- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
Recall that in Chapter 14 we argued that given reasonable assumptions about corporate
and personal tax rates on debt and equity, U.S. tax laws favored debt over external
equity financing. However, in the last section we also showed that financing projects
with retained earnings, by paying corporate rather than personal taxes on their returns,
provides an added benefit to shareholders with higher personal tax rates on their invest-
ment returns than the corporation pays. With the Bill Gates example, we showed that
these same investors may even want the firm to use retained earnings to invest in finan-
cial assets, including debt, on their behalf.
Corporations must recognize that the incentives associated with payout policy also
have implications for capital structure. Afirm that pays out retained earnings to its
shareholders, by reducing the amount of equity outstanding, increases its leverage ratio.
Such a firm also increases the total dollar amount of debt financing relative to using
those same retained earnings as “internal equity financing” for new investment. This is
because the external financing that makes up for the payout is more likely to be in the
form of debt given its tax advantage over external equity.
The arguments in the last section can be extended to show that the firm will want
to fund new investment with retained earnings rather than debt if the firm’s share-
holders’personal tax rate on debt exceeds the corporate tax rate. This can be seen if
we view the investment illustrated in Exhibit 15.5 as paying off some of the firm’s
12Until
1987, corporations were taxed on only 15 percent of their dividend income. This was raised to
20 percent in 1987 and 30 percent in 1988. Corporations that own between 20 and 80 percent of the
stock of the dividend-paying companies are taxed on 20 percent of the dividends. Firms that own more
than 80 percent of another firm’s stock are not taxed on the dividends.
-
Grinblatt
1116 Titman: FinancialIV. Capital Structure
15. How Taxes Affect
© The McGraw
1116 HillMarkets and Corporate
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Companies, 2002
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552Part IVCapital Structure
debt, or equivalently, as using the internally generated capital so that the firm does
not have to take on additional debt.13
If Bill Gates prefers that Microsoft use its
retained earnings to invest in debt on his behalf, this debt may just as well be the
firm’s debt as any other source of debt that would ultimately be netted against the
firm’s liabilities.
Given that the tax preference for debt financing versus internal equity financing
depends on the personal tax rates of shareholders, it follows that shareholders with dif-
ferent marginal tax rates may not agree about capital structure policy. This disagree-
ment is illustrated in the following example:
Should Microsoft Increase Its Leverage?
Bill Gates, founder and CEO of Microsoft, recognizes that there is a tax gain from debt
financing and that Microsoft can increase the firm’s leverage, either by repurchasing shares
or by paying a dividend, and funding more of the firm’s investment needs from debt secu-
rities without running any significant risk of bankruptcy. This would increase firm value by
lowering its corporate tax bite.
Gates currently owns about 20 percent of the company’s shares. Assume that he would
like to retain this percentage of ownership. The corporate tax rate is currently 35 percent and
Gates’s personal tax rate is 40 percent on ordinary income and 20 percent on capital gains.
Different shareholders may have different opinions about whether the firm should pay a large
dividend, repurchase shares, or continue with its policy of retaining most of its earnings to
fund its investments internally. For example, tax-exempt institutions definitely would prefer
that the firm repurchase shares or pay a dividend to increase its debt, at least to the point
where there is some risk of bankruptcy. However, Bill Gates may personally prefer keeping
the firm underleveraged. If the firm uses a large dividend to distribute its retained earnings,
Gates will have to pay 40 percent of the distribution in taxes. Because of the lower capital
gains tax, he would prefer a share repurchase over a dividend. However, if Gates is going to
keep his percentage ownership of the firm constant he will have to sell some of his shares,
forcing him to realize the capital gains on his shares. As we showed in the last section, Gates’s
incentive to have Microsoft distribute cash depends on the difference between his personal
rate and Microsoft’s corporate tax rate. If the corporate tax rate is less then the personal rate,
he will prefer retaining the earnings rather than distributing them.
-
Result 15.6
The combination of the corporate tax deductibility of interest payments and the personaltaxes on dividends (and share repurchases) implies that:
-
•
The U.S. tax code favors debt financing over financing investments by issuing equity.
•
For taxable shareholders, the tax preference for debt over internally generated equity(that is, retained earnings) is less than the tax preference for debt over newly issuedequity. Indeed, individual investors with sufficiently high personal tax rates have atax preference for financing new investment with retained earnings, rather thanpaying out the earnings and financing new investment with debt.
Consistent with Result 15.6, an in-depth study of large corporations by Gordon
Donaldson (1961) found that managers prefer funding investment, first, with retained
earnings, second, after the supply of retained earnings has been exhausted, with debt, and
finally, when it is imprudent for the firm to borrow additional amounts, by issuing outside
equity. This financing hierarchy is known as the pecking orderof financing choices.14
13As
long as the tax cost associated with distributing capital to shareholders (for example, the capital
gains rate that is triggered by a share repurchase) is constant, the actual rate is irrelevant. However, if the
rate is changing over time, corporations may find it in their interests to optimally time their distribution
choices to correspond to situations where the tax cost of the distribution is minimized.
14Non-tax-based
explanations for this pecking order behavior are described in Chapters 17 and 19.
Grinblatt |
IV. Capital Structure |
15. How Taxes Affect |
©
The McGraw |
Markets and Corporate |
|
Dividends and Share |
Companies, 2002 |
Strategy, Second Edition |
|
Repurchases |
|
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Chapter 15
How Taxes Affect Dividends and Share Repurchases
553
Chapter 15
How Taxes Affect Dividends and Share Repurchases
