- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
Announcements
This section examines the information conveyed by dividend and share repurchase
announcements. As this chapter’s opening vignette illustrates, dividend changes can
lead to dramatic changes in stock prices.
Empirical Evidence on Stock Returns at the Time of Dividend Announcements
When firms announce dividend increases, their stock prices generally increase about 2
percent [see Aharony and Swary (1980)]. Announcements of the initiation of quarterly
dividend payouts by firms that previously paid no dividends generate even larger stock
price reactions [see Asquith and Mullins (1983), Healy and Palepu (1988), and
Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995)]. Moreover, stock prices generally experience
similar declines when firms announce dividend decreases or omissions, falling about
9.5 percent, on average, at the announcement of an omission [Healy and Palepu (1988)].
-
Result 19.4
Stock prices increase, on average, when firms increase dividends and decrease, on average,when they decrease dividends.
As a corporate executive, you might interpret a positive stock price reaction to an
announced dividend increase as evidence that investors consider the dividend increase
to be a good decision. This evidence, however, does not necessarily imply that dividend
increases improve the intrinsic value of firms. Financial decisions that convey favor-
able information to the market tend to increase stock prices even when the decisions
are bad for the firm’s future profitability. As shown below, dividend increases can
diminish intrinsic values, but still generate positive stock price responses because they
signal favorable information.
ADividend Signaling Model
Although finance researchers have proposed a number of signaling-based explanations
for the positive stock price response to dividend increases, we will describe only one
model.5This model, which we believe is the most intuitive, is based on an analysis of
what an all-equity-financed firm does with the operating cash flow produced by its
assets. The sources and uses of funds equation,
Operating cash flow investment expenditures change in equity dividends,
suggests that the cash flows produced by the assets of the firm (after taxes) either have
to be retained within the firm for investment expenditures (for example, for mainte-
nance of assets or expansion of assets) or be paid out to equity holders as either a share
repurchase or a dividend.
Information Observed by Investors.The following argument assumes that investors
cannot observe the operating cash flows of the firm, perhaps because managers can
manipulate the relevant accounting numbers. In addition, outside investors cannot
observe all the items that constitute the firm’s investment expenditures, such as equip-
ment maintenance and expenditures to update its customer database. We will assume,
5This discussion is based on Miller and Rock (1985).
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however, that investors know how much the firm shouldinvest to maximize shareholder
value. In addition, the investors do, of course, observe the dividends that they receive
as well as the amount of capital the firm either raises (for example, through an equity
offering) from the capital markets or retires (for example, by repurchasing shares).
The Information Content of a Dividend Change.The dividends and changes in out-
standing equity provide investors with information about the firm’s operating cash flows
as well as the level of investment expenditures. However, investors cannot decipher the
meaning of an unexpected change in dividends. For example, a dividend increase may
reflect the fact that the firm’s operating cash flow was higher than expected, which
would be good news, since this would suggest that the firm is more profitable than was
originally believed. On the other hand, the firm may have generated the cash for the
higher dividend by cutting back investment, which would be bad news because it
implies that the firm is sacrificing futureoperating cash flows to generate higher divi-
dends. To understand the information content of dividends we will first examine Exam-
ple 19.3, which considers the case where investors observe the level of investment
expenditures.
Example 19.3:The Information Content of Dividend Payouts
Analysts observe that Johnson Trucking, an all-equity firm, has not issued or repurchased
shares over the past year.They also have observed that Johnson has paid out $10 million
in dividends over the past year and they believe that the firm has invested $15 million of its
operating cash flow back into the business.From this information, what do the analysts infer
about the firm’s operating cash flows?
Answer:Since the level of equity financing has not changed, the level of dividends plus
investment must equal the operating cash flow.The analysts would thus infer that Johnson’s
operating cash flows were $25 million.
Example 19.3 suggests that an increase in dividends from $10 million to $15 mil-
lion would imply that Johnson Trucking’s operating cash flow increased from $25 mil-
lion to $30 million. This would be considered good news by shareholders and would
result in an increase in the firm’s stock price. Hence, a dividend change may convey
important information to shareholders even if managers are not explicitly trying to use
dividends as a signaling tool.
