- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
Anumber of empirical studies have compared the characteristics of firms that use deriv-
atives to firms that do not. Although research on this topic is still evolving, a number
of patterns are worth considering.
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Larger Firms Are More Likely to Use Derivatives Than Smaller Firms
Anumber of studies have found that larger firms are more likely to use derivatives than
smaller firms.16The fact that smaller firms are less likely to use derivatives than larger
firms is inconsistent with the view that smaller firms generally face higher risks of
bankruptcy and thus have more to gain from hedging. However, the fixed costs of set-
ting up a hedging operation and their lower level of sophistication probably explains
why smaller firms are less likely to hedge. Indeed, Dolde (1993) found that among
firms that have implemented hedging operations, the larger firms tend to hedge less
completely than the smaller firms, leaving themselves more exposed to interest rate and
currency risks. In other words, size is a barrier to setting up a hedging operation, but
among firms that do hedge, smaller firms facing greater risks of bankruptcy hedge more
completely.
Firms with More Growth Opportunities Are More Likely to Use Derivatives
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) and Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) provided
evidence that firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to use deriva-
tives. In particular, firms with higher R&D expenditures and higher market-to-book
ratios are more likely to use derivatives than companies that spend less on R&D, have
lower market-to-book ratios, and, therefore, probably have fewer investment opportu-
nities. This evidence is consistent with the idea that firms hedge to ensure that they
have enough cash to fund their investment opportunities internally.
Anumber of other reasons explain why R&D-intensive firms with high market-
to-book ratios are more likely to use derivatives. As Chapter 17 discussed, firms with
these characteristics generally have higher financial distress costs, suggesting that they
should hedge to ensure that they will meet their debt obligations. Furthermore,
because R&D expenditures are tax deductible, these firms are likely to have lower
taxable earnings, implying that the asymmetric tax treatment of gains and losses, a
hedging motivation discussed earlier in this chapter, applies more to firms with high
R&D expenditures.
Highly Levered Firms Are More Likely to Use Derivatives
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993); Block and Gallagher (1986); and Wall and Pringle
(1989) found weak evidence that firms with more leveraged capital structures hedge
more. The positive relation between leverage ratios and the tendency to hedge is con-
sistent with the view that firms hedge to avoid financial distress costs. However, the
weakness of the evidence probably reflects the tendency of firms with high financial
distress costs, which have the most to gain from hedging, to have the lowest leverage
ratios. For example, as Chapter 17 discussed, high R&D firms tend to use little debt
and also tend to hedge because of their potential costs of financial distress.
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) found no significant relation between the debt
ratios of most firms and their tendency to use derivatives. However, among those firms
with high R&D expenditures and high market-to-book ratios, firms with more leverage
are more likely to hedge. This implies that firms that suffer the highest costs of finan-
cial distress are more likely to hedge when they are highly leveraged.
16See
Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1998); Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993); Dolde (1993); and
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997).
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Chapter 21
Risk Management and Corporate Strategy
769
Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry
The studies described above examined hedging choices across a number of different
industries. Astudy by Tufano (1996) looked in greater detail at the risk management
practices within a single industry, gold mining. Within a single industry, proxies for
financial distress costs, financing constraints, and investment opportunities will proba-
bly vary much less than they do across industries. Consequently, differences in the
hedging strategies across firms within a single industry are likely to be related to dif-
ferences in the incentives and tastes of the top executives.
The evidence described in the Tufano study indicates that management incentives
and tastes do have an important effect on the risk management practices in the gold
mining industry. Specifically, managers who hold large amounts of their firm’s stock
tend to use forward and futures contracts to hedge more of their firm’s gold price risk.
Thus, managers who are personally the most exposed to gold price risk choose to hedge
more of the risk. However, those who own relatively more stock options tend to hedge
less, which may reflect the greater value of the options when volatility is increased.
Tufano also found that firms with CFOs hired more recently hedge a greater portion
of their exposure than firms with CFOs who have been on the job longer.
Risk Management Practices in the Oil and Gas Industry
Astudy by Haushaulter (2000) examined hedging choices of firms in the oil and gas
industry. His evidence suggests that most oil and gas producers hedge only a small per-
centage of their future production. Specifically, only a quarter of the firms in his sam-
ple hedge more than 28 percent of their production. He also found that larger firms and
firms that are more highly leveraged tend to hedge more, which is consistent with the
studies mentioned earlier. Moreover, the evidence suggests that those firms whose pro-
duction is located in regions where prices are highly correlated with the prices of
exchange-traded futures contracts hedge more, which makes sense since these firms can
probably hedge more effectively. However, in contrast to Tufano’s study of the gold
industry, Haushalter does not find a strong relation between the shareholdings and com-
pensation of a firm’s managers and the firm’s risk management practices.
