- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
2.9Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has provided an introduction to the variousOne of the goals of this text is to bring the reader fromsources of debt financing: bank loans, leases, commercialhaving merely an intuitive feel for the time value ofpaper, and debt securities. Alarge variety of debt financingmoney—as exemplified by the discussion in the appendixis available. In addition, there are many ways to categorizeat the end of this textbook—to being able to pick up a busi-debt instruments: by their covenants, options, cash flowness newspaper or examine a computer screen and usefullypattern, pricing, maturity, and rating.employ the data displayed to value financial and real
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Strategy, Second Edition
64Part IFinancial Markets and Financial Instruments
assets. Accomplishing this goal requires a substantialkets. These skills are useful to the corporate manager whoamount of knowledge about debt securities, some of whichneeds to determine whether to finance an investment withis found in this chapter.debt securities or equity securities.
In addition to learning how debt prices and yields areTo complete the institutional education of the financialquoted, a variety of skills are acquired in this chapter.manager, it is important to explore in similar detail theAmong them is knowing where to trade debt, where to is-main competitor to debt financing: equity financing. Forsue debt, and what role debt plays in global capital mar-this, we turn to Chapter 3.
Key Concepts
Result 2.1: |
For straight-coupon, deferred-coupon, zero- |
value) and (2) settle on a coupon date, have |
|
coupon, perpetuity, and annuity bonds, the |
yields to maturity that equal their coupon |
|
bond price is a downward sloping convex |
yields. |
|
function of the bond’s yield to maturity. |
Result 2.3:Abond between coupon dates has a flat price |
Result 2.2: |
Straight-coupon bonds that (1) have flat |
that is less than par with a yield to maturity |
|
prices of par (that is, $100 per $100 of face |
that is the same as its coupon rate. |
Key Terms
accrued interest60 |
currency swap54 |
annuity bond44 |
debenture39 |
amortization36 |
defaults30 |
asset-backed securities52 |
deferred-coupon bond44 |
asset covenant37 |
direct lease34 |
balloon payment43 |
discount bond47 |
bearer bond54 |
dividend covenant37 |
benchmark rate31 |
dual-coupon bond47 |
bill47 |
equipment trust certificate39 |
bond covenants (bond indentures)36 |
Eurobond54 |
bond equivalent yield58 |
Eurocurrency loan54 |
bond rating36 |
Eurodollar deposits55 |
bonding covenant37 |
exchangeability42 |
bonding mechanism39 |
ex-date60 |
bonds35 |
face value36 |
bullet bond44 |
fallen angels50 |
callability42 |
Fed funds rate32 |
cap33 |
financial lease (capital lease)34 |
cash flow pattern36 |
financing covenant37 |
collared floating-rate loan33 |
fixed-income investments30 |
collateral trust bond39 |
flat price60 |
commercial paper rate32 |
floating rate31 |
consol44 |
floor33 |
conversion premium43 |
full price60 |
conversion price43 |
high-yield bonds (junk bonds)49 |
convertibility42 |
increasing-rate notes (IRNs)53 |
convex curvature59 |
interest coverage ratio37 |
coupon36 |
investment-grade rating49 |
coupon rate36 |
interest rate swap60 |
coupon yield62 |
junior bonds36 |
credit spread30 |
junk bonds49 |
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lease34 |
premium bond47 |
lessee34 |
price36 |
lessor34 |
prime rate32 |
leveraged buyout43 |
principal30 |
leveraged lease34 |
pure discount bond44 |
leveraged recapitalization43 |
putability42 |
LIBID32 |
refundable bonds42 |
LIBOR32 |
repurchase agreements56 |
line of credit31 |
revolver31 |
loan commitment31 |
sale and leaseback34 |
loan covenants32 |
scallop effect63 |
lock-box37 |
secured bonds36 |
maturity36 |
senior bonds36 |
mortgage bond39 |
settlement date59 |
negative amortization45 |
short sales56 |
negotiable30 |
sinking fund provision39 |
net working capital37 |
straight-coupon bond44 |
nonnegotiable30 |
subordinated claims36 |
note47 |
syndicate desk56 |
nonrevolving loan commitment31 |
takedown31 |
oil-linked bonds52 |
Treasury bills32 |
on-the-run Treasuries32 |
Treasury bonds32 |
operating lease34 |
Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS)52 |
options36 |
Treasury notes32 |
original issue discount (OID)47 |
Treasury rate32 |
over the counter (OTC)56 |
Treasury strips58 |
par value43 |
unsecured creditors39 |
par bond47 |
yield to maturity58 |
perpetuity bond (consol)44 |
Zerfix bonds44 |
PIK (payment-in-kind) bonds44 |
zero-coupon bond44 |
poison put bond43 |
|
Exercises
2.1.Critics of rating agencies argue that because the2.3.An article in The Economist(Sept. 25, 1993, p. 93)
firm pays rating agencies to rate the firm’s debt, thesaid, in part:
rating agencies have the wrong incentives. What do
Neither fish nor fowl, convertible bonds, which
you think of this argument? Can you think of ways
give investors an option to convert into equities,
to assess its validity?