Dividend Signaling and Underinvestment.Amanager faced with the situation in
Example 19.3 would choose the optimal level of investment if he or she was interested
solely in maximizing the intrinsic value of the firm. However, as suggested above, a
manager who has an incentive to temporarily boost stock prices may want to cut back
on unobserved investment expenditures and use the proceeds to increase the distribu-
tion to shareholders. Hence, an incentive to convey favorable information to share-
holders will generally lead to observable payouts that are too high and unobservable
investment expenditures that are too low. Example 19.4 illustrates this possibility.
Example 19.4:Dividend Signaling and Underinvestment
Johnson Trucking is deciding whether to pay out $10 million (option 1), $15 million (option 2),
or $20 million (option 3) in dividends.As in Example 19.3, a $10 million dividend, which allows
investment of $15 million, will maximize the intrinsic value of the stock.Higher dividends, on
the other hand, will result in an immediate share price increase but, because of the cut in
investment expenditures, will reduce the firm’s intrinsic value.The following table provides the
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firm’s intrinsic values and current market values associated with the different dividend alterna-
tives.
-
Option 1
Option 2
Option 3
$10 million dividend
$15 million dividend
$20 million dividend
$15 million invested
$10 million invested
$5 million invested
-
Intrinsic value
$220 million
$210 million
$200 million
Current value
190 million
210 million
215 million
If managers want to maximize an equally weighted average of the firm’s current market value
and intrinsic value, what are they likely to decide?
Answer:The $15 million dividend (option 2) is the best option given the managers’pref-
erences.However, if they place significantly more weight on intrinsic value, they will prefer
the lower dividend;if they place more weight on current market value, they will prefer the
higher dividend.
Example 19.4 shows that Johnson Trucking’s market value and intrinsic values are
equal when the firm pays out $15 million in dividends (option 2), suggesting that the
market correctly inferred that the firm would invest only $10 million and correctly
priced the stock. In other words, the $15 million dividend signals the firm’s value
because analysts and investors correctly infer management’s incentive to increase the
firm’s current market value at the expense of its intrinsic value. If the firm had paid
out more dividends and invested less than analysts expected, there would have been a
deviation between the firm’s current stock price and its intrinsic value.
To understand this point, consider what would happen if analysts view managers
as having little incentive to increase the firm’s current stock price at the expense of
its intrinsic value when, in reality, their incentive to increase the stock price (per-
haps because of a takeover threat) was quite large. In such a case, a large dividend
would be incorrectly interpreted as evidence of increased operating cash flow when,
in reality, the cash for the dividend was generated by decreasing investment
expenditures.
Do Positive Stock Price Responses Imply That a Decision Creates Value?In
Example 19.4, the higher dividends (options 2 and 3) use funds that would have been
used more productively within the firm. However, analysts still view the higher divi-
dend payments as good news because they reveal that the firm has more cash—and
perhaps greater earnings potential—than the analysts had previously believed. In this
case, the stock price will react favorably to a dividend increase because of the infor-
mation it conveys, even though it is a bad decision. Similarly, stock prices may react
unfavorably to good decisions. If a firm is experiencing a cash shortfall, it may be in
the firm’s best interests to cut its dividend payout. However, the announcement of a
dividend cut would reveal the firm’s difficulties, so the market is likely to react nega-
tively to the announcement.
-
Result 19.5
An increased dividend implies, holding all else constant, higher cash flows and hence higherstock prices. By cutting investment expenditures on items that cannot be readily observedby analysts, firms can increase reported earnings and dividends, thereby increasing theircurrent stock prices. Amanager’s incentive to temporarily boost the firm’s stock price maythus lead the firm to pass up positive net present value investments.
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Result 19.5 indicates that share price increases that occur when firms announce
dividend increases do not imply that investors like the higher dividend payout. Although
the dividend increase conveys favorable information, it doesn’t necessarily create value
for shareholders. Hence, the observed stock price response to dividend increases is a
misguided rationale for increasing dividends.
