firm’s credit rating. |
|
|
markets can better assess. Doing this |
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|
|
When a firm borrows at a fixed rate, both |
|
|
improves decision making. Firms will |
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|
components are fixed. When it rolls over |
|
|
absorb internally those risks over which |
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|
short-term instruments, the liability |
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|
they have the comparative advantage in |
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|
|
streams fluctuate with both kinds of risks. |
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|
evaluating. |
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|
|
Derivative instruments allow firms to |
Result |
21.8: |
If a firm’s main motivation for hedging |
|
|
|
|
separate these two sources of risk: to |
|
|
is to better assess the quality of |
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Chapter 21
Risk Management and Corporate Strategy
771
create liability streams that are sensitiveto minimize the exposure of its liabilities
to interest rates but not their creditto interest rate changes.
ratings, as described in equation (21.4),Result 21.13:Exchange rate movements can be
and to create liability streams that aredecomposed into those caused by
sensitive to their credit ratings but notdifferences in the inflation rates in the
interest rates, as described in equationhome country and the foreign country,
(21.5).and those caused by changes in realResult 21.12:If changes in interest rates mainly reflectexchange rates. In most cases, the
changes in the rate of inflation and if aincentive is to hedge against real
firm’s unlevered cash flows (and itsexchange rate changes rather than the
EBIT) generally increase with the rate ofcomponent of exchange rate changes that
inflation, then the firm will want itsis driven by inflation differences between
liabilities to be exposed to interest ratethe two countries.
risk. If, however, interest rate changesResult 21.14:When exchange rate changes can be
are not primarily due to changes ingenerated by both real and nominal
inflation (that is, real interest rateschanges, it may be impossible for firms
change) and if the firm’s unlevered cashto effectively hedge their long-term
flows are largely affected by the level ofeconomic exposures.
real interest rates, then the firm will want
Key Terms
economic risk763 |
|
real exchange rate763 |
hedge739 |
|
risk management739 |
liability management |
758 |
risk profile739 |
liability stream758 |
|
transaction risk761 |
nominal exchange rate |
763 |
translation risk762 |
Exercises
21.1. |
Small firms currently hedge less than large firms. |
can XYZ more easily hedge against the risk that |
|
Why is this? Do you expect smaller firms to start hedging more in the future? Explain. |
manufacturing costs, measured in U.S. dollars, will become significantly more expensive? Why? |
21.2.21.3.21.4.21.5. |
Why is it harder to hedge currency risks in countries with volatile inflation rates? Whistler Resorts is a Canadian ski resort just northof Vancouver, British Columbia. Discuss theresort’s exposure to exchange rate risk. It is now much easier to hedge risks than it was inthe past. How should this affect a firm’s optimal capital structure? Why? The XYZ corporation manufactures in both Turkeyand Japan for export to the United States. Japan hasa stable monetary policy and, as a result, its inflationis easy to predict. Monetary policy in Turkey ismuch less predictable. In which of the two countries |
21.6.Purchasing power parity (PPP) implies that real exchange rates remain constant. If PPPholds, do firms need to hedge their long-term foreign exchange exposure? Explain. 21.7.Oil firms hedge only part of their exposure to oil price movements. Why might that be a good idea?21.8.Harwood Outboard manufactures outboard motors for relatively inexpensive motor boats. The firm is optimistic about its long-term outlook, but its bond rating is only BB. Describe how you would manage Harwood’s liability stream if you believed that within two years Harwood’s credit rating would improve to A. |
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Strategy, Second Edition
772Part VIRisk Management
References and Additional Readings
Block, S. B., and T. J. Gallagher. “The Use of Interest
Rate Futures and Options by Corporate Financial
Managers.” Financial Management15 (1986),
pp. 73–78.
Bodnar Gordon M., and Gunther Gebhardt. “Derivatives
Usage in Risk Management by U.S. and German
Non-Financial Firms: AComparative Survey.”
Journal of International Financial Management and
Accounting10, no. 3 (1999), pp. 153–187.
Bodnar, Gordon M.; Gregory S. Hayt; and Richard C.
Marston. “Wharton 1998 Survey of Risk
Management by U.S. Non-Financial Firms.”
Financial Management27, no. 4 (Winter 1998),
pp.70–91.
Breeden, Douglas, and S. Vishwanathan. Why Do Firms
Hedge? An Asymmetric Information Model.Duke
University working paper, 1996.
Chowdhry, Bhagwan, and Jonathan Howe. “Corporate
Risk Management for Multinational Corporations:
Financial and Operational Hedging Policies.”
European Finance Review2 (1999), pp. 229–46.
DeMarzo, Peter, and Darrell Duffie. “Corporate
Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting.”
Review of Financial Studies8 (1995), pp. 743–71.Doherty, Neal, and Clifford Smith. “Corporate Insurance
Strategy: The Case of British Petroleum.” Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance6, no. 3 (Fall 1993),
pp.4–15.
Dolde, Walter. Use and Effectiveness of Foreign
Exchange and Interest Rate Risk Management in
Large Firms. University of Connecticut working
paper, 1993.
Froot, Ken; David Scharfstein; and Jeremy Stein. “Risk
Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment
and Financing Policies.” Journal of Finance48
(1993), pp. 1629–58.
Geczy, Christopher; Bernadette Minton; and Catherine
Schrand. “Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives.”
Journal of Finance52 (September 1997).
Haushalter, David. “Financing Policy, Basic Risk, and
Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas
Producers.” Journal of Finance 55 (2000),
pp.107–152.
