- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
Although it is very difficult to determine whether the taxation of dividends is reflected
in stock returns, it is true that some investors incur a tax penalty when they receive
dividends. In addition, firms impose taxes and transaction costs on their shareholders
when they distribute excess cash by repurchasing shares. These taxes and transaction
costs can distort investment and financing choices.
Dividends, Taxes, and Financing Choices
This subsection reexamines the capital structure decision from the perspective of a firm
that subjects its stockholders to personal tax liabilities when it distributes a portion of
its earnings to them. Recall from Chapter 14 that the U.S. tax system biases firms
towards issuing debt rather than equity financing. However, the analysis there largely
11That series B (cash dividend) shares in the early time period were priced to yield less than the
series A(stock dividend) shares probably reflected the fact that the stock dividends were initially higher
than the cash dividends, implying that the stock dividends were likely to fall relative to the cash
dividends. Indeed, the dividends on series Aand B shares are currently identical and their prices are the
same. (Both share classes currently pay stock dividends, but Citizens Utilities provides a service to its
series B shareholders whereby it sells the stock dividends and distributes the cash proceeds to the
shareholders.)
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ignored the distinction between internally generated and externally generated equity.
This distinction is quite important, however, if distributed earnings are taxed at high
personal rates.
Dividends, Taxes, and Investment Distortions
The personal tax on dividends affects a firm’s choice between paying out earnings and
retaining them for internal investment. This section illustrates that shareholders who are
taxed differently on their dividend income favor different investment policies for their
firms.
The Investment Policy Favored by Tax-Paying Shareholders.Assume that you
own shares in Continental Corporation and have a marginal tax rate on personal income
of 50 percent. Suppose that Continental Corporation must decide whether to pay out
an additional $1 million in dividends or to retain the earnings for internal investment.
As the holder of 10 percent of the outstanding shares, you have a major say in the deci-
sion and need to consider the possibilities seriously. Your advisors calculate that over
the next five years the firm will earn 6 percent after corporate taxes with certainty on
the $1 million and that these earnings will be distributed to the shareholders in addi-
tion to the dividends they would have received otherwise. At the end of the five years,
the $1 million retained this year will be distributed to shareholders. In essence, the
choice for shareholders is whether to defer the $1 million dividend for five years and
receive, as compensation for this deferral, additional annual dividends of $60,000 per
year ( $1 million .06) in the interim period. Deferral does not seem particularly
attractive at first glance because the rate of return on five-year U.S. Treasury bonds is
7 percent, which is where you would invest the dividend if it was paid now.
Your tax advisors, however, urge you to compare the after-tax cash flows from
these alternatives, which appear in Exhibit 15.5. They suggest that, given your 50 per-
cent marginal tax rate on personal income, you are better off if the money is retained
within the corporation. After taxes, the immediate $100,000 dividend (10 percent of
the $1 million distribution) would be worth only $50,000, which, according toAlter-
native 1in Exhibit 15.5, generates only $1,750 per year after taxes if invested at 7
percent.
The after-tax cash flows on the internally invested retained earnings, Alternative 2
in Exhibit 15.5, are higher than those on the distributed dividends, Alternative 1. A
return is earned on the entire$1 million of earnings kept within the firm rather than
on halfthis amount, as is the case forAlternative 1,because the earnings are distrib-
uted. As a result, tax-paying investors tend to prefer retaining the earnings within the
firm rather than receiving a cash dividend.
The Investment Policy Favored by Tax-Exempt Shareholders.Tax-exempt insti-
tutions would evaluate these alternatives quite differently. From their perspective,
assuming the same 10 percent ownership of the outstanding shares, cash flows would
be as specified in Exhibit 15.6. Thus, from the perspective of a tax-exempt institution,
a cash dividend, Alternative 1, would be preferred.
Payout Policy and the Personal Tax Rate on Distributions.Note that the tax rate
on the distribution to the equity holders does not directly affect the comparison in
Exhibit 15.5. If the distribution were taxed at a capital gains rate that is considerably
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1108 HillMarkets and Corporate
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Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
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EXHIBIT15.5After-Tax Cash Flows fora Taxable Investor
Alternative 1:Investment of after-tax dividend of $50,000 in Treasury bonds.
After-Tax Cash Flows
-
Principal
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Payment
-
$1,750
$1,750
$1,750
$1,750
$1,750
$50,000
Alternative 2:Retain earnings and invest internally for five years, which returns 6 percent to
stockholders per year with a final dividend in year 5.
