- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
Evaluating a potential merger candidate requires a great deal of care. These acquisi-
tions generally are very large transactions which have important effects on the operat-
ing strategy and the financial structure of the acquiring firm.
Anumber of firms now have “M&A” departments devoted entirely to discovering
and analyzing acquisition candidates. Evaluating a potential acquisition is similar in
most respects to analyzing the net present value of any other investment project a firm
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may be considering. Hence, the techniques discussed in Chapters 9 through 13 also
apply to evaluating acquisition candidates. There are, however, some subtle differences.
Most importantly, publicly traded acquisition candidates have an observable stock price
that provides an estimate of the market’s evaluation of the present value of the firm’s
cash flows. This information allows the acquiring firm to estimate more accurately the
present value of the cash flows from a potential acquisition than it can for most other
investment projects.
Valuing Synergies
Obviously, an analyst cannot rely exclusively on a potential acquisition’s current stock
price to determine the company’s value. An acquiring firm will have to offer a pre-
mium over the target company’s current stock price to purchase the firm, implying that
there has to be additional value created by combining the firms. In other words, there
must be synergies that make the value of the target to the acquirer greater than the mar-
ket value of the target on its own. The present value of the synergies must be added
to the value of the firm’s cash flows, given its current operations, to arrive at the pres-
ent value of the acquisition.
In many cases, these synergies arise because of a reduction in the fixed costs of
the combined firm. If these cost savings occur with certainty or, equivalently, are deter-
mined independently of the market portfolio’s return (assuming the CAPM holds), then
valuing the target is straightforward, as Example 20.2 illustrates.
Example 20.2:Valuing Isolated Industries
Isolated Industries is currently selling for $22 a share and has 1 million shares outstand-
ing.Since analysts do not presently expect the firm to be a takeover target, $22 a share
is also its current operating value.However, United Industries is considering the acquisition
of Isolated Industries.It believes that by combining sales forces, it can eliminate 10 sales-
people at a savings of $500,000 per year.They expect this savings to be permanent and
certain.If the discount rate is 10 percent, how much is Isolated Industries worth to United
Industries?
Answer:The present value of the perpetual savings from combining the sales forces is
$5 million ($500,000.1) or $5 per share.Hence, United Industries would be willing to pay
up to $27 per share for Isolated Industries.
Example 20.2 was simple because it assumed that the synergies were certain
and thus quite easy to value. The example also assumed that the firm’s stock price
could be used to obtain a value for Isolated Industries as a stand-alone entity which,
in general, will not be the case. The target’s stock price will exceed the present
value of the firm’s future cash flows, given its current operating structure, if it
reflects the possibility that the firm may eventually be taken over at a premium.
Assuming risk neutrality and a zero discount rate, we can express the firm’s cur-
rent stock price as
Current stock priceCurrent operating value
(Expected takeover premium)(Takeover probability)
Equivalently, the current operating value of the firm can be expressed as
CurrentoperatingvalueCurrentstockprice
(Expected takeover premium)(Takeover probability)
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AGuide to the Valuation of Synergies
Valuing acquisitions draws upon the techniques for evaluating real investment projects
described in Chapters 9 to 13. However, acquisitions tend to be much larger than the
capital investments that firms typically undertake, so firms should go into more depth
in their valuation. They should evaluate a variety of scenarios and consider the various
embedded options that exist in most firms (see Chapter 12). We suggest that acquiring
firms take the following steps to evaluate prospective targets.
Step 1: Value the Target as a Stand-Alone Firm.Valuing the target as a stand-alone
entity provides the analyst with a useful reality check for determining the value cre-
ated by the acquisition. Such a valuation requires estimates of future cash flows and
the appropriate rates for discounting the cash flows. The value obtained in this manner
should be compared with the target firm’s stock price.
Step 2: Calibrate the Valuation Model.The analyst needs to explain any difference
between the estimated value of the target and the target’s preacquisition stock price. As
mentioned above, stock prices may reflect takeover probabilities and takeover premi-
ums as well as the stand-alone value of the target. Also, stock prices may not incor-
porate proprietary information that the acquiring firm’s analysts may have obtained
about the target’s asset values during the course of their investigations. In many cases,
especially in friendly takeovers, the acquiring firm has access to information that is
unavailable to other investors. For example, the target’s management may provide pro-
prietary information when negotiating a selling price. The acquirer also may have come
across new information in the course of its own investigation. When buying an entire
company, the importance of collecting accurate information is greater than it is when
buying even large numbers of shares. Hence, it is plausible that the acquirer might value
the target better than the financial markets.
