- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
20.9Financing Acquisitions
Major acquisitions are financed in a number of ways. When the acquiring firm
purchases the target with cash, it usually will have to borrow or issue new debt. Alter-
natively, the acquirer may purchase the target by offering target shareholders its own
stock in exchange for the target’s stock.
Astudy by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) documents changes in the
financing of mergers over the past 20 years. They found that in the 1970s and 1980s,
fewer than half of the acquirers used any of their company’s stock for acquisitions.
However, in the 1990s, about 71 percent of the acquisitions used some stock and 58
percent of the acquisitions were made exclusively with the acquiring firm’s stock.
In making the decision on how to finance an acquisition, managers should consider
the following:
1.Tax implications.
2.Accounting implications.
3.Capital structure implications.
4.Information effects.
Tax Implications of the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
In a merger, the acquiring firm must decide whether to offer stock, cash, or a combi-
nation of each for the shares of the target firm. The decision is often made because of
tax considerations. Three tax considerations can affect the choice:
-
•
The potential capital gains tax liability of the acquired firm’s shareholders.
•
The ability to write up the value of the purchased assets.
•
The tax gains from leverage.
The Capital Gains Tax Liability.All else being equal, the target shareholders gen-
erally prefer a stock offer to cash for tax reasons because they do not need to pay a
capital gains tax on the appreciation of their shares if they receive the acquirer’s stock
rather than cash for their shares. Moreover, they can still obtain cash by selling the
shares received from the acquiring firms. In a cash offer, they have no such option and
are forced to realize a taxable gain.
Since the shareholders of acquired firms may have a tax preference for equity-
funded acquisitions, one might expect them to require lower premiums for equity-funded
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offers. The empirical evidence indicates that this is indeed true. Travlos (1987); Franks,
Harris, and Mayer (1988); and Huang and Walkling (1987) found that premiums in
equity-exchange offers are much lower than in cases where the shareholders of the
acquired firm are offered cash for their shares.15
Franks, Harris, and Mayer reported that
the differences in these premiums are reflected in a return to the acquired firm in the
announcement month of 25.4 percent for cash offers in the United States (30.2 percent
in the United Kingdom) and 11.1 percent for stock offers in the United States (15.1 per-
cent in the United Kingdom).
Stepping up the Basis before the Tax Act of 1986.From the acquiring firm’s per-
spective, the cash offer was preferred before 1986 because it allowed the firm to write up
the tax basis of the acquired firm’s assets, while an acquisition that used the acquiring
firm’s stock would not allow such an asset write-up. After 1986, the basis is stepped up
in a cash offer, but the associated capital gains liability more than outweighs the tax advan-
tage of the basis step-up for depreciation. (This was also noted earlier in this chapter.)
Accounting Implications of the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
If a merger is financed with an exchange of stock, it may qualify for pooling of inter-
ests accountingtreatment. This means thatthe items on the balance sheets of the two
firms are added together, and the merged firm’s reported income would simply be the
sum of the income of the two separate firms. For example, if Alpha has a book value
of $3 million and Beta has a book value of $2 million, then the merged firm, Alpha-
Beta, will have a book value of $5 million.
If an acquisition is made with cash, the acquisition must be treated as a purchase
of assets. Under the purchase method of accounting, the acquiring firm is assumed to
have purchased the assets of the acquired firm at the purchase price. As a result, if Alpha
purchases Beta for $3 million, the new book value of Beta’s assets will be $3million
rather than $2 million, with the additional $1 million reported on the merged firm’s
balance sheet as goodwill.
The choice between pooling and purchase accounting has no cash implications for
the merged firm, but it is of interest to managers because it affects reported earnings.
In the Wells Fargo merger with First Interstate Bank in 1995, a purchase accounting
transaction, earnings per share declined as a result of the accounting treatment. Aman-
ager involved in the merger told us that at least part of the $10 million in fees paid to
investment banks was compensation for convincing stock analysts that the drop in earn-
ings per share was due to the accounting treatment of the merger, not to some funda-
mental drop-off in the banking business of the merged firms.
The decline in earnings per share in a purchase transaction occurs because the addi-
tional goodwill generated on the merged firm’s balance sheet needs to be amortized,
over a period that cannot exceed 40 years. For example, in America Online’s 2000
acquisition of Time Warner, 87 percent of the purchase price was allocated to goodwill,
which was amortized over 25 years. Reported income is lower because the amortiza-
tion charges are deducted from reported income. If the $1 million in goodwill in the
hypothetical merger between Alpha and Beta was amortized over 40 years, the merged
firm’s reported income would be reduced by $25,000 in each of the following 40 years.
This change in reported income has no effect on the merged firm’s cash flows and
therefore should not affect market value. However, since various contracts such as bond
15This
also could reflect the fact that hostile offers are generally cash offers.