After-Tax Cash Flows
-
Deferred
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Dividend
-
$3,000
$3,000
$3,000
$3,000
$3,000
$50,000
EXHIBIT15.6Cash Flows fora Tax-Exempt Investor
Alternative 1:Investment of $100,000 dividend in Treasury bonds
Cash Flows
-
Principal
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Payment
-
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$7,000
$100,000
Alternative 2: Retain earnings and invest internally for five years, which returns 6 percent to
stockholders per year with a final dividend in year 5.
Cash Flows
-
Deferred
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Dividend
-
$6,000
$6,000
$6,000
$6,000
$6,000
$100,000
less than the 50 percent rate, the conclusion would be exactly the same. What is impor-
tant is the difference between the after-tax rate of return from investing inside the cor-
poration versus investing outside the corporation.
The tax rate on the distribution is irrelevant because the cash must eventually be
distributed, either now or later, and the tax rate on the distribution is assumed to be
the same in either case. However, if there are expected to be changes in the tax rate
on the distribution, such changes could affect the payout/reinvestment decision. If, for
example, tax rates on distributions are expected to increase, there will be an increased
incentive to pay out cash flows now, when the tax on distributions is low, rather than
later, when the tax rate on distributions is higher. Similarly, a corporation will have
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an incentive to delay distributions if it believes that the tax on distributions is going
to decline.
These considerations suggest that a corporation, investing on behalf of taxable
investors, may find that investment from retained cash is subject to a less stringent cri-
terion than investment financed with outside equity. To understand this point, consider
the following example:
Example 15.5:The Effect of Personal Taxes on Corporate Investments
GT Associates can earn 15 percent before taxes on its investments.However, being taxed
at a 33.33 percent rate on corporate income, it earns only 10 percent after taxes.Equity
investments that exactly track the future cash flows of GT’s projects have a pretax rate of
return of 10 percent and are taxed at a 20 percent personal capital gains tax rate at the
time the gain is realized.The 10 percent return on the tracking portfolio is GT’s cost of cap-
ital (see Chapters 11 and 13), as it represents the financial market’s alternative to an invest-
ment in the real assets of GT.GT has an investment opportunity that costs $125 million and
earns 10 percent, after taking out corporate taxes, which is exactly the firm’s cost of capi-
tal.Describe how GT would assess the profitability of this project, (1) in the case where GT
must raise outside equity to fund the project and (2) where it has internally generated cash
that it would otherwise distribute to its shareholders.
Answer:(1)Observe that the project, with an after-corporate tax return equal to the 10
percent cost of capital, has a zero NPV.Hence, if funding the project requires outside equity,
the firm should be indifferent about taking on the project.To understand this point in the
presence of personal taxes, we first need to recognize that the capital gains rate in this case
is irrelevant for assessing whether GT makes money, loses money, or breaks even on inter-
nal investments funded by external equity.As an alternative to its investors’tracking portfo-
lio, GT can raise $125 million externally by issuing additional equity.In its zero-NPVproject,
the $125 million grows to $137.5 million in the next year.
What happens if the $137.5 million in cash from the project is returned to GT’s
investors? Repurchasing the previously issued equity after one year provides GT’s
investors with $137.5 million in cash, minus a $2.5 million capital gains tax (20 percent of
the $12.5 million gain), for a total after-tax payout of $135 million.This is exactlywhat GT’s
investors would have received after capital gains taxes by acquiring the tracking portfolio
for $125 million, watching it appreciate over the year, and liquidating it at the end of the
year.This is not surprising since zero-NPVinvestments are by definition those that do not
create or destroy wealth for a firm’s investors relative to the alternatives available to them
in the financial markets.
(2)Now suppose GT has $125 million of internally generated cash.Let’s compare the
consequences of either paying out the $125 million to GT’s shareholders by repurchas-
ing shares immediately or investing it internally at the after-tax rate of 10 percent and
repurchasing shares one year later.If it pays out the $125 million immediately, GT’s
investors will receive $100 million after paying the capital gains tax, which they can invest
in the financial markets to receive $108 million after capital gains taxes one year later.
However, if GT invests the $125 million internally in a project that earns 10 percent after
taxes, it will have $137.5 million to distribute to its shareholders the following year.Under
this alternative, and after paying the 20 percent capital gains tax on the $137.5 million
capital gain, the investors will be left with $110 million.This amount exceeds the $108
million they would have earned had GT distributed the $125 million in cash in the previ-
ous year.In this sense, the project, despite being a zero-NPVproject when financed with
outside equity, creates $2 million in wealth at the end of the period for GT’s sharehold-
ers when funded with internal cash.This $2 million in wealth is the benefit of deferring
the $25 million in taxes on unrealized capital gains of $125 million for an additional year
at the 8 percent after personal tax rate of return.