Share Repurchases versus Dividends.Chapter 15 indicates that, in the absence of
taxes and transaction costs, dividends and share repurchases are essentially identical. A
share repurchase should also convey the same information as a dividend because, in
both cases, cash is distributed to shareholders, revealing to investors that the firm has
generated a sizable operating cash flow.
Indeed, Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) documented impressive share price
responses to share repurchase announcements, suggesting that the repurchase alterna-
tive conveys the same favorable information to investors as a dividend payment. Dann
found that, on average, firms that repurchase shares with tender offers experience about
a 16 percent return on the announcement date. In his sample, the tender offers were
made at a premium that averaged about 22 percent above the stock price just before
the offer. The number of shares repurchased averaged about 15 percent of the out-
standing shares, taking the premium into account, which represented, on average, 19
percent of the outstanding equity of these firms.
Given the large number of shares repurchased in these tender offers, it is not sur-
prising that the stock price reaction to a share repurchase of this kind is much greater
than the price reaction to a dividend increase. When firms want to repurchase smaller
amounts of their stock (for example, 3 to 7 percent of their outstanding shares), they
usually buy the shares on the open market. The stock returns at the time of the
announcements of open market repurchase announcements are about 3 percent, which
is comparable to the returns from the initiation of a new dividend. However, as Example
19.5 illustrates, this is not the only explanation for why stock prices do not react as
much to open market repurchases as they do to tender offers.
Example 19.5:Share Price Response to an Open Market Repurchase
On September 12, 1988, Lotus Development Corporation announced that it would repur-
chase up to 15 percent of its outstanding shares in the open market.The stock reacted by
increasing from $17 to $18 per share.While the price increase was somewhat higher than
the average increase for an open market repurchase, the number of shares Lotus planned
to repurchase was substantially higher than the average.Indeed, the planned repurchase
was about as large as the typical tender offer repurchase in which stock prices generally
have a much greater reaction.Why didn’t Lotus’s stock price react more?
Answer:While various explanations can be offered about why Lotus’s stock price didn’t
react more favorably to the repurchase announcement, we emphasize the following:
-
1.
The announcement of an intention to repurchase a quantity of shares on the open
market is not a firm commitment.Lotus could have repurchased fewer shares.
-
2.
In a tender offer, management offers to repurchase shares at a price substantiallyabove the prevailing stock price.This provides an additional signal of the stock’svalue since the firm would be substantially overpaying for its stock if the currentprice was not substantially below the stock’s intrinsic value.In open marketrepurchases, no premium is offered.
Whittakerand FPL: Simultaneous Dividend Cuts and Share Repurchases
For tax reasons, it makes sense to substitute a share repurchase for a dividend. In the-
ory, such a transaction should not convey information to investors if the amount of the
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repurchase is identical to the amount of the dividend cut. However, the market may view
the dividend cut positively if investors place a value upon receiving income in the form
of more lightly taxed capital gains. Alternatively, stock prices may react negatively if
the market views the share repurchase as a one-time event and the dividend cut as
permanent.
Unfortunately, there are few examples of firms substituting share repurchases for divi-
dend payments. However, Woolridge and Ghosh (1985) reported that on July 24, 1984,
Whittaker Corporation announced a cut in its cash dividend from $0.40 to $0.15 per share
and, at the same time, instigated a share repurchase plan. On the announcement, the share
price increased $0.125 to $18.625, suggesting that a dividend cut packaged with a share
repurchase is not necessarily bad news.
Similarly, Soter, Brigham, and Evanson (1996) reported that on May 9, 1994, Florida
Power and Light (FPL) announced a 32 percent dividend reduction along with its inten-
tion to repurchase up to 10 million shares over the next three years. In adopting this
change in dividend policy, the company noted the personal tax advantages of the substi-
tution of share repurchases for dividend payments. On the day of the announcement, the
company’s stock price fell from $31.88 to $27.50, a drop of almost 14 percent. However,
the drop in stock prices was quickly reversed; Soter, Brigham, and Evanson reported that
“as analysts digested the news and considered the reasons for the reduction, they con-
cluded that the action was not a signal of financial distress.” On May 31, FPL’s stock
closed at $32.17.
-
Result 19.6
It is unlikely that signaling considerations explain why firms pay dividends rather thanrepurchase shares.