If the acquiring firm’s analysts believe they do not have superior information, and
the difference between their estimated value of the target and the target stock price can-
not be explained by information about a possible takeover, they must conclude that
their valuation is flawed. In other words, analysts are valuing the firm using assump-
tions about future cash flows and discount rates that differ from the assumptions implied
by market prices. At this point, the analysts will have to revise their assumptions about
cash flows and discount rates. Getting these assumptions right at this stage of the analy-
sis is important because these assumptions also may be used to value the synergies.
Step 3: Value the Synergies.To evaluate what the target is worth to the acquiring
firm, analysts must value the synergies associated with combining the target and the
acquirer. Doing this requires estimates of the cash flows generated by the synergies
along with the appropriate discount rates. To simplify the analysis, assume that some
synergies are virtually certain while others are risky. For example, synergies that come
from tax savings or reductions in fixed costs are often of a lower-risk category—while
those related to increased sales or reductions in variable costs should be related to the
risk of either the acquirer or the target, or perhaps both.
The future cash flows and the discount rates used in the stand-alone valuation model
are likely to be used in valuing risky synergies. For example, to value a 10 percent
increase in the target’s cash flows that will be generated for the first five years fol-
lowing a takeover requires both the preacquisition discount rate and the cash flows of
the target. Valuing the synergies also may require an estimate of the acquiring firm’s
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cost of capital and expected cash flows. Hence, the acquiring firm also will want to
use the procedures outlined in steps 1 and 2 to value its own stock and calibrate its
cost of capital and cash flows.
As Example 20.3 illustrates, the synergies generated by a takeover should, in many
cases, be discounted at a weighted average of the discount rates of the two merging
organizations.
Example 20.3:Valuing the Marketing Synergies from Kraft and Philip Morris
Assume that by combining sales forces Kraft and Philip Morris both increase their pretax
profits by 10 percent per year.What discount rate should be used to value this synergy?
Answer:Since the gain in each year is proportional to the preacquisition cash flows of both
firms, the appropriate discount rate is a weighted average of the two firm’s costs of capital.
Example 20.3 illustrates a case with marketing synergies that affect both parties to
the merger equally. However, this will not always be the case. In the Gillette takeover
of Duracell, the synergy was Duracell’s use of Gillette’s distribution network. If this is
expected to result in a proportional increase in Duracell’s profits, but not Gillette’s, then
one would use Duracell’s cost of capital to value the synergy.
Because Duracell’s ability to enter new markets is the major gain from the merger,
one might want to consider valuing the synergies as a strategic option, using the real
options methodology, rather than the risk-adjusted discount rate method. Recall from
Chapter 12 that strategic options exist whenever flexibility exists in the implementa-
tion of an investment. When a firm expands into a new market, it has the option to
expand further if prospects turn out to be more favorable than originally anticipated,
and to exit if the situation turns out to be unfavorable. In these situations, an investment
may be substantially undervalued when such options are ignored.
Step 4: Value the Acquisition.The acquisition can be valued by simply adding the
stand-alone value of the target to the synergies being produced. In general, we would
suggest acquiring the target if it can be purchased for a price that is less than this sum.
However, as discussed in Chapters 9–13, we also have to take into account mutually
exclusive projects that may also have positive net present values as well as a possible
option to delay making the acquisition.
Hilton Buys Welch Hotels
Welch Hotels, a hypothetical company, is a relatively small chain with 23 hotels in Ger-
many. Of the 2 million shares outstanding, more than 30 percent are owned by the Welch
family, who started the hotel chain. The remaining 70 percent of Welch’s shares trade on
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. On October 3, Wolfgang Welch, the hotel’s founder,
announced that he wished to retire and would seek an international hotel company to buy
the firm. Following this surprise announcement, the stock price of Welch Hotels jumped
from €60 to €72 per share, or €144 million for the entire chain, indicating that the market
believed that an international hotel would place a higher value on the firm than its stand-
alone value.