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1112 Titman: FinancialIV. Capital Structure
15. How Taxes Affect
© The McGraw
1112 HillMarkets and Corporate
Dividends and Share
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Strategy, Second Edition
Repurchases
550Part IVCapital Structure
Summary of How Personal Taxes Influence Investment Choices.In general,
investors prefer retained earnings over a cash dividend (or share repurchase) if expected
returns, adjusted for their premiums due to risk, satisfy:
-
(1T) (pretax return within the corporation)
c
(15.4)
(after personal tax return outside the corporation)
Otherwise, investors prefer the cash dividend (or share repurchase).
Note that the entire left side of the inequality is simply the project’s return, com-
puted as is usually done from after corporate tax cash flows, whereas the right side is
the product of the return of the tracking portfolio (that is, the project’s cost of capital)
and (1 personal tax rate on the distribution). Hence, inequality (15.4) can be con-
trasted with theNPVrequirement discussed in Chapter 13—that investment projects
funded with externally raised equity must earn an after tax rate of return that exceeds
the pretax rate of return investors can earn in the financial markets from the project’s
tracking portfolio:
-
(1T) (pretax return within the corporation)
c
(15.5)
(pretax return outside the corporation)
Acomparison of expressions (15.4) and (15.5) reveals that for tax-exempt share-
holders, the two expressions are identical. Hence, a tax-exempt investor will want
the corporation to make the same real investment choices regardless of whether the
investment is funded from retained earnings, which would otherwise be paid out as
a dividend, or with a new equity issue. These expressions, however, are not equiv-
alent for investors who are subject to personal taxes on dividend distributions or
share repurchases. These investors will require a lower rate of return on investments
that the corporation funds from retained earnings if the alternative is a taxed
distribution.
The above discussion is summarized in Result 15.6.
-
Result 15.5
Tax-exempt and tax-paying shareholders agree about which projects a firm should fund fromexternal equity issues but may disagree about which projects should be financed fromretained earnings. In particular:
-
•
Tax-exempt shareholders require the same expected return for internally financed
projects as they do for externally financed projects.
•
Tax-paying shareholders prefer that firms use lower required rates of return forinternally financed projects if the alternative is paying taxable dividends orrepurchasing their shares.
To summarize, the discussion in this section suggests that the investment policies
preferred by shareholders, who are subject to personal taxes, may differ from the poli-
cies described in Chapter 14 for firms that are generating significant amounts of cash.
The hurdle rate required by the firm with cash on hand should be lower than the hur-
dle rate required of a corporation that must raise equity to fund the investment. This
does not mean, however, that a corporation with cash should be taking on projects with
very negative NPVs. The opportunity cost of a project is still the rate of return that can
be earned by investing in equivalent investments in the financial markets. This return
can be viewed, on an after corporate tax basis, as an alternative to what the firm can
earn from investing in real assets.
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15. How Taxes Affect |
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Disagreements at Microsoft
Consider a corporation, like Microsoft, which by 2001 had accumulated about $20 billion in
excesscash (that is, cash not currently needed for debt repayment or investment). Equation
(15.5) suggests that tax-exempt institutional investors prefer the firm to pay out the cash as
a dividend. However, equation (15.4) suggests that Bill Gates, Microsoft’s CEO, and other
shareholders with higher marginal tax rates than the corporation, prefer to have the corpora-
tion retain the earnings and invest the money in Treasury bonds. Shareholders with the same
marginal tax rate as the corporation will be indifferent between the two alternatives.
Although companies like Microsoft sometimes invest excess cash in government bonds
and equivalent instruments, Gates may prefer alternative uses for these funds. For example,
Gates may prefer to diversify his portfolio by using Microsoft to buy another company’s
stock instead of buying the stock with his personal money. Since U.S. corporations are taxed
on only 30 percent of the dividend income they receive from other corporations, they can
often earn a higher after-tax rate of return by buying the common or preferred shares of
other companies than they can earn from holding debt instruments like T-bonds.12
Recall from Chapter 14 that because corporations are taxed on only 30 percent of
the dividends they receive from other corporations, many U.S. firms invest their excess
cash in preferred stock rather than corporate or government bonds. As Chapter 3 noted,
financial institutions recently designed a number of variations of preferred stock that
take advantage of this tax preference. As a result, the tendency of corporations to invest
their excess cash in preferred stock has increased since the mid-1980s. Because firms
can invest their excess cash in preferred stock that is taxed at a lower rate, they find
it more attractive to reduce dividends and invest their earnings internally.