Dividend Policy and Investment Incentives
The argument in the last subsection assumed that investors could correctly infer the
firm’s investment expenditures even though the investments are not directly observ-
able. This assumption requires that investors understand the investment opportuni-
ties of the firm as well as the degree of emphasis that managers place on maximiz-
ing the firm’s current share price versus maximizing the firm’s intrinsic value. If
investors know management’s incentives and understand the firm’s investment
opportunities, they can accurately infer how much the firm will invest. The only
unobservable factor in the all-equity firm’s sources and uses of funds equation would
then be operating cash flow, which can be inferred from the observed dividends and
changes in equity financing. (For firms with debt and equity financing, operating
cash flow could be inferred by additionally observing interest payments and changes
in debt financing.)
In reality, investors and analysts are usually unable to make accurate inferences
about a firm’s investment opportunities or how much managers want to invest. As a
result, the dividend choice conveys information about both the opportunities and incen-
tives to invest as well as the firm’s operating cash flows. This implies that a firm’s unan-
ticipated dividend cut could provide a mixed signal. Adividend cut could mean that the
firm was less profitable; alternatively, the cut could mean that the firm had good oppor-
tunities and planned on investing more than investors had previously anticipated.
Can Dividend Cuts Signal Improved Investment Opportunities?Adividend cut
that is interpreted to mean that the firm has increased investment expenditures can be
either good news or bad news, depending on whether investors believe that the firm
will be investing in positive or negative net present value projects. Woolridge and
Ghosh (1985) argued that if firms can effectively communicate to investors that an
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669
announced dividend cut is motivated by a desire to conserve cash to fund good invest-
ments, their stock prices will react favorably. To illustrate this point, the authors high-
lighted the April 11, 1975, announcement by Ford Motor Company of a cut in its quar-
terly dividend from $0.80 to $0.60 per share. This announcement, accompanied by a
statement by Henry Ford II that the cut would “conserve sufficient cash to finance prod-
ucts that can add to profitability in future years,” generated a 1.9 percent increase in
Ford’s stock price. However, as our chapter’s opening vignette on ITT’s dividend cut
indicates, investors are often skeptical about such statements. As a result, stock prices
usually fall when firms announce dividend cuts.
Dividend Cuts and the Incentive to Overinvest.Arguing that a dividend cut is made
to increase funds for investment will of course elicit a favorable price response only if
shareholders believe the firm will invest the money in positive net present value proj-
ects. As Chapter 18 noted, managers may overinvest because they prefer to see their
firms grow. Thus, a signal indicating that management plans to increase investment can
be considered both bad news and good news. As a result, stock price responses to div-
idend increases and decreases should depend on the investment opportunities available
to the firm. Investors would thus view a dividend increase more favorably when firms
have poorer investment opportunities.
-
Result 19.7
Adividend increase or decrease can provide information to investors about:
-
•
The firm’s cash flows.
•
Management’s investment intentions.
In the latter case, if investors believe that an increased level of investment associated with
a dividend cut is motivated by improved prospects, they will view the dividend cut favor-
ably. However, if investors believe that managers will make negative net present value
investments, they will interpret a dividend cut as bad news.
The findings in Lang and Litzenberger (1989) support the hypothesis that investors
view dividend cuts more favorably when firms have better investment prospects and
view dividend increases more favorably when investment prospects are poorer.6They
examined the stock price reactions to announced dividend increases and decreases for
stocks that differed according to the relation between their market values (MV) and their
book values (BV). Firms with market values that exceedtheir book values are believed
to have favorable investment opportunities while those with market values that are less
thantheir book values are believed to have unfavorable investment opportunities.
Lang and Litzenberger’s sample was divided into four groups.
1.Firms with MVBVwith dividend increases.
2.Firms with MV BVwith dividend decreases.
3.Firms with MV
BVwith dividend increases.
4.Firms with MV
BVwith dividend decreases.
