- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
There are probably almost as many types of mergers and acquisitions as there are bid-
ders and targets. However, investment bankers find it useful to define three different
categories of M&Atransactions:
-
•
Strategic acquisitions.
•
Financial acquisitions.
•
Conglomerate acquisitions.
Acquisitions also are often categorized as being friendly or hostile. An offer made
directly to the firm’s management or its board of directors is characterized as a friendly
takeover. However, the managers of the target firm often object to being taken over,
forcing the bidding firm to make a hostile offer for the target firm.
In a hostiletakeover, the acquirer often bypasses the target’s management and
approaches the target company’s shareholders directly with a tender offer for the
purchase of their shares. Atenderofferis an offer to purchase a certain number of
shares at a specific price and on a specific date, generally for cash. Although a tender
offer is usually associated with a hostile takeover, it also is used in friendly takeovers
when the target’s management approves the offer before it is presented to shareholders.
Strategic Acquisitions
In many cases, strategic mergers can be viewed as horizontal mergers. Most of the
mergers during the turn of the 20th century (1893–1904) would be classified as
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horizontal or strategic mergers. This was also the case during the period leading up to
the Great Depression.
Astrategic acquisitioninvolves operating synergies, meaning that the two firms
are more profitable combined than separate. In the 1990s, strategic acquisitions became
much more popular and they are now the dominant form of acquisition.
The operating synergies in a strategic acquisition may occur because the com-
bining firms were former competitors. Alternatively, one firm may have products or
talents that fit well with those of another firm. For example, IBM’s purchase of Lotus
in 1995 can be characterized as a strategic acquisition. IBM believed that Lotus’s
software products (in particular, Lotus Notes) fit well with the overall strategy of
IBM’s software business. The Philip Morris acquisition of Kraft, described in the
chapter’s opening vignette, would also be considered a strategic acquisition. Philip
Morris and Kraft could benefit by combining their efforts in selling and promoting
their respective products.
Financial Acquisitions
Investment bankers generally classify an acquisition that includes no operating synergies
as a financial acquisition. In a financial acquisition, the bidder usually believes that the
price of the firm’s stock is less than the value of the firm’s assets. In contrast to strate-
gic acquisitions, financial acquisitions have declined substantially since the late 1980s.
Afinancial acquisition is sometimes motivated by the tax gains associated with the
acquisition. Alternatively, the acquirer may believe that the target firm’s assets are
undervalued because the stock market is ignoring important information. The most com-
mon motivation for a financial acquisition, however, is that the acquirer believes that
the target firm is undervalued relative to its assets because it is badly managed. In most
cases, a financial acquisition motivated by the acquirer’s dismal view of target man-
agement is hostile. This type of acquisition is sometimes referred to as a disciplinary
takeover.
For example, T. Boone Pickens, the CEO of Mesa Petroleum, made a bid for Gulf
Oil in 1983. Pickens’s motivation was that Gulf management was expending substantial
resources exploring for oil at a time when the price of oil made exploration unprofitable.
He believed that Gulf’s stock was priced low because of this unprofitable investment
in oil exploration and that a change of management could change this policy. Although
Pickens failed in his takeover attempt, Gulf was subsequently acquired by Chevron,
which substantially curtailed its exploration activity.
Financial acquisitions are often structured as leveraged buyouts (LBOs). In most
leveraged buyouts, an individual or a group, often led by a firm’s own management,
arranges to buy a public company and take it private. Thus, all of the publicly traded
shares are purchased and the firm ceases to be a public company. These are referred to
as leveragedbuyouts because the transactions are financed mainly with debt.
Because the acquirers in LBOs have no other assets, there are no potential syner-
gies. Hence, operating improvements must come from better management and improved
incentives. Kohlberg Kravis and Roberts’s leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco is the most
well known example of this type of acquisition.
Conglomerate Acquisitions
Athird type of acquisition, a conglomerate(or diversifying) acquisition, involves firms
with no apparent potential for operating synergies. In this sense, the conglomerate
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acquisition is similar to the financial acquisition described above. However,
conglomerate acquisitions are more likely to be motivated by financial synergies, which
lower a firm’s cost of capital, thus creating value even when the operations of merged
firms do not benefit from the combination. As we will discuss below, financial syner-
gies can arise because of taxes as well as because of the information and incentive prob-
lems discussed in Chapters 16–19.
Most of the mergers that occurred in the United States during the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s were conglomerate mergers. Apopular explanation for the predominance
of conglomerate mergers during that time was that regulators would not approve
most strategic combinations because of antitrust considerations. However, some
authors have noted that conglomerate acquisitions have also been common in coun-
tries without strong antitrust regulations.1They have become much less common in
the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting either the loosening of antitrust rules that have
allowed more strategic combinations or an increase in the efficiency of financial
markets, which could have the effect of reducing the financial synergies associated
with a merger.
Anumber of large U.S. corporations were built up in the 1960s through conglom-
erate acquisitions. For example, ITT(International Telephone and Telegraph) was orig-
inally a communications company that developed and ran telephone systems in Europe
and Latin America. After ITT’s profits had been shaken by political risk, such as the
nationalization of ITT’s telephone system in Cuba, the CEO, Harold Geneen, recom-
mended in an internal document in 1963 that ITTadopt a policy of acquiring U.S. com-
panies. The first major purchase by ITTwas Avis Rent-a-Car, which was followed by
both big and small names. Bramwell Business College; the Nancy Taylor Secretarial
Finishing School of Chicago; Apcoa, the car-parking company; Continental Baking;
Pennsylvania Glass & Sand; Transportation Displays, the billboard rental company;
Hartford Insurance group; Howard Sams, the publisher; Levitt, the home construction
company; and Sheraton Hotels are just a few of ITT’s acquisitions. This diversification
strategy did not stop at the U.S. border. In France, for example, ITTacquired a pump
maker, two television set manufacturers, a lighting company, a contractor, and a
business school.
Many of the conglomerate acquisitions of the 1960s and 1970s proved to be unsuc-
cessful. Indeed, many of the disciplinary takeovers in the 1980s were initiated to break
up conglomerates formed earlier. For example, the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout,
described in the chapter’s opening vignette, was first proposed as a bustup takeover.
The original plan was to separate the food and tobacco businesses. As it turned out,
some but not all of the food businesses were sold after the RJR Nabisco LBO. ITThas
also been the target of unwanted takeovers. Perhaps to preempt such takeovers, ITT
has sold off a number of the divisions acquired over the past 20 years. In 1996, ITT
split into three separate companies: an insurance business; an auto-parts and industrial
products company; and a hotel, casino, and entertainment company.
Summary of Mergers and Acquisitions
Exhibit 20.3 summarizes the three categories of acquisitions discussed in this section.
Note that individual acquisitions do not necessarily fit neatly into any one box. For
example, Philip Morris’s acquisition of Kraft is generally categorized as a strategic
1See, for example, Matsusaka (1996) and Comment and Jarrell (1995).
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EXHIBIT20.3Types of Acquisitions
Type of Aquisition |
Primary Motivation |
Hostile or Friendly |
Trend |
-
Strategic
Operating synergies
Usually friendly
Increasing importance in the 1990s
Financial
Taxes, incentive improvements
Often hostile
Mainly a phenomenon of the 1980s
-
Conglomerate
Financial synergies, taxes,
Hostile or friendly
Mainly a phenomenon of the 1960s
and incentives
and 1970s
acquisition. However, Philip Morris might have believed that an important source of
value in the acquisition was that Kraft was undervalued because of poor manage-
ment. If this were the case, the acquisition could also be categorized as a financial
acquisition.