have been gaining popularity in America. There2.2.On October 31, 1994, TheWall Street Journalwrote:
were $103 billion of them outstanding at the end
Once one of the raciest and most profitable areasof August, up from $52 billion in 1990. Why the
of investment banking, the Eurobond market hasenthusiasm? For an issuing company, convertibles
become boring and, even worse, not veryhave several good features. Afirm can borrow at
profitable. Though the volume of new issues thisabout three percentage points below the cost of
year in the market which comprises bondsstraight debt. It does not give up as much equity
underwritten outside a borrower’s home countryas with an ordinary share issue. That is why
is likely to exceed $900 billion, up from $337convertibles are particularly popular with small
billion in 1980, profit margins have plummeted.companies that hope to grow rapidly.
-
What do you think was happening in the Eurobond
Do you think that convertible debt represents a
market?
cheap way to finance the firm? Can you think of
any reasons why small, growing firms might favor
convertibles?
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156 HillMarkets and Corporate
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Strategy, Second Edition
66Part IFinancial Markets and Financial Instruments
2.4.The diagram below shows default rates of ratedd.Actual/360 if the coupon payment date is
bonds.August 15, 1998.
2.6.Refer to the bond in exercise 2.5. What is the
Success and failureaccrued interest for settlement of a trade on
August 1, 1998, with each of the four day-count
Corporate bonds
methods? For parts aand b,assume that the coupon
payment date is August 15, 1998.
Cumulative default rates, 1970-94
% of issuers defaulting2.7.XYZ Corporation takes out a $1 million loan that
B40semiannually pays six-month LIBOR 50 bp on
March 4, 1999. Assume that LIBOR is at 9 percent
on March 4, 1999, 8.75 percent on September 4,
30
1999, and 9.125 percent on March 4, 2000. What
Ba
are the first three interest payments on the loan?
20When are they paid?
2.8.A5 percent corporate bond maturing November 14,
Baa
2020 (originally a 25-year bond at issue), has a
10
Ayield to maturity of 6 percent (a 3 percent discount
Aa
rate per 6-month period for each of its semiannual
Aaa0
payments) for the settlement date, June 9, 2001.
What is the flat price, full price, and accrued
1 5 10 15 20
interest of the bond on June 9, 2001?
Years
2.9.Abank loan to the Knowledge Company has a 50
basis point spread to LIBOR. If LIBORis at 6
percent, what is the rate of interest on the bank
loan?
What conclusions can you draw from the diagram?