As Exhibit 19.2 shows, a dividend increase created only a slight stock price
increase for firms believed to have favorable investment opportunities (that is,
MVBV). Likewise, a dividend decrease generated only a slight stock price decrease
6Litzenberger and Lang’s sample of daily returns consisted of 429 dividend change announcements
that met two criteria: (1) The absolute value of the percentage dividend change was greater than 10
percent; and (2) data on market and book values were available.
-
Grinblatt
1352 Titman: FinancialV. Incentives, Information,
19. The Information
© The McGraw
1352 HillMarkets and Corporate
and Corporate Control
Conveyed by Financial
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
Decisions
670Part VIncentives, Information, and Corporate Control
EXHIBIT19.2Average Daily Returns on Dividend Announcement Days, 1979=84
-
Difference in Absolute
Dividend
Dividend
Values for Increases
Increase
Decrease
and Decreases
-
MV BV
0.003a
0.003
0.000
MV
BV
0.008a
0.027a
a
0.019
Difference (Row 2 1)
0.005a
a
a
0.024
0.019
aStatistically different from zero.
Source: Lang and Litzenberger (1989).
for these firms. In contrast, dividend increases and decreases resulted in much larger
stock price responses for firms believed to have unfavorable investment opportunities
(that is, MV
BV). This evidence suggests that dividend changes are viewed as sig-
nals of the firm’s level of future investment.
Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994) provided an alternative interpretation of the
observed differences in the stock price reaction of high and low MV/BVfirms to divi-
dend changes. They pointed out that high MV/BVfirms generally have lower dividend
yields and greater growth potential, which implies two things:
1.Increases in the dividends of high MV/BVfirms are less likely to be viewed
as a surprise.
2.High MV/BVfirms are likely to attract investors who are less interested in
dividends.
To understand the first point, recall from Chapter 11 that the Gordon Growth Model
version of the dividend discount equation can be rearranged to show that the cost of
capital is the sum of (1) the dividend yield and (2) the dividend growth rate. Hence,
holding the risk of the firm (and thus the cost of capital) constant, low dividend yields
imply high dividend growth rates and vice versa. The second point is an implication
of dividend clienteles, discussed in Chapter 15. Both of these factors suggest that high
MV/BVfirms will react less to dividend increases than low MV/BVfirms even in the
absence of the incentive problems discussed by Lang and Litzenberger.
Denis, Denis, and Sarin demonstrated that after accounting for differences in divi-
dend yields and the size of the dividend change, high and low MV/BVfirms react simi-
larly to dividend changes. In addition, they found that following dividend increases, stock
market analysts increase their earnings forecasts more for low MV/BVfirms than for high
MV/BVfirms. Based on this evidence, they concluded that stock prices respond to divi-
dend changes because of the information the announcements convey about the firm’s
future earnings. Their evidence does not support the idea that stock prices respond because
dividend changes provide information about the firms’future investment choices.
Dividends Attract Attention
An additional possibility is that a firm’s dividend increase or initiation results in a stock
price increase simply because it attracts attention to the firm. To understand why
investors generally view decisions that attract attention as good news, one must con-
sider the conditions under which the managers of a firm would put the firm under
greater scrutiny. If the firm is undervalued, increased scrutiny is likely to lead to a pos-
itive adjustment in the firm’s stock price, but if the firm is overvalued, the increased
Grinblatt |
V. Incentives, Information, |
19. The Information |
©
The McGraw |
Markets and Corporate |
and Corporate Control |
Conveyed by Financial |
Companies, 2002 |
Strategy, Second Edition |
|
Decisions |
|
-
Chapter 19
The Information Conveyed by Financial Decisions
671
scrutiny is likely to lead to a negative adjustment in the firm’s stock price. Hence, the
incentive to attract attention is greatest for those firms that are the most undervalued,
which suggests that one might expect to see positive stock price reactions to any
announcements that attract considerable attention.
The positive stock price reactions observed at the time stock dividends and stock
splits are announced support the idea that stock prices respond to announcements of
managerial decisions that do no more than attract attention to the firm.7Unlike cash
dividends, stock dividends and splits affect neither the firm’s cash flows nor its invest-
ment alternatives. Yet, observed stock returns at the time of stock dividend and stock
split announcements are of approximately the same magnitude as the returns at the time
increases in cash dividends are announced.