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and Corporate Control |
Acquisitions |
Companies, 2002 |
Strategy, Second Edition |
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Chapter 20
Mergers and Acquisitions
721
covenants and management compensation contracts may be based on reported income,
and since analysts are perceived by some firms as being confused about what the impact
of the accounting treatment on earnings should be, the accounting treatment of a merger
is likely to be of interest to a manager and may influence how a deal is structured.
Most acquirers prefer to use pooling accounting because it results in higher earn-
ings, but they also may want to realize the tax benefits from increased leverage that
would result from a cash offer. One might think that the acquirer could achieve the best
of both worlds either by repurchasing its own shares following the acquisition or by
having the target firm repurchase a substantial fraction of its shares prior to the merger.
However, a requirement that must be satisfied to qualify for pooling of interest account-
ing treatment is that the common equity interests of neither of the merged firms change
materially in the two years before and after the merger. Either of the preceding actions
would violate this requirement and force the acquirer to use the purchase of assets
accounting method. For example, the Wells Fargo/First Interstate Bank merger dis-
cussed above was financed by an exchange of stock but was treated as a purchase of
assets merger because the preceding requirement was not satisfied.
Aware of the perceived preference for pooling accounting treatment, potential tar-
get firms sometimes repurchase shares to deter unwanted hostile offers. In some of
these cases, target managers agree later to accept a more attractive offer, and then take
steps that allow the acquirer to use pooling of interest accounting. For example, the
target can undo the effects of a repurchase by reissuing the repurchased shares.
The Use of Pooling Accounting in AT&T’s Acquisition of NCR
AT&T’s $7.5 billion acquisition of NCR in 1991 illustrates the effect that accounting choices
can have on mergers. Lys and Vincent (1995) reported that in response to AT&T’s hostile
offer, NCR established an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) that controlled approxi-
mately 8 percent of the firm’s common stock and declared a $1 per share special dividend.
Both of these actions qualified as changes in NCR’s equity interest, which precluded the
use of pooling accounting. NCR also had repurchased shares in 1989 and 1990 which also
would be a problem.
AT&Twas concerned about the effect of the acquisition on the firm’s reported earnings
if it was forced to use purchase accounting. Lys and Vincent estimated that if AT&Tand
NCR were combined with pooling accounting, the earnings per share would have been $2.42
in 1990, but with purchase accounting, the reported earnings per share would have been
only $1.97. It should be stressed, however, that this difference in reported earnings would
have had no effect on AT&T’s taxable income and it would not affect its cash flows.
After AT&Tincreased its offer, NCR management agreed to be taken over. Part of the
increase was specifically tied to steps that NCR needed to take to satisfy the requirements
for pooling of interest accounting. For example, The Wall Street Journalreported on March
25, 1991, that AT&Twas willing to pay “another $5 a share if AT&Tpays in stock and can
treat the acquisition as a pooling of interests, avoiding certain accounting charges.”
To satisfy the conditions for pooling of interest accounting treatment, NCR had to cut
its regular dividend, to offset the prior special dividend, and reissue the shares that were
previously repurchased. Lys and Vincent estimated that the transaction cost of reissuing the
shares was about $50 million and that AT&Twas forced to pay an additional $450 million in
order to get NCR management to make the changes that allowed them to adopt pooling of
interest accounting. Apparently, AT&Tplaced a very high value on having what it considered
the more favorable accounting treatment which pooling of interest accounting provided.
The End of Pooling and Goodwill Amortization.On June 29, 2001, FASB took a
final vote to eliminate pooling of interest accounting for business combinations. All
mergers after June 30, 2001, now have to be accounted for using the purchase method.
However, the goodwill that is generated from these purchases will not be amortized.
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1456 Titman: FinancialV. Incentives, Information,
20. Mergers and
© The McGraw
1456 HillMarkets and Corporate
and Corporate Control
Acquisitions
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
722Part VIncentives, Information, and Corporate Control
This change is likely to have an important effect on the financing choices of firms that
are likely to be involved in mergers:
1.We might expect to observe more cash-financed mergers since cash and stock
financed mergers are put on an even footing under this proposal.
2.Firms might choose to forego some mergers that would be implemented under
pooling accounting because under the new purchase accounting rules, the
book values of tangible assets, such as building and equipment, will be
written up, resulting in additional depreciation and lower reported earnings.
3.Firms that are likely to be involved in mergers will be more willing to
repurchase shares since they will no longer be concerned about qualifying for
pooling.
Capital Structure Implications in the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
The financing of a takeover is partially determined by its effect on the firm’s overall
capital structure. As Chapter 17 discussed, firms that made profitable cash-generating
investments in that past, but which have few profitable new investment opportunities,
tend to use their cash to pay down debt and become underleveraged over time. Section
20.4 mentioned that firms in these situations often finance acquisitions with debt to
move toward their long-run optimal debt ratio. However, firms that are overleveraged,
perhaps because of previous debt-financed acquisitions, may have an incentive to
finance new acquisitions by exchanging stock.