2.10.Identify the conversion price in Euros and U.S.2.5.Consider a straight-coupon bond (or bank loan)dollars of Amazon’s convertible bond, as described
with semiannual interest payments at an 8 percentin Chapter 1’s opening vignette. Based on
annualized rate. Per $100 of face value, what is theAmazon’s closing price of $80 a share in early,
semiannual interest payment if the day count is2001, what was the bond’s conversion premium on
based on the following methods?that date? (Assume no change in the exchange rate
a.Actual/actualfrom that given in the vignette.)
b.30/360
c.Actual/365 if the coupon payment date is
August 15, 1998
References and Additional Readings
Altman, Edward. “The Anatomy of the High-Yield BondBencivenga, Joseph. “The High-Yield Corporate Bond
Market.” Financial Analysts Journal43 (1987), Market.” In The Handbook of Fixed Income
pp. 12–25.Securities.Frank Fabozzi, ed. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin———. “Measuring Corporate Bond Mortality andProfessional Publishing, 1995.
Performance.” Journal of Finance44 (1989), Blume, Marshall; Donald Keim; and Sandeep Patel.
pp. 909–22.“Returns and Volatility of Low-Grade Bonds,Altman, Edward, and Scott Nammacher. “The Default1977–1989.” Journal of Finance46 (1991),
Rate Experience on High-Yield Corporate Debt.”pp. 49–74.
Financial Analysts Journal41 (1985), pp. 25–41.Cornell, Bradford, and Kevin Green. “The Investment
Asquith, Paul; David Mullins; and Eric Wolff. “OriginalPerformance of Low-Grade Bond Funds.” Journal of
Issue High-Yield Bonds: Aging Analyses of Defaults,Finance46 (1991), pp. 29–48.
Exchanges, and Calls.” Journal of Finance44Duffie, Darrell. “Special Repo Rates.”Journal of Finance
(1989), pp. 923–52.51 (1996), pp. 493–526.
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2. Debt Financing |
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Ederington, Louis, and Jess Yawitz. “The Bond Rating
Process.” In Handbook of Financial Markets and
Institutions.Edward Altman, ed. New York: John
Wiley, 1986.
Ederington, Louis; Jess Yawitz; and Brian Roberts. “The
Informational Content of Bond Ratings.” Journal of
Financial Research10 (1987), pp. 211–26.
Fabozzi, Frank. Bond Markets, Analysis, and Strategies.
3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996.Fabozzi, Frank, and Dessa Fabozzi. The Handbook of
Fixed Income Securities.4th ed. Burr Ridge, IL:
Irwin Professional Publishing, 1995.
Franks, Julian, and Walt Torous. “An Empirical
Investigation of U.S. Firms in Chapter 11
Reorganization.” Journal of Finance44 (1989),
pp. 747–67.
Goh, Jeremy, and Louis Ederington. “Is a Bond Rating
Downgrade Bad News, Good News, or No News for
Stockholders?” Journal of Finance48 (1993),
pp. 2001–8.
Grinblatt, Mark, with Bing Han. “An Analytic Solution
for Interest Rate Swap Spreads.” Review of
International Finance,forthcoming, 2002.
Hand, John; Robert Holthausen; and Richard Leftwich.
“The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements
on Bond and Stock Prices.” Journal of Finance47
(1992), pp. 29–39.
Holthausen, Robert, and Richard Leftwich. “The Effect of
Bond Rating Changes on Common Stock Prices.”
Journal of Financial Economics17 (1986),
pp. 57–89.
Jefferis, Richard. “The High-Yield Debt Market,
1980–1990.” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Economic Commentary26 (1990), pp. 1–6.
Jones, Christopher. “Evidence on the Importance of
Market Making: Drexel’s Failure and the Junk Bond
Market.” Working paper, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA.
Kalay, Avner. “Stockholder-Bondholder Conflict and
Dividend Constraints.” Journal of Financial
Economics10 (1982), pp. 211–33.
Kester, W. C., and W. B. Allen. “R.J. Reynolds
International Financing.” Harvard Case 9-287-057,
November 1991.
Lehn, Kenneth, and Annette Poulsen. “Contractual
Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts.”
Journal of Law and Economics34, 2, part 2 (October
1991), pp. 645–73.