The Hilton Hotel Corporation hired Gordon Elliot, an investment banker, to evaluate
this potential opportunity. Hilton executives believe that with the unification of Europe and
the emerging markets in Eastern Europe, they would benefit from an increased presence
in Germany. Since Hilton hotels are known internationally, Hilton’s management believes
that they can create value with such an acquisition. Specifically, they believe that Hilton
is much better positioned to attract international business travelers who value the Hilton
name but know nothing about Welch. An added bonus of the acquisition would be increased
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recognition of Hilton hotels. By increasing their visibility within Germany, Hilton manage-
ment hopes to increase the number of German business travelers who stay in their hotels
when they travel outside Germany.
To value Welch Hotels, Elliot first values the hotel as a stand-alone business. To this
value, he adds the value created by its combination with Hilton. Elliot examines the pro-
jected cash flows of the corporation provided by Welch’s top management and by the stock
market analysts who follow the company. He finds that his cash flow forecasts, those of the
analysts, and those of Welch’s management are pretty much the same. These estimates sug-
gest that the unlevered cash flow that will accrue over the current year is €12 million and
that this value will increase, on average, at 2 percent per year. Based on these projected
cash flows and the company’s value of €120 million before the proposed takeover, Elliot
infers that if the company’s pretakeover value of €120 million does not capture an antici-
pated takeover premium, the WACCfor Welch Hotels is 12 percent—obtained by solving
for the discount rate in the growing perpetuity formula (see Chapter 9), PVC (r g),
where for this illustration
PVfirm value €120 million
Cend of year expected unlevered cash flow€12 million
ggrowth rate of expected cash flow 2%, and
rWACC
Elliot believes that this WACCis consistent with the hotel’s risk, which supports his assump-
tion that the value of the firm before the takeover represents the value of the hotel chain
as a stand-alone business.
Elliot estimates that because of increased occupancy rates and more aggressive pricing
generated as a result of Hilton’s reputation and its worldwide reservation network, Welch
Hotels will increase its expected unlevered cash flows more than the 2 percent per year that
it would have achieved as a stand-alone firm. He assumes that the expected unlevered cash
flows will increase 3 percent in years 2 and 3, and 5 percent thereafter. In other words, the
expected unlevered cash flows after the takeover can be expressed as follows:
Unlevered Cash Flows (in €millions) at End-of-Year
-
12
3
4
-
12
12(1.03)
12(1.03)2
2
€
€
€
€12(1.03)(1.05)
The unlevered cash flows will increase by 5 percent in each year past year 4.
Since the incremental cash flows depend on the state of the German economy, they have
the same risk as the original cash flows, so the firm’s cash flows after the takeover can be
discounted at the 12 percent WACCused to value the firm as a stand-alone business. This
assumes that the tax effects on the WACCfrom both the financing mix and the cross-border
transaction can be ignored.
To find the present value of this stream of cash flows, first calculate the end of year 4
value of the cash flows from year 4 on as
2 2 million
€12(1.03)(1.05)
V€12(1.03)2€
(1.05) million 214 million
4.12 .05
The present value of the Welch Hotels is thus
2
€12 million€12(1.03) million€12(1.03)million€214 million
1.121.12231.124
1.12
€163 million.
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Valuing the spillover benefits that accrue to Hilton Hotels outside Germany is somewhat
more difficult. Elliot estimates that by buying the chain of Welch Hotels, 10,000 German
individuals will come into contact with the Hilton name every day. He estimates that the
cost of buying that sort of advertising would cost about €500,000 per year, which he expects
will remain fixed indefinitely. Since the benefits associated with that kind of publicity are
determined by the demand for Hilton’s hotels outside Germany, Elliot discounts the pro-
jected benefits of this publicity at Hilton’s weighted average cost of capital, which is 10
percent. Assuming that this €500,000 stream is perpetual, the value is €500,000 .1
€5million. Adding this to the value of the hotel after the takeover provides a value of
Welch Hotels to Hilton of €168 million. Given that this amount is substantially above the
current market price of €144 million for Welch Hotels, Elliot recommends that Hilton pro-
ceed with an offer that is slightly higher than the current market price.