Lessard, Don. “Global Competition and Corporate
Finance in the 1990s.” Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance3 (1991), pp. 59–72.
Lewent, Judy C., and A. John Kearney. “Identifying,
Measuring, and Hedging Currency Risk at Merck.”
Continental Bank Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance2 (1990), pp. 19–28.
Nance, Deana R.; Clifford W. Smith; and Charles W.
Smithson. “On the Determinants of Corporate
Hedging.” Journal of Finance48 (1993), pp.267–84.Rawls, S. Waite, and Charles W. Smithson. “Strategic
Risk Management.” Continental Bank Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance2 (1990), pp. 6–18.Shapiro, Alan, and Sheridan Titman. “An Integrated
Approach to Corporate Risk Management.” Midland
Corporate Finance Journal3 (1985), pp. 41–56.Smith, Clifford W., and Rene Stulz. “The Determinants of
Firms’Hedging Policies.” Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis20 (December 1985),
pp.391–405.
Titman, Sheridan. “Interest Rate Swaps and Corporate
Financing Choices.” Journal of Finance47 (1992),
pp. 1503–16.
Tufano, Peter. “Who Manages Risk? An Empirical
Examination of Risk Management Practices in the
Gold Mining Industry.” Journal of Finance51
(September 1996), pp. 1097–1137.
Wall, Larry D., and John Pringle. “Alternative
Explanations of Interest Rate Swaps: An Empirical
Analysis.” Financial Management18 (1989),
pp.59–73.
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Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
1.Describe the factor beta, standard deviation, and value-at-risk methods of
estimating risk exposure.
2.Use forwards, futures, swaps, and options to generate hedges.
3.Apply the covered interest rate parity relation in foreign exchange markets to
develop currency hedges.
4.Understand why and how to tail a hedge with futures and forwards.
5.Use regression and factor models to determine hedge ratios.
6.Describe the relation between hedging with regression, minimum-variance
hedging, and mean-variance analysis.
In the early 1990s, Metallgesellschaft AG, one of Germany’s largest conglomerates,
possessed considerable refinery capacity through a 51-percent-owned subsidiary.
Promises to sell heating oil from its subsidiary’s refineries to its customers at
guaranteed prices over the subsequent 10 years exposed the company to
considerable oil price risk. To offset the risk arising from these promises,
management at Metallgesellschaft decided to purchase crude oil futures contracts on
the New York Mercantile Exchange. In September 1993, oil prices dropped
precipitously and Metallgesellschaft began to receive margin calls on its futures
contracts. The cash required to meet these margin calls soon exceeded the company’s
revenues from its sales of heating oil and Metallgesellschaft was forced to liquidate
much of its futures position, resulting in $1.34 billion in capital losses. As a
consequence of this hedging fiasco, senior management was replaced, and academics
began to study what went wrong. The consensus was that Metallgesellschaft had the
wrong hedge ratio—so wrong that its futures position increased rather than
decreased the firm’s exposure to oil price risk.
The risks a firm faces in its operations, often called its exposures, include, for exam-
ple, exposures to interest rate risk, currency risk, business cycle risk, inflation risk,
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Strategy, Second Edition
774Part VIRisk Management
commodity price risk, and industry risk. This chapter develops an understanding of how
to reduce these risk exposures.
Risk exposures are closely tied to the factor betas in factor models. Most of the
analysis of factor models in Chapter 6 focused on equity returns. In this context, value
hedging, the acquisition of financial instruments that alter the factor betas of the firm’s
equity return in order to reduce the firm’s equity return risks, is particularly pertinent.
However, as Chapter 21 noted, some firms focus on the risk of their near-term cash
flows rather than on the risk of their equity return. Reducing cash flow risk exposure
requires cash flow hedging,1which is the acquisition of financial instruments to reduce
the cash flow factor betasof the firm (see Chapter 11). To minimize risk exposure, one
acquires financial instruments that, when packaged with the firm’s assets, results in fac-
tor betas that are close to zero. Alternatively, targeting a risk exposure involves setting
the factor beta to a target betalevel.
Numerous financial instruments are used for hedging. These instruments include for-
ward contracts, futures contracts, options, swaps, and bonds. The size of the position per
unit of the underlying asset or commodity that achieves minimum risk is known as the
hedge ratio.2
This ratio is often difficult to estimate. The proper instrument for hedg-
ing also may require complex analysis. In the Metallgesellschaft discussion in the chap-
ter’s opening vignette, for example, futures were ineffective instruments for hedging
exposure to oil price risk. Metallgesellschaft’s price guarantees to its customers, which
generated its oil price risk exposure, were long-term contracts. Metallgesellschaft, how-
ever, hedged this long-term exposure by rolling over a series of short-term futures con-
tracts. As this chapter later shows, it is not possible to perfectly hedge long-term oil
price commitments by rolling over a series of short-term futures contracts. In principle,
however, Metallgesellschaft could have better hedged its price commitments with more
complex derivative securities or with a more sophisticated hedging strategy.
Although this chapter touches briefly on the topic of interest rate risk, it leaves the
detailed analysis of interest rate risk to the next chapter. For the most part, we will use
commodity risk—risk exposure due to changing commodity prices—and currency
risk—risk exposure due to changing exchange rates—as illustrative cases to address
the basics of hedging.
Thefirstpartofthechapterdiscussesthemeasurementofriskexposure.Thesec-
ondpartassumesthatthefirmhasmeasureditsriskexposureproperlyanddesires
merelytofindtheproperhedgeratiotominimizeitsexposure.