McDaniel, Morey. “Bondholders and Corporate
Governance.” Business Lawyer41 (1986),
pp. 413–60.
Moody’s Investors Service. Corporate Bond Defaults and
Default Rates 1970–93.Global Credit Research
Division, 1994.
Rosengren, Eric. “The Case for Junk Bonds.” New
England Economic Review(May/June), Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, 40–49.
Ruback, Richard. “RJR Nabisco.” Harvard Case
9-289-056, 1989.
Salomon Brothers Bond Portfolio Analysis Group. “Odd
Coupon Treasury Bonds: Price-Yield Calculations.”
July 1985.
Schallheim, James. Lease or Buy.Boston: Harvard
University Press, 1995.
Smith, Clifford, and Lee Wakeman. “Determinants of
Corporate Leasing Policy.” Journal of Finance540
(1985), pp. 896–908.
Smith, Clifford, and Jerry Warner. “On Financial
Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants.”
Journal of Financial Economics7 (1979),
pp. 117–61.
Stigum, Marcia. The Money Market.Burr Ridge, IL:
Irwin Professional Publishing, 1990.
Tufano, Peter. “Financial Innovation and First Mover
Advantages.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
5 (1992), pp. 83–87.
Weinstein, Mark. “ACurmudgeon’s View of Junk
Bonds.” Journal of Portfolio Management13, no. 3
(1986–1987), pp. 76–80.
Wilson, Richard, and Frank Fabozzi. The New Corporate
Bond Market.Chicago: Probus Publishing, 1990.
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Strategy, Second Edition
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3 |
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Equity |
Financing |
Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter you should be able to:
1.Describe the types of equity securities a firm can issue.
2.Provide an overview of the operation of secondary markets for equity.
3.Describe the role of institutions in secondary equity markets and in corporate
governance.
4.Understand the process of going public.
5.Discuss the concept of informational efficiency.
Southern Company is one of the largest producers of electricity in the United States.
Before 2000, the company was a major player in both the regulated and unregulated
electricity markets. On September 27, 2000, Southern Energy, Inc. (since renamed
Mirant Corporation), the unregulated division of Southern Company, became an
independent company with an initial public offering. In the offering, Southern Energy
issued 66.7 million shares at $22 each, representing 19.7% of the newly formed
corporation’s shares. When the company originally filed its prospectus, it estimated
that the issue would be priced in the $15–$17 per share range. However, interest in
the issue was significantly greater than expected, and the range was increased to
$18–$20 per share on September 24. On September 26, the decision was made to
offer the shares at $22 per share. The first trade of Southern Energy was at $28.25,
and the stock closed the first day at $29.00 per share. The company raised about
$1.4 billion from the stock offering and another $345 million in a simultaneous
offering of convertible preferred stock. The funds are primarily being used to pay
down short-term debt and for the acquisition and construction of generation assets.
Southern Company plans to sell the remaining 80.3% of the shares in the near
future, making Southern Energy a completely independent company.
Chapter 2 discussed debt financing, a major source of external capital for firms. We
turn now to equity, the second major source of external capital. Although debt and
equity are alike in that both provide resources for investment in capital equipment,
research and development, and training that allow firms to prosper, they differ in sev-
eral important respects.
68
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Debt holder claims must be paid in full before the claims of equity holders canbe paid.
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Equity holders elect the board of directors of the corporation and thusultimately control the firm.1
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Equity holders receive cash in the form of dividends, which are not taxdeductible to the corporation, while the interest payments of debt instrumentsare a tax-deductible expense.2
This chapter describes various equity instruments, how they are traded, and the
individuals and institutions that own them. It also briefly discusses the efficient
markets hypothesis which provides some insights into how equity is priced in the
capital markets. In addition, it examines the distinction between firms that are
privately owned and hence have no publicly traded stock, and firms that are publicly
owned with publicly traded stock. Finally, the chapter covers why a firm might want
to have its stock publicly traded and the process by which a firm goes public.
